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THE WAR
IN
EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.





MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES G. GORDON, R.E., C.B.

Mary Gertrude Segar

on her
birthday
Sept 5th
1893

THE WAR

IN

EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN *from her father.*

AN EPISODE IN

THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE;

BEING

A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE SCENES AND EVENTS OF THAT GREAT DRAMA,
AND SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN IT.

BY

THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S.,

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"PICTURES AND ROYAL PORTRAITS," ETC.

VOLUME I.



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P R E F A C E.

A friendly reviewer referred to a previous work of the writer of these lines as "the essence of ten thousand newspapers." That phrase would have been even more applicable to the volumes now before the reader.

The story of British intervention in Egypt and the Soudan, while its importance should raise it to the dignity of history, could only be written, so far as the later portion of it was concerned, after assiduous and laborious reference to a multitude of current accounts and a mass of official despatches and non-official but yet authoritative correspondence.

The occurrences of to-day were to be woven into the history of yesterday; and after the introductory pages, which were more truly historical, and were necessary to account for the immediate situation, and to show the occasion of the attitude which Britain sustained towards Egypt, the whole story has necessarily been a chronicle of events so recent that they had not come into any historical form whatever before these volumes were issued.

The writer had to bring forward what may be called a living history of a remarkable national episode, and to preserve at once the dramatic interest and the complete accuracy of the narrative. The events that he had to portray and the scenes he had to depict were too recent to have found a place in books of reference or the volumes of circulating libraries: he was therefore confronted by an almost appalling mass of what may be called the material of history; bales and skeins of the warp and woof that had to be woven into a continuous, consecutive, and attractive narrative,

containing a good deal of information on subjects that required to be relieved by a considerable variety of striking colour.

To write a complete story of the war in Egypt and the Soudan with such descriptive accounts, sketches of persons and scenes, explanations of financial and administrative changes, and narratives of successive events as would make a comprehensive and trustworthy as well as a popular history, was not rendered difficult because of the lack of sources of information. The real difficulty was in the profusion of material, which had to be examined, assorted, compared, selected, and wrought into suitable form.

It is not for the writer to say that he has succeeded in the endeavour to make the following pages contain accurate and complete information, and to be at the same time easy and interesting to the reader. He has not spared effort, and he has already the happiness of knowing that, when three out of the four volumes were issued, they were well received and spoken of by competent critics and reviewers in terms which should suffice to make him grateful, and to sustain the hope (already largely realized) for an equally favourable and friendly greeting from thousands of readers, not only in this country, but in those great Colonies which are so closely and inseparably a portion of the British Empire, that the instant the call to arms was heard within their townships or on their remoter borders efficient contingents of trained and trusty men were ready and eager to share the hardships and the perils of the campaign.

LONDON, *February, 1887.*

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THE WAR IN EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY.

Egypt. Interest attaching to the Name. The Black Country. The Nile and its Inundation. Fertility. The Desert. The Soudan. Unchanged Customs of the People. Scriptural Reminders. Two Points of Past History. Slavery. The Arabs and the Turks. Where the Present History begins. Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt. Important Geographical Position of the Country. British Intervention. Mohammed Ali. His Birth, Parentage, and Education. Character. Rise and Influence. The Memlooks. Slaves ruled by Slaves.

EGYPT! What a multitude of suggestions that name includes! What countless interesting fancies—what fascinating and romantic traditions and historical records, which, long buried in tomb and temple, or undecipherable during a period extending so far backward as to be itself dim in the mist of ages, have been, by comparatively recent discoveries, made sharp and clear to the eyes of laborious interpreters and profound scholars, who have given to the world the results of their researches! At the very mention of the name Egypt, imagination travels back upon the stream of time to those early periods of human history beyond which all seems vague and uncertain, because we are not in possession of any historic record--of any chart to guide our course, either to inquiry or observation. The great, and to many minds, almost overwhelming, attraction of the history and the antiquities of Egypt, is that they possess so many venerable and even sacred associations with the records of Holy Scripture and the history of the Jewish people. But though they refer to an age anterior to the Scripture History,—so early that

dates become conjectural, and are not to be identified with any defined historical period,—they unmistakably show that even in what is sometimes supposed to have been the infancy of the world this people possessed deep and mysterious learning, knowledge of arts and sciences, the symbolism of a religious system, and a sacred or a secret language the interpretation of which still engages the attention of Oriental scholars.

The mere mention of the word “Egypt” at once reminds us that the name itself is modern, when compared with those hieroglyphs in which the land that was old when Greece was young is called Kem or Kemi. This has been supposed to have some affinity with the Hebrew word Ham, the name given to Egypt in the Psalms, and like Kem, meaning the black land. It is a simple and obvious name for a country of which the whole of the cultivable earth is black, chiefly, if not entirely, consisting of the rich fertile black mud, brought down by the torrent of the overflowing river, whose name, *Nile*, or El Neel, signifies inundation.

Can it be wondered at that this black country, the country of the fertilizing Nile, has been called the Garden of the World, or that even the Israelites, after they had escaped from the slavery, which has ever been the deadly “burden of Egypt,” should sometimes have looked back with longing to those fruits and vegetables, of which the luxuriant profusion was not likely to be forgotten during long wanderings in the desert? Dates, oranges, lemons, figs, bananas, pomegranates, peaches, apricots, mulberries, grapes, olives, almonds, and some less important fruits, besides trees that blossom and give leaf and shade, and hundreds of varieties of flowers (even the desert species number above two hundred), amidst which the rose, jasmine, violet, and oleander are the most common and profuse, flourish in that fruitful soil. There the easily cultivated vegetables in common use are beans of different kinds, including the prolific lentil; pease, lettuces, cucumbers, water-melons, carrots, turnips, onions, leeks, garlic, radishes, cress, egg-plants, mallows, and a great number of grasses and herbs; there are also poppies, saffron, madder, castor-oil plants, mustard, rape, cummin, coriander, and other valuable seeds

and spices. In the three agricultural seasons, of four months each, into which the year is divided, the successive crops are, in the autumn—beginning in July with the rising of the Nile—maize and millet, the two staples of bread; in the winter, when the waters of the Nile recede, wheat, barley, clover, lentils, and pulse are sown. These are harvested seven months later, in the summer; when the sugar-cane is planted, tobacco is sown, and the lands of the Delta are filled with the seed of rice, cotton, and indigo.

This black land is full of natural wealth, and that wealth is protected by the nature of its surroundings;—by the deserts of the Soudan (which means, not the black land, but the land of the blacks) and those other more arid reaches of sand that are to-day much what they were centuries ago; by the rugged chains of hills and mountains that inclose the Nile Valley, and by the impassable cataracts of the river itself. Hence its later Hebrew name, Mizra or Mazor (or the plural Mizraim, denoting the division into Lower and Upper Egypt), are almost identical with the Arabic Misr or Masr, all of which mean fortified or guarded round, a signification from which the Greek *Ægypta* or *Aiguptos* is supposed to be derived. However this may have been, the Kem or Ham of remote antiquity, the Misr or Mazor of the Hebrew and the Arabic, the Egypt of the present, is the country which has within its boundaries the black land that gives its people the means of subsistence, and the deserts and chains of rocky hills which defend it from external foes. This is the Egypt of the fame of which the old world was full; this is the Egypt which continues but little changed after centuries of tyranny, slavery, and misrule, the country which to-day is the problem that engages the attention of the whole civilized world.

The problem would be easier to solve were it not that Egypt has enlarged its authority within the present century. It is true that the commencement of the Nubian desert is the usual limitation of the journey made by the tourist who visits Egypt and "does the Nile." Beyond Assouan the desert barrier commences, and for centuries the same barrier kept civilization from approaching the centre of Africa: the obstacles presented by the second

and third cataracts making the river also too difficult for the explorer, who found it almost impassable for more than 200 miles. From Wadi Halfa, southwards to Hannek, a distance of 180 miles, another desert extends, spreading also for miles eastward and westward on both sides the Nile. For the same length the river is also encumbered with ridges of rock. It was this boundary of the desert that kept the warlike and independent tribes of the Soudan quite apart from the inhabitants of Egypt Proper, and has made the Soudanese and the Egyptians two distinct peoples, that have not the least sympathy one with the other. The Nubian desert was the southern limit of the Roman domination during their occupation of Egypt, and southward of that again are the lowlands of ancient Ethiopia, which in the days of the Pharaohs was an Egyptian colony, with the important city of Meroe for its capital.

We shall presently have to notice, however briefly, the conquests by which Egypt under the rule of Mohammed Ali acquired and annexed the more distant provinces of the Soudan, taking Nubia and pushing on as far as the Abyssinian highlands. It is sufficient here to note that (as may be seen by reference to the map) the Soudan includes all that portion of Central Africa which lies between the 10th and the 20th degrees of latitude. But the term has become somewhat indefinite because of those recent extensions, and it should be remembered that as "the Egyptian Soudan" may often mean only the southern portion of the Egyptian kingdom, it has been recommended that the terms used to distinguish the provinces should be "the Egyptian provinces of the Soudan, the Equatorial provinces, and the Red Sea provinces."¹

Of course Egypt, without mention of the Soudan, would mean only the original land of the Nile valley north of the first cataract, and would include no part of Nubia, the desert, or the southern territory, with its mixed tribes, against whom the ancient Egyptians sent out expeditions as they did against Syria, or as Mohammed

¹ *Report on the Egyptian Provinces of the Soudan, Red Sea, and Equator*, compiled and published by the War Office, 1884.

Ali did before he succeeded in annexing them to the pashalik. That annexation has not amalgamated the inhabitants. It has not to any great extent assimilated them. The Egyptians of to-day may frequently resemble their ancestors of the time of the Pharaohs, and some travellers have seen a remarkable likeness between many Copts of Upper Egypt, and the figures, or rather the faces, as represented on the ancient monuments. But this resemblance is not to be noticed among the Arabs, though some of the articles they use, and the manner in which both men and women dress the hair, frizzing it out and plaiting it into numberless tails, often resembles the representations on the walls of the ancient temples. The Arabs of the desert, however, remind us emphatically of the unchanging character of the eastern people. They are Mohammedans, but the women do not conceal their faces. In their wandering pastoral life,—in the dress of the more distinguished among them, who are fond of white and flowing garments,—in their food,—in the perfumes of myrrh, cinnamon, and cassia, used by the women, and in the frequent anointing of the head with oil which makes the face to shine, and runs down the beard and to the skirts of the garments,—the customs of the better sort of Arabs are but little changed from those of the times of the patriarchs.

The Arabs generally adhere strictly to their ancient customs, independently of the comparatively recent laws established by Mahomet. Thus, concubinage is not considered a breach of morality, neither is it regarded by the legitimate wives with jealousy. They attach great importance to the laws of Moses, and to the customs of their forefathers, and quite fail to understand the reason for a change of habit in any respect where necessity has not suggested the reform. They are creatures of necessity; their nomadic life is compulsory, as the existence of their herds and flocks depends upon the pasturage. With the change of seasons they must change their localities that they may secure a supply of fodder for their cattle.

Driven to and fro by the accidents of climate, the Arab has been compelled to become a wanderer; and precisely as the wild

beasts of the country are driven from place to place, either by the arrival of the fly, the lack of pasturage, or by the want of water, even so must the flocks of the Arab obey the law of necessity in a country where the burning sun and total absence of rain for nine months of the year convert the green pastures into a sandy desert. The Arabs and their herds must follow the example of the wild beasts, and live as wild and wandering a life. In the absence of a fixed home, without a city, or even a village that is permanent, there can be no change of custom. There is no stimulus to competition in the style of architecture that is to endure only for a few months, no municipal laws suggest deficiencies that originate improvements. The Arab cannot halt in one spot longer than the pasturage will support his flocks, therefore his necessity is food for his beasts. The object of his life being fodder, he must wander in search of the ever-changing supply. His wants must be few, as the constant change of encampment necessitates the transport of all his household goods; thus he reduces to a minimum the domestic furniture and utensils. No desires for strange and fresh objects excite his mind to improvement or alter his original habits; he must limit his *impedimenta*, not increase them. Thus, with a few necessary articles he is contented. Mats for his tent, ropes manufactured with the hair of his goats and camels, pots for carrying fat, water-jars and earthenware pots or gourd-shells for containing milk, leather waterskins for the desert, and sheep-skin bags for his clothes—these are the requirements of the Arabs. Their patterns have never changed, but the water-jar of to-day is of the same form that was carried to the well by the women of thousands of years ago. The conversation of the Arabs is in the exact style of the Old Testament. The name of God is coupled with every trifling incident in life, and they believe in the continual action of Divine special interference. Should a famine afflict the country, it is expressed in the stern language of the Bible—"The Lord has sent a grievous famine on the land;" or, "The Lord called for a famine, and it came upon the land." Should their cattle fall sick, it is considered to be an affliction by Divine command; or should the flocks prosper

and multiply, particularly during one season, the prosperity is attributed to special interference. Nothing can happen in the usual routine of daily life without a direct connection with the hand of God, according to the Arab's belief.

This striking similarity to the descriptions of the Old Testament is exceedingly interesting to a traveller when residing among these curious and original people. With the Bible in one hand and these unchanged tribes before the eyes, there is a thrilling illustration of the sacred record; the past becomes present, the veil of three thousand years is raised, and the living picture is a witness to the exactness of the historical description. At the same time, there is a light thrown on many obscure passages in the Old Testament by the experience of the present customs and figures of speech of the Arabs; which are precisely those that were practised at the periods described. The sudden and desolating arrival of a flight of locusts, the plague, or any other unforeseen calamity, is attributed to the anger of God, and is believed to be an infliction of punishment upon the people thus visited, precisely as the plagues of Egypt were specially inflicted upon Pharaoh and the Egyptians.

Should the present history of the country be written by an Arab scribe, the style of the description would be purely that of the Old Testament, and the various calamities or the good fortunes that have in the course of nature befallen both the tribes and individuals would be recounted either as special visitations of Divine wrath, or blessings for good deeds performed. If in a dream a particular course of action is suggested, the Arab believes that God has *spoken* and directed him. The Arab scribe or historian would describe the event as the "voice of the Lord" ("kallam el Allah") having spoken unto the person, or, that God appeared to him in a dream and "*said*," &c. Thus, much allowance would be necessary on the part of a European reader for the figurative ideas and expressions of the people. As the Arabs are unchanged, the theological opinions which they now hold are the same as those which prevailed in remote ages, with the simple addition of their belief in Mahomet as the Prophet.

There is a fascination in the unchangeable features of the Nile regions. There are the vast pyramids that have defied time; the river upon which Moses was cradled in infancy; the same sandy deserts through which he led his people; and the watering-places where their flocks were led to drink. The wild and wandering tribes of Arabs, who thousands of years ago dug out the wells in the wilderness, are represented by their descendants unchanged, who now draw water from the deep wells of their forefathers with the skins that have never altered their fashion. The Arabs, gathering with their goats and sheep around the wells to-day, recall the recollection of that distant time when "Jacob went on his journey and came into the land of the people of the east. And he looked and behold a well in the field; and, lo, there were three flocks of sheep lying by it, for out of that well they watered the flocks, and a great stone was upon the well's mouth. And thither were all the flocks gathered; and they rolled the stone from the well's mouth, and watered the sheep, and put the stone again upon the well's mouth in his place." The picture of that scene would be an illustration of Arab daily life in the Nubian deserts, where the present is the mirror of the past.¹

References to the history of Ancient Egypt, its successive dynasties, its religion and the records depicted on the walls of tombs and temples, do not come within the scope of these pages. The present narrative will have comparatively little to do with the places visited by travellers who make the usual journey from Cairo up the Nile to the first or even to the second cataract, and are lost in contemplation of the remains of those marvellous buildings inscribed with the strange stories of a former world. The Persian invasion under Cambyzes the son of Cyrus,—the conquest by Alexander of Macedon, who founded the city bearing his name,—the rule of the Ptolemies,—the Roman intervention and subsequent domination,—the tragedy of Cleopatra, Cæsar, and Antony,—the rule of Constantine,—the introduction of Christianity,—the influence and power of the early patriarchs of the Church in Alexandria, and those fatal controversies which left a population consisting

¹ Sir Samuel Baker, *Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia*.

chiefly of monks, slaves, and soldiers, unable to resist the Arab followers of Mahomet from subjugating the country on the declension of the Empire of Rome,—are subjects which would have no place, even if they could have space, in a narrative that will deal with recent events, and a great and important episode in the history of the British Empire.

It will be well, however, to bear in mind, that during its entire history Egypt has been at once the supporter and the victim of slavery. In the intrigues, the struggles, the murders, that changed the Arab dynasties and often left the power in the hands of alien tribes, the throne was more than once occupied by some slave, who by treachery, assassination, or ability, rose to be a tyrant. At last the rule of slaves by slaves became an organized system. Saladin, the chivalrous and magnificent opponent of Richard Cœur de Lion and the sovereigns who led the third crusade, was himself a Kurd, a commander of a band of mercenaries who had been sent by the ruler of Aleppo to the aid of the government of Cairo, where there was an insurrection caused by rival claimants to the office of vizier. The contest was ended by the able Sa-lah-Ed-Deen or Saladin himself becoming vizier and afterwards seizing the sovereignty. As he was not of the family of Mohammed he refrained from taking the title of Khalif or Caliph, for the Caliph had come to be a kind of Mohammedan pope, living mostly at Baghdad and as "*Imaum*," representing the spiritual chieftainship. Saladin took the title of Sultan, and as he was a usurper he guarded against the probable resentment of the Egyptian officers by surrounding himself with a body-guard composed mostly of slaves purchased or made prisoners in the provinces which bordered the western shores of the Caspian Sea. These men, many of whom were afterwards emancipated, were called Memlooks or Mamlouks, and by their position and office gained immense influence, so that by intrigue and combining their interests they afterwards obtained enormous privileges and almost unchecked control, especially under subsequent weak or incapable sultans, who virtually gave the sovereign authority into their hands. The result was that the governing dynasties of Memlooks were no longer Arab—one was established

by a Boharite—the other by a Borgite or Circassian Memlook slave. The last of them ended with Ghorēe, when he was defeated by the Turks, who, under Selim the First, became masters of Egypt, and made it a pashalik under the Sultan of the Osmanlis; but though the Memlooks were deprived of the sovereign power they were suffered to retain their influence and authority by paying tribute, conforming their religious opinions to the decision of the Mufti of Constantinople, using public prayers for the Sultan, and placing his name on the coins. During the turbulent and demoralizing rule of the Turkish Beys, who were themselves ruled by the Memlooks, the history of Egypt for above two hundred years was an arid record of tyranny, oppression, and vice. In 1767 the Memlook Ali Bey, said to have been the son of a Circassian peasant, and sold at Cairo when he was twelve years old as a slave to the pasha, succeeded in achieving such power that he declared himself independent of the Sultan, and having subdued Syria and Arabia ventured to assume the supreme control in Egypt and to become an ally of the Russians, who were then making war with the Turks; but Ali was eventually deserted by his generals and taken prisoner in an engagement, after which it was represented that he had died of his wounds, though it was generally believed that he had been assassinated. This was in 1773, and the son-in-law of Ali succeeded him and was received by the Sultan as Pasha of Egypt. After his death there was a joint pashalik of Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, who are principally remarkable because they opposed and were defeated by Napoleon Bonaparte at “the battle of the Pyramids” on the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, at which date the course of the present narrative may be said naturally to commence.

In 1798 the authority of the sultan, in Egypt, had been reduced to a merely nominal sovereignty, and the struggle between his government and the Memlook Beys, which was again agitating and impoverishing the country, gave an excuse for Napoleon Bonaparte to attempt an invasion with the pretended object of restoring the legitimate influence of the Porte. That his real object was the conquest of Egypt in order to compensate for the

loss of the West India colonies of France, and for the still more important purpose of advancing on the British possessions in India, was afterwards admitted in his memoirs. "There were," he says, "three objects in the expedition to Egypt,—First, To establish a French colony on the Nile which would prosper without slaves, and serve France instead of the Republic of St. Domingo and of all the sugar islands. Secondly, To open a market for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to supply our commerce with all the productions of those vast countries. Thirdly, Setting out from Egypt, as from a place of arms, to lead an army of 60,000 men to the Indies to excite the Mahrattas and oppressed people of those extensive regions to insurrection. Sixty thousand men, half Europeans and half recruits from the burning climates of the equator and the tropics, carried by 10,000 horses and 50,000 camels, having with them provisions for sixty days, water for five days, and a train of artillery of a hundred and fifty pieces, with double supplies of ammunition, would have reached the Indus in four months. Since the invention of shipping the ocean has ceased to be an obstacle, and the desert is no longer an impediment to an army possessed of camels and dromedaries in abundance."

The employment of agents to excite discontent and insurrection in the countries which he intended afterwards to enter with an army, that he might subject them to military oppression, and seize their resources, was one of the early methods adopted by the Corsican general. It had been successful in Switzerland, in Venice, and in Italy, and had been tried in Ireland with the result of fomenting a rebellion under the direction of Lord Edward Fitzgerald, who had professed to belong to the Jacobin revolutionary party while in Paris, and whose wife was the illegitimate daughter of Madame de Genlis and the Duke of Orleans, Philippe Egalité. The story of the United Irishmen and of the supporters of the rebellion, Wolf Tone, Reynolds, Hamilton Rowan, Emmet, Sampson, Napper Tandy, and the rest of them, belongs to another history, and it is sufficient to say, that after the battle of Vinegar Hill, near Enniscorthy, where the insurgents were defeated, the

attempt of the French to rouse the country with the help of 900 troops of the line landed at Killala under General Humbert signally failed. The Irish people were not in favour of an insurrection which had been proclaimed by a few rebellious leaders, leagued with the enemies of England, who had already made a temporary truce in Europe by giving up Venice to the gripe of Austrian rule, and grinding the people of Italy under the heel of military despotism. The object of the attempts of Napoleon Bonaparte in Ireland was to compel England to maintain a large force in the country, for it was the interference of England abroad that he had most reason to fear. To the same purpose, the collection of a supposed "army of England" on the French coasts for the purpose of invading this country was a plan which had been suffered to become very extensively talked about. This shadowy army, and an equally shadowy fleet, was to keep the attention of our government concentrated on the protection of our own shores.

To add to the deception, Bonaparte paid a rapid visit of inspection to the French coast and the forces quartered there, at the time that he had already prepared an army at Toulon for the invasion of Egypt. This was in May, 1798, and on the 19th of that month, a succession of violent gales having driven the English blockading fleet, he sailed up the Mediterranean with a great fleet under Admiral Brueys, and a number of transports with 30,000 men, Generals Kleber and Menou being under his command. Having seized and plundered Malta through the weakness and treachery of the Knights of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, who had held it since the time of the Emperor Charles V., he left a garrison there, and thence sailed for Alexandria.

The military genius of Napoleon Bonaparte had not failed to appreciate the important and commanding position occupied by the famous city founded by the great Macedonian. Ancient Alexandria stood upon the mainland south of the present site, between the sea and Lake Mareotis. The modern city stands upon the inner isthmus of the Peninsula of Pharos and on the isthmus connecting it with the mainland. At the beginning of the present century it was a poor place with a Turkish quarter

for the most part poorly built and dirty, and a Frankish quarter with some good streets, handsome houses, and a large public square. The whole population scarcely exceeded 7000. But the wonderful capabilities of the city and its situation in relation to the Mediterranean and the Red Sea—in the route to India—could scarcely have failed to give it incontestable importance in the estimation of French politicians. In determining to attempt the conquest of Egypt, and, with that view, the seizure of Alexandria, Bonaparte was only practically adopting the conclusions that had been arrived at by many who had preceded him in France and other places. Sanuto, the Venetian, spoke of the effects on the trade in India and on the Mohammedan power by the subjection of Egypt to some nation on the border of the Mediterranean; and Count Daru declares that the communication between Hindostan and southern Europe by the Red Sea, or in other words the occupation of Egypt by a maritime power on the Mediterranean, is to be preferred to the possession of all the provinces between the Indus and the Ganges. Leibnitz too had strongly advised Louis XIV. to take Egypt for the purpose of destroying the maritime and commercial prosperity of the Dutch, which, he represented, depended chiefly on their trade with India.

Probably Napoleon Bonaparte's ships, with his army, would not have reached Alexandria had it not been for a thick haze which hung about the island of Candia and hid them from the British fleet, commanded by Lord Nelson, which was in that neighbourhood. In fact so great was the dread of the French troops lest the already famous English commander should be after them, that when on the 29th of June they landed without opposition at a spot about three miles from Alexandria, they were in such a hurry to get ashore that a large number of them were drowned.

The city was easily taken, though not without a contest, and some loss on both sides, and then Bonaparte issued a proclamation to the Egyptian people declaring that he came as the friend of the sultan to oppose the tyranny of the Memlooks, and that the French army had the greatest reverence for the Prophet and the Koran.

After the surrender of Alexandria, the French army moved towards Cairo in two divisions, one by way of the Nile, the other by the desert. They were to meet at Rahmanieh. It was a toilsome march for the troops, who had to traverse the burning sands, and many of the men died on the route. On the 21st of July, the force came within sight of the great Pyramids, and there the army of the Memlooks was drawn up ready to do battle at Embabeh, not far from Gizeh, between the Nile and the Pyramids. Pointing to the latter, Bonaparte addressed to his troops the famous, and rather bombastic speech: "Remember that from the height of these monuments forty centuries are looking down upon you."¹ The Memlook army was led by Ibrahim Bey and Murad Bey, and the fight was stubborn; the Arabs showing undaunted courage and great skill in the use of their weapons. It was afterwards declared that some of the Memlooks wielded their Damascus scimitars with such dexterity that in their rapid and fiery charges they actually cut through the bayonets of the French soldiers.² The pertinacity, numbers, and discipline of the French troops, however, gave them a complete victory. Ibrahim fled to the eastern part of the Delta, Murad with a company of his splendid horsemen retreated into the desert, and Bonaparte and his troops entered Cairo, where the victorious general summoned a divan, or assembly of the principal Turks and Arabs, and adopting the formal religious phrases of greeting and of assurance used by the Mohammedans, made them many promises that their rank and civil authority should be maintained.

But while Napoleon Bonaparte was engaged in the effort to establish his authority in this manner, Nelson had been seeking

¹ *Songez que du haut de ces monuments quarantes siècles vous contemplent.*

² There is nothing incredible in this, as the skill of the Saracens and the temper of their blades are matters of history. A more modern example is that of a Highlander, who was second dragoman to the British consular agent at Cairo, about forty years ago, and had been re-named Osman Effendi. An English traveller, who fancied he had bought a real Damascus blade, having paid a high price for it, showed it to Osman, who said it was only a piece of iron, and that it could be shattered by the very act of warding off a blow aimed with it. This was put to the test. The owner of the costly blade delivered such a blow as might have been given in battle, and Osman, slipping a little to one side, and drawing his arm gently inwards with a slight turn of the wrist, received the blow upon his scimitar, with the result that his opponent's sword fell to pieces at his feet. The incident of the feat performed by Saladin in Sir Walter Scott's "Talisman" illustrates the skill of the Memlooks in the use of the scimitar.

for the fleet of that French expedition, of which he had heard only a rumour. He possessed no ships suited for a rapid exploration of the Mediterranean, but he continued his search until he heard that the enemy had taken Malta. Before he could reach the island the French had left it, and he then led his fleet to the mouth of the Nile at a guess, found no French vessels there, sailed northward, and afterward to the south side of Candia, where he might have met the enemy but for the haze that hid them from his sight. He then ran across to Sicily, where he was obliged to take in water and provisions, but, without waiting to refit or repair, once more sailed for Egypt, and hearing that the French fleet had been seen near Candia crowded all sail for the mouths of the Nile.

Most of us have read the story of the battle of Aboukir; how Captain Hood signaled the presence of the enemy's ships in the bay; how Nelson ordered dinner to be served and afterwards gave the signal to form in line of battle; and how the tremendous engagement was won by the destruction or capture of the French fleet. The burning and explosion of the *Orient*; the efforts made to save the crew; the pathetic sight of the bodies of the Commodore Casa-Bianca and his brave son, a boy of ten years old, as they floated on a shattered mast after the blowing up of the ship, are incidents of that fearful engagement which have never been forgotten. The French Admiral Brueys perished, and there were more than 5000 men killed, and above 3000, including the wounded, were sent on shore. The British loss in killed and wounded was 895, only one captain (Westcott of the *Majestic*) having been killed. "Victory is not a name strong enough for such a scene," said Nelson; "it is a conquest."

The Arabs were wild with excitement. They lighted signal fires on the coast and on the hills. The French were in Egypt, but they were unable to leave it, and had only the stores and material of war which they had brought with them to depend upon. The sultan issued a manifesto protesting against the invasion of his territory in a time of peace, declared war against France, and began to prepare forces for attacking the French army in Cairo, where the people, not knowing what was expected

of them, broke into insurrection, and began to kill Frenchmen in the streets until they were suppressed with great slaughter by the troops.

The victory gained at the "Battle of the Nile," as the engagement at Aboukir was called, had the effect of stimulating the other European powers to form another coalition against France, who had broken the treaties which would have prevented an alliance against her.

Bonaparte had not been altogether idle, and it cannot be denied that he had introduced some better if more stringent laws, which his army was able to enforce. He had checked the irresponsible oppression of the former Memlook rulers, and had enabled some French savans, antiquarians, and Oriental scholars, who accompanied his army, to explore the tombs, temples, and monuments on the banks of the Nile above Cairo, and so to lay the foundation of the knowledge of Egyptian antiquities and ancient history which we now possess. Before these researches could be made, however, General Desaix had gone on a military expedition up the Nile, and had driven the remaining body of the Memlooks from Upper Egypt and beyond the cataracts at Assouan, thus leaving the ruins of the principal monuments to be safely examined by the artists and archæologists, who were there in the interests of learning.

Bonaparte himself had (in February, 1799) started from Cairo with an army of 10,000 men for the purpose of crossing the desert and making himself master of Syria.

Gaza and Jaffa fell before the French troops without much resistance, but when they reached the walls of Acre, which, though it was in a half-ruinous condition, was still regarded as the most important position, and the key of Syria on the coast, the enterprise took quite another complexion. Three able defenders were there to resist the attack of the French troops;—Pacha Djeddar, a truculent old tyrant who never for a moment consented to yield, especially as he was supported by Sir Sidney Smith, the able British admiral (who kept two ships of the line close inshore and landed a company of sailors and marines), and another excellent

ally already employed by the pacha,—Colonel Phillippeaux, a Royalist *émigré* who had been a schoolfellow of Bonaparte, and was now a clever military engineer. For sixty days Bonaparte tried to force the fortress by a series of assaults in which he lost about 3000 men, and at last was compelled to abandon the siege and to retreat to Cairo, where, after a march during which numbers of men died and were left to the vultures and cormorants of the deserts, he arrived on the 14th of July, to be immediately called to the coast where a Turkish army of 18,000 men had landed at Aboukir. There a tremendous battle was fought, in which the Turks, though they showed the utmost vigour and courage, were no match for the compact regiments and steady discipline of the French. The victory was decisive. About 10,000 of the Turkish force perished on that field or in the effort to reach their ships. Bonaparte then began to prepare for a departure, it might almost be called an escape, from Egypt. He could effect little there unaided by fresh troops, and the intelligence that he received of the defeat of other French generals in Europe, where the whole Continent appeared to be in arms, and of the imminent downfall of the government of the Directory in Paris, confirmed him in a determination to return and make an effort to attain the position of dictator by the road of military achievement. On the 23d of August a small frigate in the harbour of Alexandria was fitted for sea, and Bonaparte, with his confidential officers, Murat, Berthier, Lannes, and Marmont, and some of the learned explorers who took with them the results of their researches in Egyptian antiquities, embarked unnoticed, and at once set sail for France, where his companions, aided by Talleyrand and the Abbe Sièyes, soon helped him to the accomplishment of his desires by the dissolution of the government, and his appointment as first consul of a new constitution. The army left in Egypt had been reduced to 20,000 men under Generals Kleber and Menou, who were engaged in a conflict the issue of which was to a great extent determined by the continued operation of the English squadron under the command of Sir Sidney Smith. In January, 1800, Kleber, compelled to abandon a fortress at El Arish, and re-

treating from a Turkish army, agreed that the French troops should leave Egypt if they were allowed to depart without further hostilities; but the English government refused to give authority to the admiral to conclude any such arrangement, by which a large force would be set at liberty to swell the ranks of Bonaparte's army in Italy. Therefore the fighting in Egypt went on for two months longer, when Kleber, who had defeated the Turks, was obliged to march his men to Cairo, where the Arabs in insurrection were murdering the French or driving them into the citadel. A horrible massacre ensued, when the French army entered the city and suppressed the insurgents; but some weeks after, Kleber, who was endeavouring to restore something like order, was stabbed by a young man from Aleppo while walking on the terrace of his own house. The command then devolved upon General Menou, a man whose incapacity had been shown by his inability to suppress the rising in Paris against the Convention, which Bonaparte was afterwards called upon to protect.

The French army was, however, able to hold its own for some time, and five ships of war and some transports contrived to escape the British squadron, and run into the mouth of the Nile, where they landed considerable reinforcements with artillery and ammunition.

In January, 1801, the fleet, under Admiral Lord Keith, conveyed a small but effective British army to the Bay of Marmorice, on the coast of Karamania, one of the finest harbours in the world. This force was under the command of the veteran general Sir Ralph Abercromby, and consisted of about 15,300 men, of whom probably only about 12,000 were effective, but these were excellently trained, as they needed to be, since they had to reckon not only with the French army at Alexandria, under Generals Friant and Lanusse, but with the troops commanded by General Menou at Cairo. While the British army was in Marmorice Bay a sloop of war arrived in the harbour, having captured a French brig with a general officer on board, and 5000 stand of arms intended for the French troops in Egypt. Two more regiments of dismounted cavalry also joined the British forces, who were, in fact, waiting

for horses which had been promised from Constantinople. It was afterwards said that 400 or 500 good horses had been purchased by Lord Elgin, our ambassador at Constantinople, but that while on the way they had been changed by the various pashas, with the connivance of the drivers who brought them through Asia Minor and Syria. The result was that there were only a number of wretched and almost useless ponies or miserable hacks, which were either shot because they were useless, or sold at four or five shillings a head. There were but 470 cavalry men in the British force, and of these only a few were mounted on sorry Turkish beasts, purchased at Marmorice. The officers therefore asked permission to serve with their corps as infantry or with the artillery.

It was not till the 23d of February that our fleet left the Bay of Marmorice for that of Aboukir, where it came to anchor on the 2d of March, riding exactly where Nelson had fought the battle of the Nile. It was four days before the weather was such as to permit any operations being undertaken with boats, but directly the moment came, on the afternoon of the 7th, the general and Sir Sidney Smith reconnoitred the coast in a boat, and chose the best place for landing. On the following morning some gun-boats and launches went first to clear the beach, and 5500 of our soldiers followed in the boats, sitting close between the seats with unloaded muskets. The boats were rowed in regular order, but swiftly. Though they were fired at by fifteen guns from the opposite hill, and by the artillery from Aboukir Castle, the soldiers sat still. Many were wounded and several were killed, but they did not stir. Some boats sank, some turned to rescue the drowning men, but the main flotilla went steadily on. The soldiers leaped out upon the shore, some loading their pieces as they formed in line; the rest pushed on without stopping for anything. Assailed by a violent charge and by a rapid fire of musketry, they forced the French to retreat, while only 2000 of our men had landed. Every step was contested and carried; the British struggling up the sand-hills that rose above the beach, some in line with charged bayonets, others on their hands and knees; but up they went

and carried the ridges, the French retreating in disorder, some towards Alexandria, the rest to Aboukir, and leaving all their field-pieces behind them.

The British afterwards advanced about three miles towards Alexandria, leaving a small party near the sand-hills to reduce the fort of Aboukir, where the French garrison had refused to surrender. On the 9th and 10th of March the progress of the main army continued through heavy sand, the sailors dragging the field artillery with great difficulty, but with unabated activity and courage.

The French outposts were taken, along with several pieces of artillery. From the last one the enemy fled so precipitately that they left their signal-flags and their colours flying. These were struck and the English colours planted in their places. On marching about a mile beyond this post our men saw the French army drawn up along a ridge of sand-hills that reached from the sea to a small lake, but the whole force retreated without coming to an action, and encamped about three miles from the British front, where our men had several skirmishes with the French advanced guard.

The French position was in front of an old Roman camp with a tower (the tower of Mandura), and their Generals, Friant and Lanusse, believed they would there be able to resist our attack, as they were strong in cavalry, and in any event it would be easy for them to retire within the walls of Alexandria. Our army marched in two lines to the left, with the object of turning the right flank of the enemy. The French made an impetuous onslaught from the heights on the head of both our lines, but they were repulsed, and our first line, with the utmost quickness and precision, formed two lines to the front of the march and continued to advance, while the second line turned the right of the French army and drove it from its position. The British forced their way onward, and the conflict was a desperate one. The French general, Lanusse, had his horse shot under him. Abercromby was surrounded by French cavalry, and would have been cut down but for the gallantry of the 90th Regiment, who ran forward to receive the

charge of the French on their bayonets, and put them to flight with great loss. At first the British commander-in-chief intended to attack the French on the fortified heights to which they had retreated, and our men were eager to continue the battle, but these heights, which formed the principal defence of the city of Alexandria, would have been difficult to hold, for they were, it was believed, commanded by the guns of the fort, and could only have been taken at a great sacrifice of life. Our army, therefore, took up the position from which the enemy had been driven, with their right to the sea, and their left to the canal of Alexandria and Lake Mareotis, about four miles from Alexandria, so that they cut off all communication with the city except by way of the desert.

Whatever may have been the claims of the French to the introduction of better laws and a more regular government, their army in Egypt had adopted the plan pursued by them in other parts of the world, and with greater impunity. They had pursued the simple plan of taking whatever provisions they could lay their hands on, without recompensing the unfortunate Arab farmers and peasants, and the consequence was, that though they had collected considerable stores in their magazines, they began to find very little provender anywhere else. The Arabs had learned, at the alarm of the approach of the French troops, to drive off their sheep and cattle to places inaccessible to the raids of the soldiers, and to hide their fowls, vegetables, fruit, and grain as best they could in a country where there was no lack of places for concealment. Sir Ralph Abercromby and his generals adopted a different course, and were soon able to establish the confidence of the Arabs and the Egyptian fellahs. Mr. Baldwin, who had for some years been British consul-general in Egypt, and possessed knowledge not only of the localities, but of the peculiarities of the population, was attached to the staff of the commander-in-chief, and at once made arrangements with the Arab farmers and others, who engaged to bring cattle, horses, and provisions to the British camp. The discipline of our men was so good that these engagements were observed on both sides. The orders of the day strictly forbade either officers or men to take anything whatever

without paying the fair price for it, and a general market was held in the camp from seven in the morning till three in the afternoon, no dealing being permitted excepting within those hours. The result was, the appearance of the Arabs with various kinds of provisions—sheep, goats, eggs, fowls, and everything that the country afforded. They had been so ill-treated for the time during which the French army had occupied Egypt that they were glad to open a friendly intercourse with those who appeared likely to put an end to the exactions from which they had suffered.

In less than a week Fort Aboukir surrendered, and the officers and soldiers of the French garrison were made prisoners and sent on board our fleet, each of them being allowed to carry with him his own private property. It was time for General Menou at Cairo to take action against those British troops, of which he had spoken contemptuously, declaring that Friant and Lanusse would drive them into the sea. He now saw that he must collect his forces, and march from Cairo to relieve these generals at Alexandria.

It was on the morning of the 20th of March that the soldiers in the English camp stood gazing with curiosity on a long line of camels, horses, and cattle moving at a great distance on the other side of Lake Mareotis, towards Alexandria. The mist which hung upon the lake made the objects of that strange procession dim, distorted, gigantic, but it was generally understood that it was the train of Menou's relieving army, and that there would soon be more fighting. The conclusion was quickly verified. Menou's reinforcement consisted of 9000 men from Cairo, and he immediately prepared to attack the British army before daylight the next morning. Abercromby suspected this, and was prepared for it. Our men were to be in readiness, and to lie down in their blankets and with their accoutrements on, in the position which they were to occupy in case of an assault in the dark. Their muskets were well flinted, and each man had sixty rounds of ball-cartridge. General officers were warned not to throw away their fire during the darkness, but to use the bayonet as much as possible. They were forbidden to follow the enemy or quit their

positions, and the greatest silence, order, and regularity were to be observed. An hour before daylight, on the 21st, while all was still, the report of a musket was heard at the extremity of the British left, then the report of a cannon, scattered musketry shots, and the boom of big guns. The French were upon us, commencing with a false attack on the left, by which Menou hoped to throw us into confusion, and immediately make a general attack. But it became a general engagement. Our men were ready, and, instead of making a rout, the French found themselves confronted with the bayonet, and with deadly effect. The fighting was more terrible than any that the army of Bonaparte had yet experienced; they expected to surprise us, and were boldly met at all points, even amidst the darkness and the heavy pall of smoke that hung upon the scene, and when at last the day dawned and the French cavalry broke through and got to the rear of some of our infantry, the 42nd Highlanders and the 28th Regiment, aided by the flank companies of the 40th, fought at the same time in front, flank, and rear, and kept their ground, firing such volleys that the horsemen who had ridden in, lay stretched upon the field, only a few escaping. The French cavalry was destroyed, and the corps of "Invincibles," a part of the former conquering "army of Italy," was shattered and almost annihilated. The French prisoners afterwards confessed that the battles they had fought with the Austrians in Italy were not to be compared to this with the English in Egypt. The carnage was horrible; the field was covered with the wounded and the dead. "I never saw a field so strewn with dead," said General Moore, who was himself severely wounded. "Few more severe actions have ever been fought, considering the number engaged on both sides," said General Hutchinson. The French generals Lanusse and Rodie died of their wounds; General Roize, commanding the French cavalry, was killed, with nearly all his followers. Above 1700 French were found dead, and above 1000 of these were afterwards buried by the English on the ground where they had fallen. The British killed and wounded numbered 1400; the French probably twice as many. Several of our officers were severely injured, but the greatest calamity was

that the brave old commander-in-chief, Sir Ralph Abercromby, received a wound which proved fatal; though he remained on the field till the battle was won, along with General Moore, Brigadier-general Oakes, the admiral Sir Sidney Smith (who, with a number of naval officers, was doing duty on shore amidst the hottest fire), Brigadier-general Hope, and Colonel Paget, all of whom were also wounded. Sir Ralph nearly at the end of the action had been surrounded by a party of French horse. He was brave as a lion, and a general of extraordinary sagacity, but he was under the great disadvantage of being very short-sighted, and that may have been the reason of his getting to such close quarters with a mere handful of men. The French officer attacked him with the sabre, but the aged general, short-sighted as he was, received the sabre under his left arm, and wrested it from his antagonist. A French hussar then rode up to cut him down, but a Highland soldier, who saw what was about to happen, and having no bullet left, put his ramrod into his musket, and with it shot the hussar. The general had been slightly wounded on the head during this *mêlée*, and he afterwards received a shot in the thigh. He continued on the field, however, walking about, and paying no attention to his wounds until the end of the action, and then his companions saw the blood trickling down his clothes, and he himself became faint. He was placed in a hammock, carried off the field amidst the grief of the soldiers, and taken on board Lord Keith's flag-ship, where he died on the evening of the 28th.

The command of the army was committed to General (afterwards Lord) Hutchinson, but the victories already gained had so altered the condition of affairs that no great battle was imminent. Our forces received an accession of 3000 men who arrived from England, the fellahs continued to take ample provisions for the supply of the British camp, the French at Aboukir surrendered, the capitan pachas' fleet anchored there, and landed 5000 or 6000 Turkish soldiers; the remaining Memlooks began to reappear in Upper Egypt, and the grand vizier set about collecting a force to proceed, by way of the desert, to Cairo, which was still held by a considerable part of the French forces. Hutchinson prepared to go

thither also by means of a flotilla, which would convey a large number of troops up the Nile. Some more French forts were taken, and General Menou with his army retired into Alexandria. It was then that a scheme was talked about for separating Alexandria and the French army that occupied it from the rest of Egypt, by cutting through the great embankments which prevented the waters of the sea from flowing into the dry bed of the lake Mareotis. It was afterwards said that the suggestion came from the French themselves, for that a letter was found in the pocket of General Roize, who was killed in the action of the 21st—a letter from General Menou, in which some fear was expressed that the British might cut the embankment. Whether this was so or not, the matter was discussed, and the plan was so urged upon General Hutchinson that, in spite of some strategic objections and of much uncertainty as to the amount of damage that might be inflicted by flooding the country, it was put in execution. Four cuts were made, each six yards in breadth and ten yards distant from each other, and an immense rush of water broke through, the moment the protecting fascines were removed, and continued to flow for many days with considerable force.

Leaving General Coote with 6500 men before Alexandria, Hutchinson embarked the rest of his forces in the flotilla which was ready to convey them to Cairo, and capturing convoys of provisions and demolishing some of the works on the banks of the river, attacked and carried a French post at Ramanieh, fortified with intrenchments and batteries and defended by 4000 men. He then continued the voyage towards Cairo; but the Turkish army of the grand vizier had already reached the city, from which the French troops, to the number of 5000, had sallied to attack them. It would seem as though the French already regarded capitulation as inevitable, for though they had twenty-four pieces of artillery, and their troops were well disciplined, and undoubtedly brave under ordinary conditions of warfare, they were repulsed by the irregular Turkish forces. When the British commander-in-chief arrived, and the city was invested, General Belliard, the commander, capitulated, and 13,000 French marched

out of Cairo, and left behind them above 300 heavy cannon and about 45 tons of gunpowder. Resistance would have been futile, for already General Baird had sailed from Bombay with 2800 British troops, 2000 sepoy, and 450 of the artillery of the East India Company. He was at Jeddah on the Red Sea, and had there been joined by an English division of light horse and artillery which had been sent round by the Cape of Good Hope. This prompt concentration of forces in Egypt from Europe, Asia, and Africa was regarded as a brilliant achievement, and raised the reputation of British military efficiency, at which Bonaparte and his generals had long affected to sneer.

The reinforcements from India and the Cape had no occasion to take part in the war, for before the forces had united at Cairo. Menou had seen the hopelessness of his position, and had capitulated at Alexandria, where a bombardment had commenced from the ships in the harbour and the batteries on land. On the 2d of September his troops yielded on the same conditions as were granted to Belliard, namely that they should be sent to their own country without any impeachment of their honour as soldiers. Thus ended that French occupation of Egypt which gave occasion for English intervention, and may be said to have been the commencement of the important relations to Turkish and Egyptian affairs which have ever since been maintained by this country.

There can be little doubt that Bonaparte was deeply mortified by the defeat of his ambition to hold the road to India, by the subjugation of Egypt and Syria, with a view to the ultimate acquisition of empire in the East. It was rumoured that after his defeat by Sir Sidney Smith at Acre he had bitterly declared that the English naval commander had interfered with his destiny; but now he had no longer a military footing in either Syria or Egypt, and though he said little in public his consternation and disappointment could not be altogether concealed. In his memoirs he declared that a French army would have reached the Indies in the winter of 1801-1802 had not the command of the army devolved, in consequence of the murder of Kleber, on a man who, although

abounding in courage, talents for business, and good-will, was of a disposition wholly unfit for any military command.

After Bonaparte had been made first consul, and when his attempt to subdue the negroes of St. Domingo had resulted in the loss by sickness of the successive armies which he sent to that deadly island, he still turned his eyes towards Egypt and Syria, and longed to be master of the approaches to Hindostan. He had previously sent out as an agent to the Levant a Corsican (Colonel Sebastiani), a man of singular ability and address; but the peace of Amiens was coming to an end, and he soon found it necessary to give his whole attention to the conflict which threatened to become a life-and-death struggle.

Still the exigencies of the war in Europe made it necessary for our government to keep a sharp look-out upon Egypt, for though Napoleon had not, perhaps, any immediate expectation of again invading it, he pursued his intention of making use of the intriguing genius of Sebastiani, his agent, for the purpose of inciting the Turks to continued hostilities with Russia, in order that the young czar might be obliged to maintain so large a force on the lower Danube, that he would be unable to send an army to aid his allies against France. Selim the Third, the Sultan of Turkey, who had succeeded to the caliphate in 1789, was an enlightened and ambitious ruler, who formed the idea of re-establishing the Turkish Empire, but in his war with the allied Russians and Austrians he had been defeated. In 1792 he had lost the Crimea to Russia, and though the English restored Egypt to the Porte, after delivering it from the army of Bonaparte, he had to purchase peace with Russia by conceding fresh territories to the czar. It was by the influence of the French over Selim that the war with Russia was renewed, and our diplomatists being unable to counteract the intrigues which had this result, a small naval force was sent from England to the Dardanelles in 1806. Nothing of importance could be effected, however, except the breach of the rule laid down by ancient treaties with the Porte that no ships of war with their guns on board were allowed to pass the Straits of the Dardanelles, or the Straits of the Bosphorus.

The English and Russian ambassadors were taken from Constantinople by our ships, and a larger, but still insufficient, force was then sent early in the following year.

A Turkish squadron was defeated by Sir Sidney Smith, but as prompt advantage was not taken of this success by Admiral Sir John Duckworth, who delayed pushing on to Constantinople, little was gained by it. The city was put in a complete state of defence, and after the admiral had menaced it, he returned through the Straits, left a Russian squadron to blockade the Dardanelles, and hastened down to the mouths of the Nile. But Egypt had been in a state of civil war ever since the British troops had left it after the defeat of the army of Bonaparte. To hold possession of the country would have required a very considerable force, and we had no troops to spare, for the war in Europe was assuming threatening proportions. The only effect of sending an English army to Egypt or to Constantinople would have been to relieve Russia, and it was quite certain that the French could not keep or even take possession of Egypt while a British fleet maintained our superiority at sea. The Sultan Selim was himself insecure upon the throne, and the new pasha of Egypt, Mehemet or Mohammed Ali, was already displaying a military ability which would have been sufficient to oppose a greater obstacle to our regaining possession of the country than our government was at that time disposed to overcome.

The subsequent war in Europe, the ultimate victories gained over the French, the downfall of the Emperor Napoleon, and the final triumph of the allied armies by the successes of Wellington, entirely changed the aspect of affairs, and left Egypt to emerge from her own difficulties as best she could, after the deposition of Selim by the Janissaries, his assassination by his nephew Mustapha, whom they had placed on the throne, the deposition and death of Mustapha himself, and the accession, in 1808, of Mahmoud II., under whom the power of the Turkish Empire continued to diminish.

There are few names in modern history which have been so generally known and remembered as that of Mehemet or (more

properly) Mohammed Ali, and the mere fact that he occupied such a space in the history of the world, and caused so much commotion not only in Turkey but in Europe, would suffice to show that he was, at anyrate, no common man. When he became viceroy of Egypt, he proved that he was no mere vulgar usurper. In spite of his want of education, and that cruel covetousness which seems to have belonged alike to the Turks and their Memlooks or mercenaries, he was an able ruler, and though he almost crushed the people of Egypt under a burden of taxation, he gave them more in exchange than they had ever obtained from their Turkish despots, since he once more made Egypt a nation, and practically succeeded in liberating it from the Ottoman rule, though he failed in rendering it absolutely independent. Perhaps Mohammed Ali was the latest of the pashas around whom there seemed to European eyes to be an atmosphere of romance. There was, undoubtedly, something of the old barbaric splendour and semi-savage but heroic personality about him, which even the familiar revelations made by travellers or ambassadors who were admitted to visit the crafty, resolute, and unscrupulous pasha did not altogether dissipate. There was much that was commonplace, but little that was mean in his character—even his exactions were on such a scale that they were not sordid, and the sense of his fierceness and cruelties was not seldom relieved by generous and even kindly inclinations. In craft and cunning he was more than a match even for Russian diplomatists, and was not to be deceived by the subtlety of Turkish intrigue. He professed, doubtless sincerely, great admiration for the French, and not without reason, for, whatever may have been the oppressive exactions of the army of Bonaparte, the regulations which had been introduced under French authority had aided to accustom the people to a more systematic and centralized form of government. The advantages that had been derived from the scientific and mechanical inventions—the improved mode of living, the social observances, the refinement and good-fellowship introduced by the French civilians and maintained by those who still dwelt in Alexandria or in Cairo—were of inestimable importance to a ruler who hoped

not only to be recognized as independent sovereign of Egypt, but to be assisted in his ambition by an alliance with the great nation. France, though it had but recently lost its vast military prestige and the misleading splendour of an empire maintained both abroad and at home by the sword, was yet potent in the councils of Europe, and had not ceased to hold the dominion which had been gained over the Arab tribes in Algeria.

The wily viceroy very soon learned that he might depend on the assurances of England. He was acute enough to discover that the sturdy independent courage and serene determination which he had observed in our naval officers, and the agents who waited on him from our government, were types of national trustworthiness, and that though we refused to support his inordinate claims, we also refused to recede from the terms which were demanded from Turkey on his behalf. He soon discovered that English interposition was intended to imply a determined resistance to the professed policy of the French, who allowed him to suppose that he should be made the independent sovereign of Egypt, Syria, Nubia, Kordofan, and the Hejaz. Perhaps he never really believed that France would or could give him directly substantial aid to accomplish such a design. At all events he soon discovered that England would not listen to the breach of her engagements to Turkey; nor permit a viceroy to claim irresponsible sovereignty, on the pretext that he was entitled to reign over the territories which he had conquered and added to the possessions of his titular master.

Of course, in estimating the character and the demands of Mohammed Ali, it is necessary to consider the past history and the peculiar political and social condition of Egypt, almost unchanged since the rule of the Arab dynasties. At the same time it is to be noted that the circumstances amidst which the pasha had risen from comparative obscurity to a position in which he could defy the power and authority of the sultan, were as strange and romantic as those that had attended the rise of Saladin and of other rulers whose names still live in history.

Mohammed Ali, who was born in 1769 at Cavalla, a small town or village in Roumelia (Albania), was the son of a retail

shopkeeper who dealt in tobacco. The father, who died while Mohammed was quite a boy, may have been a well-known personage; but, at anyrate, the governor of the place took the lad under his protection, and finding him active and precocious, kept him among his followers that he might receive the usual instruction in horsemanship and the use of arms, which was regarded as the best education for anyone who desired to rise to distinction in those tumultuous times, when the whole country under Turkish rule was alternately under the influence of oppression and insurrection. As Mohammed did not learn to read till he was above forty years of age, it may be believed that his "natural abilities" were considerable, and to judge from later development he must have possessed that kind of sagacity which consists of a wily aptitude for taking unscrupulous advantage of every circumstance that enabled him to attain wealth or power, and must also have been vigilant to seize opportunities which could only be turned to account by energy and daring.

Like most men of his stamp Mohammed Ali, even after he had attained his highest distinction as Viceroy of Egypt, and "had no master," as he asserted—in spite of his being called the vassal of the sultan—was inclined to boast occasionally of his personal achievements, and some remarks he made to a British consul-general will serve to illustrate his own view of his early characteristics.

The consul-general had just presented his credentials, and the viceroy, who graciously returned them to the dragoman without opening them, began to speak of the prudence and sound understanding of a previous representative of England, who never opposed his will or contradicted his opinions; which, he observed, presented no difficulty, since they were founded in reason and justice. "But," added the pasha, "I will tell you a story: I was born in a village in Albania, and my father had, beside me, ten children who are all dead; but while they were living not one of them ever contradicted me. Although I left my native mountains before I attained to manhood, the principal people in the place never took any step in the business of the commune without

previously inquiring what was my pleasure. I came to this country an obscure adventurer, and yet when I was but a bimbashi (captain) it happened one day that the commissary had to give each of the bimbashis a tent. They were all my seniors, and naturally pretended to a preference over me, but the officer said:—‘Stand you all by; this youth, Mohammed Ali, shall be served first,’ and I *was* served first; and I advanced step by step as it pleased God to ordain; and now, here I am (rising a little from his seat and looking out of the window, which was at his elbow, and commanded a view of the Lake Mareotis)—and now here I am. I never had a master!”—glancing his eye at the imperial firman.¹

There is a simplicity, almost a commonplace quality, about this which makes us wonder how the man could have risen to such a height of authority, and to such a comparatively enlightened policy, as that which he afterwards displayed. He appears to have strangely united the calculating prudence of the trader, with the occasional impetuosity and the frequent ferocity of the bimbashi, and so to have developed both qualifications that they inspired respect or terror, according to the conditions under which they were exercised.

It is possible that the passage of autobiography may have lost something of dignity by translation, for at this time the Pasha of Egypt spoke neither French nor English. It is needless to say also that he had not yet experienced the results of European intervention, for the conversation took place in the year 1826, a few months before the battle of Navarino taught him that it would still be wise to moderate his language, so far as England was concerned.

The governor who was Mohammed's first patron, placed him in an office, which was eminently calculated to develop those talents which he afterwards exercised on a vast scale. That is to say, he procured for him an appointment as a subordinate collector of taxes, the duties of which he performed with such resolution that the lives of the peasantry over whom his authority

¹ James Augustus St. John, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali*, 1834.

extended were made precarious. His extraordinary readiness of resource soon gained him a higher position. The people of a village who had been subjected to imposts which they thought were no longer to be borne without resistance, rose in rebellion and refused payment. The governor was so surprised that he could not quite determine what steps to take, and intrusted the affair to the young collector, who hastily summoned a few armed followers, to whom he represented that he was intrusted with a secret commission. Having arrived at the village he entered a mosque followed by his retainers, summoned several of the chief men of the place to meet him there, and when he once got them inside, ordered that they should be bound hand and foot, and immediately dragged them off to Cavalla without regard to the inhabitants of the village, who would have followed him but for his threat that if they attempted a rescue he would put his prisoners to death on the instant.

Such a determined and successful vindication of the authority of the taxing powers gained for him almost immediate promotion, and as he filled up the intervals of military duty by following his father's business as a tobacco dealer, an avocation the profits of which were doubtless considerably increased by the opportunities afforded him for obtaining customers, he became a person of some consideration. The invasion of Egypt by the French gave a new opening for him to push his fortune, and his ability as an officer enabled him to obtain the command, as *bimbashi*, of a contingent of three hundred men, raised at Cavalla as a regular troop for active service in Egypt.

Of course his first employment in Egypt was against the French and on the side of the Memlooks, to oppose whom, however, he was soon afterwards to be in arms. After the departure of the French army from Egypt, Lord Hutchinson used all his influence in order to obtain a renewal of good-will towards the Memlook beys, who had so gallantly fought to preserve Egypt from occupation by a foreign army. It was true that Ibrahim and Mourad had formerly, by their contentions, raised hostilities which it had become necessary for the sultan to suppress by sending the

pasha with a considerable armed force to Cairo and even to Upper Egypt; but the plague had carried off the pasha and had made ravages among the Egyptian population; while the authority of the Porte was not maintained so decisively as to prevent the return of the two insurgent chiefs from exile. Then came the French invasion, and these two men who had been foremost in opposing the demands of the sultan, were ready to unite for the defence of the country against a foreign foe. The Memlook beys had done good service and had suffered considerable losses, and the English general was anxious that their safety should be secured and their reasonable rights and privileges restored. Mourad was dead, and Ibrahim, now an old man, was the chief, his lieutenant being a very brave and accomplished officer named Osman Tambourji.

The terms asked on their behalf by Lord Hutchinson were that they should be reinstated in their legitimate position, on condition that they paid an annual tribute to the sultan and recognized the right of the pasha to exercise the power belonging to him as viceroy, with a sufficient body of troops under his command. These proposals appeared to receive the concurrence of the grand vizier. Ibrahim was restored to the dignity of governor of Cairo, and with his principal officers was invited by the Turkish capitan pasha to pay a visit to his camp of Aboukir. They accepted this courtesy and were received with the greatest attention, feasts and various amusements being provided for their entertainment. These tokens of friendship without any apparent object, aroused some slight suspicions among the beys, who began to talk of bringing their visit to an end, and actually hinted to the British general that the extreme hospitality of the pasha was by no means reassuring. Lord Hutchinson, who was preparing to leave the country, allayed their anxieties by the declaration that the pasha's intentions were friendly and his demonstrations genuine, and they soon afterwards took their leave without anything of a sinister nature having occurred.

After some time had elapsed they accepted a second invitation to Aboukir, where a superb entertainment was to be followed by

a pleasant excursion on board some luxuriously appointed pleasure-boats, in which they were to be accompanied by the pasha, who was unremitting in his courtesies and attentions. The pleasure-boats had left the shore at some distance when a cutter with sails set was seen in their wake and signalling. The pasha, perceiving it, intimated to his guests that it was probably a boat with intelligence or despatches from Constantinople, and asked permission to inquire what was the message which it conveyed. The cutter drew alongside, papers were handed to the pasha, who, in order to examine them, stepped into the cutter which immediately fell away, leaving the pleasure-boats to continue their trip to Aboukir Bay. The guests found that they were betrayed. They were within easy range of some ships of war ready for action and with their decks full of soldiers, who immediately opened fire with their muskets upon the Memlooks, while the guns of the vessels were also brought to bear upon them. Very few escaped from the sinking vessels, and those who were not killed were made prisoners and compelled to solemnly swear that they would not appeal to the English.

The embarkation of Lord Hutchinson and the British troops could not be delayed for the purpose of punishing the treachery of the Turks; but indignant that he had been tricked into giving an assurance of safety to the beys, the general and his officers sent a stern protest to the pasha and compelled him to liberate the prisoners, and to order that the bodies of the slaughtered Memlooks should be interred with military honours.

This was one of the last acts of the pasha before he left Cairo, having appointed as governor of Cairo his principal slave, Mohammed Khosrew or Kusrouf, a Georgian, who was ready to devote all his energies to the extermination of the remaining Memlooks, who had again fled to Upper Egypt, refusing his invitation to remain at Cairo. As they would neither submit nor negotiate, a large force was equipped and sent against them under Yousef Bey, Mohammed Ali being second in command. At a battle fought near Damanhour this army was utterly defeated by the Memlooks, and but for their jealousy of each other and consequent delays the

conquerors might have marched on Cairo. As it was, the fugitive Turks had time to rally and the viceroy was able to place the city in a condition of defence.

The real significance of this defeat of the Turks may possibly be guessed at from the fact that Yousef on his return declared that his coadjutor Mohammed Ali had played the part either of traitor or of coward, an accusation which the pasha was by no means unwilling to entertain since he had already begun to look with uneasiness upon the movements of the ambitious Roumelian.

Here at all events was a charge which warranted strong measures, and the pasha thought the readiest way to rid himself of Mohammed Ali would be to disgrace him by ordering him to quit the country and his command. That was a mistake of which the cunning Cavalliot at once took advantage. He returned for answer that the pay of the troops under his command was considerably in arrear, and demanded that before he obeyed further orders the money should be sent. This would have been inconvenient, and another message was despatched commanding Mohammed to present himself at night before the governor. Such a proposal was too suggestive of sinister intentions, and was one not likely to commend itself to a person who had already had some experience of Turkish treachery; he therefore replied that he would appear in Cairo, not at night, but in broad daylight and in the midst of his soldiers. There was little ambiguity in such a retort, and Kusrouf becoming alarmed determined to make a counter demonstration by calling in Taher Pasha, the commander of other Albanian guards, who were admitted to the capital. The pasha supposed that by thus giving an opportunity for intrigues and contentions between the two leaders he would be able to suppress both; but unfortunately for him he had not calculated that the soldiers who were clamouring for their pay were ready to support the measures taken by either chieftain for the purpose of extorting it. In a very short time the citadel was taken, the palace attacked, and the governor, his family, and his retainers were driven from Cairo, where Taher assumed the viceregal office, which he exercised for about three weeks in a manner so oppressive

and tyrannical that the Memlooks, aided by Mohammed Ali, regained their authority.

It need scarcely be said that Mohammed Ali did not regard with complacency the restitution of the Memlook power, except as the occasion for paving his own way to the pashalik, and he soon took advantage of an opportunity for setting the beys quarrelling with each other; when he at once pretended to the position of a preserver of law and order, and, in the name of the popular interest and the professed interest of the sultan, drove the fiery old Ibrahim Bardissy from the capital and reinstated the exiled pasha, until he could ensure fulfilment of his own ambitious projects. The governor, while affecting to regard his assumptions with indifference, did not fail to propitiate him, and, by way of conciliation, caused him to be appointed Pasha of Djidda and of the port of Mekka. Kusrouf sent to invite Mohammed Ali to the citadel that he might there be invested with the insignia of his high office, but the Cavalliot fox was not to be caught. He was an adept in Oriental stratagems, and reflected that "he who enters the hyæna's den seldom comes out alive." He insisted that the ceremony should be a private one, and should be performed at the house of one of his own friends. He took his new honours quietly and accepted the insignia with a bearing of humility. "The tiger is most dangerous when he crouches." The official days of Kusrouf were remembered—the Albanian and Roumanian soldiers again demanded their pay, talked sedition, and threatened revolt and insurrection. Mohammed Ali, who had been their commander and was still their chief, was the only person who could still the tempest, and the inhabitants of Cairo, tired of the extortions of the pasha and his subordinate governor, were ready to join the soldiers in their cry. Affairs soon reached a crisis. Mohammed Ali was implored by those to whom he had given the hint, to take upon himself the duties of the viceroyalty that he might save Egypt from rebellion and bloodshed. The troops demanded it—the population endorsed the entreaty, and, with some show of surprise and reluctance, Mohammed Ali yielded, and was proclaimed pasha, the representative of the sultan in Egypt. The deposed Kusrouf

made some efforts to oppose this usurpation, and even invited the Memlooks whom he had endeavoured to destroy to become his allies; but while he was engaged in these attempts he received orders from Constantinople, through the capitan pasha, to place the citadel in the hands of Mohammed Ali, and to present himself in person at the head-quarters of the capitan on the sea-coast. He obeyed, and was appointed to another office in a distant part of the Turkish Empire. He had failed, and it was necessary to have a strong and able representative of the sultan at Cairo. The result of the insurrection was accepted by the sultan, and Mohammed Ali was duly appointed Pasha of Egypt by the Sublime Porte.¹

This appointment was, of course, the signal for the remaining Memlooks to gather their forces together in opposition. They were still sufficiently powerful to give the new pasha great uneasiness, but he kept a wary eye upon their movements, and determined to defeat their plans by the mingled cunning and resolution which had already achieved so much for his fortunes. He must, if possible, inflict upon them a blow from which they would not soon recover, and it must, if possible, fall upon them in Cairo itself, and at the moment that they felt secure in pride and power. His efforts were directed to bringing their animosity to a practical issue as soon as possible, for until he had suppressed them he would be unable to extend operations for the establishment of his authority. If they could be brought to enter Cairo with the avowed object of causing a riot and attacking him he would be ready for them, and to stimulate them to action he took an opportunity to offend, or to have it represented that he wished to offend, one of their number, who, either in anger or for a bribe, stirred up the rest to resent the injury. They agreed among themselves to make an attack on the pasha during the evening of the celebration of the festival of the opening of the Nile, that is the cutting of the earth embankment of the canal when the Nile

¹ The Ottoman or Osman Government (Ottoman being derived from Osman or Othman, the founder of the Turkish Empire) is called the "Sublime Porte," from the French translation of *Bab Ali*, the high, or exalted, or supreme gate—the gate of the palace at which justice was administered. In an imperial sense, the High Court or Supreme Court of Justice.

has reached its height, in order to allow the water to flow into the channel which carries it completely through the city. This holiday, usually observed with a good deal of merriment, firing of guns, and general feasting, they thought would be a favourable time to carry out their plans; but the pasha had been well acquainted with their design, and had even employed emissaries to excite them to enter Cairo. They assembled at one of the gates and rushed in along with a drove of donkeys which had just been admitted; but directly they entered the narrow streets and endeavoured to arouse the people by shouts and cries and the clash of arms, they were assailed on all sides by a fire of musketry from windows and terraced roofs. Numbers of them fell and died of their wounds, others were taken prisoners and executed, the rest escaped in the gathering darkness of the night. Whether it be true or not that the heads of some of the Memlook chiefs were cut off and sent to the sultan at Constantinople, it is certain that Mohammed Ali did not hesitate to follow up his advantage.

The sultan became uneasy, and the opinion at Constantinople was that means should be taken to check the ambition of the new pasha. An officer of high rank was despatched to Cairo with authority to set affairs straight, and bearing a firman or imperial order. The pasha received him with the utmost docility and placed the firman against his forehead in token of obedience. The envoy was invested with robes of honour and received costly presents, but he never reappeared at Constantinople, and Mohammed actively employed himself in strengthening the garrison, collecting vast quantities of stores and provisions and other produce of the country, and in amassing wealth for himself. Once more the sultan endeavoured to restrain him by sending the Turkish admiral with orders to bring him at once to Constantinople, but Mohammed Ali was sick—nothing but his deplorable condition would prevent him from obeying the high behests of his sovereign and master, to whom, however, he might, he hoped, be permitted to offer a sum of money as a proof of his dutiful attachment. What could be said or done with a vassal at once so resolute, so humble, and so considerate? The suspicions of the sultan were suffered to

slumber. At the next festival of the Beiram, when appointments, promotions, changes, or endorsements of all offices of the state were announced, Mohammed Ali was confirmed in the office of pasha of Egypt,—the viceroy, to whom all the district governors were responsible for the districts under their command, though it should be remembered that these district governors were, in a sense, independent and despotic, as they had power to make their own laws, alter them to suit certain emergencies, and change them again when the desired end was attained. All that really concerned them was to secure their own authority and the favour of the viceroy, by sending him as much money as possible, and being ready to do his bidding. Of course the system was one of a succession of tyrannies, under a series of officers and subordinates whose business it was to squeeze as much as they could out of the people, that they might furnish supplies of troops for the garrisons and regiments, and provisions for the pasha's stores, and either a proportion of merchandise or produce for sale and export, or coin for the exchequer. To do these things they had first to be thoroughly acquainted with the capabilities of the districts over which they ruled; that is to say, with the extent to which pressure of taxation could be placed on the people. As the system became more closely organized under Mohammed Ali, the condition of the people was often hard, and many of them suffered much oppression amidst the bitterness of grinding poverty, but it is doubtful after all whether the fellahs and the lower classes of the population were worse off in this respect than they had been under the more precarious tyranny of the Memlooks; and though they were now liable to be called upon to serve in the garrisons and the army they enjoyed greater protection, more equal, or at all events more regular and intelligible, administration of the law, and a degree of certainty which was in itself a great boon to a people who had long writhed under the heels of indiscriminate and constantly changing oppressors. Of course the imposts were often such as to crush those who were compelled to submit to them; nor were the means of extorting them gentle or merciful. But heavy taxes were always inflictions on other countries beside Egypt, and the methods by

which they were exacted were not often such as to conciliate the sufferers. Even in this country, and in our own day, occasional complaints may be heard, especially from the inhabitants of districts where to increasing local rates, heavy imperial taxes, and the inquisitorial and often monstrous demands of the assessor of income-tax, is added the infliction of extra tithe.

Mohammed Ali now prepared to extend and consolidate his power. Old Ibrahim Bardissy and Elfy Bey were both dead, and he had no reason to fear that anyone else could successfully interfere with his legal title. Still he kept a wary and suspicious eye upon the surviving Memlooks. He advanced into Upper Egypt with a considerable force and there attacked and defeated them, and would probably have followed them in their retreat but for the despatches from Constantinople telling him of the hostilities between Great Britain and Turkey already referred to. In this conflict he and the beys, who now made peace with him and followed his standard, bore a prominent part, and inflicted great loss and some barbarities upon the small English force, which, as we have seen, was compelled to retire without having effected any particular object, or gained any special advantage.

But he still feared that there could be no real security for him while the powerful influence, which even the traditional authority of the Memlooks represented, continued to exist. His position would be precarious while a body of men, whose chiefs were still numerous, and all of whom may be said to have represented an independent armed force, could be propitiated by the Sultan Mahmoud and used to create divisions for the purpose of preventing a settled government in Egypt.

It did not require much deliberation to determine their fate. The pasha had more than one example of Turkish treachery for imitation. The fate of those Memlook beys who had been devoted to slaughter in the Bay of Aboukir perhaps suggested to him a plan for destroying the power of these brilliant turbulent warriors, that he might no longer have them to reckon with when his ambitious projects for attaining independent authority over Egypt and Syria could be matured and acted on.

There were some 1700 of these brave splendid horsemen in the country, and Mohammed soon hit on an expedient for attracting above 400 of their beys to Cairo. It is difficult to imagine how they could have trusted him after the experience of the Nile festival; but on that occasion they entered the city as insurgents, and now, in 1811, their attempt had been condoned, they were restored to favour, and had been in arms as the allies of this powerful Roumelian pasha, whose prowess they understood and acknowledged.

There was again an opportunity of engaging in their trade of war, and under conditions which probably delighted them. Mohammed Ali had been fully employed since the hostilities against the British expedition, in making his government permanent in Egypt. To increase the numbers of his army, and to provide for the expenditure which became necessary for the support of a large body of troops, he was compelled to adopt such severe measures of conscription and taxation that his popularity was considerably diminished, and a rising of the Memlooks avowedly in the popular cause might lead to his overthrow. At the same time he had determined to take immediate measures for making war against the Wahabees, and it would be necessary to employ his most able commanders and his best troops on such an expedition. The Wahabees, a fanatical sect of Arabia, had made a descent upon the holy city and committed outrages. Mohammed Ali determined to suppress them, an intention in which he was obeying the behests of the sublime porte, from which an intimation had come that the subjection of the Wahabees was important for the preservation of the true faith and the integrity of the empire. An important command was to be taken by Toussoon, son of the pasha, who received the title of pasha of the second grade.

Mohammed Ali began his preparations by calling a divan, or meeting of notables, to declare his intention to prosecute the war. At the same time he announced that he would hold a *fantasia* or festival in honour of the expedition. He had already propitiated the good-will of the Memlooks by giving them to understand that they would occupy a prominent place in the army

destined to prosecute a religious war against the Wahabees, and stated that he proposed holding a review, in which he should himself inspect the Memlook cavalry. This programme was carried out with the utmost satisfaction, the pasha declaring that he was delighted with the appearance of the warriors, and giving them many assurances of his approbation. About half the number of these men set forward on their march, and were to await the rest at a station at a distance. In the course of a few days another festival was held, when the main body of the troops were to be marshalled for the inspection of the pasha, and the investiture of his son Toussoon with his new honours was to take place in the citadel. Thither he invited the remaining Memlooks in order that they might take part in the celebration and receive his final instructions. They arrived in glittering array, superbly attired, armed, and mounted. With their leader, Cháhyn Bey, they repaired to the hall of audience, where they were received by Mohammed Pasha with apparent kindness and hospitality. The parade took place and the troops marched to the citadel, the pasha's men first, the mounted Memlooks following. The way was by a passage or defile cut out of the rock. No sooner had the Memlooks entered it than the gate behind them was closed, and they were thus caught as in a trap, and were shot down from the rocks and battlements above, or from the windows of the houses in the citadel square, where men fired upon them volleys from which they could neither defend themselves nor retreat. There is a story that one of the beys named Amim escaped the massacre. He was a splendid fellow and a wonderful horseman, as many of the Memlooks were, and at the first attack he spurred his steed till he made him clamber the rampart, and thence urged the noble animal to leap over the parapet. The fall was that of a precipice about forty feet deep. The horse was killed, but the rider escaped and sought the protection of some Albanians, who refused to give him up though a large reward was offered. The rest of the Memlooks, to the number of 470, were slaughtered. Those of them who rode on and sought for protection in the houses of the square were driven out and killed. For several

hours Cairo was a scene of butchery and disorder, as advantage was taken of the search for the Memlooks by the troops to perpetrate many atrocities.

The signal was given for the army to set out. When the troops reached the spot where the first detachment of the Memlook cavalry was encamped the latter came forth expecting to meet their comrades, but they were immediately attacked and numbers of them slain. Outside Cairo, and in other parts of the surrounding country, similar massacres took place. The Memlooks being divided, only a few survived, and these fled to Dongola, one of the finest of the Soudan provinces, its northern border being the limit of Upper Nubia. This territory was afterwards tributary to the Shaiki, by whom it had been taken from the Memlooks, and did not come under the Egyptian rule till the conquests by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of Mohammed Ali, in 1820. Here the remnant of the escaped Memlooks were suffered to remain, as there were too few of them to cause the pasha further anxiety. That the destruction of their power was beneficial, inasmuch as their influence had prevented the progress and development of the country, can hardly be denied, and the same may be said in relation to Turkey and the suppression (by similar means) of the Janizaries by the Sultan Mahmoud in Constantinople in 1826; but the tale of the massacre has always been regarded as one of the blackest of the records against Mohammed Ali. That personage, however, considered that he was justified in perpetrating the deed as a measure of self-protection, even leaving out of the question the orders he was said to have received from Constantinople. It has been reported that on being informed of the reproaches expressed against him by travellers or visitors who gave narratives of their journeys in Egypt, he retorted that he would have a picture painted of the massacre of the Memlooks, together with one of the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, and leave to posterity to pass judgment on the two events. He might with even greater force have pointed to the massacres of the Huguenots in France, which continued with only slight intermission for two hundred years.

The Wahabees were heterodox Moslems of Derayeh named

after a leader, Abdul Wahab, who a century earlier had introduced certain heretical doctrines with regard to the Prophet. He was a man of severe and simple habits, and his followers became so numerous that he was able, in opposition to the provincial governors, to deny the efficacy of pilgrimages to the tomb of Mohammed, or of the use of relics and the outward ceremonials which were accounted of more importance than prayer and true piety.

Both he and his successors endeavoured to make converts by the sword. They became bitter persecutors, and as their armed bands were well trained and had augmented in numbers till they became an organized army, the propaganda was carried into Persia, where the people of the city of Kirbeleh were slaughtered and the tomb of Hassan, the grandson of the Prophet (a shrine visited by pilgrims) was plundered and desecrated. Nor did the Wahabees stop there. At the head of 40,000 men their leader Schood, who was now ruler of Derayeh, marched on Medina, which he entered, and ordering the tomb of the Prophet to be opened, despoiled it of numerous jewels and precious stones, vessels of gold and other treasures. He afterward went to Mecca, where he also met with little resistance.

It was then that the government at Constantinople sent to the viceroy of Egypt to suppress the Wahabees and punish their audacious leader.

There is no need to enter into the details of the war against these fanatics in Arabia. It was not successful at first, and Toussoon, the son of Mohammed Ali, who was in command, died either of disease or of poison. The viceroy, who had already retrieved the first failure by taking the command himself, then confided the generalship to another son, Ibrahim Pasha, who afterwards became famous not only for his personal courage and able generalship, but for the enlightened views which he entertained, and for his intelligent friendship towards Europeans, and the adoption of their methods of organization, both in civil and military affairs.

Mohammed himself, however, had soon discovered that to create a really powerful and effective force, which would enable him

to extend his power, he must improve the military tactics of his troops, and cause them to be drilled and instructed on the plan employed in the armies of Europe. It was said that for this purpose he first employed some French soldiers who had deserted from the army of Bonaparte at the time of the invasion and had remained in the country. But, at all events, it was not long before he had in his pay several French ex-officers, while a large number of his own officers were placed under the training of Colonel Sève, formerly aide-de-camp to Marshal Ney. In the navy also he afterwards placed in command some former English officers of considerable ability. These innovations caused so much dissatisfaction among the troops and the people at Cairo, and especially among the native troops, who objected to regular discipline, that they led to dangerous demonstrations by the men against the subaltern officers; several of the latter were assassinated in the streets, and at last the troops in the neighbourhood of the city broke into open mutiny. This outbreak was probably instigated by some of the beys or chiefs; but the viceroy, who had taken up his position in the citadel, was able to still the commotion by promising a general amnesty to the offenders, and as many of the beys afterwards disappeared, and the sudden death of some persons of more or less distinction also followed, there was reason to suppose that the ringleaders were known. For a time this demonstration of hostility interrupted his first efforts to reorganize the army, but the campaign in Arabia had proved the necessity for a better discipline and training for the troops, and though the defeat of the Wahabees and the destruction of Basille in 1815 had terminated that campaign, it was almost certain that war would have to be resumed. In this expedition disease had thinned the Egyptian ranks, and the Albanians, who were worn out with a series of desultory engagements with half-barbarous opponents, had begun to murmur against being kept for so long a period amidst hardships and the ravages of sickness. Yet these Albanians were afterwards the obstinate opponents of the introduction of European drill and evolutions, till they were shamed out of their prejudices by the improvements effected in the regiments

of fellaheen and Nubians, who had been under regular drill and instruction.

Mohammed Ali was too acute an observer to have failed to note the vast superiority of French and British troops, and was far-seeing enough to understand that his future existence might depend on his ability to hold his own even against the Turkish battalions. However romantic and picturesque the brilliant cohorts of Memlooks may have been, however brave and impetuous the charges of Roumelians and Albanians in their wild warfare, nothing could stand in the place of the steadiness, discipline, concerted action, and obedience to well understood command, displayed by European troops.

Perhaps the usually accepted notion of the imposing appearance of the Albanian warriors, even on the occasion of a triumphal return, was liable to question by an unsusceptible and adverse critic. Sir Frederick Henniker was in Cairo in 1821 on the occasion of the triumphal return of Ibrahim Pasha from the victorious campaign in Arabia, and he describes the scene:—"Soon the infantry (Albanians) mustered. An attempt to drill these lawless ragamuffins occasioned the last insurrection; no marching and countermarching, no playing at soldiers. They, however, suffer themselves to be drawn up in a line to listen to the music, if such it may be called, when produced by drums and squeaking Moorish pipes in the hands of Turks: a number of voices frequently chimed in and destroyed the monotony; during this the soldiers were quiet. It is nearly impossible to distinguish officers from privates; every man provides himself with clothes and arms according to his means; there is only this family likeness among them, that pistols, swords, and a shirt outwardly exhibited are necessary. An Albanian is not improved since the time of Alexander; he is still a soldier and a robber. Ibrahim Pasha, having, as he says, conquered the Wahabees, made his triumphal entry this morning—first came the cavalry, horses of all sizes, ages, colours, and qualities; an Arab fellah attendant upon each soldier carried a musket; every soldier carried—a pipe; occasionally the prelude of a kettle-drum hammered monotonously with a short

leathern strap, announced a person of consequence, the consequence consisted in eight or nine dirty Arabs carrying long sticks and screaming tumultuously; then came the infantry, a long straggling line of Albanians; then a flag; then a long pole surmounted by a gilt ball, from this suspended a flowing tail of horse-hair; then a second flag, a second tail, a third flag, and the pasha's third tail; the victor covered with a *white satin* gown and a high conical cap of the same military material; this Cæsar looked like a sick girl coming from the bath. The mobility closed this Hudibrastic triumph. Having traversed the town, they vented their exultation in gunpowder. The Turkish soldiers, whether in fun or earnest, always fire with ball; and on a rejoicing day it commonly happens that several are killed; these *accidents* fall in general on the Franks."

This is an amusing example of smart writing, and from the observer's point of view it was accurate enough; but it was not very long before considerable changes had taken place. Not only was the army of Mohammed Ali drilled and instructed on the European plan, but it was vastly augmented. The conscription was wide and severe, and though many of the fellaheen had a rooted antipathy to enter the service, and frequently maimed or half-blinded themselves to avoid being drafted into the army, the proclamations of the pasha were not easily avoided, especially as any artifices used to escape military service were punished by fine or otherwise. The advantage of possessing infantry so organized that large masses of men could be moved wherever the ground was such as to allow of military evolution, was soon proved by a succession of victories over the Arabian fanatics, which left the viceroy at liberty to turn his attention to other enterprises, the first of which was an expedition which he had prepared in 1820, for the purpose of bringing the natives of Kordofan and Sennaar completely under his rule. This duty was confided to another son, Ismael, who conducted the campaign with energy and not without barbarity, sending vast numbers of prisoners from the conquered districts to Essouan, where they were at once drafted into the army and placed under the discipline of the French instructors. Unhappily, either from disease brought on by the change of climate

and mode of living, or, in many cases, from the misery of enforced service away from home and friends, or from actual indifference to life and either neglect of the means of maintaining it or direct suicide, these black troops dwindled down from 20,000 to about a sixth of that number; but the drilling and training went on throughout the army, and the levies of fellahs and Arabs were eventually formed into disciplined troops—clad in more useful and comfortable uniforms, governed by military law, and punished for offences only after trial by the appointed tribunal.

By 1827 a complete army of twelve regiments of infantry, each consisting of five battalions of 800 men, besides cavalry, artillery, and marines, had been formed on this plan, the marines being stationed at Alexandria, to be ready, if necessary, to serve in naval warfare. As the blacks were not found capable of undergoing the fatigue and monotony of the training, the national conscription included about 30,000 additional peasants and Arabs, who were sent under a military guard to Upper Egypt.

That the miseries inflicted on the inhabitants of the country who were compelled to serve in the army were not soon at an end, however, the following decree, sent as late as 1833 to the military governors of districts, will be some evidence:—

“With respect to the men whom we take for the service of our victorious armies and navies. On their way to us, some draw their teeth, some put out their eyes, and others break their arms, or in other ways maim themselves, thus laying us under the necessity of sending back the greater part, and causing the deficiency in the report of the war department which I always perceive. *Make up those deficiencies*, by sending *immediately* all the men which are wanting, all *fit for service, able-bodied and healthy*. And when you forward them, let them know that they must not maim themselves, because I will take from the family of every such offender, *men* in his place—and *he who has maimed himself shall be sent to the galleys for life!* I have already on my part issued *written* orders on this subject to the Sheikhs, and do thou also take care, in concert with them, to levy the conscripts demanded, and send them *immediately*, informing me at the same time, and with the *least possible delay*, of the number of men which remains in your department. This is what I demand!

(Signed) MOHAMMED ALI.”

Writing on the subject some time afterwards, and when the military organization was more complete, a traveller who had unusual means of observation said: "The Arabs have a very strong and natural aversion to a military life, and when they know that any recruiting is going forward, nothing is more common than for them to cut and maim themselves in order to escape being taken from their families. They not only chop off the forefinger of the right hand, but they have even been known to put out their own and their children's eyes with sharp instruments or corrosive substances; such is their hatred of Mohammed Ali and their love of home. It must not be supposed that the Arabs are cowards, this is far from being the case, but they are naturally industrious, social, and domesticated, fond of their children, and well-disposed to all who use them well. This effort to elude the pasha's vigilance succeeded for a time, but was attended in the end with most disastrous consequences. Terrible punishments were inflicted; and very often the innocent, who had been blind or maimed from other causes, became the victims of a set of wretches, who, finding that a decree had gone forth on the subject, threatened to hand them over to the authorities if they did not answer their demands.

"In the summer of 1832 all influential men were required to furnish a certain number of soldiers, under a penalty of 700 piastres (about £10) for each default. This occasioned such a search, and so many were seized and sent away from their homes, that the villages and towns were filled with lamentation; and the women went about wailing and shrieking, as for the dead."

The soldiers were not soldiers by choice, as they were taken from their families by force, and were often ill-fed and ill-paid or suffering from long arrears of pay. When Mohammed Ali organized what he called a "National Guard," the force was chiefly composed of boys stolen from their families, and driven down from the interior in chains, and when there was a scarcity of chains, holes were made in planks for the hands, and the planks were then nailed together. In this state they were sent on board the ships to be forwarded to Candia, there to be drilled, and it often hap-

pened that their hands were so swollen by the time they reached the coast, that they were unable to use them for weeks.

The advance into the provinces of Nubia and the Soudan, though it was successful so far as the subjugation of the native rulers and the mixed populations was concerned, was disastrous to Ismael Pasha, whom Mohammed Ali had placed in command of the forces. Having arrived at Shendy with his troops, he called the great Sheikh Mek (Melek or king) Nimmur (leopard) before him, and demanded as tribute to the pasha, supplies for his army, 1000 young girls as slaves, 1000 oxen, 1000 of camels, goats, and sheep respectively, 1000 camel loads of corn and the same quantity of straw, with various other commodities all numbered by the thousand. "Your computations show a charming simplicity," said Mek Nimmur, "as the only figure appears to be 1000."

In a short time the supplies began to arrive; strings of camels laden with corn came to Shendy to the Egyptian camp, flocks and herds were on the way, and 1000 camel loads of fodder packed and dry were brought to headquarters, and stacked in a neat protecting wall round the space occupied by the general's tent. In the dead of night there was a crackling noise, a sudden glare, and the tent was encircled with a blaze of fire. The Arabs had set light to the wall of dry straw and fodder in several places. The flames roared; there was no escape, the tent itself caught fire. In the confusion the Arabs fell upon the invading troops and massacred numbers of them. The body of Ismael Pasha was found amidst the scorched and lifeless forms of some of his women. All within the fatal inclosure had perished. Mek Nimmur (the leopard king) retired with his people and herds to Sofi on the river Atbara, the chief tributary to the Nile, which town a few years ago was entirely destroyed by the Egyptians after he had retired to Abyssinia, where he had been welcomed as an enemy of the Turks, and had been presented by the king with a considerable territory at the western base of the high mountain range. In 1861 old Mek Nimmur was dead, and his son (also named Mek Nimmur) had succeeded him. He was constantly

at war with the Egyptians and such of the Arabs as were friendly to Egypt. His principal quarters were about seventy miles from Tomāl at a village named Mai Jubba, from which he made successful raids upon the Egyptian territory.

It may be as well to remember that the signification of "Nubia" and "the Soudan" has undergone some change recently. We have already seen in a previous page what is now meant by the Soudan; but it was originally, roughly speaking, Negroland or Nigritia, and the term was used to indicate African territory of somewhat indefinite area. It meant in its larger extent the great zone of land more or less cultivated or fertile from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and the highlands of Abyssinia, and from the Sahara and Egypt in the north to the Gulf of Guinea, the equatorial regions, and the Albert and Victoria Nyanzas. This is the home of the true negro race, though the population has become considerably diversified by various elements. The Soudan thus delineated has three principal divisions:—the Western Soudan, which includes the basins of the Senegal, the Niger, the Benuwe, and other rivers draining to the Atlantic; Central Soudan, comprising the basins of the Shasi and other rivers running into Lake Tschad, and covering the countries of Bornu, Begharmi, Kanem, and Wadai; and the Eastern Soudan, east of Wadai, which is chiefly included in the basin of the Middle and Upper Nile. This latter is the Egyptian Soudan with which we have to do.

Up to the year 1882 the Egyptian Soudan was, in fact, one ill-organized province:—its capital, Khartoum, at the junction of the Blue and the White Nile. It was afterwards divided into (1) the western territory of Darfur, Kordofan, Bahr el Ghazal (on a western tributary of the White Nile south of Kordofan), and Dongola, the capital being Fasher in Darfur; (2) the Central Soudan, which includes Khartoum, Sennaar, Berber, Fashoda (s.e. of Kordofan), and the equatorial province, extending along the upper province to the great lakes, the capital being Khartoum; (3) the Eastern Soudan, stretching along the Red Sea, and including Taka, Suakim, and Massowah; (4) the country of Harâr, east of Abyssinia and north of the Somali land, almost entirely

separated from other Egyptian possessions, and divided into Zeyla, Berbera, and Harar.

The Egyptian Soudan, before the division, had an approximate area of about 2,500,000 square miles, and a population of 12,000,000, three-fourths of whom were probably of mixed or pure negro descent, the rest being of Semitic or Hamitic races. The former were pagans or nominal Mohammedans, the latter orthodox or fanatical Mohammedans. The term Arabs as applied generally to the inhabitants of this region is somewhat vague, since, though some of them have a claim to Arab descent, they consist of various tribes much intermingled. On the other hand, Nubia, or the land of Cush, derives its name from the Coptic and Egyptian word *Noub*, gold, and at one time Mohammed Ali visited the territory in the hope that he would be able profitably to work the gold that is to be found there. It is the ancient Ethiopia, and extends from Philæ, near the second cataract of the Nile, to the Sennaar. The modern inhabitants are principally Arabs who invaded the country in the time of Mohammed. In the reign of Selim the people of one tribe were driven into Dongola, and there their descendants remain at Ibrim, Assouan, and Sai, while the lower country is held by the Berbers. The whole country is inhabited by a mixed race of Arabians and Nigritians. East of Dongola are the Sheygha, a fine black race, warlike, and renowned for their horsemanship. South of Cosseir are the Ababdeh Arabs, famous as guides and camel-drivers, and the Bishareens, said to be a remnant of the ancient Blemmyes, a tribe living on flesh and milk, and differing in some respects from the oriental character of the Arabs. The Takahs are the dwellers in the mountains. The languages of these tribes differ. The number of the inhabitants of the whole territory has been estimated at 1,000,000, and they were governed by their own chiefs or rulers till they were subdued to the domination of Egypt by Ismael Pasha in 1820, and the numerous and valuable products of the country in grain, gums, perfumes, senna, wax, wool, cotton, gold-dust, ivory, &c., went by way of commerce to Egypt.

The people inhabiting the country above Egypt have been

described as two tribes of people resembling each other in physical characteristics, but of distinct character and origin. It has been suggested that one is the aboriginal or native, and the other a foreign tribe. Dr. Prichard distinguished them as Eastern Nubians or Nubians of the Red Sea, and Nubians of the Nile or Berberines, but all these tribes have red-brown complexions, often approaching to black, though not to the ebony-black of the actual Eastern negro. Their hair is not woolly but frizzy. The Eastern Nubians are the roving tribes who inhabit the country between the Nile and the Red Sea, and the northern division of the race are the Ababdeh, who are to be found northward in the eastern district as far as Kossein and towards the borders of the land of the fierce and barbarous Bishareens, who extend towards the confines of Abyssinia.

The Barabra or Berberines are in the higher country of the Nile in the Berber valley, from the southern border of Egypt to Sennaar, and many of these people go up to Egypt as labourers. They are a people distinct from the Arab tribes around them, and follow agricultural and pastoral pursuits, cultivating fields of grain and plots of vegetables on the banks of the Nile. The Berbers have in general a good character for honesty and fair dealing, and they are mostly placable folks ready to trade in the products of their fields and gardens. They may be said to be divided into three sections, who speak respectively the dialects of the Nuba, the Kenous, and the Dongolawi, and it is considered probable that they are an offshoot from the original stock which first peopled Egypt and Nubia.

On the antiquity and extension of this people Dr. Latham says, "All that is not Arabic in the kingdom of Morocco, all that is not Arabic in the French provinces of Algeria, all that is not Arabic in Tunis, Tripoli, and Fezzan, is Berber. The language also of the ancient Cyrenaica, indeed the whole country bordering the Mediterranean, between Tripoli and Egypt, is Berber. The extinct language of the Canary Isles was Berber; and finally the language of the Sahara is Berber. The antiquity of the Berber nation is indubitable, and from the earliest times it has occupied

the same territory as it does at present. The ancient Numidian and Mauritanian names of Sallust have a meaning in the modern Berber language. It has affinities with the Semitic. In the northern parts of the Atlas these people are called Berbers, in the southern tracts they are the Shelhas or Shuluh, in the hilly country belonging to Tunis the Kabyles, in Mount Aouress the Showiah, and in the desert the Touarick; all belong to the same group."

This apparent digression has, it will be seen, a direct relation to the proper definition of the territory and the people constituting the Egyptian Soudan, the outlying territory which Mohammed Ali subjected to his authority. At first his immediate object was vastly to recruit his army by troops from among the people of the conquered provinces, but the blacks could not endure transportation to Egypt. The cold of the Egyptian winter caused great mortality among them, and though Ibrahim Pasha afterwards took a large number of Nubian soldiers to the Morea, in the war against Greece, he found that the number who sickened and died was so great that he could not depend on the regiments being fit for active service.

The invasion and conquest of the upper provinces had scarcely been achieved when Ibrahim had to withdraw his troops from the territories of Dongola and Kordofan, that they might, by the orders of the Sublime Porte, aid the sultan in preventing Greek independence.

It does not fall within the scope and object of these pages to recount the events which led to the oppression of the Greek people by the Turks, nor to describe the revolt which took place, followed in 1826 by the capture of Missolonghi by Ibrahim Pasha and the subsequent intervention of the great powers of Europe, and the vindication of the Greek claims to freedom. The stern, passionate, but far-seeing and determined son of Mohammed Ali was the foremost figure in the drama of Turkish domination, and Missolonghi, which was said to be the key of Western Greece, soon fell before his ruthless assaults. For two years his fleet had wrought havoc upon the unhappy country where the people had long previously commenced a struggle, the events of which belong to the romance or to the poetry of history, and deeply moved

the sympathies of many English men and women, who shared with Lord Byron an earnest, if a somewhat sentimental or dramatic sympathy with the patriots, to whom they could at all events send contributions of money from a regular fund.

There was something at once poetical and classical about Greek scrip; the issue of it assumed the aspect of a philanthropic subscription rather than a commercial speculation, until the inevitable land-sharks found it would be possible to prey upon it, and the fund was mismanaged, the contractors and manipulators contriving to intercept a large proportion of the money that should have gone to the relief of the Greek patriots. Lord Byron had died in 1824 at Missolonghi, two years before it fell before the forces of Ibrahim Pasha, and public feeling here ran high when the oppressed people appealed to the government of Britain for help, which could not be afforded them without the breach of some treaty clause or other and the consequent danger of European quarrels.

In the following year, however, Mr. Canning had brought to a successful issue his proposed triple alliance of England, France, and Russia for the settlement of the affairs of Greece. He, like many other scholars and men of classic tastes and poetical imaginations, was enthusiastic in favour of maintaining the liberty of the land of old renown, and enabling it to occupy a position of respect among the nations of the world. Apart from enthusiasm, however, events that were then happening were such as to stir the generous instincts and fire the indignation of any people with a traditional love of liberty and a hatred of tyrannical cruelty. Ibrahim Pasha had gone to show that the sultan, whose forces had been repeatedly defeated by the Greeks, ever since the commencement of the war in 1821, would only succeed by calling him and his army to help him. He therefore set about, not only the conquest, but the devastation of the country and the merciless slaughter of the people. His large army of mixed races and savage desert tribes, but all of whom had been drilled and trained, was let loose upon the land of the olive and the myrtle. Ibrahim Pasha showed that he had inherited the barbarous ferocity which some men declared had frequently characterized the proceedings of his father. It is

doubtful whether in this respect the general of the army in Greece did not exceed the uneducated but astute and humorous viceroy. He was no more unscrupulous than Mohammed Ali, but there was at this time a persistent relentless cruelty about his proceedings combined with obstinate dogged temper, frequently breaking out into paroxysms of fury, which he, however, succeeded in mastering by a violent effort whenever he saw the advantage of so doing. His name was hated, not only in Greece, but by large numbers of Egyptians, although it must be owned that he introduced a more certain government by settled laws not only in the army but wherever he had authority, so that there was a little more security from gross and scandalous injustice, even if there was a greater degree of severity.

He had 163 war vessels in his fleet, and the Greek flotillas, composed chiefly of light polacca-built brigs, were swept away by the Egyptian and Turkish ships of the line built by Europeans. The war of oppression had become an atrocious massacre, as though for the purpose of exterminating the people of Greece. The opportunity was taken of showing the Sultan Mahmoud what could be achieved by his viceroy, where he himself and his Turkish commanders had failed. The story of the intervention of the three powers; the arrogant assumptions of indifference shown by Ibrahim Pasha, who refused to become a party to a proposed arrangement and suspension of hostilities; his treacherous continuance of the savage slaughter of women and children, and the burning of houses, farms, and vineyards after he had promised in reply to the allied admirals that he would put a stop to the devastation on shore, and cause his fleet to remain at Navarino, is pretty well known, and belongs to another history. Ibrahim Pasha, and his father the viceroy, Mohammed Ali, had possibly reached such a pitch of arrogance that they thought the European powers would not commence actual hostilities, or they perhaps counted on the friendly offices of France to restrain the other powers at the last moment; for France was constantly at the elbow of the viceroy, and still had a hankering after the establishment of a dominating influence in Egypt.

At anyrate, it soon became evident that the dogged obstinacy of the Turkish and Egyptian commanders was immovable except, by some forcible demonstration, and the entrance of the allied squadron into the Bay of Navarino, there to keep in check the Ottoman fleet, would itself have been of little effect if it could have been possible to prevent some accidental or intentional display of hostility which would end in a decisive engagement.

The relative situation of the European powers, Turkey, and Egypt was, that while the allies were endeavouring to negotiate with the government of the sultan for securing an armistice, Ibrahim was prosecuting the war in Greece in a manner so savage as to raise the indignation of civilized peoples. On being assured by the allied admirals that, if he continued hostilities, he would probably lose his fleet, and injure the real interests of his sovereign the sultan, he agreed to stay further acts of devastation on shore, and to keep the fleet at Navarino so as to prevent it from engaging in any further hostilities against Greece, until he had instructions from Constantinople. On the strength of this promise the allied squadrons departed, leaving only one English and a French frigate to watch the harbour of Navarino. As soon as the squadrons were out of sight, Ibrahim, entirely disregarding his agreement, and, it may be presumed, acting quite independently of any advices for which he professed to be waiting, put to sea for the purpose of descending on Patras. The British admiral, Sir Edward Codrington, was then at Zante with his own ship of the line, one frigate, and two brigs, and on the intelligence reaching him he sailed at once to intercept, if possible, the vessels that had thus treacherously left the harbour. He discovered that they were nine corvettes, two brigs, and nineteen transports on the way round the Morea and keeping near the coast. After he had made ready for action, he sent a message that they must return to Navarino; and, as they had already heard that British admirals were not to be trifled with, they obeyed. But this did not put an end to the massacres and cruelties which were perpetrated by the troops on shore, and it was determined to take the allied fleet into Navarino Bay, and there by an imposing display of force again

seek to negotiate with Ibrahim for the purpose of putting an end to the sanguinary and barbarous conflict on terms which would be to the advantage of the porte.

It will be seen that Ibrahim, as representing his father Mohammed Ali, had already assumed an authority which was significant of coming events; but nothing was more likely than that the sultan, who might soon require European aid, was not unwilling to leave the Egyptian commander responsible for occurrences for which the porte might repudiate any immediate personal responsibility should they prove detrimental to Turkish interests. It can scarcely be doubted that the assumptions of Mohammed Ali, his increasing wealth, and the portentous army which he had organized, in addition to his acquisition of the territory of the tribal chiefs over whom he had acquired control, had already made the sultan uneasy and suspicious; and it is probable, because it would have been consistent with the usual Turkish policy, that he was purposely holding back, leaving Ibrahim to bear the brunt of European hostility, and so contriving matters that he himself might be able at some future time to temper defeat by asking for the aid of one or other of the powers against any aggressive act of insubordination on the part of the viceroy.

The course taken by the allied admirals was not resisted. The combined squadrons (26 ships of various rates with a total of 1324 guns) passed the Turkish batteries without a shot being fired at them, anchored in the harbour without interference, and close to the Turkish-Egyptian fleet of 79 ships crowded with men (but only three ships of the line), and 2240 guns. There they remained in silence, except for the occasional hum and stir on board one or other of the vessels, and the sound of a band of music practising on the deck of the British admiral's ship. It was a strange spectacle, and the result might have been expected. Every one was at high tension. The two fleets were like hounds in the leash ready to spring. Orders had been given that not a gun should be fired. The Turks were equally silent, both on board their vessels and in the batteries. Before the proposal for renewed negotiations could be conveyed, the inevitable spark fell that produced the

conflagration. A boat sent from one of the British frigates with a request for the removal of some Turco-Egyptian fire-ships from the entrance to the harbour, either was mistaken for a menace to the vessel which lay nearest to it, or its approach was made a pretext for an attack. A volley of small arms was fired into it, and the lieutenant in command, with several of the boat's crew, were killed. A couple of cannon shots fired into one of the ships of the squadron followed, and then the guns began to boom in a general cannonade. The attack was unexpected, but it did not take long for the British and French ships to clear for action, and very soon a storm of artillery shook the air.

The Turks and Egyptians fought with the utmost courage; but who could stand against the men of the French and English squadrons? The French officers not only vied with our own in courage and gallantry, but by their adroitness gave ready aid to our commanders, and generously yielded the leading position only to stand by us with fearless alacrity. So tremendous was the conflict, that at one time Sir Edward Codrington's ship, the *Asia*, which took the lead in the engagement, could not be seen, and it was feared that she had sunk; but when the smoke cleared and the admiral himself was seen alone upon the poop, his clothes torn with shot, and when the flag upon the topmast was visible fluttering in the murky air such a ringing cheer went up from the whole combined squadron that it sounded like a shout of victory; as, indeed, it was. This battle liberated Greece from the Ottoman tyranny; it also proved to the viceroy and his son that they had underestimated the determination and the force of the British character, for they discovered, not only that the alliance was of British origin, but that the destruction of their navy and the crushing defeat at Navarino was caused by their having paltered with the assurance they had given to the admirals. They had not calculated that the calm patience and endurance of the English officers was the result of confidence, and that prompt and effectual action was to be the result of the refusal to consider the offers made to the sultan.

As a confirmation of the suggestions already made in reference

to the attitude assumed by the Sultan Mahmoud, it should be noted that when the intelligence of the utter defeat and destruction of a large part of the fleet at Navarino was carried to Constantinople he showed little emotion and no anger. The ambassadors of England, France, and Russia were allowed to depart without the slightest molestation, though it must be remembered that war had not been declared when the attack made upon the despatch boat precipitated this tremendous battle. The ambassadors, of course, left the Turkish capital, but many of their countrymen who chose to remain were placed under the protection of the law, and were in complete security.

Mohammed Ali was now sixty-three years old, and while his son Ibrahim Pasha was actively employed in the wars in Arabia and against Greece, the viceroy was as fully engaged in developing the resources of Egypt and organizing numerous schemes for improvement, in which he sought the assistance of Europeans, particularly of the French. Unfortunately for him, and particularly at a later date, Egypt was becoming a resort for a great many adventurers, who, as the phrase ran, went "to look after the piastres." He continued, however, to intrust to Europeans the management of certain subordinate departments of his government, and in this respect Ibrahim Pasha was in complete accord with him, so that everywhere in Egypt the antagonism to the Franks, which still characterized the Turks, was being broken down by the energetic determination of the pasha to employ Frenchmen in the army, Englishmen in the navy, and English, French, and Italians in several civil offices. Many of the higher class of Turks both at Cairo and Alexandria began to adopt some of the manners of Europeans, such as sitting on chairs, using knives and forks at table, and glass or porcelain drinking vessels. Ibrahim Pasha himself employed a French cook when he was not on a campaign, and sometimes, it was said, indulged rather freely in wine and brandy. Mohammed Ali, however, retained personally the old fashions, even when he received European visitors, as he frequently did, though he had to employ an interpreter. A story is told of a lady who accompanied a friend, escorted by some gentlemen, to

dine with the pasha. The party sat in the Turkish manner on a divan, round a low table or tray on which the viands were placed, and his highness paid her the compliment of depositing on her plate a choice portion of meat which he had taken with his hand from the dish. As the keen and expressive eye of Mohammed Ali was upon her, and a smile of benignity illumined his rather commonplace, but still strongly marked, features, she asked her female friend in a whisper what she was to do with the tempting morsel. "Do! why, eat it, to be sure," was the reply; an injunction which she at once carried out, to the apparent satisfaction of the host, whose countenance continued to beam upon her. Probably the old fox, though he did not understand English, knew perfectly well what was said, for one of his most remarkable gifts was the ability to read the thoughts of others, and to conceal his knowledge of them by a serene unaltered smile or grave attention to what was being *said*, that he might reply to it with diplomatic courtesy and hoodwink the unhappy individual who fancied that fair words had covered some treacherous attention. His son Ibrahim also possessed the faculty of reading in people's faces, or in their manner of speaking, the thoughts which their words were intended to conceal, and the accomplishment often proved to be valuable to himself and dangerous to his enemies.

It need scarcely be said that the viceroy and his probable successor to the pashalik profited by their frequent association with the more cultured Europeans, who held positions of confidence. We have already noted that Mohammed could neither read nor write till he was forty years old; and though Ibrahim had learned much more than most of his Egyptian officers, his accomplishments were chiefly those of a general. As a general, too, his character was severe, and in war he allowed or even directed unnecessary cruelties to be perpetrated on those who opposed him, but he had at the same time a very strict sense of justice. The army learned to respect him, and those who were in his confidence entertained a sincere esteem for his character; for in spite of the treachery, which appeared to be regarded by the Turks as only a necessary weapon of government, he possessed

a certain degree of integrity, while his courage and fortitude were beyond question. Both he and the viceroy had an honest admiration for the fearless outspokening of some of the Englishmen who were in their service, or with whom they came into accidental communication. As they were neither of them cowards, and only prevaricated profoundly when they thought it to be necessary to their own advantage; and as they were for the most part surrounded by obsequious dissimulators, and men who were ready to promise anything and to do anything within their power for a sufficient bribe, they could not always believe that a British ambassador, for instance, would refuse the offer of a jewelled sword, or that a naval commander in their pay would firmly decline to take his share of a second bottle of champagne—when invited to do so by Ibrahim—even though the pasha flew into a rage at his refusal, and told him that he was the only man who would dare to pass such a slight upon him.

Both these instances occurred among many others, and, as subsequent events proved, the viceroy as well as Ibrahim profited by the reliance they learned to place on British firmness and independence.

The protection afforded to Europeans in Alexandria and Cairo was in fact sufficient to arouse the jealousy of Turks and Egyptians. Some German workmen who hustled a Turk of some distinction while he was passing along a street, and when he drew his sword in self-defence wrested it from him and handled him rather roughly, were only punished by a reprimand and a day in the guard-house, and in many instances considerable indulgence was granted for offences which, if they had been committed by natives, would have been severely resented. Some English sailors ashore on leave amused themselves by seizing a small fort and holding it in defiance of the garrison of three or four soldiers, whom they overpowered and tied neck and heels. They were eventually captured, and their offence was brought under the notice of the pasha, who laughed at what he recognized to be only an escapade of the British blue-jacket. They had been locked up for a few hours, and then were handed over to the English consul, who

had orders to get them on board their ship again as quickly as possible.

A more ludicrous story of the tolerance of the viceroy for the British sailor, for whose rough humour and defiant reckless daring Mohammed Ali seems to have had genuine admiration, is told by Dr. Yates in his narrative of experiences in Egypt. It happened in Alexandria that a weather-beaten jack tar, one of the old species belonging to an English frigate lying at anchor in the roads, endeavoured to introduce himself with polite attentions to some Egyptian ladies who were returning from their usual weekly visit to the baths. This son of Neptune was taken before the pasha himself in the dockyard charged with causing a disturbance, proofs of which appeared on the faces of two Arabs of the guard, who in the endeavour to arrest the prisoner had had their heads punched to such an extent that they could scarcely distinguish the pasha from his officers. Jack had at last been overpowered by numbers, but not before he had bestowed upon his original assailants, not only a drubbing but various choice epithets in the vernacular of Portsmouth. His highness was entirely unable to comprehend how an unarmed man could have contrived so to disfigure their faces; and at last Galloway Bey, one of his English officers, by way of illustration, told the sailor to "let the pasha see *how he did it*." The man-of-war's man, delighted to hear the round tones of his native idiom once more—being, as he thought, "in the hands of the Philistines"—replied at the top of his voice, "Aye! aye! sir!" And, suiting the action to the word, "hitched up" his trousers, and began "squaring" at a group of soldiers that stood near, knocked one of them down, gave a back-handed blow to the second, and simultaneously putting out his foot capsized a colonel of artillery, who in the scuffle was trying to get out of the way. Mohammed Ali enjoyed the joke as much as anybody; for in all his experience he had never witnessed such a scene before. Our hero, having been admonished by his countryman, was sent "under convoy" to the Mahmoudieh, or landing-place, where he said he should find his comrades and the ship's boat. Being told to depart, he gave his trousers another "hitch," kicked out his right

foot significantly, and rolled out of the yard, muttering words of mysterious import, and making grimaces at everybody he met.

After the battle of Navarino, when the Egyptian army evacuated the Morea, Mohammed Ali, who was "biding his time," made the losses he had sustained in Greece, together with the advantages likely to accrue to the sultan from his campaigns against the Wahabees and the Nubians, a pretext for strong claims upon the porte. He demanded the pashaliks of Acria and Damascus. The island of Candia was assigned to him instead; but this not being what he wanted, and altogether inadequate to his demands, he pretended to take umbrage, and subsequently withheld his aid when it was most needed, allowing the Sultan Mahmoud to fight his own battles against the Russians. The treaty of Adrianople, in September, 1829, established the independence of the Greek States; and soon after, Otho of Bavaria was placed on the throne by the five powers. Mohammed Ali was not idle all this time. He watched the proceedings of the sultan with the eye of a lynx, and secretly fomented discord in the Turkish provinces. It was at that time that he had become sufficiently acquainted with Europeans to desire their services and invite them to his dominions; but he was rash; he deceived others, and was deceived himself. Tempted by the hope of gain, all sorts of characters flocked around him; now and then he met with clever men, but seldom with talent, experience, and principle united. He was very desirous of extending his marine. He passed a great deal of his time at the arsenal at Alexandria, and caused four frigates and several smaller vessels to be built in rapid succession under the superintendence of Monsieur Cerisier, a French engineer, whom he appointed to the head of the dockyard. Two ships of the line were then laid down, and his first three-decker of 110 guns was launched on the 3rd of January, 1831. About the same time he purchased a large frigate of the English, which was sent out under the command of Captain Prissick, R.N., who allowed himself to be persuaded to remain in the pasha's service.

The viceroy continued his warlike preparations with unremitting perseverance. Ibrahim raised a body of cavalry; several new

regiments of infantry were organized on the European system; and in the course of about four years from twenty-six to thirty sail were added to the Egyptian navy. Sanguine of success, the pasha determined to *take* what his master had denied; he had no difficulty in finding a pretext for waging war with Abd-allah, Pasha of Acria, who locked himself up in his stronghold with immense stores and a garrison of 3000 men. Ibrahim may be said to have commenced the siege on the 27th of November, 1831, but being opposed by the inhabitants of the neighbouring districts did not finally take possession of the citadel until the 27th of May following, although he had been joined by the Emir Beschir and the Druses of Lebanon. He was able to depend on very few of his officers; and the expedition cost the viceroy between 4000 and 5000 men. Abd-allah, who on various occasions had made himself obnoxious to the sultan, was now sent a prisoner to the Bosphorus; the sultan became exasperated at the pasha's assurance, and on the 14th of March, 1832, despatched Hussein, whom he had previously employed to destroy the Janizaries (and whom he now appointed Pasha of Egypt in Mohammed Ali's stead), with an army to attack Ibrahim, who, as well as his father, was anathematized by the Sheikh ul Islam. A fleet was also despatched to the Levant. To show his contempt for this, the viceroy induced the Sheriff of Mekka to issue a similar bull or fethwa against the sultan, declaring him the enemy of the Prophet; and Ibrahim immediately took possession of Damascus. He entered the city on the 15th of June, and hearing of the advance of 20,000 Turks proceeded to give them battle; the whole of his available force did not exceed 16,000, nevertheless he completely routed them, taking twelve guns and 3000 prisoners.

On the 17th of July he became master of Aleppo. It is to be feared his soldiers committed great excesses there, for we are assured on good authority that a population of 200,000 was reduced to 75,000. Elated with so large a share of prosperity, the Egyptians engaged the enemy again at Beylau, in the north of Syria, beat them and carried off twenty-five pieces of cannon—subsequently crossing the Taurus from Adana, they encamped in the

plains of Anatolia, having destroyed no less than 70,000 men in two battles. On the 18th of November they entered Konieh; the whole country was panic-struck, and it was confidently expected that Ibrahim would order them to march upon the capital.

He was well aware, however, that the Russians were ready to espouse the cause of the sultan, though the other European powers delayed to interfere. He determined, therefore, to recruit his army, and to wait until he was compelled to defend himself. He might now be said to have conquered Syria. He concentrated a large force at Aleppo and Damascus, and the efforts made by the porte to resist his advance were unsuccessful as his army was far superior to the Turkish forces which were brought against him. Between Konieh and Constantinople there was no apparent check to his victorious troops. He advanced to Broussa, at the foot of the Bithynian Olympus, and only about three forced marches from the capital of the sultan.

The assumptions of the viceroy had been largely encouraged by his French advisers, and he was certainly led to expect that he would eventually have the support of France. Before the revolution which dethroned Charles X. the French government had sent a powerful fleet and a large army to Algiers, and taken possession of the city and the neighbouring country. It was at first represented that only a temporary occupation was intended, one of the objects of which was the suppression of the Algerine pirates; but, having once gained complete possession, and the dey having retired to Italy, it was discovered that as France required African possessions to balance the British interest in India and the West Indies, the territory that had been acquired would become a French dependency. The revolution which ended in the accession of Louis Philippe, made, of course, no change in this respect, and it also soon became evident that the designs of former French governments to maintain a preponderating influence over Egyptian affairs had been transmitted to the ministry of the citizen king.

But the revolution was not well over, Louis Philippe was not yet quite so firmly seated on the throne as to enter with energy into foreign expeditions, and consequently no step was taken by

France to support the extraordinary demands of Mohammed Ali by giving him any definite or material aid, but most that was done, or rather said, by the Frenchmen at Constantinople tended rather to aggravate the impending mischief. England, on the other hand, had just passed through, not a revolution or an insurrection, but a tremendous political crisis. The air was still full of the Reform Bill and of reduced taxation. There was much to attend to at home, and we had already undertaken interpositions in the affairs of Greece and of Portugal, so that it seemed as though our interests in Egypt had been lost sight of.

This was the moment for Russia to offer her assistance to the porte, with the view of obtaining supremacy in European Turkey, and controlling the counsels of the sultan. The czar could send a sufficient force from the ports of the Black Sea, in the time that would be occupied by the despatch of ambassadors and promises of assistance from the other great powers. The sultan seemed to have no prospect of immediate aid except from Russia, and he had reason to fear that the conquering pasha would soon be at his gates. He sent to ask for the help which the czar was waiting to send—help both by sea and land—and on the 20th of February, 1833, a fleet from Sebastopol anchored at the entrance of the Bosphorus.

Admiral Roussin, the French ambassador at the porte, became alarmed, and as he could not prevail on the Turkish government to send the Russian fleet back, he exerted himself to draw up a treaty of peace, which was to be sent to the viceroy, with the threat that unless he accepted it he would see the French and English fleets on the coast of Egypt. The treaty would have left Mohammed Ali in possession of St. Jean d'Acre, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, but he actually demanded the whole of Syria and the adjoining territory of Adana, giving him authority as far as Mount Taurus. He probably thought that the opposition of France and England to the supremacy which would be gained by Russia in an occupation of Asia Minor would enable him to obtain, at all events, more than was offered him; and in this he calculated with his usual cunning. He sent orders to Ibrahim to continue his advance

towards Constantinople; the Sultan Mahmoud applied again to the czar. Before the end of April 15,000 Russians were landed at Scutari, on the Asiatic side of Constantinople, and encamped between the army of Ibrahim Pasha and the Bosphorus, while the Russian fleet stopped the passage of the Bosphorus itself, and another army was coming from the Danube. Then the other powers began to perceive that the plans of the czar must be defeated, and the sultan was naturally anxious to be set free from the probable future menace of the Russian army in his dominions, and from the immediate danger of the victorious army of the Egyptian pasha; since, whatever might be the result of a war, he was certain to have to pay dearly for it both in money and in the loss of territory. It would be easier to deal with Egypt than with Russia, as the latter had been invited to assist him, while the viceroy was his vassal, incurring the displeasure of the great powers of Europe by his contumacy. Again a French ambassador was authorized to treat with Ibrahim, who, being perhaps acquainted with the difficulties of the situation, still held out, and finally his demands were complied with—he received not only Aleppo but Adana—and on the conclusion of the treaty at once recrossed the Taurus, the Russian troops and fleet soon afterwards taking their departure. But Russia had its reward in a treaty made soon afterwards, by which, the czar was to assist the sultan in repressing any future internal aggressions, and in return was to be entitled to demand of the sultan, that under certain circumstances the passage of the Dardanelles should be closed against the ships of all other nations. This was an artful stroke, and aroused much resentment both in France and England; but as they had given no aid to the sultan in his need, and had left the initiative to Russia, they were compelled to endure it.

From whatever point of view it might have been regarded, the treason of Mohammed Ali could not reasonably be endorsed by any firmly constituted government. He was the vassal of the sultan, had been made viceroy in Egypt only by the authority of the Ottoman government, whatever may have been the degree of influence exerted upon them by his own daring and effrontery,

and he had never been acknowledged by any power as holding a position higher than that of the viceroy of the imperial ruler of Turkey and Egypt, and paying (or owing) annual tribute. He had not even the excuse of national impulses, for he was not a native of the country, and had so little sympathy with the national peculiarities or characteristics that it required all his extraordinary astuteness and all the immense improvements which he undoubtedly effected, to overcome the dislike with which his exactions, no less than his innovations, were regarded by the people. At all events, the circumstances under which, as a rebellious governor, he had set himself above his sovereign, and taken advantage of diplomatic complications to demand a large accession of territory, were not considered to be such as to make binding the promise or concession which had been thus illegally extorted from the Sultan Mahmoud. The world had grown older since the Memlook dynasties gained the throne by assassination, and all Europe left them to fight out their quarrels among themselves. If Mohammed Ali's object was to carry modern civilization into Egypt he must submit to the civilized modes of government, and observe the conditions by which alone his authority as the viceroy of the sultan had been recognized. Beside this, it had become of the utmost importance to the great nations of Europe that the government of Egypt in its relation to Turkey should be maintained on a soundly constituted basis.

These were the main arguments in favour of the decision of the sultan to cancel the extorted concession. Other reasons may have been found in the continued plotting of the viceroy and of Ibrahim Pasha to undermine his authority, foment revolts in the provinces, and make attempts which could only be explained by an intention to aim at the imperial power. At anyrate, Mahmoud determined to regain Syria by means of an invading army and the support which he expected to receive from the European powers. No doubt Mohammed Ali and his son were quite aware of the decision, and had been expecting it, and they must also have known, or they very quickly learned, that, though the French in their service continued to encourage them to renewed resistance,

and that there was a great probability of the government of France supporting some of their pretensions, the united determination of England, Austria, Russia, and Prussia to support the Ottoman claim would make it impossible for the viceroy to make any long resistance.

The sultan was sick. He was no more than fifty-four years old; but an anxious and tumultuous life, and his recent endeavour to banish cares by dissipation and excess, had enfeebled him. Proclamations were issued without being enforced; divans were summoned; the European ministers were consulted; and troops were levied, marched about, and recalled; but nothing of any consequence was done till the spring of 1839. It appeared as if a decisive blow was then to be struck; for suddenly a movement was made towards the Euphrates. A force amounting to not less than 35,000 men, under the command of Hafiz Pasha (aided by several Prussian officers), assembled on the right bank of the river, and laid siege to about sixty villages. On the 22nd of May they fortified themselves at Nezib; and two days afterwards, falling in with the Egyptian outposts and the division of Suleiman Bey at Ouroul, some desperate skirmishing took place, which became the signal for Ibrahim to advance from Aleppo. Having carefully reconnoitred the enemy, he made a few manœuvres with a view of getting, if possible, into their rear, not liking their position. The two armies were numerically equal; but he could not depend on all his troops; and, feeling that this battle, if well contested, might lead to the overthrow of the sultan's cause, he boldly placed himself between his antagonists and the Euphrates, thinking to prevent the possibility of desertion. Nevertheless, 1800 of his Syrian Guards joined the Turks during the action, and several disaffected corps quitted their ranks, and were dispersed at the very onset. The engagement took place on the 24th of June, 1839; and, as usual, was decided in favour of Ibrahim. The Ottoman army was completely defeated; and those that escaped the carnage were plundered by the wandering tribes, while numbers died in the desert from their wounds or for want of food and water.

Three days after this battle the Sultan Mahmoud died, and his son Abdul Medjid, a sickly youth of sixteen years old, who succeeded him, offered the rebellious pasha full pardon for the past and the hereditary viceroyalty of Egypt if he would return to his allegiance. Mohammed Ali persisted in his demand for the possession of Syria, still relying upon the support of France, if not to accomplish his ambition, at least to secure other concessions or to procure delay, during which new opportunities might arise by foreign political complications.

It happened, however, that he had England to deal with, and England as represented in the foreign office by Lord Palmerston. Having once determined to interpose, our government was on this occasion not inclined to be dilatory, especially as the viceroy had been still further put out of court by the fact that the Turkish lord high admiral or capitan pasha, instead of preparing to attack the forts in Syria, sailed his fleet through the Dardanelles, but took it to Alexandria, where he delivered it up to Mohammed Ali, in return, it was believed, for an enormous bribe. The five great European powers then informed the porte that they intended to meet to discuss and settle the embarrassed question, and a conference was held in London early in 1840, in which the representatives of the powers met that they might bring matters to a definite understanding. This settlement, which was afterwards known as the Brunnow convention, after M. le Baron Brunnow, the able minister from the court of St. Petersburg, was not come to without the delay on which perhaps Mohammed Ali had counted, and, as he expected, it was France that stood in the way of a settlement.

Of course the first demand was that he should restore the Turkish fleet, and then there arose a rumour that England, Austria, and Russia had agreed that he should be compelled immediately to evacuate Syria before any proposition could be entertained with regard to his retaining hereditary authority over any part of Syria or Egypt.

Mohammed Ali at once prepared to resist. He daily inspected the Turco-Egyptian fleet, and, it was said, became highly popular with the Turkish officers and seamen. A levy of troops *en masse*

was ordered. The workmen in factories and industrial workshops in Cairo were formed into a militia and drilled, and it was said that the entire body of men in that city amounted to 30,000.

Ibrahim Pasha was still in command of the army in Syria; and to make that army effective both Egypt and Syria had been drained of effective men. It appeared as though Mohammed intended to make a determined fight if force should be employed against him, for he had these Syrian troops amounting to 70,000 men, 36,000 men on board the squadron capable of service either by sea or land, and upwards of 50,000 Bedouin Arabs, beside a large number of irregulars such as some of those to whom our army in the Soudan has been lately opposed.

The conference in London dragged its slow length along month after month. Early in March the young sultan at Constantinople had addressed to his council and the high functionaries of the empire a speech modelled after the fashion of those delivered by constitutional sovereigns. The council and ministers had been reorganized the year before, and the speech declared that since that time every subject brought before them had been discussed freely and impartially, that the whole system of finance was being reformed, that judges paid by adequate fixed salaries had been appointed, and the police of the country had been placed on a more efficient footing. An anxious desire was expressed to put an end to abuses and to promote a general reform. An address was adopted by the council accepting and reiterating these assurances, and to this the sultan affixed his endorsement, in which he stated his intention to present himself before the council at the commencement of each year, for the purpose of making known his opinions on public affairs.

While these assurances were being made in Constantinople there were imminent disturbances in some parts of the territory claimed by Mohammed Ali. On the 27th of May a violent insurrection broke out at Lebanon, in Syria, among the Druses and Christians against the emir and the Egyptian government. The discontent already existing because of the taxes exacted by Mohammed and the conscription for the army with which he

prepared to oppose the sultan, had prepared for the revolt, and the immediate or pretended occasion for it was an order which he issued to the emir to take away the arms which had formerly been distributed among the Druses and Christians of the mountains for their defence. This order, the insurgents alleged, was to prevent them from resisting future extortionate demands.

The main obstacle to the settlement of the question by the conference of the five powers in London, was the continued opposition of France and the persuasion of Mohammed Ali, that he had only to prolong his resistance till substantial aid from France would reach him. All that did reach him were vague hints of support, which he soon had reason to doubt, and at last, instead even of that "moral support" which he had been promised, he had to smother his wrath at the receipt of a message which amounted to little more than that France would continue to regard him with friendly sentiments, if he would submit to the demands which he had resisted, under the impression that he had the French government for his powerful ally.

Almost immediately after the meeting of the conference in London, the French representative announced that he could not agree to the terms proposed for settling the affairs of the Levant. Upon this Lord Palmerston politely, but in unmistakable terms, replied that though the non-concurrence of France was to be deeply regretted, as the other powers had agreed on the terms, it might be possible to settle the questions without France continuing to give her practical aid, though the conference would still hope for her moral support.

It was this which led to the false confidence of the viceroy. France could not have her own way, and therefore encouraged Mohammed Ali to continue to resist, much to his injury, as he afterwards discovered.

The French minister had, in fact, declared that no objection was offered to the arrangements proposed to be made with Mohammed Ali, provided that Mohammed consented to them, but that considerations of various kinds made it impossible for the French government to join in coercive measures against the

viceroys. This was a significant declaration, and was about as trustworthy as a circular message which was despatched a few days after by Mohammed Ali to all the pashas of the empire, intimating that the intrigues of Khusrouf Pasha were the cause of the attack on his troops by the army of the sultan. That on learning the accession of Abdul Medjid he (Mohammed) had ordered Ibrahim not to follow up his advantages: that on hearing of the appointment of Khusrouf as vizier he felt convinced that the ascendancy of that minister must be destructive to the empire: that Achmet, the capitan pasha, was of the same opinion, and acted upon it by keeping his fleet out of the power of Khusrouf and uniting it with the fleet of Alexandria, in order that the joint fleets might be in a position to serve the sovereign and the nation. The circular also said that Mohammed Ali had received the capitan pasha with distinction, had written to Khusrouf Pasha urging him to send in his resignation, and had also written to the mother and aunt of the sultan, and to the sheikh ul Islam, and Habil Pasha, entreating them to co-operate for the removal of the vizier in order to save the country. This message is a very suggestive example of the skill of the viceroy in putting a plausible construction on acts, of the treachery of which there could be no doubt, though it was, of course, probable that the advice of the vizier coincided with the determination of the Sultan Mahmoud to endeavour to recover Syria. Six of Mohammed's couriers, with the circular message in their possession, were seized and detained.

The treaty between the four powers was signed. France was left out of it, and refused to consent to hostilities. That the convention should have been made without them incensed the French ministry. While Marshal Soult was at the head of affairs the military element made a violent demonstration of anger—when he gave place to Thiers aggressive declarations increased and violent denunciations were expressed. Diplomatic language amidst a multiplicity of notes and despatches represented that in the opinion of France the “prince vassal” (Mohammed Ali), having succeeded in establishing a firm rule in two provinces, ought now to be considered an essential and necessary part of

the Ottoman Empire, and also that the deposition of the viceroy if put in force would be a blow given to the general equilibrium. "The question of the limits which ought to be established in Syria in order to divide the possessions of the sultan from those of the Viceroy of Egypt, might with safety be left to the chances of the war now actually in progress, but France cannot prevail upon herself to abandon to such a chance the existence of Mohammed Ali as prince vassal of the empire. Whatever territorial limits may ultimately separate the two powers by the fortune of war, their continued dual existence is necessary to Europe, and France cannot consent to admit the suppression of either the one or the other;" and so on.

There is no telling what might have happened if Thiers had remained at the head of the French government. It came out that he was called upon to resign because of warlike language that had been put into the king's speech for the opening of the chamber. M. Guizot was called upon to form a ministry, and Thiers went into opposition, when it appeared that he had been ready to resent the insult passed upon France by the convention of the other powers to a treaty which she had refused to endorse. He would have demanded a modification of the treaty, and if the rest of Europe had said, If you do not consent to do a thing we will do it without you, he would have gone to war with the rest of Europe. Words and tempers ran high in the French assembly. In the opposition something was actually said about France herself taking possession of Turkey. Fortunately there were calmer tempers and cooler heads in the majority. Lamartine had said that the proposition to occupy Egypt and Syria would naturally never be consented to by England, nor was it reasonable it should be, as the demand for the occupation of the high-road to India would cause another European war. Marshal Bugeaud, too, opposed the war fever in a speech of great common sense. Still there could be no doubt that the king, the ministry, and the nation were aroused to a remarkable pitch of anger, and at one time it seemed as though war would actually be declared, for military preparations were set on foot. Mohammed Ali, seeing France

in this temper, and supposing that mutual distrust would keep the other powers from commencing hostilities against him, continued to hold out. He had an army of 30,000 men, and the combined fleets, beside which the season was approaching when the African coast would be too dangerous for the operations of an invasion.

But there were other forces with which the French government had to count in reckoning upon the chances of European war. Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, afterwards Napoleon III., had made his attempt to rouse adherents in France. The body of the Emperor Napoleon I. was about to be brought from St. Helena to the Invalides; there was widely spread disaffection against the government, and numerous secret societies gave sinister evidence that they were in active operation. Ordinances were issued for mobilizing the national guard, immensely increasing the navy, and making such provisions as would indicate a hostile attitude, and these were hailed with acclamation; but it was discovered that Paris itself was unprotected against an invader, and it was proposed to surround it with fortifications. The objects of the military preparations were not quite clear, and the warlike disposition, fomented by the successes against Abd-el-Kader and his Arab forces at Milianah, caused still further excitement.

The treaty which had been effected between the four European powers was put in execution, and Mohammed Ali was offered the choice of retaining Egypt as a hereditary pashalik, with the government of Acre during his own lifetime, on condition of his submitting within ten days. If he did not decide within that time he would have no option but to retain Egypt alone; while after twenty days, hostilities would be at once commenced against him.

The pasha was obstinate to the last, and refused all terms; but there was to be no more temporizing on the part of the western powers. The treaty between the four powers was ratified on the 15th of September, 1840, and by the beginning of October a British fleet, under the command of Commodore Sir Charles Napier, aided by Austrian naval and land forces, reduced the city of Beyrout, on the Syrian coast, and captured the Egyptian fleet. There was tremendous excitement in Paris at the intelligence, the

ministry was denounced, the Marseillaise was called for and sung at the theatres on the demand of the audiences, and there was a general warlike outcry. The government was alarmed, military preparations appeared to be pushed on, and large additions were made to the regular army.

It was futile, however, for France to persist in the appearance of supporting Mohammed Ali, who, as Lord Palmerston pointed out, was to be dealt with, not in opposition to his being a "prince vassal," but because he *was* a vassal in rebellion, and claiming imperial rights against his master and sovereign. Mohammed himself saw that it was useless any longer to delay because of the representations of his advisers that the French government would support him. More important to him were the strong assurances of the English that though the British government demanded his submission, it would aid him in retaining the hereditary pashalik of Egypt. This representation, he afterwards found, was in no degree exaggerated.

His army was now compelled to retreat on St. Jean d'Acre. An insurrection against him was spreading all over Syria, among the people who had suffered from his oppressions and those of the military rule of Ibrahim. The chief of the Druses of Lebanon sided with the allies.

On the 29th of October M. Thiers was obliged to resign the ministry of foreign affairs in France, and M. Guizot succeeded him, and immediately ventured to show a pacific policy and a friendly disposition towards England. He desired to conciliate rather than to defy and denounce the other powers of Europe; and it was time that this policy should have been adopted, for the commercial and financial credit of France was already suffering, and new credits had to be opened, to the detriment of the exchequer. Guizot at once declared that he should accept the decision of the other powers against the Viceroy of Egypt without any material opposition from France.

By that time the hopes of Mohammed were at an end, so far as Syria was concerned; the terrific bombardment of St. Jean d'Acre had destroyed it in less than four hours. The Egyptians lost

more than 2000 men, killed and wounded; while the British counted only twelve killed and forty-two wounded. The British fleet was threatening to open fire on Alexandria, when, on the 27th of November, Mohammed Ali—the remnant of his army having left Syria—accepted the terms offered him, and signed a convention, by which he restored the Turkish fleet, and relinquished possession of Syria on the condition that the pashalik of Egypt should be conferred on him and his hereditary successors as tributaries of the sublime porte.

The story of the revolt of the viceroy, of the attitude of France, and of the complication which brought about this European interposition in the affairs of Egypt will be seen to have no little significance in relation to the events depicted in subsequent pages of this history.

CHAPTER II.

Enterprise of the Pasha. Foreigners in Egypt. Progress of Agriculture. Land Tenure. Oppression of the People. Fellaheen. Population. Public Works. Education. Death of Mohammed Ali. Ibrahim. Abbas Pasha. Assassination. Said Pasha. The Burden of Egypt. Debt. The Slave-trade. Exploration of the Nile. Railways. Ismail the Borrower. Attempts to Suppress the Slave-trade. Sir S. Baker. Gordon Governor-general. The Suez Canal. The Strange Story of Egyptian Finance.

Mohammed Ali was called a tyrant and an oppressor, and he deserved both titles; but it must be remembered that he became the ruler of a country where tyranny and oppression had for ages been the governing forces. Pictured records on the monuments are the representations of slavery, rapacious taxation, and enforced labour. Those institutions had been maintained through various dynasties, and had survived them all when the Albanian adventurer, who had defied his sovereign, was placed securely in his seat by a convention of the powers of Europe. The land was held by its cultivators on a feudal tenure of the worst kind, the taxes consisting of a large proportion of the produce of the soil, the value of which was fixed by the ruler or his subordinate officers, who were empowered to chastise reluctant peasants with the *kourbash*, a whip made of hippopotamus hide or of a thick sinew, and applied to the soles of the feet. This method of tax collecting was not invented by the pasha, and after a time he was not only able but willing to insist on some discrimination being exercised by his subordinates, so that rough justice, which has been said to be synonymous with revenge, was sometimes exercised upon local officers who were guilty of oppression for the purpose of securing excessive imposts, out of which they could take a percentage for themselves. The Egyptian fellahs were no worse off than other oriental or even some European tillers of the soil, though every product of their fields, from the date-tree to the patch of maize or millet, belonged less to themselves than to the pasha, inasmuch as he demanded the first gathering from the crops.

When the Syrian war was over, however, and Mohammed set



COLLECTING TAXES FROM A FELLAH BY THE AID OF THE KOURBASIL

SCENE IN A VILLAGE ON MESAUT LAK

THE KOURBASIL IS A VILLAGE ON MESAUT LAK



himself seriously to raise the condition of Egypt, it could not be denied that he went to work in earnest; and he succeeded. The recruiting of his armies had retarded the progress of agriculture by removing the labourers from the fields, but the discipline which he introduced and the protection that he was enabled to give to the people, relieved the country from the raids of bands of robbers, and made it comparatively safe for travellers through any part of his dominions, where only a few years before they could only have ventured to make a journey with a large and well-armed escort. He carried out numerous public works, buildings, bridges, arsenals, canals for supplying water and irrigating the land; and much suffering was endured by the labourers, men and women, who were compelled to join the gangs for removing the soft earth and heaping up the embankments, or for making bricks and hewing stones, but the results were of far greater importance than the construction of a vast mausoleum or a stupendous pyramid. The future civilization and prosperity of the country was the aim of this semi-barbarous ruler, who had lived to middle age without having learnt to read, and, now that he had reached threescore years and ten, had succeeded in re-establishing on a modern basis, schools which had been founded by the Caliphs, and had been suffered to decline and to become useless because of the obstinate antipathy of the Turks to the introduction of European improvements and discoveries, and the teaching of modern science.

Mohammed Ali, however, had at an earlier date sent several young men and boys to France to be instructed, and though their attainments were of rather a superficial kind, and they mostly returned to find that they were incapable of reducing their accomplishments to practice in the direction of public works or in the advancement of learning, they at least added to the number of the unprejudiced, and were ready to appreciate the value of the improvements which the pasha, with the assistance of European inventors, contractors, and craftsmen, was rapidly promoting.

His impatient eagerness to secure European assistants, however, led to one evil result, the effects of which have been of serious import in the later history of Egypt, and had a direct

influence in quite recent events. The rewards which appeared to be waiting for anyone who could obtain a commission from the pasha tempted a number of needy, ignorant, and unscrupulous adventurers. For some time before he had seriously commenced a regular reformation, Egypt had become the happy hunting-ground of many adventurers from Europe. As early as 1836 he was compelled to issue a decree in consequence of the disputes which were continually arising between such men and the authorities. The consuls were unable to settle these quarrels, and a number of men were sent out of the country on account of their violent conduct. The proclamation ordered that "every individual coming to Egypt for the purpose of establishing himself will be required, on his first arrival, to show that he has the means of existence, and to exhibit to the local government a guarantee from among the principal inhabitants of the country, who will be responsible for his moral conduct." This rule was also to be observed by everyone already established; and a third clause ordained that every captain of a vessel, bringing as passengers persons unable to give the securities required should be obliged at his own risk to convey them back to Europe. How far such a decree was, or could be, carried out, it would be difficult to say—for, assuredly, a good many incompetent, if not absolutely destitute, people continued to find their way to Alexandria and Cairo. It was no doubt extremely galling to those of the pasha's officers who were men of principle to find themselves perpetually associated with a set of adventurers who had neither manners nor morals. But these gentry did not always reap the reward which they had anticipated, and they, as well as their more conscientious colleagues, were often placed in an awkward position. A visitor to Egypt at that time wrote:—

"These men took every advantage in their power, did nothing, and were, many of them, thoroughly ignorant of their profession. If, however, the pasha was deceived by them, it is only fair to acknowledge that they also had been deceived by him; for it is notorious that he does not make good his promises; nothing that he says can be depended on. He was wont to offer largely to Europeans to induce them to come to Egypt; he raised their

expectations but did not satisfy their demands. He would put them off from time to time, under false pretences, and was always in arrears. The same system is still pursued. Those who would serve him faithfully are not appreciated, and they soon leave him in disgust, for they are not only badly paid, but insulted by those with whom they are compelled to associate. In fact, he has introduced such a medley of nations, languages, and character, that his service is anything but agreeable. It is, moreover, the most difficult thing imaginable to get any business done, even when people *are* disposed to work; for he has so many irons in the fire, and possesses such a prolific imagination, that whatever he hears of he is anxious to adopt, without considering how it is to be accomplished."

Mohammed Ali did not, till towards the end of his life, recognize that the real riches of Egypt consisted of its agricultural produce. The greater number of the youths were taken from many villages to fill the ranks of the pasha's army. Mr. St. John was informed that in a town on the Nile there remained twelve women to one man, and the cultivation of the sugar-cane had been abandoned for want of hands. Egypt became so depopulated that the fields could not be properly cultivated, and the government seized Arabs and dragged them to the tillage bound together two by two like galley slaves. But another reason for this dearth was the abandonment of the land by the former labourers, because the tenure by which it was held and the exactions of tax collectors had made its cultivation unproductive of any benefit to the actual tiller of the soil.

It is not necessary, even if space would permit, to trace the history of the system of land tenure in Egypt. The principle that the land was the property of the state was maintained by the Ottoman Turks under Sultans Selim and Suleyman after the conquest of the country; but for the purpose of facilitating the collection of the revenue, villages were conceded to tenants of the state (*multazim*), who were responsible for the payment of the amount of taxes at which the land was assessed, and themselves were permitted to levy a certain amount of taxes for their own benefit.

and to occupy a portion of the land. The government reserved authority to take back the land to itself at pleasure, but this power was seldom exercised, and the intermediate owner was permitted to bequeath, and in some cases to sell, the rights which he had acquired. The occupiers of holdings could also bequeath their holdings to their families, but they had no power either to sell or to abandon the land which they occupied; and if any of them died without heirs to whom the land would pass in order of succession, the multazim or feudal lord was obliged to find a tenant for it. The occupation and cultivation of the land thus became compulsory, and the administration of the land revenue was intrusted to a high official, the Defterdâr.

Under the Memlooks regular laws and a definite system of taxation gave place to an oppression all the more harassing because it was fitful, and depended on the whims or sudden needs of the rulers.

Mohammed Ali, after the destruction of the Memlooks, changed the system of land tenure by abolishing the multazims or lords of the villages, and making himself the immediate landlord and absolute controller of the soil. Had he been in the prime of life when he settled down, after relinquishing his ambitious schemes, he might have adopted some further laws after recognizing the enormous importance of promoting agriculture as the staple industry of the country; but he was an old man, and had already been made to feel that he must devote his remaining energies to securing the succession of the viceroyalty to his heirs.

The work of restoring the land to cultivation was also too great for him fully to accomplish. As we have seen, the country had in many parts been almost depopulated by the enormous drafts of men for the army and by the devastations of sickness. The soil was still fertile, the people industrious and willing, often eager, to return to the pacific occupation of agriculture, but considerable areas of land had ceased to be under cultivation, or had become unproductive through the loss of cattle by the murrain, and because of the want of means to maintain the small canals and simple means of fertilization on which the profitable cultivation depended.


The peasants of these villages were utterly destitute of the money that would restore their primitive works, and, therefore, leases for a certain period were granted to persons possessing sufficient capital, who were only called upon to pay the government a reduced sum as assessment. This was, in fact, a partial return to the old system, and in many cases, where villages were almost barren and their inhabitants destitute, though they were not permitted to abandon the land, the old tenure was restored with very little difference—the lordship of the land being granted to officers of state or wealthy persons, who became responsible for the payment of the taxes, and were able to assist the people to resume the tillage of the soil.

It can scarcely be wondered at that the viceroy should have made some of the largest and most important of these grants to members of his own family for the purpose of providing for their maintenance, and this plan has in fact been followed by successive pashas, but not without giving rise to some complications. It may be mentioned here that Abbas Pasha, who virtually succeeded Mohammed Ali, gave his son such a large landed property, and the grants represented such an extent of territory, that Said Pasha, his successor to the viceroyalty, was obliged to insist on the restoration to the government of all lands which had been thus held under the tenure of a *multazim*, for, as he not unreasonably declared, if the viceroy were empowered to make absolute grants of territory to members of his family, he would be able virtually to make over the whole country to any of them, leaving nothing but the mere title for the hereditary successor to the viceroyalty.

It may well be understood that considerable difficulties still prevented the complete development of agriculture even in the reclaimed villages. The pasha monopolized nearly all the productions of the soil and many of the most necessary articles which passed through the country. Thus the peasant, taxed by government agents or by proprietors whose interest it was to keep on good terms with the pasha, had to suffer the worst inflictions both of direct and indirect taxation. Or in other words, what should have been indirect taxation was in many cases made into a com-

pulsory impost. As an instance: the salt tax was one which pressed heavily on the people, and the inhabitants of several villages, oppressed with the burdens laid upon them, determined to forego the use of salt for a time except as an occasional luxury. This kind of resistance would not have been adopted had the tax not been increased till it became almost unbearable, for the Egyptians are great consumers of salt. Of course their abstinence caused some deficiency in the revenue, and for a short time the viceroy did not quite know how to meet this declaration of a right to abstain, which, of course, was a defiance of authority and could not be permitted. The remedy was easy. While the fellahs were congratulating themselves on the probable success of their plan for obtaining relief from the excessive impost, a number of government boats were observed to be mooring under the villages, and these were presently unladen and their freight piled upon the ground. An officer then demanded to see the Sheikh el Beled, and informed him that his highness the viceroy, having ascertained the quantity of salt formerly consumed, had forwarded the proper supply, and that he (the sheikh) would be held responsible for payment to the government.

Of course the monopolies of the pasha were subject to losses to the revenue because of the difficulty of discovering, among the Turks, honest and trustworthy agents, and the sale of merchandise was regulated to a great extent by a system of bribery between merchants and the officers who sold the produce which had been collected by the peasants and delivered at the different *shoonahs* or warehouses, established in the several towns and provinces in such numbers as to make it unnecessary to transport the commodities to any great distance from the place where they were produced. When they were delivered at the *shoonah* the articles were weighed or measured and an order on the treasury given for the money, the price having been previously fixed by the council. The order was received back from the peasant, at its full value, in payment of taxes, but there was usually so much delay in obtaining the balance that he was induced to sell it for a discount of from twenty to thirty per cent, that he might not have to apply to the



FELLAHEEN BRINGING THEIR PRODUCE TO A SIDONIAN OR DUTY TAX
WAREHOUSE, IN PAYMENT OF TAXES

treasury for it and be kept waiting. From the warehouses the goods were sent down to Alexandria as they were wanted, and there distributed among the different merchants, principally English, French, Italian, Greek, and Armenian. The introduction of olive-trees and *Cassia Fistula*, as well as other valuable trees and plants, was the result of the observations of Ibrahim Pasha in the Morea, and as we have already seen, the great fertility of the soil, the succession and immense variety of crops of cereals, pulse, fruits, and vegetables sufficed to make Egypt, under improved cultivation, perhaps the most productive country in the world.

But though the method of taxation was intelligible and impartial in its operation, and, therefore, to be preferred to the violent and cruel exactions of the Memlooks, who would pass through the country with a troop of horsemen seizing cattle, sheep, or grain, stripping the villagers, and frequently carrying off their women and children to slavery or worse, the burden placed on Egypt by Mohammed Ali was a heavy one. The organization which gave a degree of security and operated with impartiality, enabled the pasha greatly to increase the general imposts. The last coin which could be wrung from the fellah without reducing him to absolute beggary was demanded; while he was no longer subject to such constant and iniquitous exactions as those under which he had formerly suffered, he was systematically impoverished and depressed. It is perhaps impossible to buy law and order too dearly, and the peasantry, feeling the overwhelming burden, and yet with a sense of the blessing of not being subject to the wild raids, cruelties, and extortions that characterized their former oppressors, forbore to complain very loudly, or perhaps feared that such complaints might bring back their former sufferings. The feeling of security was new to them then. Their complaints have been both loud and deep since that time, and not without reason, though their condition was certainly improved a few years ago. Not contented with increasing taxation, Mohammed Ali contrived to considerably reduce the size of the feddān or Egyptian acre, so that the owner of 200 acres suddenly, and without knowing it, became possessor of 210, and

had to pay the taxes on that number. In the time of the Memlook beys the ordinary taxation had not exceeded, in average amount, from fourteen to eighteen piastres an acre in the inferior, and twenty-seven piastres in the most fertile districts. Under Mohammed Ali the taxation had nearly doubled, and from the fields around Cairo and the rice grounds of the Delta forty and sixty piastres was respectively levied.¹

Of course the want of discrimination in taxing the poor lands and the already impoverished peasantry at about an equal rate all round (the value of land being computed according to its proximity to a large city) produced disastrous results in many cases. Little or no regard was had to the fertility of the soil, and consequently to the value of the productions in various districts. In the district of Upper Egypt several hundred feddāns of inferior land were divided among the peasantry in proportion to their supposed means of cultivating them, and these they were compelled to till and tend for the purpose of paying the land tax, which frequently consumed nearly the whole produce. Worse still, the pasha was accused, not only of monopolizing trade and every article of produce, but of using this power to maintain an artificial scarcity, and, therefore, enhance the price, so that wheat purchased by the government in Upper Egypt was sold at Cairo for above four times its cost, and the price of common articles of food, like beans and millet, was raised in proportion.

St. John, who in 1834 wrote an account of his travels in Egypt under the rule of Mohammed Ali, observes that travellers appear not to have remarked the extraordinary family likeness discernible in the fellahs, who, he says, seem to have been all cast in the same mould; and he acutely remarks that this striking resemblance, which exists in character and manners no less than in features, probably prevailed also among the ancient Egyptians; hence that monotony observable in their sculptures and paintings. Despotism he regards as the primary cause of this phenomenon, for the multitude, all reduced to nearly the same level, urged by the same wants, engaged in the same pursuits, actuated by the same passions

¹ The feddān was $1\frac{1}{16}$ English acre before being reduced; the piastre about $2\frac{1}{2}d$. English.

through a long succession of ages, necessarily assimilate. Poverty depriving them of all pretensions to free agency, they are universally cringing, trembling, dissimulating. Fear is their habitual passion. Credulous, ignorant, superstitious, no man has the originality to be a heretic. In religion, morals, manners, and opinions the son treads servilely in the footsteps of his father, without inquiry, without reflection, nay even without the consciousness that nature has endowed him with the power to do otherwise. The fellah marries and begets children, who are allowed to run naked about the villages until the age of puberty; he then throws them a rag to bind about their loins; they begin to labour, become masters of a few piastres, and marrying in their turn run the same career as their parents. Both men and women, he affirms, are extremely profligate: the men inconstant, the women false and sensual.

The taxation of artisans, public officers, artisans' servants and employés, consisted of the demand for a month's stipend or income per annum, and the house tax consisted of one month's rent per annum assessed to the proprietor, whether the premises were occupied or not; which was scarcely less equitable than the plan of imposing a house tax on the tenant in addition to heavy rates which are computed on the basis of his rental, that rental being fixed, so far as assessment for taxation is concerned, by the authorities who themselves make the imposition of the rates.

These particulars of the agricultural condition of the country and the mode of taxation will be found to illustrate the subsequent history of European intervention in the financial concerns of Egypt; and it will be noticed that the system laid down by Mohammed Ali, though the whole scheme of land tenure was altered and the monopolies were relinquished by Said Pasha, had an abiding effect on the condition of the people. Whatever may have been subsequent improvements, in effect the astute old viceroy succeeded in laying the foundations of an independent government, and of what might have been made a prosperous national life. His view was comprehensive, his ambition powerful, and his ability extraordinary. In the cultivable country of Egypt

proper, extending for about 115,200 square miles (including the Nile bed and its islands), there were about 10,000 square miles watered by the river; but the increased irrigation soon extended the surface under tillage, and the institution of public works, and above all of colleges and technical schools by Mohammed Ali, laid the foundation of many more recent improvements in agriculture and in industrial arts and sciences. The institutions for public instruction, though they had many imperfections, were, at anyrate, the foundation of all the educational establishments now in operation. The college of Kasserlyne, on the right bank of the El-Rhondah Canal, was a kind of preparatory school for 1000 to 1200 youths of promising ability selected to be trained for various departments under government. They were fed and clothed by the state, that is by the viceroy, and provided with books, stationery, and pocket-money—an extension of free state education which is even now unusual in any other country. But as all the pupils practically became the property of the viceroy, and were to be at his disposal in whatever direction he might require their services, they were entirely dependent on his bounty. This college soon became disorganized. Everything was supposed to be regulated by strict discipline, which meant the application of the kourbash as a punishment; but the European professors having been dismissed and the senior pupils being set to teach the others, the amount of study soon diminished, the fine library of 12,000 volumes (chiefly French and Italian) became neglected, and the whole college became a scene of confusion, immorality, and sickness.

The School of Cadets, which was established at a former palace of Toussoon Pasha a little to the north of Ghizeh, was far more successful, for there Turks, Europeans, and Circassians were taught military engineering, drawing, fortification, horsemanship, and European and Oriental languages. There was also a school of artillery at Toura, where the pupils were taught the art of gunnery, mathematics, and languages; a school of engineers at Khanka for instruction in surveying, modelling, drawing, mining, and fortification; and a naval school in the arsenal at Alexandria

to teach shipbuilding and navigation, while every youth on board the Egyptian navy received some practical instruction in seamanship.

One of the most important institutions, however, was the School of Medicine, founded at Abou Zabel, near Cairo, with a hospital for receiving 600 patients, with a residence for professors and pupils separated from the hospital by a fine esplanade planted with orange-trees, sycamores, mimosas, and palms. In this college there was special instruction for women, who were taught obstetric surgery.

Thus it will be seen, not only that Mohammed Ali thoroughly appreciated the advantages which Europeans had derived from education, but that he was also anxious to hasten the advance of his country by the establishment of schools of various kinds, in some respects with provisions in advance of those to be found in European capitals. Nor did he neglect the consideration of the value of accomplishments, for an Academy of Music was founded at Cairo, where French and German professors instructed the pupils, particularly in instrumental music. Every ship in the navy was also provided with a band. The other schools or colleges were for teaching agriculture and veterinary surgery, the former including the art of irrigation, hydraulics, boring for water, and making roads.

It may be asked how it is that the people of Egypt should apparently have derived so little benefit from these institutions as to be obliged to employ foreigners in their larger engineering and other operations, and to show so little advance in the arts and sciences; but it must be remembered that not half a century has elapsed since Mohammed Ali commenced the development of Egyptian education; that some of the schools and colleges became disorganized, or never were properly provided with an efficient staff of competent teachers; that the government of the country has undergone many vicissitudes, and has been under the pressure of debt and of financial difficulties; while, above all, must be taken into account the amount of ignorance, superstition, obstinate resistance to innovation, and extreme indolence by which the people themselves are greatly characterized.

Another reason for failure was the impetuous determination of the viceroy to hasten the process of instruction and its reduction to practice. Himself uneducated, he seemed to have formed an idea that it only needed the establishment of schools, the appointment of teachers, and the application of a system resembling that of the schools of France and England to secure immediate results. He therefore sent youths to England and France to be taught, and on their return took it for granted that they were competent to fill important positions; or he drafted to the various special schools, pupils from the General College at Kasserlyne, which was itself demoralized and without efficient teachers. Mohammed Pasha had not time to obtain the results which he himself desired to see; and his hurry to raise the country to a position of prosperity and enlightenment, for a time defeated its own object, especially as he was not scrupulous as to the means he took for enforcing his views. He was eager to be on a level with Europeans, and set about imitating them without considering that many of the public works and institutions of which he had heard were the outcome of generations of experiments and improvements. It was much the same with his efforts (successful as some of them were) to develop manufactures, for which he neglected the more immediate and certain advantages of agriculture. A whole district of Cairo was cleared of vile dens and filthy and degraded inhabitants for the erection of cotton mills, factories, and magazines, and the undertaking was not altogether unsuccessful; but there, as elsewhere, the system of forced labour was adopted, and during the Syrian campaigns the factories were idle because the hands were driven into the ranks of the army. The Nubians who were employed in the mills at Cairo and elsewhere succumbed to disease brought about by the effects of the confined atmosphere and the conditions of life upon people who had been accustomed to breathe the pure and rarefied air of the desert. The fellahs, who were compelled to work by overseers who oppressed them cruelly, and lamed them with the punishment of the kourbash, frequently maimed themselves and sometimes committed suicide rather than toil in what was a prison-house of labour. The mills were frequently set

on fire, the machinery was found to be almost useless during the period when the fine sand was blown into every nook and cranny, and filled the cogs and cranks with grit, and the peculations of overseers, added to the carelessness and ignorance of the workmen, made the undertaking troublesome and unprofitable; so that a quantity of machinery was left unused to grow rusty, and several factories were abandoned to ruin.

The establishment of manufactories by Mohammed Ali was very remarkable, however—sugar and rum, gunpowder, refined saltpetre, chemicals, leather from the tanneries at old Cairo, guns and gun-carriages from the foundries, copper from the mills, fire-works and rockets, &c.; silk, ropes from the rope-works at Alexandria, muskets and small-arms, cloth, printed calico, iron from a splendid foundry conducted by Galloway Bey, besides the product of weaving by power-looms, dyeing-works, rice-mills, corn-mills, glass-houses, an enormous number of forges, and a paper-mill, attested his activity, and the printing-office at Boulak was used to produce books for the schools and colleges, and the newspaper which he started to maintain his views.

The viceroy also established a tribunal of commerce, resembling a court of equity, composed of the representatives of different nations, and intended to emancipate the operations of trade from the old restrictive Mohammedan laws. But, of course, the advantages gained were, to a great extent, prevented from benefiting the community because of the monopoly claimed by the viceroy himself over almost every profitable commodity.

The character of Mohammed Ali, and the changes and improvements which he designed, and many of which he lived to accomplish, may be said to have restored Egypt to a national position. It cannot be denied that the remains of barbarism were still numerous and striking, and it must be remembered that the pasha had, as it were, fought his way to civilization, and a strong will, a vast ambition, united to native shrewdness and ability almost amounting to genius, enabled him to make use of every opportunity for furthering his ends, and thereby, as he conceived, advancing the interests of the country, over which he

held almost despotic rule. It should be distinctly borne in mind when we are considering the affairs of Egypt, the method of its government and the characteristics of its people, that oriental nations regard many questions from an entirely different point of view from that which we naturally assume; and that if they are prejudiced in favour of their own institutions, there is often as much prejudice in our insisting to judge them only in relation to our own notions, derived from a condition of society which, to the Eastern mind, offers no attractions and does not commend itself as a model for imitation, either on the score of expediency or national morality. Taking him altogether the viceroy was far superior in humanity, justice, and intelligence to the sultan, or to his Turkish subordinates. Many of the punishments for offences against the law were, and still are, severe and even cruel, and were executed by barbarous methods; but it may be believed that severity and a striking demonstration of authority and the power of punishing is necessary among peoples in a certain stage of civilization, which often displays the vices both of the Old and the New World. Above all, it should be strictly kept in view that the time is not so very long past when barbarous punishments, legislative oppression, the possibility of purchased immunities and privileges for the wealthy, the advocacy of slavery, and the denial of political and almost of social rights to the poor and the weak, existed in this country, and with the disadvantage that, while poverty and misery bore aspects at least as sordid, and were suffered under conditions almost as degrading as may have been seen among the Egyptian peasantry or the lower class of the population in the villages of the Nile or the streets of Cairo, they were not associated with the "barbaric" splendour, the rich profusion of colour, the gorgeous attire, the jewelled ornaments, the superb adornments of arms and utensils, the luxury and magnificence (often contrasting with meanness and bareness), which distinguished the palaces of the rulers, and above all, the brilliant sky, the dazzling light, and the luxurious climate which make the Egyptian landscape and the lovely groves and gardens in the vicinity of Cairo so attractive. The summer palace of the viceroy at

Shoobra and his palace at Cairo were not altogether wanting in the magnificence which is associated with the notions of an Eastern potentate, and the presents of valuable gems, gold, and ivory, which he sent to the sultan whenever he had a government difficulty to overcome, were royal in value. Seen in the plain and barely furnished room in which he often received visitors on business, or in the garden in Cairo to which he occasionally retired, the pasha appeared to be a rather truculent but shrewd old man, with a penetrating eye, a choleric temper, a marvellous power of reserve or of frankness, as the occasion might demand. He never wore splendid apparel, but the hilt of his sword and the handles of his pistols were studded with rare jewels. His harem adjoining the palace was a large establishment. Beside the four wives permitted by the law of the Prophet, he had several favourite slaves, and the retinue of slaves, servants, and attendants amounted to about three hundred, including musicians and dancers. He employed a female secretary, who had been taught to write well and to keep secrets, and other attendants were retained to read translations from the London and Paris newspapers. His first wife, Amina, the mother of Toussoon, Ismael, and Ibrahim, possessed remarkable influence over the impetuous and crafty viceroy, and he regarded her goodness and common sense with constant respect and esteem, believing that to her he was greatly indebted for the advantages he had acquired. Amina was also beloved by the people because of her frequent pleadings on the side of justice and mercy. If she presented a petition to mitigate or to correct the decisions of the viceroy's subordinates, they knew well that it was better at once to accede to it, for if they began to remonstrate his highness would exclaim in his unmistakable manner: "'Tis enough. By my two eyes, if she requires it the thing must be done, be it through fire, water, or stone."

Of the pasha's delightful and splendid palace and garden at Shoobra most people have heard—of its fountains with marble hippopotami spouting jets of clear water, its series of lofty halls with ceilings painted with landscapes, its lower room, safe from the summer heats, with the inscription from the Koran on the wall:

"An hour of justice is worth seventy days of prayer"—its sumptuous pavilion, 250 feet long by 200 broad, composed of white marble, with a sunken court and four pillared galleries or colonnades, and at each corner of the chief colonnade a terraced slope, over which water passed in a cascade to the court below, and on the ledges of which sculptured fish lay as though they were swimming. In the water of the sunken court or basin the ladies of the harem would paddle about in or out of small shallops, much to the amusement of his highness, who sat in the colonnade above. But the pasha had not too much time to bestow on amusements, and even the chess player, who was constantly in attendance at Cairo, and was also a kind of mimic or jester, affecting extravagant and ludicrous sorrow whenever a piece was taken from him by his master, must often have found that his appointment was a sinecure, though, probably, like everybody else employed by the pasha, he found it exceedingly difficult to obtain punctual payment of his salary.

The grounds of Shoobra, situated in the plantations between Cairo and the river, and connected with the city by an avenue of sycamores and acacias, were open to the public; but the whole city of Cairo was soon improved, and the improvements have since been so extensive that it is a very different place indeed from the Cairo of Mohammed Ali, though the mosque which he erected in the citadel is still one of the first buildings in the world. At Alexandria, however, the improvements made by the pasha were more conspicuous, though they consisted chiefly of public works, such as the schools, hospitals, arsenal, docks, and warehouses. The Mahmoudieh Canal, too, was an enormous acquisition to the commerce of the city. The only really remarkable buildings were the arsenal and the pasha's palace; but it was to its commercial and strategical or geographical importance that he devoted attention, and his judgment was endorsed by others, and by his second successor, Said Pasha, who constructed the railway from Alexandria to Cairo, of which 60 miles had been completed in 1854. Of course the greater number of the institutions founded by Mohammed Ali were designed to answer the purpose, in the first

instance, of consolidating Egypt as an independent power, and workshops, printing-press, arsenal, and schools were all regulated to this end, rather than to the general progress of the country. Probably he would have said that no certain progress could be made until the national independence was established, and the assertion would not have been unreasonable at that time, for the Turkish government was anti-progressive, though many small innovations were adopted chiefly by imitating the dress and the manners, not to say the vices, of Europe.

The viceroy achieved personal independence, inasmuch as for his government of Egypt he was practically irresponsible. Of course he had no representative assembly or constitution in the English sense—he was absolute, and could reward or bribe with land or money, or punish as he thought fit. In the midst of an examination, or on his own judgment, with or without a trial, he could send to death any of his subjects. A horizontal movement of his hand was sufficient sentence, and the ready executioner acted upon it at once, the culprit being taken away by the officers and decapitated. Many of the punishments for ordinary fraud were cruel and excessive, though the officers who ordered them were notorious for taking bribes and occasioning a failure of justice. Occasionally, however, the barbarity of these representatives of the pasha was detected in cases where they themselves were the guilty persons, and they were then paid in their own coin either by a superior, who desired to carry out the principles of strict retaliation, or by the viceroy himself, who resented the claims of any one but himself to fleece his subjects. Lane, in his *Modern Egyptians*, tells some stories of the administration of “justice” which have quite the flavour of the tales in the *Arabian Nights*. Some of these recount horrible atrocities, even where they are designed to show the retribution that sometimes visits the oppressor.¹

The same authority, speaking of the revenues of the pasha at that time (1835) reckons them at about £3,000,000 sterling, nearly

¹ Lane's *Modern Egyptians* is still the best authority, as it is the most entertaining and instructive, on the manners, customs, and observances of the people of Lower Egypt.

half of which was derived from the direct taxes on land and from indirect exactions from the fellaheen, the remainder principally from the customs, income-tax, the tax on palm-trees, and the sale of the produce of the land, on much of which the government obtained a profit of above fifty per cent. As the private proprietors were all dispossessed of their lands, and were only partially compensated by a pension for life, supposed to be in proportion to the extent and quality of the land taken from them, the farmer had nothing to leave to his children but his hut and perhaps a few cattle, with, possibly, a trifling sum of money saved by great self-denial.

The fellah, to supply the bare necessities of life, was often obliged to steal and convey secretly to his hut as much as he could of the produce of his land. He could either supply the seed for his land or obtain it as a loan from the government, but, in the latter case, a considerable portion of it was likely to be stolen by the persons through whose hands it passed. It would scarcely have been possible for the peasants to suffer more and live, so that few of them were eager to follow the pursuit of agriculture. Those who did so mostly worked under compulsion.

The pasha also took possession of the incomes of a good many religious and charitable institutions, granting annuities in place of the income derived from the legacies by which they were founded. The tax upon palm or date trees amounted to about £100,000, and the tax on grain paid by the inhabitants of large towns was about equal to the price of the wheat in the country after a good harvest. It must be remembered, too, that this grain was often taken from the fellaheen and credited to them much below its market price.

At the time when the viceroy was carrying out his reforms there was no registration and no proper computation of the number of inhabitants; but the best authorities appear to calculate the population of Egypt proper at not much over two millions and a quarter, of which the Arab fellahs were above a million and three-quarters, the rest being made up of Copts, Bedouins, Arabs,

Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Turks, Albanians, Syrians, Ethiopians, and Franks.

Of course the keen efforts of Mohammed Ali to establish commerce, public instruction, and manufactures on European models led to numberless attempts on the part of adventurers to obtain profitable concessions for government or public works, and, after the settlement of the government in 1840, several eminent engineers and contractors from this country made engagements which were afterwards of considerable value. At the same time the effrontery with which mere speculators attempted, not always without success, to lay hold of contracts for Egypt, or represented to the pasha that they could undertake some enterprise which would be to his profit and advantage, must have made the honourable men of the same nation who were at Cairo or Alexandria ashamed of their countrymen. It was actually declared by a paragraph in the *Spettatore Egiziano* that it had been proposed to Mohammed Ali to convert into paper the cloth of the mummies, of which it was calculated 420,000,000 must have been deposited in the mummy pits. Whereupon there appeared in the columns of *Punch* a skit which has been quoted since:—

“ Oh, shade of Memnon!

Cheops and Rameses, shake in your cere-cloths;
Save smoke-dried pashas of the Eastern phlegm, none
Can read, unmoved, the end of all your glory.

Announced in the Grand Cairo *Spettatore*;

How, in the place of mere cloth

Of hempen, linen, cotton,

More or less rotten,

As made at Manchester and sold by every draper,

They're going to take the bier-cloths,

That wrap the sons and daughters of Old Nile.

From gilded kings to rough-dressed rank and file,

And turn them into paper!

We're not told in the Egyptian *Spectator*

What daring speculator

Conceived the notion: but I'd make a bet it grew

Up to the thought from watching Dr. Pettigrew,

At some soiree or conversazione,

'Midst talk of Young, Champollion, or Belzoni,

And such hieroglyphic twaddle,
Unwinding nimbly, swaddle after swaddle,
The wrappings aromatic
Of some aristocratic
Dandy of hundred-gated Thebes or Heliopolis,
Consigned to our mushroom of a metropolis
Per last Peninsula and Oriental packet;
And from the hush of his necropolis—
So deep and drear—
Tumbled ashore 'midst the unholy racket
Of the Southampton pier.

Heaven only knows what acreage of mummyhood
Is resting in its thousand-year-old dummyhood
Under the desert sands;
Nor what miles on miles of linen bands
Are rotting in the bosom of the lands,
Which Mehemet commands.

But these are times when not even mummies
Can longer rest as dummies;
And as the grains of wheat found at their side
Were sown, have grown, and now grow far and wide.
So must old Egypt's gentlemen and ladies,
To the disgust of each old-fashioned ghost,
Give up their ceremonies to the hand whose trade is
To turn them into foolscap or Bath post,
To fly round all creation,
In tongues of every nation,
Spreading (at least we hope it) useful information."

There is an appearance of irreverence in this, but the history of Egypt for the previous fifty years and more had not been conducive to reverence. There was nothing very preposterous in the notion of such a proposition having been made to the pasha; he cared less about the mummies and the ancient monuments of the country than he did for its future development and the establishment of his authority, and for that he was scarcely to be blamed. He would, as a man of common sense and a Mohammedan, have refrained from desecrating the depositories of the dead and making a traffic of the contents, but as a matter of fact mummy pits were being opened and their contents sold by the Arabs, and nobody interfered. The remains of ancient monu-

ments at Alexandria were used to build the arsenal, and the pasha very kindly made the English government a present of the second of Cleopatra's Needles—a gift which was appreciated but could not be made practically available till about forty years afterwards, that is to say till quite recently, when the beautiful monument was brought to this country, and now stands on the Thames Embankment.

The name of Ibrahim Pasha, or of "Abraham Parker," as he was jocularly called by the populace, was pretty well known in London when he paid a visit to this country in June, 1846. Songs were made about him, and there was a good deal of discussion about his mode of living, his encouragement of Europeans, his yacht, his horses, and all his possessions. Directly he landed at Portsmouth a corporation address reminded him of the facilities which his father Mohammed Ali had always afforded to this country for maintaining uninterrupted communication with India. He was made a good deal of, and when he came to London and took up his abode at Mivart's hotel he made the usual round of visits to places of interest, was invited to dine with her majesty, and also accepted invitations to banquets in his honour by the East India Company and the Oriental Steam Navigation Company. The pasha had in fact become remarkably European, and though it can scarcely be said that he was the sort of man to evoke what is called good fellowship, and was often rather silent and saturnine in his look and manner, he had a large fund of sagacity, and was, of course, a person of very high consideration, since it was almost certain that he would soon succeed to the viceroyalty. As a matter of fact his countenance was somewhat forbidding, and his eye, which like his father's was quick and penetrating, had a look of suspicion. The story of his cruelties in Greece, too, had not been quite forgotten, and there were many things which made some people shy of him. At the same time he was a distinguished guest, and as he was said to appreciate good living, and had grown corpulent through self-indulgence and want of exercise since no fighting had been going on, he was supposed to be ready enough to be entertained in the true British fashion.

It was well known that Ibrahim Pasha did not altogether agree with his father's methods of government, and that though the old viceroy admired his son's military genius, and could make allowance for his passionate temper, he did not consult him much upon affairs of state. They held different views on many subjects, and it was believed by the well informed that the opinions of the younger man were the most enlightened. He had at one time been less appreciative of European institutions than his father had, but after the war in Greece and greater opportunities for observation, he had become convinced that in this respect Mohammed Ali had not overrated the influence and practical example of England. Between his father and himself, however, there was no great sympathy, and they lived in a friendly difference of opinion which made their intercourse rather less than cordial. But if their regard was not cordial it was apparently loyal and sincere, and for eight years after the treaty of 1840 the viceroy continued to push on the various enterprises which he had taken in hand without much remonstrance, if not always with the concurrence of Ibrahim. A life of fierce conflict, restless ambition, and vast responsibilities had not left the old pasha altogether unscathed; yet such was his marvellous vitality and great mental activity that he continued those organizations which made Egypt by far the most civilized and capable of Mussulman governments, and left to his successors only the task of reformation and development. It was not till he was nearly eighty years old that he showed serious signs of failure or decrepitude, and it was when he had reached his eightieth year (in 1848) that he succumbed. His active and ever-planning brain did not outlive his body. His malady was mental, and he fell into a condition of apparent imbecility, in which he continued for a year until his death on the 2d of August, 1849.

Ibrahim Pasha was practically no more than prince regent after the resignation of his father, who survived him. He reigned for no more than four months, and, therefore, was unable either to perpetuate or to reform the policy to which he succeeded. The next heir was Abbas, the son of Toussoon and grandson of Mohammed Ali. He was invested by the sultan, and did little

or nothing to continue the policy which had been inaugurated by his grandfather, who died soon after his accession. He seemed to have inherited the cunning and the treachery of the old pasha, but without most of the redeeming qualities which had succeeded in raising the country to a position of importance. He was at once a fanatic and a voluptuary, and, though he has been credited with the discrimination which led him to continue his confidence in English advisers, the story of his baleful authority is a dark page in Egyptian history. It must be borne in mind, however, that the modern history of Egypt has been recorded by those who were partisans and were influenced by personal or political motives; and the writer of an Eastern romance might find many materials in the records of this short and unprofitable episode of Egyptian history. He made few attempts to develop the improvements which had been instituted by Mohammed Ali, and his professed regard for the traditions of Islam were certainly not supported by the gross debauchery which characterized his life. He resorted to the aid of spies and assassins for the maintenance of his authority, and his cruelty and injustice caused him to fear that he would fall a victim to the instruments which he himself employed. His life was one of sensualism, avarice, terror, and suspicion; and his fears were not unfounded, for he was murdered by his own slaves after less than six years of tyranny and the lowest forms of self-indulgence. The next heir to the viceregal power was Said Pasha, the third son of Mohammed Ali, whose extravagant expenditure for his personal gratification was combined with a laudable ambition to complete and extend the improvements which had been commenced by his father.

It should in justice be mentioned that the first line of the Egyptian railway system was completed by Abbas Pasha, who in 1852 commissioned Mr. Robert Stephenson to construct a single railway from Alexandria to Cairo in the interest of the rapidly developing overland traffic. As early as 1834, however, the keen intelligence of Mohammed Ali had ordered surveys and sections of a desert line from Cairo to Suez to be made by his engineer, Mr. Galloway, and the plant and appliances were actually ordered

from England; but then, as ever, French jealousy was aroused, and French influence prevented the scheme from being carried out. A short steam tramway was subsequently constructed at Alexandria by Mr. Galloway, who, with his brothers, erected nearly all the pumping and other machinery required by the pasha at that time, and continued to do so during the reigns of Abbas and Said. The line from Alexandria to the capital was afterwards doubled by Said Pasha, and in 1861 a floating ferry across the Rosetta branch of the Nile, 65 miles from Alexandria, was replaced by a fine iron bridge of twelve spans resting on hollow piles. This cost £400,000, and was proposed with the direct line between Cairo and Suez as an alternative for the maritime canal across the Isthmus of Suez.

The scheme for cutting a canal through the isthmus was, however, begun in this reign, and among other enterprises a plan for the preservation of ancient monuments was decided on. As Said Pasha died in 1863, it would be useless to criticise his policy in relation to the debt which he contracted. In 1862, the last year of his reign, the revenue was £4,929,000, and the expenditure £4,330,000, with a debt of £3,292,300, a mere fleabite when compared to later developments of the art of raising loans. The public works and the system of education and general improvement which he inaugurated or continued, could not be carried on without considerable outlay, and, as the finances of the country were insufficient under the management of his ministers to provide for his own expenditure and the immense expenses incurred for public works, he started on that debt which has ever since been an accumulating burden.

We have already referred to the subject of slavery and slave-dealing in Egypt, and we shall have still more to say in a later page, but it is desirable that this topic should be touched upon here in order to preserve the consecutive interest of our story, and also because it has a very marked association with the conditions which led to British interposition in the affairs of Egypt when the rebellion of Arabi led to the troubles in Alexandria, and was

followed by the insurrection to suppress which British troops were despatched to the Soudan.

It will be remembered that after Mohammed Ali had subjugated Nubia, he turned his attention to the districts bordering the White and the Blue Nile. He had heard accounts of gold mines, and desired to see whether the reputed wealth could be realized, though, at the same time, he proposed to introduce commerce and civilization among the negro tribes, and to find among them recruits for his army. An armed expedition went up the Blue Nile as far as Fazokol, which the viceroy himself started to visit in 1838, and in 1840 and following years three large expeditions were organized. Comparatively little gold was discovered, but the provinces were brought under the Egyptian government, the navigation of the White Nile was declared to be free, military stations were established on both sides, and, as we have previously noted, a vast number of slaves were taken and drafted into the ranks of the pasha's army. The result of this expedition and the subsequent government of the provinces that had been subjugated was the establishment of Khartûm, not only as the capital of the Soudan, but as the central mart for a vast slave-trade. The provinces then annexed were Kordofan, Taka, and Sennâr. Kordofan, due west of Sennâr, and separated from it by the White Nile, is a tract of country watered only by the rains and by wells placed at considerable intervals, its cultivable area being about 12,000 square miles. Further westward, on the other side of a narrow strip of desert inhabited by the Hamrân and Boggara Arabs, lies Darfûr, which was not annexed till 1875, and holds an important part in the history of the achievements of General Gordon. Darfûr is in reality a group of oâses, and is hilly in the southern portion, a ridge called Marrah, which traverses the province from end to end, being the most important elevation. The Shillûk country, which was subjected to Egypt in 1870, is between Southern Kordofan and Sennâr, a strip of moderately fertile territory, about twelve miles wide and two hundred long, running east and west to the junction of the Nile with the Sobat and Bahr el Ghazal rivers. West and south

of this long ribbon of territory are Darfetit and Donga, the countries comprised in the province of Bahr el Ghazal; and on the south and east of this we come to the equatorial provinces, bounded to the south by Lake Albert Nyanza and the Victoria Nile.

Taka is a small province on the border of Abyssinia, east of the Atbara river, the stream which Sir Samuel Baker regards as the fertilizer of the country, and, so to speak, the key of the Nile inundation; and its capital, Kassala, he describes (in 1861) as a walled town, surrounded by a ditch and flanking towers, and containing about 8000 inhabitants, exclusive of the troops stationed there, and for whom it is a depot. The houses as well as the walls are of unburnt or sun-dried bricks, those of the houses smeared with clay and cow-dung, and the walls of the city loop-holed for musketry and surrounded by a deep fosse. It was built in 1840, at the time of the annexation by Egypt, and occupies a good military position in case of war with Abyssinia, as the river Gash supplies water, and the country around is fertile, the mountainous district in the south and south-east being wild, and affording a healthy retreat during the rainy season. As a trading centre, too, Kassala is next in importance to Khartûm, the merchandise consisting of ivory, hides, bees'-wax, senna, and gum-arabic. Sennâr, which, as we have noted, was entered in 1820 by Ismael, the son of Mohammed Ali, occupies principally the angle formed by the White Nile above Khartûm and the Blue Nile or Bahr el Azrek. The frontier of Sennâr begins at Khartûm, and may be said to be bounded east and west by the Atbara and Abyssinia, west by the White Nile, separating it from Kordofan, and south by the mountains of Fazokol. It consists chiefly of an undulating plain, increasing in elevation to the south, and with forests near the rivers. Near Khartûm the soil is sandy, but mixed with the mud deposits of the Nile, while further south is a deep bed of argillaceous marl, which is covered with crops during the autumnal rains, though unproductive in the dry season, the pastoral tribes moving north with their herds in May and returning in September. The inhabitants, whose occupation is almost entirely that of cultivating the land in a very primitive and imperfect fashion,

are of a low and degraded type; and dress in a fashion similar to that represented on the tombs of ancient Egypt. They declare that Egyptian rule has suppressed all habits of industry. The whole country is thinly peopled, and there are no actual proprietors of the soil, since anyone can take a piece of open land and cultivate it, with the drawback that he cannot claim the produce until he has actually gathered it in; therefore the agricultural importance of the territory is far less than it might become under another system of tenure and a more enterprising industry. The chiefs and principal men of the villages live in indolence, and intoxicate themselves with merissa, a kind of beer made from bread or grain steeped in water and fermented; they also chew a preparation of tobacco or stramonium, which produces a kind of temporary insanity. The principal food of the poorer class consists of a kind of paste made of flour, water, and milk, but the people are omnivorous in their tastes, and though they often endure hunger without complaining, will consume large quantities of any kind of flesh food, including pork and the entrails of camels, sheep, or cattle, some parts of which, especially the liver and the fat, they devour raw. Curiously enough, they have among them several clever practitioners of the art of surgery, who can perform amputations and some more difficult operations, and they have long been accustomed to inoculation for small-pox. There are also many handicrafts among them, including weaving, goldsmith's work, the art of the currier, and that of the potter, and they are celebrated in Ethiopia for superior workmanship. They profess to follow the faith inculcated by the Koran, but have few mosques, and do not include among their observances either washing or prayer.

Sennâr may be said to be an old stronghold of slavery. The work of the fields is all done by slaves, and abject slavery, either to a private master or to a despotic ruler, was the actual condition of the greater part of the population when the province was an independent state.

But it was in the most western part of the province, watered by the southern tributaries of the Bahr el Arab and Bahr el Ghazal—the country known as Darfertit—that some of the earliest

settlements of the slave-trade and the ivory trade were to be found. These settlements were made by small resident traders, called *kalabas*, who paid taxes to the native chieftains of the Kredy tribe, and about the year 1854 trading companies from Khartûm with armed bands of Nubians began to establish slave-dealing stations over the whole of that country, their headquarters being the land of the Bongo or Dohr, a large tribe following agricultural industry, and soon entirely subdued and reduced to slavery by these gangs, who made the province their chief settlement, because of its being at no great distance from Meshera, the highest navigable point on the Bahr el Ghazal. The smaller tribes were soon overcome and reduced to slavery, and the traders then settled stations further towards the south-east. The Denka tribes on the north-east were protected by their impenetrable marshes, and the fierce and warlike Niam-Niam nation on the south-west was able to offer a resistance which the armed gangs of slave-hunters could not overcome. When in 1870 the Egyptian government concerned itself with the administration of the province, with the avowed intention of suppressing the slave-trade, the officers and troops sent to effect that object not only abetted the slave-hunters but became active and energetic traders, and it is only about six years ago that, by the active and able exertions of Gessi, an Italian of great courage and determination, who had been an interpreter to the British during the Crimean war, and who served on the staff of Gordon in the Soudan in 1874, the evils there were remedied and the slave-hunting chiefs suppressed.

Of this portion of the story and its relation to recent events we shall have to take more particular notice when we come to the consideration of the condition of the Soudan just before the intervention of British troops and the expedition of General Graham, but it is as well to note that the system of slave-hunting and slave-dealing in the provinces here referred to had reduced that which had been a thriving population, possessing flocks and herds and inhabiting a fertile country, to a condition of misery and starvation. Women and children had been seized and exported in large numbers, perhaps as many had fled to escape from the

cruelties of the traders and the horrible desert journey which they might be forced to endure, that they might be resold at some distant part of the country. The population was so reduced that many districts became wholly desolate. The uninhabited wilderness of Darfertit country to the west of Zeriba Zobeir was described by Dr. Schweinfurth in 1870 as a "sold-out land."

When the slave-traders and their armed forces first arrived at Bongoland from Khartûm they found the country divided into a number of small districts, each with its own chief, and not consisting of one strong and united community like the Denkas. This made the subjugation of the people easy, and the traders, after making them vassals, compelled them to live round the Zeribas or stations, so that these docile and industrious red-brown men, who were chiefly employed in cultivating their land, with occasional excursions for fishing and shooting, but were also skilful workers in iron, manufacturers of arms, basket-makers, and wood-carvers, virtually maintained their tyrants. When the Khartûmers first invaded them they lived in large villages inclosed with palisades, now these are only to be found in the neighbourhood of the government stations.

From the time of Mohammed Ali's expeditions Darfûr was constantly ready to resist Egyptian aggression, and the country was practically closed to all Europeans, who were regarded as spies.

Writing in 1843, Dr. William Holt Yates says: "We have melancholy proofs that the time has not yet arrived for sending missionaries or men of science into Central Africa. It is perfectly well ascertained that the native and Jewish merchants, who are on distant parts of the coast, do not find it their interest to encourage Europeans either to trade with or instruct the negroes; because they know that as soon as they become enlightened they will resist the impositions to which they are now compelled to submit; therefore they try to persuade them that all white men are their enemies. They have succeeded, alas! too well; and if the traveller escapes the severity of the climate, he seldom eludes the wrath of the inhabitants. In many parts the white men *are*

the source of their calamities, for a considerable traffic in slaves is carried on by private speculators. The different tribes are also incited to war, because, instead of destroying the prisoners as formerly, they have been taught that it is more profitable to sell them to the slave-dealer. In this way children are suddenly torn from their parents, and parents are separated from their families, manacled, and carried off into Egypt; many do not survive the journey. Several caravans arrive at Cairo every year; their principal halting-places are Essouan and Ghéneh for those who come from Abyssinia, and D'Girgeh for those who are natives of Darfûr; they are driven across the desert linked together by the neck, and arriving at the Nile are then forwarded by water. I have passed many such cargoes, men, women, and children perfectly naked, emaciated and disconsolate, all huddled up together like pigs or sheep, and swarming with vermin. Sometimes they change hands *en route*, the various dealers bartering with one another, and each putting his mark upon his *stock* with a hot iron, that in the event of one being missed he may swear to him before the *cadi*. The Wakaleh or Khan which constitutes the slave-market at Cairo is a filthy, wretched court, surrounded by arched vaults or dungeons, having an upper floor for the females, of which I generally saw a good supply. Any person is at liberty to inspect them just as he would cattle; they invariably look ill, and, except when a purchaser draws near, dejected, for they are compelled by their master on such occasions to smile and appear happy, that they may fetch a good price. . . . I saw there a great number of slaves from all parts, of both sexes and various ages, squatting in groups upon a piece of ragged mat or on the bare earth. The women were naked to the loins, around which was bound the "raht" or apron made of strips of untanned buffalos' hide ornamented with shells; their bodies were thickly anointed with grease, and some of them wore glass beads and brass rings or armlets. The Abyssinians are much better looking than any of the rest, their features are more regular and spirituelle. I saw one very beautiful girl who was to be sold for sixty dollars (about £15), and many others who were well-formed and wanting neither

intelligence nor expression; they were modest and well-behaved, and rejoiced that their toils were nearly at an end; for when sold they are better provided for, fed, and clothed, and for the most part well treated."

It was not, however, the traffic in slaves made prisoners of war that stocked the market. The Garzoua or negro-hunting; the raids made upon native villages by the scoundrels, who were often pashas or slave-hunting chiefs of rank and wealth, were the curse of the country.

It is significant, having read the remarks of a traveller who spoke of the slave-trade above forty years ago, to note what Victor Giraud, the French explorer, said the other day before the French Geographical Society. After having undergone innumerable sufferings at the hands of African despots, M. Giraud, introduced by M. de Lesseps to an audience at the Salle de Sorbonne, gave an account of his journeys in the lake district of Central Africa, and speaking of the natives, said:—

"I was deeply impressed with the extreme misery in which they live, a misery resulting from their indolence and the sterility of the soil. . . . Another remarkable fact is the growing depopulation of these countries; they are in a continual state of war, famine, and slave-trade. There are on an average less than a hundred male inhabitants to every twenty-five square kilometres. It would be vain to think of aiding the native in the cultivation of the soil; he is in no want; what does he care for our civilization? Nor would it be of any use to think of cultivating these districts, the vegetation being poor and the mines unpromising; ivory will always be dear on account of the transport, and commerce will always be in the hands of Arabs and half-caste Portuguese; in order to render it productive, the slave-trade must first be suppressed."

No doubt. The question, however, is, how is it to be done? and in the present condition of affairs there appears to be no other means than a permanent establishment of military stations throughout the Soudan, and an occupation, the cost of which would be so great as to be beyond the present resources of the Egyptian government, while the question of European occupation is one

beset with difficulties which need not be discussed here. It may be mentioned with some emphasis, however, that there are many who, by long experience of the country, by close observation, and by deep reflection, are persuaded that the slave-trade of the Soudan will not be abolished by military occupation or by armed retribution,—that the system and practice of slavery is so deeply ingrained in the very constitution of the country, where it has existed from time immemorial, that only the slower but more certain and complete influences of advancing civilization, and the irresistible changes brought about through the commercial and social invasion of the country by enlightened and honourable representatives of European enterprise, will effect the radical change by which the curse of the land will be removed, and its agricultural and productive wealth be restored and enormously increased.

We have already gone beyond the date to which we had come in pursuing the consecutive story of “the burden of Egypt.” Said Pasha lived only till 1863, and his nephew, Ismail Pasha, the second son of Ibrahim, succeeded to the viceroyalty. Of him and his character and ability we shall see an outline presently, but for a moment we may remark that he spared no possible effort and no expense to suppress the slave traffic, and that though he succeeded while the efforts were being made by men unsurpassed for integrity, courage, and determination—Sir Samuel Baker and the heroic and lamented Gordon—the slave-dealers, who were often powerful chiefs and rulers, could only be kept down by constant pressure and repeated chastisement, and directly the armed forces occupying the stations were removed the traffic was resumed. The story of Darfûr, which is associated with that of Zobeir, Sebehr, or Zebehr Rahama,—a name which has occurred pretty frequently in relation to General Gordon and to the course of events in the Soudan—will illustrate the difficulties that met attempts to suppress the powerful and ruffianly chiefs of the slave depots.

Darfûr had never been under the government of Egypt, but

had been ruled by its own sultans in regular succession for 400 years. The inhabitants were not of the true negro type,—the army of fighting men was mostly composed of Arabs of the wandering tribes, who paid tribute to the Sultan of Darfûr. The country was famous not only as a centre of commerce but as a great slave depôt. “Je vous prie de m'envoyer par le première caravane 2000 esclaves noirs ayant plus de 16 ans, forts et vigoureux,” wrote Bonaparte to the Sultan of Darfûr, Abd el Rahman, surnamed “the Just;”—“je les achèterai pour mon compte. Ordonnez notre caravane de venir de suite, de ne pas s'arrêter en route: je donne les ordres pour qu'elle soit protégée partout.” Darfûr was practically closed to Europeans, who were regarded as spies, but for ages caravans conveying slaves, ivory, feathers, and gum went from Darfûr to Egypt, where the merchandise was exchanged for cloth, beads, and firearms.

In 1869 the slave-dealers in the Bahr el Ghazal had attained to such power that they refused to pay their rentals to the Egyptian government. One of the foremost of those was Zobeir or Zebehr Rahama, the individual already mentioned, who lived in princely style, and was a person in high authority. As it was impossible for the ruler of Egypt to submit to the insolence of the slave-making chiefs, he sent a small armed force to bring them to submission, and also to subjugate Darfûr. This expedition, which was under the command of Bellal, found itself opposed by Zebehr, who was a kind of king surrounded with a court little less than princely in its details. Here special rooms, provided with carpeted divans, were reserved as ante-chambers, and into these all visitors were conducted by richly dressed slaves. The royal aspect of these halls was increased by the introduction of living lions, secured of course by strong chains. The exquisite Zebehr Rahama was a slave-hunting ruffian, but this was his style. His ambition was great, his wealth enormous. Among other stories told of him it was affirmed that, as he superstitiously believed in the power of one of his enemies to withstand leaden bullets by the aid of magic, he had 25,000 dollars melted down into bullets, as the charm possessed by the foe did not extend to protection against silver. This

story, at all events, proves that the superstition of the silver bullet is almost universal wherever firearms are used. Zebehr owned about thirty stations, and these fortified posts were carried into the heart of Africa, and in the district extending widely between these stations, and round each of them far and wide, he exercised despotic rule. He it was who went forth to meet the few companies of soldiers sent from Egypt to the Bahr el Ghazal. There was a sharp engagement, which ended in the defeat of the Egyptian force and the death of their commander, Zebehr himself being wounded in the ankle. Meanwhile the Sultan of Darfûr, expecting to be attacked by the Egyptian troops, had placed an embargo on corn along his southern frontier, which had the effect not only of distressing the enemy but of depriving the slave-traders of their supplies, a condition which was at once resented by Zebehr, who was strong enough to attack Darfûr, and commenced hostilities. This was alarming. Ismail Pasha feared that should Darfûr fall into the power of this chief the whole of the Soudan would revolt from the Egyptian government. He therefore determined to make the slave-hunter an ally, and sent a force into Darfûr from the north to support the slave-dealers who were advancing from the south. Zebehr received the rank and title of Bey, the Sultan of Darfûr and his two sons were slain, a young man named Haroun succeeded to the government, and Darfûr was subjugated; but the victors were soon in the heat of a quarrel over the spoils. Zebehr was not satisfied with his title. He said that as he and his men had done all the fighting he ought to be governor-general of the province. He became so powerful and dangerous that his audacity was one of the great incentives to Ismail Pasha to suppress the slave-trade which threatened his supremacy. The very soldiers of this usurper were bands of armed slaves, smart dapper-looking fellows like antelopes, fierce, unsparing, the terror of Central Africa, having strongly fortified camps, a prestige far beyond that of the government, and ready to make their chief independent of Egyptian rule. Eventually Zebehr, in an evil hour for himself, but in a most happy one for the lands that he had wasted, went down to Cairo to assert his own claim, taking with

him £100,000 to use for bribing the pashas. At Cairo, however, he was detained, without receiving the appointment and the title which he coveted, and until he had seen two successive governors appointed,—Sir Samuel Baker and General Gordon. He was in fact a prisoner of state unable to leave the city, and in his rage incited his son Sulciman, who had taken his place, to break out into a formidable revolt, which after a time was crushed by Gessi, Colonel Gordon's energetic and able lieutenant.

“Dar For and Dar Fertit mean the land of the Fors and the land of the Fertits,” wrote Gordon. “The Fors and the Fertits were the original negro inhabitants; then came in the Bedûin tribes, who partially conquered the country, and made the Fors Mussulmans, giving them a sultan. The Fors and the Bedûin tribes, the one stationary and the other nomadic, live in peace, for their habits are different.”

The brief glance which we have taken of the great slave-trading territories will be of service in following intelligently the course of the narrative of the relations of Egypt and the Soudan, though we shall presently have to continue the reference by mentioning some other provinces which have been recently annexed to Egypt through the action taken by Gordon after he was appointed governor-general.

We should here, however, mention the relations between Egypt and Abyssinia, which also have an important bearing upon the same subject.

This is not the place to recount the story of the expedition sent in 1867 from England to Abyssinia against the self-styled “Theodorus, King of Kings,” whose real name was Dejazmatch Kasai. The name of this wild and unexplored country had been familiar to us because of the records of explorers from Bruce downward. We knew that, bounded by the Red Sea, Nubia, and Sennâr, it spread out on the south and south-west into unknown tracts inhabited, where they were inhabited at all, by the Gallas, the Shoans, the Wanikas, and other warlike and half savage tribes. We had learned that the whole country formed a great irregular table-land projecting from the high regions south of the line into

comparatively level plains bounding the basin of the Nile, and forming a succession of undulating tracts of various altitudes, deeply cut into by narrow valleys and water channels, which often descend 3000 or 4000 feet below the level of the plains. The population consisted, we were told, of three races; one of them like the Bedûin Arabs, another of them resembling the Ethiopians, and a third, comprising the tribes of the south and south-west, quite distinct from the rest, as they are also distinct from the negroes, who are held there as slaves, brought from the countries of the south and west. The majority of the Abyssinians professed the Christian religion in a strangely corrupt form, partaking of a mixture of ceremonies, with hosts of saints and objects of veneration, several sacred places, numerous fasts, and the observance of both the Christian and the Jewish Sabbath. In 1850 the few missionaries and other Europeans who were engaged in visiting Abyssinia reported that a great movement was taking place there by means of the conquests made by Theodorus or Kasai, who claimed to be a direct descendant of King Solomon. A succession of victories over the Gallas tribes, the Shoans, and the men of Tigré, so raised the ambition of this fierce and savage ruler that he claimed an alliance with England and France, and demanded an acknowledgment of his dignity from Queen Victoria, and the establishment of an amicable treaty between himself and this country. The execution of this treaty he urged by alternate persuasions, favours, and furious threats addressed to the few Europeans who were in his territory, and therefore liable to his animosity.

He had assumed the title of "Theodorus, King of Ethiopia," because of an alleged ancient prophecy which said that a king of that name would reform Abyssinia, restore the Christian faith, and become master of the world; and he appeared to have a great desire to retain the services of Englishmen. In 1860 Mr. Plowden, who had been British consul in Abyssinia since 1848, went on a journey to Massowa, and while on his way was attacked near Gondar by a band of rebels, and received a wound of which he died. King Theodore, who had a great regard for him, took signal vengeance on his murderers. In 1861 Captain Cameron was appointed

consul. Theodore then addressed a letter to the queen, declaring that his mission was to overthrow the Gallas and the Turks, and to restore the whole country with himself as emperor. He also requested that arrangements might be made for the safe-conduct of his ambassadors, that they might not be molested by the Turks, who were his enemies. This was, of course, no less than an endeavour to obtain a material alliance with England against the Islams. The letter was forwarded to England by Mr. Cameron, who immediately afterwards went on to the frontier province of Bogos, where, as the Christian inhabitants were under his protection as British consul, he conceived that he had a right to go, and he also had been commissioned by the foreign office to report on the suitability of Massowa as a consulate station, and to report on the conditions of trade there.

The time chosen was injudicious, as our government desired to avoid any appearance of interfering with the fierce disputes of the native tribes living on the frontier of Egypt and Abyssinia; and as by some oversight the letter sent to England by Theodoros had been left at the foreign office, and no notice was taken of it, the savage king chose to assume that the consul had another motive, and said, "He went to the Turks, who do not love me." In revenge he made Mr. Cameron prisoner, and at the same time seized all the Europeans who could be found in Abyssinia, including missionaries, artisans, and workmen, with their families. They underwent alternate kindness and horrible severity, were shut up in wretched huts or stone buildings, were frequently placed in irons and half-starved, and were subjected to the furious abuse and threats of the king, who appeared to suffer from insanity aggravated by frequent bouts of intoxication. After every possible expedient had been tried, and various attempts at intercession had been found fruitless, it was determined to send a force against the barbarous chieftain; and, as we all know, this resulted in the destruction of his stronghold at Magdala, and his death by his own hand after he had sustained a complete defeat.

In consequence of the assistance rendered to the Prophet Mohammed by one of the kings of Abyssinia he restrained his

immediate followers from attempting the subjugation of Abyssinian territory. This was for long afterwards regarded by many of the Arabs as a prohibition extending to the faithful, and it is asserted that the reluctance of the soldiers on the Egyptian frontier to prosecute hostilities against Abyssinia, will account for the country having so long remained uninvaded. Zula, Suakim, and Massowa were seized by the Turks, the first in the sixteenth century, the others in later times, but their occupants have neither advanced into the Abyssinian hills nor occupied the coast country between Massowa and Suakim.

In 1866 Egypt obtained Massowa from Turkey in exchange for an increased tribute, and in 1867 claimed authority as far as Zula, which is in Annesley Bay. In 1868 the assistance offered to England by the Egyptian government during the expedition to Abyssinia was understood to be for the purpose of securing the concurrence of this country in the encroachments that might be made on the coast of the Red Sea. Ismail Pasha could not be satisfied till he claimed Bogos, which he pretended had been conquered by Mohammed Ali. The Abyssinians denied that they had ever relinquished their rights in the territory, only the borderland of which had been occupied by the Egyptians. In fact, a border war had been maintained until Said Pasha withdrew, after which Bogos had remained neutral. During the war of the King of Abyssinia with the Gallas in 1874, however, the Egyptian government employed a Swiss named Munziger, who acted as consul for England and France in Massowa, to occupy Keren, the capital of Bogos, with a small force, and at the same time the governor of Ailat, the province lying between Hamasin and Massowa, actually sold that territory to Egypt, while in the following year the port of Zeila and the nominal rights of the sultan to the coast land from a point near Tajureh to one on the Indian Ocean, including Berbereh, were also acquired by Egypt in consideration of £15,000 a-year additional tribute.

The story of African exploration, and of the journeys of the intrepid travellers who devoted themselves to the discovery of the

sources of the Nile, is intensely interesting, but even the main narrative would fill a volume of large dimensions. It only comes within the present purpose to note that the results of this exploration will be closely associated with the development and future government of the Soudan. According to quite recent representations, the solution of the difficulties which attend the settlement of a regular government in the provinces claimed by Egypt, and the extinction of that slave-traffic which prevents the resources of the country from being cultivated, will ultimately depend on the relation of the latest discoveries made by explorers on the Congo to those which have been accomplished on the Nile.

Bruce had followed the Blue Nile to its source in the mountains of Abyssinia, but the White Nile remained for nearly three-quarters of a century unexplored, till in 1858 Captains Speke and Grant, commissioned by the English government to organize an expedition, discovered the Lake Victoria Nyanza, and in 1861 Sir Samuel Baker, going on a journey on his own account in the hope of meeting with the famous travellers and making further explorations, successfully accomplished both objects, and in 1864 discovered the Albert Nyanza.

These two vast lakes, the investigators concluded, were of sufficient volume to support the Nile through its entire course of thirty degrees of latitude, the parent stream fed by never-failing reservoirs, supplied by the ten months' rainfall of the equator, rolling steadily on its way through arid sands and burning deserts till it reaches the Delta of Lower Egypt.

Sir Samuel Baker, having explored all the tributaries of the Nile, however, claims to have discovered that, though the lake sources of Central Africa support the life of Egypt by supplying a stream throughout all seasons with sufficient volume to support the exhaustion of evaporation and absorption, that stream if unaided could not overflow its banks, and Egypt would thus be deprived of the annual inundation, cultivation being confined to the close vicinity of the river. He says that the inundations are caused chiefly by the two grand affluents of Abyssinia, the Blue Nile and the Atbara, streams of extreme grandeur during the period of the

Abyssinian rains, from the middle of June to September, but reduced to insignificance during the dry months; the Blue Nile being then so shallow as to be unnavigable, and the Atbara perfectly dry. At that season the water supply of Abyssinia having ceased, Egypt depends solely upon the equatorial lakes and the affluents of the White Nile until the rainy season shall again have flooded the two great Abyssinian arteries. This flood occurs suddenly about the 20th of June, and the grand rush of water pouring down the Blue Nile and the Atbara into the parent channel inundates Lower Egypt, and is the cause of its extreme fertility. Not only is the inundation the effect of the Abyssinian rains, but the deposit of mud that has formed the Delta, and which is annually precipitated by the rising waters, is also due to the Abyssinian streams, more especially to the river Atbara, which, known as the Bahr el Aswat or Black River, carries a larger proportion of soil than any other tributary of the Nile. Sir Samuel Baker sums up his conclusions by stating that the equatorial lakes feed Egypt, but the Abyssinian rivers cause the inundation.

It was in 1864 that Baker witnessed the melancholy condition of the countries of the Soudan, which was then under the governorship of a certain Mûsa Pasha. The provinces were utterly ruined, governed only by military force, the expenditure exceeding the revenue, the country paralysed by the oppressive taxation, and communication with the outer world difficult because of the deserts by which the lands were surrounded. These countries, he declared, were so worthless that their annexation could only be accounted for by the profits derived from the slave-trade. Yet Said Pasha had made a tour through these provinces in 1857, had proclaimed the abolition of slavery at Berber and at Khartûm, had organized a new government for the five provinces which were then comprised in the Soudan, namely, Kordofan, Sennâr, Taka, Berber, and Dongola. The taxes on the lands and water-wheels were to be greatly reduced, and a postal system by means of dromedaries was organized to cross the desert. But three years afterwards the European traders sold their stations to their Arab agents, who paid the rental demanded by the Egyptian government, and the

country fell into worse ruin and disorder than that under which it had previously suffered.

At the time that Sir Samuel Baker returned from his exploration Ismail Pasha had been two years on the throne. While desiring to extend his territories, he also declared his determination to suppress the slave-trade, and had not only issued orders, but had begun by establishing an Egyptian camp of 1000 men at Fashoda in the Shillük country. The method of operations adopted by the slave-traders has already been mentioned, and they soon utterly ruined the country. It was only a few years since the time (1853) that Mr. John Petherick, the English consul for the Soudan, started on the first trading voyage to the upper waters of the White Nile. Other traders had followed, tempted by the large quantities of ivory which could be obtained; and far in the country of Bahr el Ghazal (or "Bahr Gazelle") these traders established fortified posts, held by bands of armed men commanded by Arabs. The cursed lust of gain soon caused some to set the evil example of following a more profitable trade. Slaves paid better than ivory, and there were numerous villages where slaves were to be had for the hunting, while, even if they tried to defend themselves, they would almost certainly be defeated by the superior weapons of their assailants, and prisoners of war would become merchandise. This was what led to the Europeans selling their stations to the Arab agents. The scandal had become so great that they dared not persevere in the nefarious traffic, and so got all they could from their successors, who were quite ready to continue it with a reckless ferocity that more than half depopulated the country, and left provinces that had once been fertile and beautiful mere desert scenes of ruin and decay. Twenty years ago Captain Speke, writing of "those ruffian traders on the White Nile," said, "The atrocities committed by these traders are beyond civilized belief. They are constantly fighting, robbing, and capturing slaves and cattle. No honest man can either trade or travel in the country; for the natives have been bullied to such an extent that they either fight or run away according to their strength or circumstances."

Dr. Schweinfurth, who spent three years with the slave-hunters.

says, "There are traces still existing which demonstrate large villages and extensive plots of cultivated land formerly occupied the scene where now all is desolation." Sir Samuel Baker declared that the wasting and depopulation of the country was caused by razzias made for slaves by the governors of Fashoda, the chief station of the Shillúk country. In 1864 he had first seen the Victoria Nile. In 1872 he revisited it and wrote: "It is impossible to describe the change that has taken place since I last visited this country. It was then a perfect garden, thickly populated and producing all that man could desire. The villages were numerous; groves of plantations fringed the steep cliffs on the river's bank; and the natives were neatly dressed in the bark cloth of the country. The scene has changed! All is wilderness! The population has fled! Not a village is to be seen! This is the certain result of the settlement of Khartûm traders; they kidnap the women and children for slaves, and plunder and destroy wherever they set their foot."

That Ismail Pasha should have desired to extend his territory, and to recover from the blight and ruin that had fallen on them lands exuberantly fertile by nature, is not to be wondered at; but, unhappily, while his motives were called in question, the means for accomplishing his desires could only be obtained by borrowing largely. People who suspected him, and believed that they had reason to doubt both his integrity and his ability, seemed to have a good argument in his notorious extravagance and the increasing embarrassment of the financial affairs of the government. Apart from this, however, there can be no doubt that he renewed those efforts for the development and national prosperity of Egypt which had been initiated by Mohammed Ali, but had almost sunk into abeyance under Abbas Pasha, and were prevented from reviving under Said Pasha, because he was a less imperial borrower than Ismail, and did not contrive (perhaps did not dare) to obtain the almost boundless credit which ended in the bankruptcy of the exchequer and the deposition of the sovereign.

It must be admitted, however, that the efforts made by Ismail to suppress the slave-trade, which he had always been denouncing,

restored civilization and comparative prosperity to a considerable territory. The addition to his dominions was such that the Egyptian settlements on the Nile, which had extended only to about 120 miles south of Khartûm, had increased till, in 1880, fortified posts were found between the Lakes Albert and Victoria Nyanza, little more than two degrees north of the equator. And the line of conquest had not followed the course of the Nile only. By the subjugation of Darfûr the Egyptian border came within less than fifteen days' march of Lake Tchad, while in the east, lands had been annexed which were washed by the lower part of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.¹

The scheme proposed by Ismail Pasha was wide and effective, and if it could have been permanently accomplished would have raised Egypt to a position of wealth and influence which she has never yet achieved. The annexation of the Nile basin, the opening of the equatorial lakes to steam-vessels, and the establishment of commerce, supported by an able and efficient government, were the objects which he professed to have in view, and his sincerity was evinced by his determination not to intrust this momentous enterprise to any of his Egyptian officers, but to give large and almost irresponsible authority to an Englishman. At that time the authority of Egypt in the Darfertit country was little more than nominal, and in Donga it exercised power only along the river valley to Gondokoro. To Sir Samuel Baker, therefore, a firman was issued in April, 1869, giving him absolute power over all the country south of Gondokoro, that he might extend the annexations as far as the equator, and entirely suppress slave-hunting and the slave-traffic in this its very centre.

As Sir Samuel Baker remarked, the employment of an European to overthrow the slave-trade in deference to the opinion of the civilized world, was a direct challenge and attack upon the assumed rights and necessities of his own subjects. The magnitude of the operation could not be understood by the general public in Europe. Every household in Upper Egypt and in the Delta was dependent upon slave service; the fields in the Soudan

¹ *Colonel Gordon in Central Africa.* Preliminary sketch by the editor, G. Birkbeck Hill, D.C.L.

were cultivated by slaves; the women in the harems of both rich and middle-class were attended by slaves; the poorer Arab woman's ambition was to possess a slave; in fact, Egyptian society without slaves would be like a carriage devoid of wheels—it could not proceed.

The slaves were generally well treated by their owners; the brutality lay in their capture, with the attendant lawlessness and murders: but that was far away, and the slave proprietors of Egypt had not witnessed the miseries of the weary marches of the distant caravans. It was obvious that an attack upon the slave-dealing and slave-hunting establishments of Egypt by a foreigner—an Englishman—would be equal to a raid upon a hornets' nest, that all efforts to suppress the old established traffic in negro slaves would be encountered with a determined opposition. Had the enterprise been placed under the command of a native officer, it is almost certain that he would have become demoralized by the facilities with which money could have been made, and would have either secretly started or openly joined in the traffic. At one of the stations where Sir Samuel Baker sent for the agent commanding the company, to explain to him that he would not be permitted to send cargoes of slaves down to Khartûm, the fellow was incredulous that the orders for the suppression of the slave-trade would be enforced against his employer, who had been placed in command of a government expedition by the governor-general of the Soudan, though he was known to be one of the principal slave-traders of the White Nile. So utterly incorrigible were the people with regard to this traffic, that Sir Samuel Baker with his followers and his armed force had only been at this station one day when one of his sailors deserted to the slave-hunters, and the colonel, Raouf Bey, reported that several officers and soldiers had actually purchased slaves from the station—so that the troops who were employed under Baker's command to suppress the traffic would quickly have converted the expedition into a slave-market. Another suggestive incident, recorded on the same day, was the attempted desertion and recapture of one of the black soldiers, a fine young fellow, a native of Pongo,

who had been taken as a slave and had become a soldier against his will.

The condition of Central Africa and the White Nile at the time when Sir Samuel Baker organized his expedition was such that only a very powerful and long-continued effort could have remedied it, and that effort has never yet been maintained. A large and almost boundless extent of country of great fertility, with a healthy climate favourable for the settlement of Europeans, with a mean altitude of 4000 feet above the sea level, and well peopled by a race who only required the protection of a strong but paternal government to become of considerable importance, and to eventually develop the great resources of the soil, had been made desolate, and the slave-trade prospered to the detriment of all improvement. The slave-hunters and traders who had caused this desolation were for the most part Arabs, subjects of the Egyptian government, who had deserted their agricultural occupations in the Soudan, and had formed companies of brigands in the pay of various merchants at Khartûm, and frequently officered by soldiers who had deserted from their regiments. It was supposed that about 15,000 persons, who should have been working at honest callings in Egypt, were engaged in the so-called ivory trade and slave-hunting of the White Nile. An individual trader, named Agād, assumed the right over nearly ninety thousand square miles of territory. It was impossible to calculate the number of slaves taken annually from Central Africa, but Sir Samuel Baker concluded that at least fifty thousand were either captured and held in the various *zarebas* or camps, or were sent *viâ* the White Nile and the various routes overland, by Darfûr and Kordofan. Of course the people of the country were suspicious and hostile to all strangers, and the evil did not stop there. The armed scoundrels who held such an extensive territory in subjection fomented hostilities between the tribes, and made alliances with some to help them to destroy their neighbours, to carry off their wives and children, and vast herds of sheep and cattle. Those natives who had not fled from their homes to distant districts often remained only to join their aggressors in

ruining and enslaving other tribes. The result was a condition of savagery without government, laws, or security, and it was to change this that authority was given to Sir Samuel Baker for five years, in which it was hoped he would be able to subdue to the Egyptian government the countries to the south of Gondokoro, to suppress the slave-trade, to introduce a system of regular commerce, to open to navigation the great lakes of the equator, and to establish a chain of military stations and commercial depots, distant at intervals of three days' march, throughout Central Africa, accepting Gondokoro as the base of operations. The expedition, which consisted of a strong armed force, and engineers, constructors, labourers, and various officers, was not regarded favourably by the officials at Cairo, nor did the authorities here give it any countenance. In fact, the appointment of Sir Samuel Baker as the sole and supreme governor of the territories to be controlled, was looked upon with some foreboding of possible political troubles, and consequently a note was despatched from the foreign office to the consul-general of Egypt, stating that British subjects belonging to Sir Samuel Baker's expedition must not expect the support of their government in the event of complications. Sir Samuel Baker says: "The enterprise was generally regarded as chimerical in Europe, with hostility in Egypt, but with sympathy in America."¹

The English "governor-general of the equatorial Nile basin" set to work with immense energy, and determined to overcome difficulties which had always seemed to be insuperable. One of the chief of these was the obstruction of the White Nile by enormous masses of vegetation, which prevented navigation and actually closed the river.

At Gondokoro he had caused to be specially constructed a steel steamer of 108 tons, and had left ready packed for land transport another steel steamer of 38 tons and two steel life-boats, each of 10 tons, for conveyance to the Albert Nyanza, while at Khartûm he had left in sections a steamer of 251 tons. All these vessels had been brought from England, and conveyed with incredible

¹ *Ismailia*, by Sir Samuel W. Baker Pacha.



THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE SOUDAN CONVOY OF SLAVES ON THE MARCH.



trouble upon camels across the deserts to Khartûm. Besides these there were steam saw-mills, a large quantity of tools and machinery, a great store of merchandise for the purpose of establishing trade, and calico, handkerchiefs, common jewelry, and innumerable articles intended for presents to the native chiefs and kings, besides stores, clothing, and provisions for the expedition, which would be for three or four years out of reach of any certain means of obtaining many of the necessities of life. Six steamers, varying from 40 to 80 horse-power, were ordered to leave Cairo in June, together with fifteen sloops and fifteen diahbeeahs or travelling boats, in all thirty-six vessels, to ascend the cataracts of the Nile to Khartûm, a distance by river of about 1450 miles. These vessels were to convey the whole of the merchandise. Twenty-five vessels and three steamers were ordered to be in readiness at Khartûm, where the governor-general, Djiaffer Pasha, was to provide them by a certain date, together with the camels and horses necessary for the land transport. When the fleet should arrive at Khartûm from Cairo, the total force was to be nine steamers and fifty-five sailing vessels of about fifty tons each. The artillery (rifled mountain guns for throwing shells), a supply of rockets, and fifty Snider rifles with 50,000 rounds of ammunition, had come from England, and a large portion of the stores, the clothing, and all the medicines and drugs, had also been selected and ordered in England by Sir Samuel Baker himself, who, in fact, was indefatigable in making all the arrangements. For the transport of the heavy machinery across the desert he employed gun-carriages drawn by two camels each; the two sections of steamers and of life-boats were slung upon long poles of fir from Trieste, arranged between two camels in the manner of shafts, and these poles were afterwards used at headquarters as rafters for buildings. The military force comprised 1645 troops, including a corps of 200 irregular cavalry and two batteries of artillery. The infantry were two regiments, supposed to be well selected, the black or Soudan regiment, including many officers and men who had served for some years in Mexico with the French army under Marshal Bazaine; the Egyptian regiment turned out to be

for the most part convicted felons, who had been transported for various crimes from Egypt to the Soudan. It will thus be seen that the expedition was of a very important character, and it might have had more permanently effectual results but for the opposition of the Egyptian officials almost without exception. That opposition had one weapon which in Egypt is always a powerful and frequently a fatal one—delay. In a country where deserts have to be traversed, and where the great highway is a river unnavigable for vessels of any size, except at one period of the year, there is no difficulty in postponing, or in other words preventing, such an undertaking, if the preparations or provisions for it are left to persons interested in defeating it.

Baker brought up the rear by another route by way of Suakim on the Red Sea, from which the desert journey to Berber on the Nile is 275 statute miles, and thence to Khartûm by river 200 miles. Khartûm, then a forlorn, muddy, and malodorous town, had been deserted by half the inhabitants, and the surrounding country was abandoned, the once verdant and cultivated banks of the river had been suffered to remain untended and had become mere wilderness, irrigation had ceased, the villages were silent, and the population gone. They had fled from oppressive taxation, and numbers of them had taken to the slave-trade on the White Nile; had escaped from the hated tyranny of the tax collector to become abettors of the more atrocious tyrants who seized not only upon all the possessions of their victims, but upon their women and children. This desolation was caused by the governor-general of the Soudan, who considered it to be his business only to collect and to increase the taxes. In one year he had sent to his master £100,000 wrung from the peasantry, and as probably as much more was taken by the collectors in the shape of private extortion, there was nothing left to the toiler but flight or starvation. A strange condition of things, in which the money required for the purpose of suppressing slavery in the equatorial Nile basin was obtained by means which either reduced the peasantry of the Soudan themselves to a vassalage little better than, and as far as personal well-being was concerned, inferior to, that of the slaves in

Egypt, or as an alternative incited the over-burdened wretches to abandon their villages and join the ranks of the slave-hunters, for whose suppression a costly expedition had been ordered and additional taxes imposed. This, at all events, is one view of the situation; but it should not be forgotten that the suppression of these hordes of scoundrels, who had half-depopulated and ruined vast and fertile territories, was a righteous and even an absolutely necessary work, which would have been well worth the sacrifice of luxury and extravagant self-indulgence, and also that the people around Khartûm and their rulers were always accustomed to regard the traffic in slaves as a profitable commercial undertaking offering a tempting alternative to legitimate and productive labour. But there were endless complications. At the very time that the governor of Khartûm had neglected to prepare vessels for the transport of troops for this expedition, he had been busily engaged in procuring a squadron of eleven vessels for an expedition to the Bahr Ghazal, where it was intended to form a settlement at the copper mines on the frontier of Darfûr, and this government expedition had, as we have seen in a previous page, been intrusted to the command of one of the most notorious slave-hunters in the country.

Many things contributed to the delay of Sir Samuel Baker's enterprise. The vessels and the sailing flotilla from Cairo should have started early in June to ascend the cataracts at Wady Halfa at the time of high Nile; but Ismail Pasha was on a visit to Europe, and did not return till the end of August. Again, there were the preparations for celebrating the inauguration of the Suez Canal by magnificent festivities, to which many distinguished visitors had been invited, so that every available vessel was required for the occasion. In addition to these causes of procrastination, however, there was the bitter hatred of the officials, and their friends the slave-traders, to an expedition which they foresaw, if conducted with energy, might stamp out their business.

The energy and determination of Sir Samuel Baker, though it could not prevent the loss of a year, was sufficient to overcome repeated obstacles, and the authority he had received was so

complete that he could command assistance, even though it was rendered so reluctantly and imperfectly that the entire scheme was in danger, and was eventually carried out with a less complete organization, and probably at a greater expense, than was originally contemplated. When the vessels were ready and equipped, the flotilla of ten steamers and thirty-one sailing-vessels with a military force of 800 men prepared to start; sailors had been engaged with great difficulty, for the boatmen had all run away from Khartûm, where everyone endeavoured to avoid the expedition. At last, however, on the 8th of February, 1870, it got away; but the entry in Sir Samuel Baker's journal on that date was: "Mr. Higginbotham, who has safely arrived at Berber with the steel steamers in sections for the Albert Nyanza, will, I trust, be provided with vessels at Khartûm according to my orders, so as to follow me to Gondokoro with supplies and about 350 troops with four guns. My original programme—agreed to by his highness the khedive, who ordered the execution of my orders by the authorities—arranged that six steamers, fifteen sloops, and fifteen diahbeeas should leave Cairo on 10th June to ascend the cataracts to Khartûm, at which place Djiaffer Pasha was to prepare three steamers and twenty-five vessels to convey 1650 troops together with transport animals and supplies. The usual Egyptian delays have entirely thwarted my plans. No vessels have arrived from Cairo, as they only started on 29th August. Thus, rather than turn back, I start with a mutilated expedition, without a single transport animal."

The contingent from Berber did follow, and the expedition eventually arrived at Gondokoro; and there the expedition, with the aid of its artisans, shipwrights, and engineers, made a fortified camp or settlement of an extensive and efficient kind, and Sir Samuel Baker summoned the head-men of the natives in the district, the principal of whom were a division of the brutal and warlike tribe of the Baris, intractable savages, who were in close alliance with the slave-hunters, and were determined to oppose and harass those who had come to put an end to their traffic. After formal annexation of the country in the name of the Khedive of Egypt, the business of the enterprise began. The arduous task

that was before him did not dismay the leader, who had overcome tremendous difficulties during the passage of the river. The story is worth telling. From Khartûm the force on board the flotilla, with the merchandise and various appliances, made the passage to Fashoda, the government station in the Shillûk country, where, having taken on board a month's rations for all hands, they proceeded to the Sobat junction with the White Nile, arriving on the 16th of February. Between the Sobat junction and Khartûm the White Nile is a grand river, but south of the great affluent the travellers entered upon a region of vast flats and boundless marshes, through which the stream winds in a labyrinthine course for about 750 miles to Gondokoro. But the expedition was to make the voyage, not by the original White Nile, but by the Bahr Giraffe, a river which had been found to be a branch of the White Nile. This stream had been discovered by the slave-traders to offer a new route when the White Nile had become obstructed by vegetation, which had formed a solid dam, and had been, of course, left unopened by the Egyptian authorities. The result was that an extraordinary phenomenon was presented there. The great number of floating islands which are constantly passing down the stream of the White Nile, being prevented from passing onward, were by the force of the stream sucked under the great obstructive mass in front of them. In this way the channel, which had existed beneath the accumulated vegetation, was also choked; the river disappeared, or rather became a marsh, beneath which, by the great pressure of water, the stream oozed through innumerable small channels. Thus a dense spongy mass intercepted the mud and other impurities as the volume of the stream was checked and had to filter slowly through it; mud-banks and shoals were formed and spread, closing the original bed of the river, which the rapid growth of reeds and river-grass in such a soil and climate soon converted into a marsh covered with dense vegetation.

The Bahr Giraffe flowed at first through a country all flat prairie with occasional forests, and it soon became evident that the doubts which had been entertained whether large vessels could navigate it were not ill-founded. The difficulties were tremendous,

for the narrow and shallow parts of the stream were choked with successive masses of vegetation, through which a passage or canal 150 yards long had to be cleared by cutting through the high grass with swords sharpened for the purpose. The grass resembled sugar-canes, growing from twenty to thirty feet in length, and throwing out roots at every joint, so that they became matted in a tangled and almost impenetrable jungle; and in the wet season quantities of the mass broke away and floated on to accumulate wherever there was any impediment to the stream, and formed fresh barricades. The labour of cutting away great bundles of this grass, and towing them out by thirty or forty men hauling on a rope, was so extreme that numbers of the people became sick and almost exhausted after days of such work. In one day a force of 700 men cut about a mile and a half of the grass and vegetable refuse, which they piled on each side like banks upon the floating surface of vegetation. At one time the river was lost, and a way had to be cut through what appeared to be a morass. Worse still were the rotten accumulations which could not be piled up. The water flowed beneath the marsh, which swarmed with snakes and a venomous kind of ant. Crocodiles were also plentiful, but these and hippopotami were shot, and furnished the favourite food of the Soudanese troops, while antelopes, ducks, and partridges were killed at several points of the journey, and here and there in the pools there were quantities of fish. At length after all this labour, and the constant necessity for hauling the heavy vessels through the channels that had been cleared, it became evident that no more could be done. The river had apparently ended in a chaos of marsh and jungle, and as numbers of men were down with fever, and the greater part of the force was sick and almost incapable of working, Baker determined to retreat, and to make a station at some convenient spot on the White Nile beyond the Sobat junction, where they could prepare to renew the attempt in the following year. It would have been impossible to proceed, for the vessels which had led the way were most of them aground, and had to be hauled back into the water through which they had passed. The return journey was difficult, but there was more water, and

after tremendous exertions the whole expedition reached a station on the White Nile. After having done a very satisfactory stroke of business in detecting one or two slave depots, and insisting on liberating a large number of slaves, much to the discomfiture of the governor of Fashoda and other officials who were thus detected in being engaged in the atrocious traffic, a camp was established near a large native village, and there preparations were made, and heavy spades and other implements provided for renewing the exploration of the river in the following season, an enterprise which was successfully accomplished by the finding and clearing a canal passage into the White Nile, and the settlement of the headquarters at Gondokoro.

The detailed story of Baker's subsequent achievements, of his battles with native tribes in league with the slave-hunters, his explorations, and his sporting and hunting adventures, by which he provided his followers with meat rations from elephants, hippopotami, antelopes, crocodiles, and all kinds of birds, beasts, and fishes,—do not form any essential part of the narrative of British interposition in the Soudan; but the main results of his expedition in temporarily suppressing the slave-trade and opening up the country are very distinctly related to the history of recent events. Those results, however, were not maintained, and even the vigorous and practical genius of Colonel Gordon, who succeeded him, and was appointed governor-general of the Equator, could not destroy this traffic, to abolish which a strong permanent central government, with well appointed and freely communicating stations, was necessary. Nothing else could possibly overcome the persistent opposition of Egyptian officials, who are themselves interested in the iniquitous traffic. What could have been a more emphatic proof of the futility of a merely temporary experiment for the suppression of the slave-trade, than the fact, that the very provinces which Baker was authorized to annex had already been leased by the Governor-general of the Soudan to a notorious slave-trader, Achmet Sheikh Agad, whose son-in-law and partner, Abu Saoud, was still more notorious, and so powerful that Gordon afterwards attempted to conciliate him and make use of his

influence, but found him so treacherous that means had to be taken to abandon him altogether and to destroy his authority.

Baker left Gondokoro for the south in January, 1872, and on the 14th of May had reached Massindi, where he proclaimed Ungoro an Egyptian province, and afterwards organized military posts in the country, and established friendly terms with M'tésé, the king of Uganda. The authority of the Khedive of Egypt, therefore, extended to within two degrees of the equator. That the slave-trade was suppressed in the annexed territory as well as on the Nile there can be little doubt, and there would have been no outlet for it in the direction of Khartûm if the Egyptian officials had possessed common loyalty and honesty.

In 1873 Baker returned to Cairo, having, as he said, achieved the success of a foundation for a radical reform in the so-called commerce of the White Nile. Before his arrival in the Soudan the entire river force of the steamers on the Blue and White Niles was represented by four very inferior vessels. He added six from Cairo, and built a seventh, leaving a force of eleven steamers working on the river, exclusive of two in sections. There were stations garrisoned by regular troops at Gondokoro, Faliko, Foweera, and Fabbo, and by newly raised irregulars at Farragenia and Faloro.

The main difficulty in his original enterprise was, as we have seen, the obstruction of the White Nile. After the tremendous and yet tedious work of cutting through fifty miles of swamp and agglomerated vegetable matter, by way of the Bahr Giraffe, he requested the khedive to order the governor of Khartûm immediately to commence the reopening of the White Nile; and in obedience to the instructions that were issued, the work was completed in two years, though not without the loss of several vessels, which were overwhelmed by the sudden bursting of vast masses of floating swamp and entangled weeds. It had been necessary to commence below stream, that the blocks of vegetation might escape when they were detached from the main body. A few months after the expiration of Baker's appointment, however, the river was restored to navigation, and was soon cleared for

large vessels, and six steamers, which had been sent up from Cairo to ply between Khartûm and Gondokoro, but had been only employed as far as Fashoda station, at once formed rapid and regular communication with the equatorial provinces—and Gondokoro was in communication with the outer world, from which it had formerly been excluded. Beside these vessels there were at Gondokoro and Khartûm the large steel steamers already mentioned, and the two steel life-boats for conveyance to the Albert Nyanza, all of which had been built in England, and conveyed with enormous difficulty across the deserts to Khartûm.

Baker returned to Cairo at the close of his enterprise, in August, 1874. He had achieved, as far as was possible, the objects for which his expedition had been organized; but, as Colonel Gordon afterwards discovered, the condition of the country with regard to the slave-trade is like that of a portion of the river in which Sir Samuel Baker had to force a passage, where the corruptions that impede navigation are composed of a mass of rottenness, in which the attempt to clear a way is frustrated, because the moment there is any relaxation of exertion the semi-fluid mass pours back again and chokes the channel.

Continuous effort, such as that which had been maintained for five years, was too great a burden upon the revenue of a country already suffering under an increasing debt, which threatened to overwhelm its resources, and had contributed £17,000,000 in money to the construction of the Suez Canal, which had diminished the revenue by diverting a large and increasing traffic from the Egyptian ports and railways. The khedive was, so to speak, already in the hands of the bill brokers, and it was thought to be necessary that he should diminish the expenditure, which was threatening to involve the country in liabilities, which he, at all events, would never enable it to discharge.

Baker's expedition had been organized on an extensive scale, and it necessarily entailed a large demand upon the treasury; but if the khedive was disappointed in the results, he must have been very imperfectly acquainted with the difficulties which had been overcome in order to suppress the slave-traffic on the White Nile

for a distance of 1600 miles, from Khartûm to Central Africa, and to open up the country to regular government, the development of legitimate commerce, and renewed cultivation. But, at anyrate, the experiment was not followed on the same scale; and in order to prevent the evils that had arisen from the almost irrepressible authority of the governor of Khartûm, the government of the Soudan was changed by dividing it into provinces under responsible governors, who were more or less independent of him: Fashoda being intrusted to Ussuf Effendi, Khartûm to Ismail Yacub Pasha, and Berber to Hussein Kalifa. It would have been utterly futile to expect the effects of Baker's expensive enterprise to be lasting without further means being adopted to establish what had been temporarily secured, however, and the attention of the khedive was directed to Colonel Gordon of the Royal Engineers, an officer whose extraordinary services in command of the "ever victorious army" which suppressed the Taiping rebellion in 1863 and 1864, had made him famous.

Of this hero—whose noble simple character, and marvellous personal authority over all those who came within his influence, eminently fitted him for a leader of men—we shall have much more to say in a future page, for he is still the central figure in the later history of British intervention in Egypt and the Soudan. The attention of the whole civilized world has been fixed upon him, the admiration of people of every nation has been aroused by his simple, unselfish courage and devotion, and men and women throughout Europe and America have mourned his death. The story of his noble life had begun while he was yet a lad in the trenches before Sebastopol, and at the age of thirty-one he had achieved a reputation of which no general description could be more complete than that of the *Times*, which thus summarized his services in an article published in August, 1864: "Never did soldier of fortune deport himself with a nicer sense of military honour, with more gallantry against the resisting, and with more mercy towards the vanquished, with more disinterested neglect of opportunities of personal advantage, or with more entire devotion to the objects and desires of his own government, than this officer,

who, after all his victories, has just laid down his sword. A history of operations among cities of uncouth names, and in provinces the geography of which is unknown except to special students, would be tedious and uninteresting. The result of Colonel Gordon's operations, however, is this: he found the richest and most fertile districts in China in the hands of the most savage brigands. The silk districts were the scenes of their cruelty and riot, and the great historical cities of Hang Chow and Soochow were rapidly following the fate of Nan King, and were becoming desolate ruins in their possession. Gordon has cut the rebellion in half, has recovered the great cities, has isolated and utterly discouraged the fragments of the brigand power, and has left the marauders nothing but a few tracts of devastated country and their stronghold of Nan King. All this he has effected, first by the power of his arms, and afterwards still more rapidly by the terror of his name."

The Chinese government conferred on him the yellow jacket and the peacock's feather; thus he became a mandarin of a high order, and received the rank of Ti Tu, the most distinguished in their army. It was difficult to reward a man who cared little for honours and refused presents. Sir Frederick Bruce, writing from Hong Kong, and inclosing to Earl Russell (who was then foreign secretary) a translation of the decree of the Chinese emperor, said:—

"Lieutenant Colonel Gordon well deserves her majesty's favour; for, independently of the skill and courage he has shown, his disinterestedness has elevated our national character in the eyes of the Chinese. Not only has he refused any pecuniary reward, but he has spent more than his pay in contributing to the comfort of the officers who served under him and in assuaging the distress of the starving population whom he relieved from the yoke of their oppressors. Indeed, the feeling that impelled him to resume operations after the fall of Soochow was one of the purest humanity."

Gordon had been promoted to a lieutenant colonelcy, and received the title of "Companion of the Bath." Still greater honour was the address sent him by the merchants of Shanghai

and other native and foreign residents. This he received and answered gratefully, but he would have no money. The Empress of China sent him a gold medal inscribed with words of praise and compliment. In after years he obliterated the inscription, and sent the medal as a contribution to the relief of the distress in Lancashire during the cotton famine.

"I leave China as poor as when I entered it," he wrote home; and so he did in one sense, but he was so rich in the admiration and respect of those whom he had rescued and befriended, that his sensitive and vigilant conscience may have seen even in that a temptation to swerve from the rigorous simplicity which he had determined to make his rule of life, and the old adjuration, "Beware when all men praise thee," probably had for him a deep spiritual significance.

We may, however, defer to a subsequent and more appropriate page of the present narrative the more than romantic records that illustrate this man's truly heroic life, and need only in the present chapter touch briefly on his appointment to the governorship of the Equator, when Sir Samuel Baker had accomplished his term of office, and on his subsequent nomination to the governorship of the Soudan.

In 1865 Gordon was appointed to the duty of superintending the construction of the defences of the Thames, and took up his abode at Gravesend. There he remained for nearly six years quietly attending to the work that he so well understood. The comparative retirement suited him. He was as indifferent to what the world usually calls fame as he was to the possession of wealth. It may almost be said that he took as much trouble to be forgotten, or to remain in tranquil obscurity, as other men take to obtain a general acknowledgment that they have done something to merit the acclamations of society. He disliked what is known as publicity, nor would he consent to talk about himself or his achievements. He endeavoured to live the divine life of unselfishness, that is to say, a life in which the consideration of himself or his own gratification or convenience had no place, and he succeeded. The time that was not occupied in the duties to

which he assiduously attended, he devoted almost entirely to beneficent work among the poor of the district, teaching at the ragged-school, visiting the sick in hospitals and workhouses, giving relief to those who were in want, and helping numbers of people who applied to him in their distress. This commanding officer of engineers was also teacher, missionary, and general benefactor. None applied to him in vain. He always loved the society of children, and the boys—the poor little ragged scarecrows employed or unemployed about the river shore and the town—found in him a friend who took them from the gutter and clothed and fed them, and even gave them a home in his house till he could find berths for them on board ships, or situations for those who were unfit for sea. For these lads, whom he called his “kings,” he formed reading classes which he superintended himself, reading to and teaching the lads with as much ardour as if he were leading them to victory, as indeed he was.

It is astonishing how easily a man who desires to be unnoticed by the world may have his wish gratified; but if he be such a man as Charles George Gordon he will deeply appreciate the tender regard of the few friends who are near and dear to him; nor can a man so distinguished as he was, continue to live in obscurity. The able and scrupulous discharge of a duty which is of public importance will lead to his being called to other duties which his conscience will remind him he cannot consistently refuse.

At the end of 1871 Colonel Gordon was appointed as British member of the Danubian Commission, the chief business of which is to improve the navigation of the mouth of the river Danube by deepening the channel. Each of the great powers of Europe is represented by a member of the commission, and the present deep Sulina Channel, by means of which large vessels can load at the wharves of Galatz and Braila, is mainly due to Gordon's professional skill. In 1872 Gordon was at the British embassy at Constantinople, and there met Nubar Pasha, the famous minister of the khedive, who had been a firm advocate of the expedition undertaken by Sir Samuel Baker. The term of that expedition would expire in the following year, and the Egyptian minister was anxious

to find a competent successor to the governorship of the country of the Nile basin.

To whom could he better apply than to the British Commissioner of the Danube to recommend an officer of the engineers who would be likely to accept, and able to fulfil, the arduous duties of such a position? To whom is it likely that the astute Armenian was mentally assigning the governorship, but to Gordon himself?

The colonel could not recommend anybody offhand, but promised to consider the matter. There was no occasion for haste, and he had time to think about it. The result was that he began to regard the government of the provinces and the suppression of the slave-trade in Central Africa as a mission to which he might be called upon to devote his best energies, and that remarkable faculty for dealing with semi-civilized races which had made his success in China so complete. To organize a plan, simple in execution and successful in putting an end to the atrocious traffic which had devastated and almost depopulated a vast territory, was a prospect which may well have fired the imagination and quickened the heart of a man like him, to whom religion was the perception and the unhesitating performance of duty, without distinction of high or low, and without fear or anxiety about the consequences to his own temporal interests or personal safety. In Central Africa he would find an almost illimitable field for active beneficence even amongst people to whom he might be called upon to show striking severity by the swift and certain punishment of traitors and oppressors.

In July, 1873, he wrote to Nubar Pasha, stating that he would be willing to accept the appointment if the khedive would himself apply to the English government to obtain permission for him to transfer his services. The application was made and received a favourable reply, and Gordon, after coming to England to make necessary preparations, set out for Cairo at the end of the year. He saw the khedive, who was willing that he should name his own terms, and the government, who thought that he could be induced to make a great show of state, as Egyptian officials would, urged him to take £10,000 a year. He refused to accept more than

£2000, though he afterwards was obliged to yield in the matter of engaging several attendants, most of whom he found to be of very little use, and so got rid of as soon as possible. His title, at which he himself laughed "as an extraordinary mixture," was "His Excellency General Colonel Gordon, the Governor-general of the Equator," and an abstract of the final instructions which he received at his departure, and dated February 16th, 1874, will show pretty well the nature and the extent of his duties.

"The province which Colonel Gordon has undertaken to organize and to govern is but little known. Up to the last few years it has been in the hands of adventurers, who have thought of nothing but their own lawless gains, and who traded in ivory and slaves. They established factories and governed them with armed men. The neighbouring tribes were forced to traffic with them whether they liked it or not. The Egyptian government, in the hope of putting an end to this inhuman trade, had taken the factories into their own hands, paying the owners an indemnification. Some of these men, nevertheless, had been still allowed to carry on trade in the district, under a promise that they would not deal in slaves. They had been placed under the control of the governor of the Soudan. His authority, however, had scarcely been able to make itself felt in these remote countries; the khedive, therefore, has resolved to form them into a separate government, and to claim as a monopoly of the state the whole of the trade of the outside world. There is no other way of putting an end to the slave-trade, which at present is carried on by force of arms in defiance of law. When once brigandage has become a thing of the past, and when once a breach has been made in the lawless customs of long ages, then trade may be made free to all.

If the men who have been in the pay of these adventurers are willing to enter into the pay of the government, Colonel Gordon is to make all the use of them that he can. If, on the other hand, they attempt to follow their old course of life, whether openly or secretly, he is to put in force against them the utmost severity of martial law. Such men as these must find in the new governor neither indulgence nor mercy. The lesson must be

made clear, even in those remote parts, that a mere difference of colour does not turn men into wares, and that life and liberty are sacred things.

One great error must be avoided into which others have fallen. The armament must be so well supplied with provisions that there shall be no need, as heretofore, to take from the tribes their stores of corn. By doing such things as this, distrust has been sown, where the khedive had hoped to establish a feeling of confidence. The land must be tilled by the troops and crops raised. If, as seems to be the case, Gondokoro is an ill-chosen position, situated as it is on a thankless soil, the seat of government must be moved to a more favoured spot. Among the natives who should be rescued from the slave-dealers many will be found who have been carried away from countries so far off that it would be impossible to restore them to their homes. They could be employed about the stations in tilling the ground.

Another object of the new governor should be to establish a line of posts through all his provinces, so that from one end to the other they may be brought into direct communication with Khartûm. These posts should follow as far as is possible the line of the Nile; but for a distance of seventy miles the navigation of that river is hindered by rapids. He is to search out the best way of overcoming this hindrance, and to make a report thereon to the khedive.

In dealing with the chieftains of the tribes which dwell on the shores of the lakes the governor is, above all, to try to win their confidence. He must respect their territory and conciliate them by presents. Whatever influence he gains over them he must use in the endeavour to persuade them to put an end to the wars which they so often make on each other in the hope of carrying off slaves. Much tact will be needed, for should he succeed in stopping the slave-trade while wars are still waged among the chiefs, it might well come to pass that for want of a market the prisoners would, in such a case, be slaughtered. Should he find it needful to exercise a real control over any one of these tribes it will be better to leave to the chieftains the direct govern-

ment. Their obedience must be secured by making them dread his power."

This was all remarkably concise, definite, and satisfactory; but remembering what had been Baker's experiences, and reading the instructions in the light of them, it seems to have been founded on an intention to pose in the face of Europe after European models. Baker with almost incredible exertion, courage, and determination had pioneered the way and found himself handicapped by the encouragement of slave-holders by the Egyptian government, and by the appointment of men of notorious lawlessness and violence to be governors and commanders of expeditions. With unyielding energy and pluck he had scotched the snake of slavery, if he had not killed it, and now he was left unhonoured and unsung, and the moral government of Ismail Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, was reading a beautiful lecture to his successor, who very soon discovered that sincere as the khedive himself might be, no steps had been taken to remove, or even to reprove and threaten the governors and high officials, who continued their traffic in slaves in the country to which he was appointed governor in chief, but without sufficient power to depose or to punish those who were constantly defying the law.

Gordon detected the hollowness of the whole affair when he reached Cairo and began his official interview, and Baker it seems had warned him. "I paid a visit to Shereef Pasha, the minister of justice," he writes on the 9th of February, 1874, "and I took the opportunity of asking him to express to the khedive my ideas of giving up the affair if it did not pay, and let him understand that your brother was not an hireling. I did this rather sharply because I thought Nubar Pasha's manner was different."

Five days afterwards he wrote:—"I think I can see the true motive now of the expedition, and believe it be a sham to catch the attention of the English people, as Baker said. I think the khedive is quite innocent (or nearly so) of it, but Nubar is the chief man. Now what has happened? There has been a mutual disappointment: Nubar thought he had a rash fellow to do with who could be persuaded to cut a dash, &c. &c., and found he had

one of the Gordon race; this latter thought the thing real and found it a sham, and felt like a Gordon who had been humbugged."

In the preface to the narrative of his expedition¹ Sir Samuel Baker writes:—"It was evident that the result of the expedition under my command was a death-blow to the slave-trade, if the khedive was determined to persist in its destruction. I had simply achieved the success of a foundation for a radical reform on the so-called commerce of the White Nile. The government had been established throughout the newly acquired territories, which were occupied by military positions, garrisoned with regular troops, and all those districts were absolutely purged from the slave-hunters. In this condition I resigned my command, as the first act was accomplished. The future would depend upon the sincerity of the khedive, and upon the ability and integrity of my successor."

Evidently, however, Baker did not suspect the khedive himself of insincerity, for he goes on to say that his highness had "adhered most strictly to his original determination, and to prove his sincerity he intrusted the command to an English officer of high reputation, not only for military capacity but for a peculiar attribute of self-sacrifice and devotion." Generous and manly words, which he follows up by the triumphant expression of a belief that this appointment had "extinguished the delusions which had been nourished by the Soudan authorities, that 'at the expiration of Baker Pasha's rule the good old times of slavery and lawlessness would return.' There was no longer any hope, the slave-trade was suppressed, and the foundation was laid for the introduction of European ideas and civilization." After all his toil, heart-burning, and experience of treachery he retired from the thankless task, but still with enough of enthusiasm and loyalty to hail the appointment of a successor who would carry on, with higher ability and higher promise, the work that he had begun. Alas! Gordon, when his equally thankless task was accomplished, and he also had retired after having established greater order, and

¹ *Ismailia*, a book which is full of interesting adventure, and of information on the subject of the natives of Central Africa.

placed military stations along the Nile, was less hopeful, more depressed, than Baker had been. His splendid physical constitution had almost succumbed to continual fatigue, privation, and anxiety. To say nothing of the tremendous responsibility, the disappointment, and the many strong emotions which affected him—the physical exertion had been enormous. In travelling alone it was enough to wear out an ordinary man. In 1879 he had ridden 2230 miles through the deserts on camels, and 800 miles in Abyssinia on mules. In the three years, 1877, 1878, 1879, he rode 8490 miles on camels and mules: his average day's journey on camels being 32½ miles, and on mules 10 miles.

Reserving characteristic and interesting details of Gordon's personal experiences for a later part of this story, in which he will reappear, a glance may be taken at the successive steps by which he completed the enterprise to which he had been appointed. He was not the man to draw back, but he frequently felt that he was acting under the disadvantage of having to deal, not only with the treachery and falsehood of the hostile governors, who, knowing that he would defeat them in their nefarious schemes, gave him no assistance, and plotted against him continually, but also of a half-hearted support from the Egyptian government. He never could realize the utter baseness of many of the men whom he endeavoured to propitiate, and whose conspiracies he detected. They were incapable of appreciating the simplicity and nobility of the man who was ready to forgive them or to let them off with only just enough punishment to warn them against an immediate repetition of an offence.

The most conspicuous example of Gordon's method of gaining an influence over people by trusting them, was his taking Abu Saoud out of prison at Cairo and making him his lieutenant, but in that instance it was a conspicuous failure.

This man was a notorious ruffian, who had commanded the territory occupied by the largest combination of slave-hunters and dealers. He had over and over again endeavoured to destroy Baker's expedition by inciting the native tribes against it, and had been convicted on the clearest evidence, collected by Baker himself,

of acts of rebellion and treachery for the purpose of maintaining the traffic. Gordon released him because, though he knew his character and had been warned against him, he believed that his influence at the slave-dealing stations would be useful. Gordon wrote "he will be a very great help—he is built and made to govern." Not only Abu Saoud but several other slave-dealers were employed, and the result was that Gordon, but for his own extraordinary vigilance and penetration, would have been killed and his efforts frustrated by this treacherous scoundrel, of whom he got rid by sending him away, after having forgiven him and taken him back into his service on two occasions, when he discovered that he was plotting against him and robbing him. The other Dongolese slave-dealers were very much like him, but with less influence and persistent villany, and eventually they were all cleared out and sent about their business.

In following the account of Gordon's mission, as told in his letters, it is evident that he was enabled rapidly to complete the work he had undertaken, because of the pioneering of Sir Samuel Baker, whose expedition, though it is stated to have cost over a million pounds, included the establishment of a monopoly of the trade in ivory to the Egyptian government; and this was continued by Gordon with very great success. The great difficulty which the latter had to encounter was the revival of the slave-trade, even in the short time that had elapsed between the retirement of his predecessor and his own acceptance of office.

It was an immense extent of territory over which he had *nominal* control, a territory about the size of Europe omitting Russia. Khartûm is, in fact, about as far from Gondokoro as London is from Turin, and though both the Egyptian settlements lie on the same great river, they are, as we have seen, cut off from each other for months together by the barrier of rapidly growing vegetation which forms in its upper reaches.

Colonel Long, an American in the employment of the khedive, accompanied Gordon, and was intrusted with important expeditions, and made some able explorations.

Lieutenant Hassan Wussif and a number of European civil

employes also joined the expedition. Gordon found that only three stations were held by the Egyptian troops—mere posts—at Gondokoro, and (far to the south) at Fatiko and Foweira. A strong body of troops was needed to convey stores or even letters from one garrison to another. It was not till the twenty-first month after his arrival at Gondokoro that he reached Foweira, for the organization of this government required much time and great labour, and he had found out that he must, for the most part, trust to his own exertions in important matters to secure any satisfactory result.

The khedive gave him a firman as governor-general of the Equator and left him to do what he could. On an examination of affairs he found that he must get hold of the finances of the new province, and of the troops. This he effected by getting rid of Raouf Bey, the subordinate of Ismail Yacoob Pasha, governor of the province of Khartûm and commander of the troops at Gondokoro. Both these men were hostile—Raouf Bey, who, in 1880 or 1881, actually became Raouf Pasha and governor-general of the Soudan, went off to Cairo, and was made commander of the Harrar country, and Gordon then separated his finances entirely from those of Khartûm.

Raouf Bey received Gordon cordially enough at Gondokoro, where there was a garrison of 450 men, 150 of whom were Egyptian soldiers; that at Fatimo being composed of 200 Soudan soldiers. On the soldiers sent by the khedive the governor found he could place no reliance. "The khedive's people are incapable of civilizing these natives, and may generally be described as 'conies,' a feeble race.

"One Arab lieutenant came up to Moogie, and you never saw such a pitiable sight. He was muffled up like his veiled wife, who accompanied him to me, begging and praying in the loudest and most pitiable terms to be allowed to go back. . . . It is wonderful how effeminate these Arabs are. . . . The fact is these officers have committed some crime at Cairo, and are sent up here for punishment. They are the most useless set of beings I ever came across. . . . The horde we are is something fearful.

For every 100 soldiers there are 120 women and children, boys, &c., so 500 soldiers are equal to 1100 souls." And again of the black soldiers. "The soldiers will pillage *en route*. The natives collect and then run away, enticing the soldiers to follow them into ambushes. . . . It is no use telling these dolts that the natives' object is to entice them to separate. How cordially glad I shall be when the whole relations between us cease! I cannot help it, but I have taken such a dislike to these blacks that I cannot bear their sight. I do not mean the natives, but these soldiers. They are nothing but a set of pillagers, and are about as likely to civilize these parts as they are to civilize the moon. Though it tells against me in my operations, I am glad in my heart that they are afraid of the natives. It will be long before they get the whip-hand of them. The natives will be up to all sorts of dodges by the time the soldiers get consolidated in the country. . . . To my mind a semi-soldier, more civilian than soldier, is required for the command here." The latter remark was caused by the want of discipline and obedience, and the dense stupidity that could not or would not understand an order, or execute it if it could be passed on to some one else. In an outburst of indignation he writes:—"Cowardly, effeminate, lying brutes these Arabs and Soudanese!" It will be seen that Gordon had begun to discover what the real difficulties were in any undertaking for the purpose of improving the condition of the country under Egyptian influence. He had begun to find it out before he reached Khartûm, but he meant to go on in spite of it. In one of his letters at the beginning of 1876 he says:—

"I think the khedive likes me, but no one else does; and I do not like them—I mean the swells, whose corns I tread on in all manner of ways. . . . I saw —— at Suez. He agrees with me in our opinion of the rottenness of Egypt: it is all for the flesh, and in no place is human nature to be studied with such advantage. Duke of This wants steamer—say £600. Duke of That wants house, &c. All the time the poor people are ground down to get money for all this. Who art thou to be afraid of a man? If He wills, I will shake all this in some way not clear to

me now. Do not think that I am an egotist; I am like Moses, who despised the riches of Egypt. We have a King mightier than these, and more enduring riches and power in Him than we can have in this world. I will not bow to Haman. . . ."

He afterwards began to think that the khedive would have preferred a commander with less energy, "an easy salary-drawing man." In fact he always was conscious that there was pretence in the professions of the Egyptian government, and that with one hand the slave-traders were threatened and with the other assured if not encouraged.

After reaching Gondokoro Gordon's first care was to occupy Bohr, an important position in the north, and to send Colonel Long on an expedition to M'tésé, King of Uganda. In June he commenced breaking up three large slave-trade stations on the Bahr el Zeraf, and established a strong post at Sobat, so strategically situated as to enable him to stop all the illegal traffic on the river. A boat would appear on its way from Gondokoro with a cargo of ivory and wood, all still on board, the crew perfectly innocent; but with an instinctive perception Gordon would have it searched, and there beneath the wood there were a number of slaves packed together, wretched, starving, and in misery. Then slaves and ivory were seized, and while the former had to be kept, because to liberate them at once would be to condemn them to be captured afresh, the ivory was put in stock to be sent to the Egyptian treasury.

It was when approaching the entrance of the Sobat river that some of his new subjects, a whole tribe of Dinkas, came out to meet him and his followers, not without great fear. With great difficulty the chief was induced to go on board with four of his people. He was in full dress—a necklace. They gave him some presents. He went up to Gordon, took each hand, and "gave a good soft lick to the backs of them; then held my face and made the motion of spitting in it."

This was the Bahr Gazelle; and they shortly reached the junction with the Gondokoro river and went on to Bohr, a great slave-trading place, where the people were not very civil when they

heard of the decree and of Gordon's mission. Two days previously the expedition had passed St. Croix, where a few banana trees were the only remains of the Austrian mission of which Speke had written in 1863: "The Austrian government, discouraged by the failure of so many years, had ordered the recall of the whole of the establishment for these regions. It was no wonder these men were recalled, for out of twenty missionaries who during the last thirteen years had ascended the White Nile for the purpose of propagating the gospel, thirteen had died of fever, two of dysentery, and two had retired broken in health, yet not one convert had been made by them. . . . The missionaries never had occasion to complain of these blacks, and to this day they would doubtless have been kindly inclined towards Europeans had the Nile traders not brought the devil amongst them." Baker, however, when with his expedition he had reached the place, said, "I had always expected trouble with the Baris, as I had known them during my former journey as a tribe of intractable savages. The Austrian missionaries had abandoned them as hopeless, after many efforts and a great expenditure of money and energy. The natives had pulled down the neat mission-house, and they had pounded and ground the light red bricks into the finest powder, which, mixed with grease, formed a paint to smear their naked bodies."

The slaves that were liberated, Gordon planted at Sobat, and encouraged them to cultivate the soil. He had formed an opinion that the wars between native tribes were often caused by the great deficiency of food; and it certainly appeared like it, when parents would sell their children as slaves for a measure of grain, and people who had stolen a cow and devoured it were quite contented to submit to one of their two boys being seized by the owner of the cow, who had probably stolen it himself.

Gordon, true to his actively beneficent nature, was constantly trying to alleviate the misery of the people among whom he was placed. The serenity of the man, notwithstanding outbursts of sharp, hot temper, his general good humour, his pity and ready forgiveness notwithstanding the decided and prompt severity with which he punished the treacherous slave-owning chiefs, and the

dauntless courage with which he would rush in upon them alone and unarmed and threaten them with vengeance, all make up a character which is a wonderful study. And not the least interesting part of Gordon's personality was his extraordinary sense of humour. In his letters, as in his conversation, the touches of merry description and of dry or rather sardonic humour are provocative alternately of hearty laughter or deep and serious reflection. One reflection, however, would be that the simple utterances of a truthful man, a man of single eye who speaks of the habits, the artificialities, and the aims of society as he sees them, are sure to appear like satires.

"I took a poor old bag of bones into my camp a month ago, and have been feeding her up; but yesterday she was quietly taken off, and now knows all things. She had her tobacco up to the last, and died quite quietly. What a change from her misery! I suppose she filled her place in life as well as Queen Elizabeth. . . . A wretched *sister* of yours is struggling up the road, but she is such a wisp of bones that the wind threatens to overthrow her, so she has halted, preferring the rain to being cast down. I verily believe she could never get up again. I have sent her some dhoora, and will produce a spark of joy in her black and withered carcass. She has not even a cotton gown on, and I do not think her apparel would be worth one-fiftieth of a penny. . . . I had told my man to see her into one of the huts, and thought he had done so. The night was stormy and rainy, and when I awoke I heard often a crying of a child near my hut within the inclosure. When I got up I went out to see what it was, and passing through the gateway I saw your and my sister lying dead in a pool of mud. Her black brothers had been passing and passing, and had taken no notice of her. So I went and ordered her to be buried, and went on. In the midst of the high grass was a baby about a year or so old left by itself. It had been out all night in the rain, and had been left by its mother—children are always a nuisance! I carried it in, and seeing the corpse was not moved I sent again about it, and went with the men to have it buried. To my surprise and astonishment she was alive. After a considerable trouble

I got the black brothers to lift her out of the mud, poured some brandy down her throat, and got her into a hut with a fire, having the mud washed out of her sightless eyes. She was not more than sixteen years of age. There she now lies; I cannot help hoping she is floating down with the tide to her haven of rest. The babe is taken care of by another family for a certain consideration of maize per diem. . . . I prefer life amidst sorrows, if those sorrows are inevitable, to a life spent in inaction. Turn where you will there are sorrows and troubles. Many a rich person is as unhappy as this rag of mortality, and to them you can minister. 'This mustard is very badly made,' was the remark of one of my staff some time ago when some of our brothers were stalking about showing every bone of their poor bodies.

"Your black sister departed this life at 4 P.M., deeply lamented by me, not so by her black brothers, who thought her a nuisance. When I went to see her this morning I heard the 'lamentations' of something on the other side of a hut. I went round and found one of our species, a visitor of ten or twelve months to this globe, lying in a pool of mud; I am not sure whether he was not less in age. I said, 'Here is another foundling!' and had it taken up. Its mother came up afterwards, and I mildly expostulated with her, remarking, however good it might be for the spawn of frogs it was not good for our species. The creature drank milk after this with avidity."

"Do you know," he quaintly asks in another letter, "that the black babies when they make their first appearance are quite light coloured; they colour after a time like pipes?"

"Residence in these Oriental lands," he wrote afterwards, "tends, after a time, to blunt one's susceptibilities of right and justice, and, therefore, the necessity for men to return at certain periods to their own countries to reimbibe the notions of the same. Some men become imbued with the notions of injustice much quicker than others when abroad, but ——— certainly has not taken much time to throw off all the trammels of civilized life, and to be ready to take up the unjust dealings of an Arab pasha. The varnish of civilized life is very thin, and only superficial. . . .

Man does not know what he is capable of in circumstances of this sort; unless he has the lode-star, he has no guide, no councillor in his walk.

“I feel that I have a mission here (not taken in its usual sense). The men and officers like my justice, candour, my outbursts of temper, and see that I am not a tyrant. Over two years we have lived intimately together, and they watch me closely. I am glad that they do so. My wish and desire is that all should be as happy as it rests with me to make them, and though I feel sure that I am unjust sometimes, it is not the rule with me to be so. I care for their marches, for their wants and food, and protect their women and boys if they ill-treat them; and *I do nothing of this—I am a chisel which cuts the wood, the Carpenter directs it*. If I lose my edge, He must sharpen me; if He puts me aside and takes another, it is His own good will. None are indispensable to Him.”

On the 11th of September, 1874, twenty-five chiefs of the tribes round Gondokoro went in to pay homage to Gordon:—chiefs who had been at open enmity within the garrison. His determination to have justice done, his fearless dealing with them, his humanity and illimitable pity had begun to tell, and his rule had become successful, but the slave-trade was yet very far from being abolished, for in the following month the governor of Fashoda intercepted a convey of 1600 slaves and 190 head of cattle from the stations of Ratatz and Kutchuk Ali on the Bahr Zaraf.

At about this time Colonel Long had returned from his expedition to Uganda, and he reported that the King of Unyoro, with the slave-traders to back him, had shown himself to be very unfriendly. It was, therefore, determined that stations should be established at Laborah, Duffli, Fatiko, and Foweira. At the same time preparations were being made for the expedition to the lakes. The sections of the steamers which had been left by Baker at Gondokoro were sent forward by carriers to be put together at the Falls of Duffli, beyond which point there is a free passage to the lake Albert Nyanza. A trustworthy messenger was sent to M'tésé, who had shown himself to be friendly, and on

the 21st of November Gondokoro was abandoned as the headquarters in favour of Lado, a more healthy spot a few miles down the river; a post was also established at Regaf, a short distance up the river.

Gordon had had a hard and yet monotonous time of it at Sobat, where there was so much sickness and death in his camp, though he himself, thin as a shadow, retained his health and strength marvellously, and was nurse and doctor as well as director and governor. The country on both sides the river was flat for sixty miles, not a soul to be seen for miles amidst the low forests and huge grasses, all the people had been driven off by the slavers in years past. "A fair and properly conducted emigration would be the best thing for these parts, and I think the blacks would gladly respond to such a scheme," he wrote. "It will be a very long time before much can be done to civilize them; the climate is against it, and there can be no trade, for they have nothing to exchange for goods. Poor creatures! They would like to be left alone. The Arabs hate these parts, and all the (Arab) troops are sent up for punishment; their constitutions, unlike ours, cannot stand the wet and damp and the dulness of their life. I prefer it infinitely to going out to dinner in England. . . . I agree that I have no patience with the groans of half the world, and declare I think there is more happiness among these miserable blacks, who have not a meal from day to day, than among our own middle classes. The blacks are glad of a handful of maize, and live in the greatest discomfort. They have not a strip to cover them; but you do not see them grunting and groaning all day long, as you see scores and scores in England, with their wretched dinner parties and attempts at gaiety, when all is hollow and miserable. If they have one thing they have not another."

Little as he regarded the difficulties of his responsible office, Gordon sometimes was ready to give up, and he eventually did so, though he was persuaded to return, with additional powers, to the Soudan. In September, 1875, he says of his followers:—"The men, unless you fly on them, will sit down and watch with calmness the

eyes starting out of the heads of some others who are hauling with all their force on a rope, without ever thinking of helping them. Without any reserve I could at this minute pack up and go back if shame did not prevent me. I have now quite made up my mind, God willing, to make these stations and *well* equip them, to quell the hostile tribes in the vicinity of them, to place next March, when the river rises, the steamer and six or eight nuggars above the cataracts; to quell, I hope, in December, Kaba Rega, and then to place forts along the Victoria Nile at Magungo, Anfina (Foweira already exists), Mrooli, and on Lake Victoria; to construct or acquire a flotilla for the Victoria Nile where navigable, and to put the small steamers together on the Victoria Lake. Not to go on the lakes at all, but as soon as that programme is completed to leave them altogether. . . . I am thoroughly disgusted. These people are unfit to acquire the country. . . . Some pasha will come, he will be a grand man, will neglect the stations, lose them perhaps, and the whole affair will die out, unless they send another foreigner, which they may do." This was written in 1875, in relation to the expedition to the lakes for which he had been preparing; but he had already by the close of the year 1874 reported the organization of governmental districts along the whole line of his provinces, the chief stations being (1) Sobat, at the junction of the Sobat river with the Nile, where there were 50 Soudan regulars; (2) Nasr, on the Sobat, garrison 100 Dongolese irregulars; (3) Shawbeh, 30 Soudan regulars, 150 Dongolese irregulars; (4) Makaraka, 20 Soudan regulars, 150 Dongolese irregulars; (5) Bohr, 10 Soudan regulars, 150 Dongolese irregulars; (6) Latuka, 10 Soudan regulars, 100 Dongolese irregulars; (7) Lado, headquarters, 180 Soudan regulars, 50 Egyptian regulars; (8) Regaf, 80 Soudan regulars; (9) Duffli (Ibrahimieh), 10 Soudan regulars; (10) Fatiko, 250 Soudan regulars, 100 Egyptian regulars; (11) Foweira, 100 Soudan regulars, 100 Egyptian regulars.

The White Nile had been mapped with very considerable accuracy from Khartûm to Regof; the slave-trade on that river had received a deadly blow; confidence and peace had been restored among the tribes round Gondokoro, who freely brought

in for sale their beef, corn, and ivory. Besides these achievements the work of opening a water communication between Gondokoro and the lakes had been seriously commenced. Communications had been established with M'tésé and the connection of Lake Victoria with Lake Albert, by way of the Victoria Nile, demonstrated; and government districts had been formed, and secure posts with intercommunication established. In a year the khedive had received £48,000 from the province, and Gordon had spent £20,000 at the outside, and had £60,000 worth of ivory in hand. One of his staff said, "He has certainly done wonders since his stay in this country. When he arrived, only ten months ago, he found a few hundred soldiers in Gondokoro who dare not go a hundred yards from that place, except when armed and in bands, on account of the hostile Baris. With these troops Gordon has garrisoned eight stations. . . . Baker's expedition cost the Egyptian government nearly £1,200,000, while Gordon has already sent up sufficient money to Cairo to pay for all the expenses of his expedition, including not only the sums required for last year, but the amount estimated for the current one as well."

It should not be forgotten, however, that Baker had to "lay down" the enterprise, to obtain steamers and boats, and to discover by experience the matters, the knowledge of which his successor profited by. He also commenced the government commercial monopoly which Gordon revived. To an impartial inquirer it does not seem that any comparison can be justly made of the expenditure incurred by the respective governors. Gordon really became independent of the Soudan government as regarded supplies, because he could raise them from his own resources. As early as the autumn of 1874 parties were sent out to levy taxes on the hostile tribes by demanding their cattle, and this had a salutary effect in keeping them quiet.

The scheme which Gordon had prepared at that time has been called the Juba River Expedition. The communications with Egypt *via* Khartûm were by no means satisfactory. The navigation of the river was full of difficulties, and there was a scarcity of

firewood for the steamers. A new base might be obtained if the khedive would send a small expedition to Mombaz Bay in the Indian Ocean, 250 miles north of Zanzibar, where a station could be established, and where a detachment could push inland towards M'tésé. The Mombaz Bay route, it was represented, would be shorter than that by Khartûm, and would much more effectually open up Central Africa. The khedive consented, and sent out an expedition under M' Killop Pasha of the Egyptian navy, with Colonel Long to command the proposed inland expedition. But there was trouble; the anchorage at the mouth of the Juba river was bad, and the expedition moving further south encroached on territory of the Sultan of Zanzibar, to whom the British government were to a certain extent bound by treaties concerning the slave-trade. The usual tangle occurred. The Zanzibar merchants feared for their equatorial trade, and the people of Aden for their supplies from the Somalis, who had been independent till Egypt had acquired a portion of their territory and levied taxes at their ports. There was a clashing of interests, amidst which the expedition was abandoned on the advice of the British government, the end of which was that the authority of the khedive was tacitly acknowledged as far along the coast as the 10th degree of north latitude, a result which gave Ismail Pasha the notion that he was entitled to the whole of the Red Sea coast, and could resist any claim of the Abyssinians to a port. It was also believed by the government of this country that a safeguard had been provided against European settlement on the coast, and that a way had been opened to a slave treaty with Egypt.

By the middle of 1876 Gordon had decided that he could do no more than he had already accomplished, his troops were mostly worthless, and yet he was in a continual state of war with the slave-hunting governors, who did all they could to frustrate his intentions. Among those from whom he suffered most, of course, was Ismail Yacoub Pasha, the governor-general of the Soudan, and as he had no support to enable him to withstand this man's treachery, he determined to throw up his command. Early in the year he had made preparations for Gessi to proceed to Lake

Albert Nyanza with two life-boats, while he himself proceeded towards Lake Victoria.

Gessi started in March, and succeeded in circumnavigating the lake in nine days, finding it to be only 140 miles long and 50 miles wide. The natives showed themselves hostile, and the west coast was inaccessible. In July the steamer was at last put together above the Duffli Falls, and the passage cleared to the Albert Lake. A treaty was made with M'tésé recognizing his independence, and Dr. Emin Effendi, a gentleman of German extraction, was sent to him as Gordon's representative.

Gordon himself did not return north, but in October was at Khartûm, having appointed Colonel Prout, an American officer, to the government of the province.

He writes in his journal on August 23d: "After careful study I decided on the following course: viz. when the troops return from Dubago to move with a hundred of them to Nyam Tongo and Urundojani, and survey the river and country between Mrooli and those places. . . . This bit of the Nile (between Urundogani and the lake) I am forced to give up. I avoid pushing it for fear of complications before we are ready for them. You can imagine how I feel about this bit of the Nile, for it is the *only bit* I have not done from Berber upwards to Lake Victoria; but reason says, 'divide and weaken your forces,' and so my personal feelings must be thrown over. I daresay a desire to be out of this country is mixed up with my decision, which will (*D. V.*) bring me to Khartûm about the middle of October, to Cairo in January, and home about February 5th, having been absent a few days over three years. My present idea is then to lie in bed till eleven every day, in the afternoon to walk not farther than the docks, and not to undertake those terrible railway journeys, or to get exposed to the questionings of people and their inevitable dinners; in fact, get into a dormant state, and stay there till I am obliged to work. I want oysters for lunch."

On the 2nd of December he arrived in Cairo, called on Cherif Pasha, minister for foreign affairs, and left it for him to inform the khedive of his having relinquished the command.

He arrived in London on the day before Christmas day, 1876. Nearly all his companions who went out with him had died or been invalided home, and he was suffering from overtoil, from the effects of the terrible climate in which he had lived, and from the long want of proper and nourishing food. Ismail Pasha now began to perceive that the man who had done this great work was entirely independent of him, and would no longer submit to the prevarications and neglect which made it impossible to hold the province without unceasing toil and disappointment.

Gordon had succeeded in checking slave-driving in his own province; but he could not stop it in the extensive Soudan district, where Khartûm is the head-quarters of the system. He had done all that seemed to be possible, but the khedive was exceedingly unwilling to lose his services, and people in authority in England also urged that it was his duty to return. He had only been at home about five weeks when he consented to return to Cairo to talk the matter over. He had made up his mind that he would not resume office unless he had the Soudan under his control, and he did not expect that Ismail Pasha would consent to give him so much power. "I have promised that if his highness will not give me the Soudan I will not go back to the lakes. I do not think he will give it, and I think you will see me back in six weeks," he wrote on the 31st of January. Then on the 13th of February, "I went to see H. H. He looked at me reproachfully, and my conscience smote me. He led me in, and Cherif Pasha came in. Then I began and told him all; and then he gave me the Soudan, and I start on Saturday morning."

The khedive had put Gordon in the place of the man who had so troubled him, and had so extended his duties that an immense territory was put under his rule; a province about 1640 miles long, with an average breadth of about 660 miles.

On the 17th of February the khedive wrote to Colonel Gordon:

"Setting a just value on your honourable character, on your zeal, and on the great services that you have already done me, I have resolved to bring the Soudan, Darfour, and the provinces of the Equator into one great province, and to place it under you as

governor-general. As the country which you are thus to govern is so vast, you must have beneath you three vakeels (or deputy-governors), the first for the Soudan properly so-called, the second for Darfour, and the third for the shores of the Red Sea and the Eastern Soudan. . . . There are two matters to which I would draw your attention: the first, the suppression of slavery; the second, the improvement of the means of communication. As Abyssinia for a great distance lies along the borders of the Soudan, I beg you when you are on the spot, to look carefully into the state of affairs there; and I give you power, should you think well, to enter into negotiations with the authorities of that kingdom, to the end that a settlement may be arrived at of the matters in dispute between us and them."

On the 18th of February, 1877, Colonel Gordon left Cairo for Suez on his way to Massowa, where he arrived on the 26th.

The khedive had given to Gordon a task which would have appalled a man of less single-minded determination. Affairs in Abyssinia were almost hopelessly entangled. On the retreat of Theodore to Magdala in the final scene of the English expedition, Kassai had assumed the title of "Johannis, King of Abyssinia." We have seen what had taken place there up to the time when Egypt had seized upon Bogos, and acquired other territory by the treachery of the governor. Egypt had still been hankering after an annexation of territory which was claimed by "Johannis," the successor of Theodorus, but, having been defeated in the attempt by Walad el Michael the hereditary Prince of Hamaçen and Bogos, whom Johannis had set free that he might go into his own country and raise his people against the Egyptian invaders, the khedive prepared another expedition commanded by Rahib Pasha, and having an American officer. By that time Walad el Michael had quarrelled with Johannis, and went over to the Egyptians, but the Abyssinian was too strong for them both, and utterly defeated them, so that the remnant of the Egyptian army had to get back to Massowa under a truce, while Walad el Michael had slipped off with his 7000 men to Bogos, and actually made a plunge into the province of Hamaçen, and killed the Abyssinian governor. This

so incensed the furious Johannis that he sent to Cairo offering to the khedive to cede Hamaçen—the very place to obtain which war had been made—if Walad el Michael were caught and handed over to him. The envoy was kept waiting in Cairo for three months, and then returned to Abyssinia without an answer. Johannis was now in a temper which made it unsafe for anybody to go near him, and this was the complication which Gordon was commissioned to clear up. The situation is quaintly explained by Gordon himself:

“There were two courses open to me with respect to this Abyssinian question: the one to negotiate peace with Johannis and ignore Walad el Michael, and if afterwards Walad turned rusty, to arrange with Johannis to come in and catch him. This certainly would have been easiest for me. Johannis would have been delighted, and we would be rid of Walad; but it would first of all be very poor encouragement to any future *secessions*, and would debase Egyptian repute. The process of turning in the polecat Johannis to work out the weasel (Walad) would play havoc with the farmyard (the country) in which the operation was carried on; and it might be that the polecat Johannis having caught the weasel Walad, might choose to turn on the hens (which we are), and killing us, stay in the farmyard. For, to tell the truth, we, the hens, stole the farmyard, this country, from the polecats when they were fighting among themselves, and before they knew we were hens. The other course open to me was to give Walad a government separated from Johannis, which I have done, and I think that was the best course; it was no doubt the most honest course, and though in consequence we are like a fat nut between the nutcrackers, it will, I hope, turn out well.”

This arrangement, which Gordon himself knew well enough would be no more permanent than any other, and was only adopted because it was the simplest, and on the whole, perhaps, the most equitable, had to be rapidly effected, for affairs in the Soudan were looking dangerous.

The work that lay before him was almost appalling, and grateful as he was to the Khedive Ismail for giving him this apparently arbitrary power over such an enormous extent of territory, he

was soon to discover that his supposed prerogative was practically frustrated. He had no distinct authority to punish the chiefs and governors who were plotting his destruction, opposing him by force or treachery, and using all their influence to maintain the slave-trade, to suppress which was the very object of his mission. The declared punishment for slave-hunting chiefs by the decree of the khedive was from five months' to five years' imprisonment, but the purchase of slaves in Egyptian territory was legal, and it was not easy to determine whether a caravan of slaves had been bought within the prescribed limits. When the false and rebellious chiefs and officers who were to have aided Gordon, but whom he discovered to be, like the rest of Egyptian officials, utterly untrustworthy, were dismissed by him and sent away to Cairo, they should have been punished there, but were either unquestioned or treated with such leniency as to encourage others in their opposition to the efforts that he was making. Some of them actually appeared at the assemblies and balls given by the khedive at his palace, and were quite pleasantly received.

The only notice which reached Gordon from Cairo on the question of the slave brigands who were making war against him was an offer from Nubar Pasha to *send Zebehr*—Zebehr having promised Nubar to pay a revenue of £25,000 a year, a sum which he could only obtain by sending down slaves. Gordon, of course, declined that offer. "The way that the Cairo government support Sebehr, who is in Cairo, makes a very bad impression," he wrote, "for every one here thinks that I am the only obstacle to his return. Now H. H. knows that Zebehr has egged on his people to this revolt, that it was he who devastated the whole country, and that he alone is responsible for the slave-trade of the last ten years; and yet Zebehr has the *entrée partout*. . . . I am putting, in all the frontier posts, European Vakeels (sub-governors) to see that no slave caravans come through the frontier. I do not think that any now try to pass, but the least neglect of vigilance would bring it on again in no time. I shall give Gessi £1000 if he succeeds in catching Zebehr's son. I hope he will hang him, for if he is sent to Cairo he will be made much of."

The state of the law which hampered Gordon's endeavours was utterly confusing. In a letter of March 15th, 1879, he briefly says:—

“1. I have an order signed by the khedive to put to death all slave-dealers or persons taking slaves.

“2. I have the convention (between the British and Egyptian governments for the suppression of the slave-trade, signed at Alexandria, Aug. 4, 1877), which calls slave-taking ‘robbery with murder.’

“3. I have the khedive's decree, which came out with the convention, that this crime is to be punished with five months to five years prison.

“4. I have a telegram from Nubar Pasha saying that ‘the sale and purchase of slaves in Egypt is legal.’”

Added to these difficulties the authorities in Cairo were worrying him for money, while the pay of his soldiers was in arrear, the yearly deficit of the Soudan finances was £109,000 and the debts £300,000. No more than five-sixths of the revenue was ever obtained, because the collectors said to the heads of communities, “Pay me four-sixths of the sum due, and give as *back-sheesh* to me one-sixth; then I will certify that you cannot pay the remaining sixth.” This kind of peculation could not be checked in so vast a country with only Egyptian officials to work with.

These were the distressing conditions which he had to endure after more than two years' constant anxiety, frequent sickness, perpetual travelling on camels from place to place, and surrounded by war, treachery, and revolt; to say nothing of the harrowing cruelties of which he had to witness the results, and on the perpetrators of which he endeavoured to inflict chastisement. The loyalty of the man who reduced his own salary one half because of the appointment of a subordinate who would require to be paid, and the dismissal of worse than useless retainers, was manifest at the very outset of the expedition, when he left Abyssinia because of the report of a serious insurrection in Darfûr. He says:—“I have written to Vivian¹ to say that if anything happens

¹ The Hon. H. C. Vivian, the English consul-general.

to me the khedive is to be defended from all blame, and the accident is not to be put down to the suppression of slavery. I have to contend with many vested interests: with fanaticism, with the abolition of hundreds of Arnauts,¹ Turks, &c., now acting as Bashi-Bazouks, with inefficient governors, with wild independent tribes of Bedouins, and with a large semi-independent province, lately under Sebehr Pasha, at Bahr Gazelle."

His energy was tremendous. "I got here to-day," he wrote from Katarif, "after a very hot journey. We did it in a very short time—sixty hours, 150 miles. . . . With terrific exertions in two or three years time I may, with God's administration, make a good province, with a good army and a fair revenue, and peace and an increased trade, and also have suppressed slave raids; and then I will come home and go to bed, and never get up again till noon every day, and never walk more than a mile."

On the route from Kasala to Katarif on the Atbara Gordon noted a remarkable spectacle. There was a great fête as he and his escort came into the settlement, and there were a number of men in regular chain-shirts of links with a gorget; these chain-mail shirts reached to their feet. They had helmets of iron, with a nose-piece and fringe of chain-armour. They rode on horses which had a head and cheek defence, and were covered with a sort of quilt of different colours, that reached down to their feet. It reminded the colonel of the fêtes at Charlton, where they used to represent the ancient tournaments. All the swords were like the old crusaders'—straight, two-handed, and cross-hilted. Evidently these people had not changed since the Crusades.

Some months afterwards, at Dara, he found a number of ancient swords similar to those here mentioned; he also found some chain-armour which had been on the men who accompanied the Sultan Ibrahim when he was killed in the invasion of Darfûr. In a note on the subject Colonel Gordon wrote, "When the Crusaders ceased their attacks on the Mussulmans of the Arabian peninsula the latter found their land too crowded and began to emigrate. One band went up the Nile and swept along to the

¹ Greek Mohammedans from Albania.

west. They did not go further than 10 degrees N. latitude, because their camels could not live beyond this line. When they first settled in these lands, in the belt which stretches along 10° north latitude, they were few in number. They squatted and lived with the negro tribes. They increased and multiplied, and then began to influence these tribes, and induced them to become Mussulmans. These Bedouins still maintained their nomadic life, and to this day are a distinct people from the negro aborigines. The armour, I believe, came up with the emigrants. The people of these lands say that it is as old as David King of Israel. Anyway it never was manufactured in these countries, and must have come from Syria. Kordofan, Darfûr, Wadi, Fertit, Bagirmi, Bornou, and Sokoto are Mussulman states founded by these settlers." It would thus appear that Mohammedanism has spread as far southward as the camel can exist; the tenth degree of north latitude being the limit of both.¹

In the following year (1878), when Gordon had arrived at Dongola from Khartûm, a man had run after him *en route* with some Darfûr things which he brought as a present for his highness the khedive. "There was a helmet, a guard for the arm, a buckler, the spear, and the sceptre. The date on them was 280 of Hegira, which would make them 1015 years of age. They were evidently taken by some one at the capture of Fascher, and will make a nice present for H. H. I fear I had to give £100 for the things, but as they are a sort of regalia and as the money stays in the country, I did not grudge it. The buckler has many small figures around it in gilt, of men on horses hunting deer, and of falcons killing geese." Alas! Gordon soon discovered that he might as well have kept his money in his pocket. Writing in January, 1879, he says, "I am perfectly furious with H. H., for I see that he has given the whole of the splendid collection of arms and trophies which I had sent him from the Equator and the Soudan to a museum in Paris. Among them were the shield and helmet, &c., for which I gave £100 in solid coin of my own, and which I gave to H. H. Fancy H. H. giving a national collection

¹ Colonel Gordon in Central Africa.

like this which would have sold for £15,000, to a French museum when we are wanting £5 in this country."

Six days after leaving Khatarif, Gordon and his following were at Sennâr after travelling forty-five miles a day in the nights and mornings, tormented by myriads of biting beetles. In another six days he reached Khartûm, having stopped to give orders, write letters, consider petitions, and settling all kinds of applications at the stations which he passed through on his way.

He had, indeed, a stupendous task before him in attempting to reform the Soudan. "To give peace to a country quick with war; to suppress slavery among a people to whom the trade in human flesh was life and fortune; to make an army out of perhaps the worst material ever seen; to form a flourishing trade and a fair revenue on the wildest anarchy in the world. The immensity of the undertaking; the infinity of details involved in a single step towards the end; the countless odds to be faced; the many pests; the deadly climate; the horrible vermin; the ghastly itch; the nightly and daily alternations of overpowering heat and bitter cold—to be endured and overcome: the environment of bestial savagery and ruthless fanaticism—all these combine to make the achievement unique in human history," writes Mr. Hake in his biography of Gordon.

At Khartûm he was installed as governor-general, the *cadi* reading the firman and presenting an address. A royal salute was fired, and Gordon had to make his speech. It was pithy, but definite; and "pleased the people much." All he said was: "With the help of God I will hold the balance level." He celebrated the occasion by distributing to the deserving poor, gratuities amounting to a thousand pounds of his own money. He had first to encounter the opposition of Halid Pasha, the man who had been sent to him as his second in command, and who tried to bully him, but "after a two days' tussle" had to give in, and was all subservience, which, as usual, meant that he intended to frustrate what his chief was trying to do; a course which ended sometime afterwards in Gordon dismissing him and sending him back to Cairo, where he no doubt was received quite agreeably.

The sister of the former governor-general at Khartûm too showed her indignation at her brother's supercession by breaking all the windows in the palace—130 of them,—and cutting the divans or raised cushioned seats to pieces. Gordon had but a month in which to change the entire condition of affairs at Khartûm. He restored the authority of the former Ulemas; abolished flogging with the *kourbash*, under which ten to fifteen poor wretches had been made to suffer daily; and remitted the outstanding fines which had been inflicted on the people by the former grasping government. He could not entirely suppress the system of bribing officials by those who wanted places, and his head-clerk brought him considerable sums of money which had been given by people who sought situations worth about £200 a year—a salary which would necessarily be increased by the “perquisites” wrung from the people. He took the money and put it into the treasury, but did not punish the bribers, as they had “been brought up to it.” The smaller bribing by persons who had petitions to present was stopped by providing a box with a large slit in it which was placed at the door of the palace to receive written complaints or requests, to which he gave prompt attention, and thus saved much valuable time by avoiding the long and formal personal interviews which would otherwise have been demanded by petitioners. Another reform was the provision of a simple system by which water was pumped up from the river to supply the city. The most difficult task which he accomplished, however, was the disbanding of about 6000 Turks and Bashi Bazouks, who formed the guards of the frontier, and persistently allowed the slave caravans to pass. This was absolutely essential, but was, of course, not completed without arousing the animosity and opposition of a large number of those who were deprived of their command.

Gordon could not remain at Khartûm. He afterwards said that he expected to ride 5000 miles that year; and it, indeed, appeared that only the most unsparing energy could enable him to meet the difficulties by which he was surrounded. Darfur was in revolt. Haroun, the relative of the previous sultan, still claimed the throne, and took advantage of the discontent caused by the ill

government of the province to incite the people to insurrection. This was in February, 1877, and a very large number of men were ready to maintain the claims of Haroun since the Bedouin tribes, who had held aloof from the sultan when Darfûr was conquered in 1874, were now ready to uphold his claim. Darfûr and Kordofan were peopled by large tribes of Bedouins under their own sheikhs, and more than semi-independent, the country for the most part a vast desert, with wells few and far between, some of which were only known to those tribes. Some of the tribes could put from 2000 to 6000 horse or camel men into the field. One formidable weapon of the Darfurians was a long lance with a huge blade like a potato-hoe. Of these and the "assegais," which these people threw with great skill, we have heard a great deal during the more recent conflicts in the Soudan.

The Bedouins who were supporting the revolt in Darfûr were slave-traders, making raids on the negro tribes to the south, or exchanging cloth for slaves with other Bedouin tribes beyond even the pretended boundary of Egypt on the west. The slaves thus entered the Egyptian territory four or five at a time, though nothing would have prevented their going in a hundred at a time, as there was no range of sentinels on the borders of the country. Gordon considered that the large slave-caravans in which the wretched captives were driven in numbers through the desert manacled or bearing heavy wooden yokes had ceased, but that there was still an extensive trade carried on by small dealers which it would be impossible to put down.

The governor of Darfûr, Hassan Helmi Pasha, was supine and useless. He had a large force at his disposal, but failed to render any assistance to the stations of El Fascher, Dara, Kolkol, and Kakabieh, where the insurgents or followers of Haroun had hemmed in the Egyptian garrisons. A force which had been sent from Fogia to their aid had, for some reason or other, not succeeded in relieving them. It was to accomplish this relief that Gordon's first efforts had to be made. But that arch-villain and supreme slave-dealer, Zebehr, was still planning. He at the outbreak of the Russian war had been sent from Cairo, where he had

been made so comfortable by the khedive, to Stamboul. He had not ceased to plot; and now his son Suleiman was at the head of the slave-dealers to the south, and with a great horde at his command was holding a threatening attitude at Shakka, his headquarters, and the very nest of the slave-trade in that part.

Gordon had declared that Darfûr was quite worthless as a possession, and as the revolt was caused by the cruelty and extortion of the Bashi-Bazouks, he determined to evacuate Toashia, Dara, and Kadjmour, and with their united garrisons move against Haroun. He thus proposed to get rid of the useless exposed stations, and by taking away the troops to save the people from pillage, the cause of revolts. His plan was to keep only the trunk road to Fascher.

Haroun had a vast number of men, but as the seed-time approached they were likely to desert, for they would not like to stay long away from their districts; and as each tribe would steal from the others who had been their allies, the coalition would be soon broken up. Gordon had 500 nondescript troops with him; there were 350 more at Toashia, and 1200 at Dara, which was to be vacated, so that he had about 2000, not counting the 1000 men at Kadjmour who were wanted to march from that place to Kolkol. But at Shakka were the hordes of Zebehr, led by his son, and there had assembled a host of murderers and robbers who made raids on the negro tribes for slaves. Gordon reckoned that they could put 10,000 men into the field. He wrote:—"Altogether it was well I came to the Soudan. Another year would have left little Soudan to come to, what with these gentlemen, Darfûr, and Abyssinia. I am overwhelmed with debts. Some of the men have had no pay for three years!"

When once Gordon had left Khartûm he sped from place to place with his accustomed alacrity, and it may be added without caring much whether he arrived without his escort. He went single-handed and unarmed amidst not only doubtful friends but avowed enemies. His utter fearlessness, which looked like audacity, but was simple indifference to danger or even to death, astonished the enemy so much that they often submitted at once. His sudden appearance

frequently dismayed the cowardly and procrastinating garrisons at the stations. In this way he approached Fogia, where the force had been sent two months previously to relieve the Darfûr garrison.

"I am quite alone, and like it. I am become what people call a great fatalist, viz. I trust God will pull me through every difficulty. The solitary grandeur of the desert makes one feel how vain is the effort of man. This carries me through my troubles and enables me to look on death as a coming relief when it is His will. The heat is sometimes terrible. I am now accustomed to the camel. It is a wonderful creature, with its silent, cushion-like tread. . . .

"I have a splendid camel—none like it; it flies along, and quite astonishes even the Arabs. I came flying into this station in marshal's uniform, and before the men had time to unpile their arms I had arrived, with only one man with me. I could not help it; the escort did not come in for an hour and a half afterwards. The Arab chief who came with me said it was the telegraph. The Gordons and the camels are of the same race—let them take an idea into their heads, and nothing will take it out. If my camel feels inclined to go in any particular direction, there he will go, pull as much as you like. The grand cordon was given to a man who guaranteed to give it to me as we approached the station; but, alas! it did not come for an hour afterwards. It is fearful to see the governor-general, arrayed in gold clothes, flying along like a madman, with only a guide, as if he was pursued. The mudir had not time to gather himself together before the enemy was on him. Some of the guards were down at a well drinking. It was no use; before they had got half-way to their arms the goal was won. Specks had been seen in the vast plain around the station moving towards it (like Jehu's advance), but the specks were few—only two or three—and were supposed to be the advance guard, and before the men of Fogia knew where they were the station was taken. The artillerymen were the only ones ready!"

It was a wretched "tag, rag, and bobtail" army that Gordon led to Toashia; they were nearly starved and had not been paid. He led to Dara "500 of all sorts, a very poor set," with flint-lock

muskets and all kinds of arms, a band of brigands in fact. He was in hourly danger of being attacked by thousands of the blacks, who were far superior to the Arabs. Dara had been six months without news from without. "It was like the relief of Lucknow." Everything was at famine prices. There were above 200 slaves, or poor creatures who seemed to be slaves, who were captured from the tribe attacked by the expedition. They were starving, and had been thirty-six hours without food. Intelligence came from Fascher that when Haroun was attacked there, hundreds of men, women, and children were dying or dead of smallpox and starvation. Gordon's Arabs let the wretched people captured at Dara go free. "They went off, 235 of them, arm in arm like a long string. They did this to prevent the vultures, the Gallabats, taking them as slaves, which they wanted to do." These Gallabats were regular slave-traders, and Gordon dared not do anything against them because of his position with respect to Shakka. He feared to raise them against him, as they appeared at the time to be well disposed.

Among the liberated slaves were "some poor little wretches, only stomachs and heads with antennæ for legs and arms." The enormous stomachs were caused by feeding on grass. A swarm of starved wretches afterwards invaded the court-yard of his quarters, and he was obliged to send them off till the next day, when he could procure some dhoora for them. His position was one of the most extreme difficulty, which was increased by the necessity for keeping up an armed force, and making use of the slaves for the purpose of recruiting it. Already he was being accused of inconsistency, and accusations were brought against him which could only be refuted by a complete understanding of the painful position in which he was placed.

"Of course," he wrote, "I must let time soften down the ill effects of what is written against me in the papers on account of my purchasing the slaves now in possession of individuals in order to obtain the troops necessary to put down slavery. I need troops. How am I to get them but thus? If I do not buy these slaves, unless I liberate them at once they will remain slaves, while

when they are soldiers they are free from that reproach. I cannot liberate them from their owners without compensation for fear of a general revolt. I cannot compensate the owners and then let the men go free, for they would only be in danger. Though the slaves may not like to be soldiers, still it is the fate of many in lands where there is the conscription, and, indeed, it is the only way in which I can break up the bands of armed men which are owned by private people—slave-dealers, and get these bands under discipline. When I have these bands, of which Sebehr's son and others are the chiefs, then the slave-dealers will have no power to make raids, while, at the same time, I get troops able to prevent any such like attempt. . . . I doubt not people will write and say: 1. Colonel Gordon buys slaves for the government. 2. Colonel Gordon lets the Gallabats take slaves. To No. 1 I say: 'True, for I need the purchased slaves to put down the slave-dealers and to break up their semi-independent bands.' To No. 2 I say: 'True, for I dare not stop it to any extent for fear of adding to my enemies before I have broken up the nest of slave-dealers at Shaka.' I should be mad if I did. We should not, if at war with Russia, choose that moment to bring about any change affecting the social life of the Hindoos. The slaves I buy are already torn from their homes; and whether I buy them or not, they will till twelve years have elapsed remain slaves. After twelve years they will be free according to the treaty. It is not as if I encouraged raids for the purpose of getting slaves as soldiers. But people will, of course, say: 'By buying slaves you increase the demand, and indirectly encourage raids.' I say: 'Yes, I should do so if after buying them I still allowed the raids to continue; which, of course, I shall not do.' . . . This slave question is most troublesome and difficult to manage. A number of the slaves who were taken in the last raid made near here on the sly by the Gallabats refuse to go back, for they find they are better fed with their new masters than they were with their old. . . . What am I to do with the 3000 or 4000 slaves, women and children, that are now at Shaka if we take it? I cannot take them back to their own country, I cannot feed them. . . . I

must let them be taken by my auxiliaries, or by my soldiers, or by the merchants. There is no help for it. If I let them loose they will be picked up in every direction, for an escaped slave is like an escaped sheep—the property of him who finds him or her. One must consider what is best for the individual himself, not what may seem best to the judgment of Europe. It is the slave who suffers, not Europe. There is not the slightest doubt but that if I let the slaves be taken by my soldiers, by the tribes, or by the Gallabat merchants, instead of there being a cessation of the slave caravans, there will be a great increase of them for two or three months, and a corresponding outcry against me. But, at any rate, the slaves will go by frequented routes, and will not die on the road. I could let the matter solve itself; *i.e.* let the slaves stay as they are, and let the owners run the cordon as they best can; but I should thus cause the slaves to undergo great suffering, and perhaps the death of one-half of them. Shall I be cowardly and do this for fear of what ill-informed Europe may say? . . . There are the slaves; around them the hungry vultures, and only one man to protect them, and that man has no means of feeding them or of sending them back to their friends. . . . Strange to say, these wretched slaves have their likes and dislikes. Some would sooner go with their Gallabat merchants, some with the tribes, and some with the soldiers. They are of different minds. Even if they could, they would not go back to their now desolate homes. If they did, they would be attacked by more powerful tribes, and be made slaves to them. Their own country is probably a desert, their people dispersed, and the land run over with weeds. It would be a long time ere they could get their crops again. . . . It makes one wink to think how the slaves of all these Bedouin tribes are to be freed in twelve years. Who is to free them? Will Great Britain? When the trees hear my voice and obey me, then will the tribes liberate their slaves! The only thing the government can do is to prevent their getting new ones."

Can anything point more emphatically to the obstacles that surrounded the question of slavery in the Soudan? This quotation in itself will show pretty clearly the bearings of the whole

question, and the improbability of any European power taking armed possession of a vast extent of worthless territory, arid and almost waterless desert, and inhabited by tribes warlike and constantly at war with each other, for the purpose of putting an end to a traffic which everybody around recognizes as an institution to be supported and defended. Gordon came to be almost heart-broken when he realized the position in which he found himself. When he was *en route* to Shakka he wrote (on the 10th September, 1877), "I have complaints on all sides of the pillage committed by the slave-dealers' people. I cannot help it. . . . I am running a great risk in going into the slavers' nest with only four companies, but I will trust to God to help me, and the best policy with these people is a bold one." It is not easy to realize the loneliness, the tremendous sense of responsibility, the mental and physical suffering which this man had to undergo; only his firm faith in the directing power of God, perhaps only his fatalism, as he knew people would and must call it, would have upheld him and carried him through.

The manner of his entering Dara was illustrative of his marvellous energy, his contempt for danger, his utter disregard of anything that might happen to himself when duty seemed to point to the course to be pursued. On his way thither he learned that an officer (lieutenant-colonel) who should have attacked the enemy at one of the stations had been bribed to remain inactive. The culprit went to meet Gordon, who would not see him; but had to deal with him afterwards. This fellow allowed his men to rob right and left, and all along the road the wretched people went running to Gordon for protection, for the irregular banditti troops would steal a boy or a girl with as little compunction as they would snatch a fowl.

The manner in which the governor-general reached Dara is suggestive enough:—

"I got to Dara alone, about 4 P.M., long before my escort, having ridden eighty-five miles in a day and a half. About seven miles from Dara I got into a swarm of flies, and they annoyed me and my camel so much that we jolted along as fast as we could.

Upwards of 300 were on my camel's head, and I was covered with them. I suppose that the queen fly was among them. If I had no escort of men I had a large escort of these flies. I came on my people like a thunderbolt. As soon as they had recovered, the salute was fired. My poor escort! Where is it? Imagine to yourself a single, dirty, red-faced man on a camel, ornamented with flies, arriving in the divan all of a sudden. The people were paralysed, and could not believe their eyes."

His success, however, was greater than he expected. That the bold policy was the most effectual was soon proved.

On Sept. 2, 1877, he wrote:—"No dinner after my long ride, but a quiet night, forgetting my miseries. At dawn I got up, and putting on the golden armour the khedive gave me, went out to see my troops, and then mounted my horse and with an escort of *my* robbers of Bashi-Bazouks rode out to the camp of the other robbers three miles off. I was met by the son of Sebehr—a nice-looking lad of twenty-two years—and rode through the robber bands. There were about 3000 of them—men and boys. I rode to the tent in the camp; the whole body of chiefs were dumb-founded at my coming among them. After a glass of water I went back, telling the son of Sebehr to come with his family to my divan. They all came, and sitting there in a circle I gave them in choice Arabic my ideas—that they meditated revolt, that I knew it, and that they should now have my ultimatum—viz. that I would disarm them and break them up. They listened in silence, and then went off to consider what I had said. They have just now sent in a letter stating their submission, and I thank God for it. They have pillaged the country all round, and I cannot help it."

But before gaining this advantage he had been delayed by an unexpected danger, for on his pushing out to Fascher to see how matters were going on there, he was confronted by a tribe known as the Leopards. He had for his allies the Masharins, which was a fortunate thing, as though he had 3500 troops they were such a cowardly set that they would scarcely fight even behind their entrenchments, and but for the brave Masharins, whose chief was

killed in the first encounter, would have been badly off. Gordon eventually suppressed the Leopards by strategy, contriving to cut them off from the wells so that they were unable to obtain water.

"The detachment of the Leopards are without water, and have been so for a day. I am sorry for it. Consider it as we may, war is a brutal, cruel affair. Do you notice how often, in the wars of the Israelites, the people were in want of water? Those wars were the same as our wars here (see 2 Kings iii. 9). I fear we are like them, for we take captives—in fact, the whole of the circumstances are just as they were in the time of the Kings of Israel, even the cloth wrapped round the men, and the immense spears. To a man who knew the Scriptures, and could write well, it would be a grand chance. The chiefs are now, as then, men of known personal courage, like the commander-in-chief of David. The small portion of the Leopard tribe which is near here has got my letter of pardon, and some of them are flying down to the water. Fancy what a comfort to them in this fearful sun! You see the people coming over the sand like flies on a wall. The poor fugitives cannot stand the thirst, and are coming down, one by one, to water. You have not the very least idea of the fearful effect of want of water in this scorched up country, yet this Leopard tribe would rise in rebellion though it had never been molested by the government. The effect of crushing it will be great; never before have they been so disastrously situated. Hunger is nothing to thirst; the one can be eased by eating grass, the other is swift and insupportable."

The "nice-looking lad," Zebehr's son Suleiman, whom Gordon afterwards calls "a cub" (seeming to have been amused at his cool insolence), turned out to be a cunning treacherous scoundrel, as might have been expected; but alarmed by the rapidity and authority of the governor-general he left about half of his followers and returned to Shakka. To this place Gordon followed him about the middle of September, 1877, and sent him to Bahrel-Ghazal, while the other chiefs he dismissed to various places. The slave-trade was thus broken up for the time in this direction, and very large numbers of slaves had been liberated; but there

were above 4000 more slave-hunters to be dealt with in the Bahr-el-Ghazal, though Edrees, the chief of these, was apparently friendly to Gordon.

The anxiety of the governor-general was extreme. He did not fear death, but he feared, or rather he knew, that if he should die or be killed the whole country would again fall into anarchy, and the slave-hunters resume their detestable traffic. He was almost crushed beneath the weight of responsibility, surrounded as he was by those who only awaited an opportunity to undo all that he had done, and he could not count even on the moral support of the Egyptian government.

There were some 6000 more slave-dealers in the interior who were ready to obey when they heard that the son of Zebehr and the other chiefs had submitted, but there was then the difficulty of dealing with such a number of armed men. Gordon wrote:—"I have separated them here and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass. Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our government once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came into Bristol harbour in the time of our fathers? . . . If it suits me I will buy slaves, I will let captured slaves go down to Egypt and not molest them, and I will do what I like, and what God in his mercy may direct me to do about domestic slaves; but I will break the neck of slave raids even if it cost me my life. . . . Certain Greeks are now at Katarif, on whom I have my eye, who have gangs of slaves cultivating cotton. I mean to make a swoop on them. In fact, the condition of the negro is incomparably better in these lands than ever it was in the West Indies, and I therefore claim for my people a greater kindness of heart than was possessed by the planters, with all their Christian profession and civilization. . . . Act up to your religion and then you will enjoy it. The Christianity of the mass is a vapid tasteless thing, and of no use to anyone. The people of England care more for their dinners than they do for anything else, and you may depend upon it, it is only an active few whom God pushes on to take an interest in the

[slave] question. 'It is very shocking! Will you take some more salmon?'"

A journey of six hours to Shakka through the forest, where "you are nearly torn to ribbons by the thorny trees," brought Gordon to the midst of the insubordinate slavers. Suleiman and the rest of the notables were all submission, and begged for various appointments. None of them were to be trusted. If Suleiman were sent to Cairo it would be to make a great man of him, and at the same time he would be regarded as a martyr by everybody at Shakka. Gordon took the upper hand and caused the band to play Salaam Effendina—Vive le Khediva!—for a vast territory was brought under the Egyptian government by the suppression of the turbulent rulers. Suleiman was sent to the Bahr Gazelle, and the other chiefs to different places where posts could be found for them. The population of the Nile had emigrated to the Bahr Gazelle regions to seek safety under the new regime, and to escape from the government exactions.

Gordon made these arrangements rapidly, for he was anxious to return to Khartûm by way of Obeid. Shakka was a great unhealthy town full of slaves, and two large Arab tribes were already squabbling who should be their head chief, refusing to obey the sheikhs who were their hereditary rulers. Gordon did not see how he could dethrone these sheikhs, and therefore gave the Arabs an audience and said he would force no one, but that "those who wished for A could go with A, and those who wished for B could go with B." Zebehr's son was still importunate, and wanted to be made chief of the seribas—a cool request, as to have granted it would have been to put everything into his hands.

When Gordon left Shakka with the mass of slaves that remained there, he was afraid that it would be long before the work of dispersing them could be accomplished. On his journey he became aware that he was conveying to Obeid a caravan of slaves, and could not help it. "One man says that seven women who are with him are his wives! I cannot disprove it. There are numbers of children—the men say that they are all their

offspring! When you have got the ink which has soaked into blotting paper out of it, then slavery will cease in these lands." On the following day he came upon a caravan of slaves which accompanied him—some sixty or eighty men, women, and children chained. What was he to do? If he released them, who was to care for them or feed them? Their homes were too far off to send them to, so he decided to leave them with the slave merchant, after compelling him to take off their chains. He, looking on them as though they were as valuable as cows, would look well after them. "Don Quixote would have liberated them and made an attempt to send them back some forty days' march through hostile tribes to their homes, which they would never have reached. The slave merchant had done no harm in buying them, for it is permissible in Egypt, and he had not taken them from their homes, which they would never have reached. . . . There is no doubt I could stop all the slave gangs in one way, viz. by telling the tribes to capture and keep all the gangs that pass. They would soon do it, but then they would use no discrimination, and would plunder every one; besides which I think the slaves would prefer servitude with the Arabs of the towns to servitude with the Bedouins."

On his way he came across more slaves—one gang was kept under some trees waiting till he and his followers had passed; but he detected them and found that they were perishing for want of water. One of the gangs that he met consisted of slaves from Dara, who had been captured and sold to the pedlars by his own officers and men. It was enough to make the most resolute heart despair of doing any permanent good. No person under fifteen years of age was safe in Darfûr or Kordofan. The people were bent on slave-traffic, and looked on the capture of a slave in the same way as people would look on appropriating an article found on the road. He could not then make up his mind what to do, except that he was determined to stop at once the slave markets at Katarif, Gallabat, and Shakka, and to prevent the slave raids on the black tribes near the Bahr Gazelle. Gallabat was a place under the control of a semi-independent chief of the fierce

and warlike Tokrooris, who were immigrants from Darfûr, and to deal with them he would have to concentrate troops and prepare for war; for the chief might cause a revolt and claim the protection of Abyssinia, from which Gallabat had been stolen by the Egyptians. In that case there would be both Johannis and Walad el Michael to settle with. Then at Zeila there was another semi-independent chief named Aboubec'r, who had so much power with the tribes that he could not be interfered with except with the aid of a strong body of troops. It was a maddening complication, and amidst it all there were the horrors which were witnessed daily on the journey back to Khartûm. One of the Shakka men who was riding with Gordon told him that hundreds and hundreds of slaves died on the road, and that when they were too weak to go the pedlars shot them. In all previous emancipations there had been a strong government to enforce obedience, or a majority of the nation wished it; but in that country there was not one who wished it or who would aid it even by advice. There were many who would willingly see the sufferings of the slave gangs cease, and also the raids on the negro tribes; but there they would stop. The tenure of slaves was the A B C of life there to rich and poor, *no one* was uninterested in the matter.

Gordon reached Khartûm in the middle of October, and found that his energetic measures had caused him to be feared and respected, but not much liked. All the officials were on the alert directly they heard of his approach. Some of the dilatory pashas he had pursued, and quickened their movements towards the stations. He was received with a certain show of enthusiasm; but everybody wanted money, and he had none to give them. He set to work to put affairs in order, for he had only a few days to spare, and then set off again down the Nile to Berber, intending to go from there to Dongola, Wadi Halfa, Assouan; thence across to Berenice on the Red Sea, and then up to Massowa, and from Massowa to Bogos. Thence he proposed to go to meet King Johannis, to return to Massowa and go to Berbera, and perhaps to Harrar. While he was at Dongola, however, inquiring into a plan for a railway, he received a telegram from Khartûm to say

that there was a report of an Abyssinian invasion, and that Sennâr was threatened. He immediately started to return to Khartûm by crossing the Bayouda desert in a "bee-line;" and hearing that the report was false, but that Walad el Michael was again in arms at the frontier, he set off to the Bogos country. He found Walad encamped on a plateau on an immense mountain, to reach which two other mountains had to be crossed with great difficulty. The camp was six hours' journey from Sanheit, and when Gordon arrived Walad and his people were quartered in several huts close together, and surrounded with a ten-foot fence. His people looked afraid, and were very uneasy. It seemed as though they were to be made prisoners. About 7000 men were drawn up in military array to receive the visitor, and the son of Walad, with a troop of priests bearing sacred pictures, met him on the road. Walad himself was shamming sick, and Gordon, who found him lying on a couch with (he said) a bad knee, gave him a few hints, that any attempt to keep the governor-general's people prisoners within the fenced enclosure would be resented by the khedive. This was answered by profuse assurances that no harm was intended; and Gordon, who was accustomed to go where he pleased regardless of personal danger, made use of the time that he was kept waiting for an audience with the chief, by inspecting the army of brigands, some of whom looked pleased with the attention, while others scowled at him. It was a bold stroke for the governor-general in his gold uniform to assume the authority which his position entitled him to, for he had only his servants and ten soldiers in his retinue; but he had a sort of instinct for facing such difficulties. When he was admitted to a conference with Walad he advised him to ask pardon of Johannis, but this the chief utterly refused, and demanded more districts over which he might exercise the right to plunder. At last a compromise was made by Walad consenting to be quiet for a subsidy of £1000 a month, and Gordon departed for Khartûm by way of Suakim and Berber.

He had been a year in office, and had achieved marvellous reforms, only effected by labour from the very thoughts of which

most men would have shrunk appalled. His journeys on camels, 3840 miles in all, had produced physical suffering, which he thus describes:—

“From not having worn a bandage across the chest, I have shaken my heart or my lungs out of their places, and I have the same feeling in my chest as you have when you have a crick in the neck. In camel-riding you ought to wear a sash round the waist and another close up under the arm-pits; otherwise all the internal machinery gets disturbed. I say sincerely, that though I prefer to be here sooner than anywhere else, I would sooner be dead than lead this life. I have told my clerk, to his horror, to bury me when I die, and to make the Arabs each throw a stone on my grave, so that I may have a good monument. It is strange, fatalists as they are in theory, how they dislike any conversation like this; they consider it ill-omened, though they agree that it is written when we are to die.”

No sooner had Gordon reached Shendy on his return journey to Khartûm, by way of Suakim and Berber, than he received a long telegram from the khedive asking him if it would be possible for him to leave the Soudan and go down to Cairo to arrange his (the khedive's) financial affairs. The message reached him on the 25th of January (1878), and on the 7th of February he started for Cairo. The journey to Dongola was long and the weather was bitterly cold, a piercing north wind blowing the dust before it into the eyes of the travellers. The same disagreeable conditions lasted all the way to Wady Halfa.

He was exceedingly averse to going to Cairo, and appears to have expected that he would not succeed in proposing any acceptable scheme for disentangling the intricacies of the financial question, and he felt personally disinclined to participate in the formal ceremonies of the court. “I have now,” he wrote, “been one year governor-general, and I have lived a very rough sort of life, so much so that I have lost all my civilized tastes, and have an aversion to my meals that I can scarcely express. The idea of dinners at Cairo makes me quail. I do not exaggerate when I say ten minutes per diem is sufficient for all my meals, and there

is no greater happiness to me than when they are finished; and this though I am quite well."

The dreaded invitation to dinner awaited him in a telegram asking him to go to the palace on his arrival at 8 P.M. on the 7th of March. He did not arrive at the station till 9 o'clock, dusty and dirty, but he was at once "whisked off to the palace," where his highness was waiting dinner for him. Before dinner, however, late as it was, the khedive took him aside and asked him to be president of the inquiry into the state of the finances of the country. Ismail was exceedingly kind, and placed him at his right hand dirty and covered with dust as he was. "After some little conversation I was taken off to the palace that General Grant, U. S., had lately vacated, where the Prince of Wales lodged when here! . . . My people are all dazed! and so am I, and wish for my camel. . . . Fancy a palace full of lights, mirrors, gentlemen to wait on you, and the building itself one of the finest in Cairo." A week afterwards, however, he wrote: "I am much bothered, but I get to bed at 8 P.M., which is a comfort; for I do not dine out, and consequently do not drink wine. Everyone laughs at me, and I do not care. . . . I am almost desperate in my position in the Soudan. My crop of troubles is never to be got under; slave questions, finance, government—all seems at sixes and sevens; there is no peace or rest. . . . H. H. appoints men to my government with pay, &c., and then if they do not fit into their places he says to me, 'Settle with them.' I was not quiet in my lands, but even H. H. sends me firebrands, as if there was not enough inflammatory matter." A week later still and there was an end of it. "H. H. threw me over completely at the last moment; but far from being angry I was very glad, for it relieved me of a deal of trouble, and he said I might go at the end of next week. I laugh at all this farce. . . . I left Cairo with no honours; by the ordinary train, paying my passage. The sun which rose in such splendour set in the deepest obscurity. I calculate this financial episode of mine cost me £800. H. H. was bored with me after my failure, and could not bear the sight of me, which those around him soon knew. I daresay I may have been imprudent in

speech. I have no doubt it is better as it is. I have no doubt H. H. and I would have fallen out about the composition of the court of inquiry, for I feel sure that it was meant to be packed, and that I was only to be figurehead."

On the 30th of March he left Cairo for Suez, thence to Aden, from which he crossed over to Berbera on the African coast, and thence went to Zeila, a place which the khedive had obtained from Turkey for £15,000 a year extra tribute, and before he had contrived to annex Harrar. At Harrar, which is distant eight days' journey, Raouf Pasha was governor, the same man who had been at the Equator with Baker and afterwards with Gordon, and whom Gordon had deposed from his command four years before. He had not altered. He was a regular tyrant and a monopolist. Gordon confiscated about £2000 worth of coffee which he had sent to be sold to his private account at Aden, that he might buy other merchandise and retail it at exorbitant prices to the soldiers at Harrar. "It is the only way to punish him," wrote the governor-general, "for H. H., doing much the same thing, will never do so."

The former sultan or ameer of Harrar had oppressed his people, favoured the Galla tribes, and bullied the Mussulmans; and this led to the inhabitants sending to the khedive asking him to take possession of the province. Acting in his usual manner he sent as his representative Raouf Pasha, the man who had been turned out by Gordon for misgovernment of another province. Raouf made short work of the ameer by having him quietly strangled, a proceeding to which the son of the man objected so strongly, that he went to Cairo and complained to the khedive, who appeared to be exceedingly angry, but as usual did nothing. Raouf then turned upon the Gallas, made one of their great chiefs a prisoner and put him in irons, but released him when he heard of the approach of Gordon, who had sent forward the order that the governor should at once give up his command.

Raouf offered no resistance nor much remonstrance, but left the place two days after Gordon's arrival. He appeared to be rather downcast at being turned out, but probably he reflected that

he would be kindly received if not rewarded and pensioned at Cairo, which was after all a much more agreeable place than a town in the midst of a desert, where it became a problem with the people how they were to exist.

The effect of Gordon's experiences at Cairo was to make him a more determined reformer. The strip of country between the frontier of Abyssinia and the sea was inhabited by fanatical Mussulmans, and from the ports all along the coasts the slaves passed to Hodeidah on the Arabian coast. It was part of his task to stop this traffic, but the very vastness of the territory over which he was supposed to have control made it almost hopeless ever to do so effectually, and since his visit to Cairo his feelings had very greatly altered with regard to his plan of action. There was no hope of any change for the better in the government even if there should be another khedive. This made him careless of praise or blame from Ismail. All he cared for was to endeavour to benefit the people. He felt that he and the khedive were likely to squabble on the old question of making bricks without straw. Every possible expense was put upon the Soudan, and he was determined to keep down unnecessary outlay. There had been spent at Berbera £70,000 on a lighthouse (which was useless), on water supply, a mosque, a wharf, and other works, and it cost £40,000 to keep steamers and troops there, while the total revenue was about £170 a year; and the British government insisted on Berbera being a free port, and forbade a tax being levied on the 10,000 cows and the 60,000 sheep which were exported to Aden.

At anyrate Gordon went to work again in earnest, and began quickly to get rid of useless or inimical officers. Three generals of division, one general of brigade, and four lieutenant-colonels were turned out on his journey to Khartûm, and when he reached that place he took up his residence there and began assiduously to devote himself to the reformation of abuses, the settlement of the finances of the country, and the organization of its affairs. The state of the finances was rather dismaying. The budget for the current year showed a deficiency of £72,000. In October, 1878, the Soudan accounts had just been made out, and showed

that the debt was £327,000, the revenue £579,000, the expenses £651,000, the deficit therefore £72,000; but he had already effected a great improvement. In 1877 they spent £259,000 more than they had, but he had so cut down the outgoings that in 1878 they only exceeded the revenue by £50,600. This reduction had necessitated his looking after every detail. There was no one at Cairo to help him, on the contrary there were constant signs of trouble there; and Mr. Goschen, who was then making his inquiries with a view to proposing a financial scheme, was told that the Soudan gave a tribute of £143,000 a year, while it must have been known that the Soudan had always cost money, and never gave any until Gordon was made governor, and so managed that nothing was given on either side. One of the great difficulties was that the khedive, having made contracts for railway material and works which were not entirely carried out, and the terms for which were extravagant (as a forfeit had to be paid in the shape of an enormous interest on unused material), endeavoured to place the burden of responsibility on Gordon, by handing over to him the contract that he might see what could be done with it. A worse attempt still was made by his highness, who, finding among his private property a couple of steamers that he did not require, tried to have them added to the provisions for the Soudan at a cost of £20,000 a year. Gordon would not yield to either of these attempts. He demanded that the khedive's government, who made the railway contract, should get out of the difficulty, and he refused the steamers. Things looked as if they were coming to a crisis in every direction; after working hard at the accounts Gordon found that, while Cairo was demanding £30,000 as money due from the Soudan, it was the Cairo government that owed the Soudan £9000.

Life at Khartûm was dreary enough. In the intervals of his arduous work Gordon found it dull and dispiriting. He had scarcely any books, and no associates. He very seldom saw anyone except on business, and even in that he was obliged to decide on everything. In a climate that scarcely any European could endure, and in which half the Arabs were on the sick list (or said that they were ill), with a heavy debt, and yet hard put to it for

the want of fifty or a hundred pounds, he had no counsellor on whom he could rely. All fell on him.—“They are perfect sheep,” he wrote. “If you ever, in a moment of *weakness*, ask them anything, they give a sickly smile, and say, ‘You know best.’ Just as H. H. and Nubar telegraph to me.”

He occupied his evenings for a short time by making a large map of the Soudan, and then he sought amusement in taking the clocks to pieces and putting them together again. The dulness was almost insupportable. Doubtless he sometimes wished that he had been free to lead the attacks against the slave-dealers, which he was for the time only able to direct from Khartûm.

The subject of the Soudanese railway, already referred to, had occupied his earnest attention. It had been in course of construction when he entered on his governorship, but had turned out a failure, and he was not permitted to carry it forward in the way that he believed would make it permanently useful.

Ismail had come to the conclusion that if he continued to hold the Soudan he must improve the communications between it and Egypt proper; but his notion was to bring the Soudan trade down the Nile through Egypt, and he therefore abandoned the natural trade outlet by the route to the Red Sea from Berber to Suakim, a distance of 280 miles across the desert, and decided on constructing a railway through the desert, along the Nile, past the cataracts from Wady Halfa to Hanneck, a distance of 180 miles. With the usual recklessness of consequences contracts were entered into; but in 1877, after about £450,000 had been spent on the line, the financial muddle stopped the works, and the line came to an abrupt conclusion “in the air” about fifty miles from Wady Halfa, and with 130 miles remaining to be crossed before the barrier of desert would be passed. Careful personal examination by Colonel Mason, Mr. Gooding, and Colonel Gordon himself had shown that the river for this 130 miles was not continuously encumbered by rocks. Between the rocky ridges there were long spaces of open water, and steamers built in England had in times of full flood been hauled up every one of the ridges to Khartûm and had plied to Gondokoro. Gordon's plan was to bring up small steamers

during high Nile, to place one on each of the open strips of water that were of reasonable extent, and thus work them from ridge to ridge in the open spaces; at the same time, to save expense, having only one crew, which would shift from steamer to steamer. The distance between the debarking or landing place of one open water-way and the embarking wharf of the next open water-way was to be traversed by tramways, and thus the 130 miles from the place where the railway terminated to Hanneck would be got over. The entire cost of thus carrying out the work was computed at £70,000, as against a million and a half which would have been required for the completion of the railway; but the revolts of the slave-drivers and native rulers in the Soudan, and the various troubles that attended the administration of the province, prevented the adoption of the scheme, and so there the unfinished railway remained with its valuable stores perishing, while Egypt proper had no more actual hold over the Soudan than was possessed by Ancient Egypt.

But if Gordon was sick and solitary, he was never idle. He never really had a quiet day, and had the misery of fearing that in spite of all he did no true progress was made. Dishonest officials, interfering consuls, and a deaf and indifferent government who would give him no assistance, but while encouraging his enemies, would leave his communications unanswered, were quickly bringing him to the conclusion that he must relinquish office directly his term expired. First, however, he would use every effort that he could make, to strike a death-blow to the slave-trade. By the end of July, 1878, his people had seized twelve caravans of slaves in two months, and though he was cooped up in Khartûm, and occupied with the finances, he began to take prompt and severe measures against the cruel scoundrels who not only held but ill-treated slaves, and especially slave women and children. A caravan of 400 slaves, with about 180 guards, met one of Gordon's mudirs or sub-governors of Darfûr and refused to obey him. They got away, but about ninety of the slaves were captured by a steamer coming from Berber. They presented a terrible spectacle. There were few over sixteen years of age, and many

of them had babies. Some were tiny boys and girls. They had come over 500 miles of desert, and were a residue of four times their number. Well might Gordon say it was much for him to do to keep himself from cruel illegal acts towards the slave-dealers, though he remembered that God suffered it, and that one must keep within the law.

At the end of 1878 Gordon heard that the khedive was going to take from him the command of Harrar and Zeila, and he was glad of it, for they were a constant source of trouble and expense, and he had his hands full in addition to endeavouring to pacify Johannis and Walad el Michael in Abyssinia, where the former persisted in ignoring the khedive and treating only with Gordon, whom he called the Sultan of the Soudan. The only authority, as regarded Abyssinia, that Gordon had been able to obtain from Ismail was the following, not in Arabic but *in French*, and it was written at the end of his nomination as governor-general:—"The Abyssinian frontier joins the Soudan. Some disputes about the frontier exist. I authorize you, if you think fit, to settle these questions with the Abyssinian authorities." These were the powers with which he had to negotiate with Johannis, who demanded not only an arrangement of the frontier, but that a Christian abuna or archbishop should be sent to him from the Coptic church at Alexandria, as only such an archbishop could ordain priests, and what was perhaps of equal importance, could excommunicate those who disobeyed the king, a terrible punishment among the barbarous fanatics of that country.

The revolt in the Bahr Gazelle, which had been stirred up by Zebehr, who, when he went as a prisoner to Cairo, took with him £100,000 for the purpose of bribing the other pashas, had become dangerous. Zebehr's son, with a gang of slave-dealing chiefs, commanded a very large force, and were pillaging the country and subverting all regular government.

Gordon had caused several of the members of Zebehr's family to be arrested, and had confiscated such of their property as could be discovered, and he had sent an expedition under his brave and able lieutenant Gessi against the rebels. Gessi wrote to him

on the 1st of January, 1879, saying that Suleiman had been repulsed.

At Khartûm Gordon was perplexed what to do with 1300 of the slave soldiers who had remained faithful to the government. These men were a second-class force, and included the larger part of the full-grown natives in the seribas or camps. They were called "Farookh," "Narakeek," or "Bazingir," and their duty had been to accompany the natives in their expeditions whether for war or for trade. These black soldiers constituted nearly half the fighting force in all the seribas, and took a prominent part in time of war.¹ Though they had been loyal to his authority the governor-general did not know how to employ them. He could not put them into the regular army, for they would never stand the discipline; so he temporarily gave them a zone of country on the frontier of Wadai and Darfûr, and sent two Europeans with their chief (who was one of the best and bravest of Zebehr's men) that they might keep their eyes upon the natives to prevent slave-raiding; for all the chiefs had been brought up to be brigands and could not be expected to change.

Zebehr's system had been to kidnap boys and train them to be soldiers, so that by the time they grew to be young men of five-and-twenty years old they were formidable foes; one of their accomplishments being shooting with the aid of a tripod which they carried with them. They were, in fact, armed and trained brigands, and often ruled their nominal chiefs. It was another phase of the system of Memlooks and Janizaries. The destruction of Zebehr's gang was the turning-point of the slave-trade question, and yet Gordon could get not a word of support, much less material assistance, from Cairo. It was at this juncture that in answer to his reports on the subject of these slave brigands, Nubar had offered to send him Zebehr, the very man who had devastated the country and was responsible for the slave-trade, and who ought then to have been in prison instead of being a great personage at Cairo. Could there have been a more bitter farce than this?

But Gordon had pretty well determined what to do. "I shall

¹ Schweinfurth, *Heart of Africa*.

give Gessi £1000 if he succeeds in catching Zebehr's son," he wrote:—"I hope he will hang him, for if he is sent to Cairo he will be made much of."

In February, 1879, Gordon received orders to go to Cairo to appear before the council of ministers. This was the third summons, but he replied, that he could not present himself till July, and sent a telegram to the English consul asking him not to interfere, but, if possible, to see that his successor was a European, as, if he was forced to go to Cairo, he meant to resign. He knew that the false position in which the government of the khedive persisted in placing the financial affairs of the Soudan would bring him into direct antagonism with the finance minister; and it was also necessary for him to remain until the taxes of the previous year had been collected and the serious revolt in the Bahr Gazelle suppressed, a revolt which Gessi could not deal promptly with, for want of troops, and which Gordon, having no funds and no spare troops, was obliged to "starve down" by cutting the rebels off from supplies.

At last Gordon, becoming uneasy about Gessi, telegraphed to the khedive for permission to go to Shakka and look after him. On the 10th of March he received leave to go, and set out to Kordofan. He had determined if possible to deal a death-blow to the slave-trade, but the work before him was tremendous. There was the rebellion of the slave-dealers in the Bahr Gazelle, as well as insurrections in Darfûr and Kordofan. In Darfûr Haroun, who two years before had fled to the hills, was in the field again claiming his right to the throne. In Kordofan Sabahi, once a chief of Zebehr's gang, was at the head of the rebels, and had taken to pillaging and slave-dealing on his own account. In September, 1878, he had murdered a governor whom Gordon had sent to Edowa. Gordon's comments on the situation are brief.—"Ever since that time (Sept. 1878) I have been ordering and ordering him to be crushed; but no, not a bit of it. He is in the mountains and the 400 troops or more are in the plain, where they have been for three months doing nothing, I expect, but collecting slaves. Hassan Pasha Helmi has been at Obeid a month, but has made

no move to go against him, though as far as his words went he was going to eat him." Gessi had also an arduous task before him; but he was a man of iron energy, courage, and decision. He is thus well described in a few words: "Romulus Gessi, Italian subject: aged forty-nine—short, compact figure; cool, most determined man. Born genius for practical ingenuity in mechanics. Ought to have been born in 1560, not 1832. Same disposition as Francis Drake. Had been engaged in many petty political affairs. Was interpreter to Her Majesty's forces in the Crimea, and attached to the head-quarters of the Royal Artillery."

On his way up the Nile the valiant Gessi soon found how hopeless was the expectation of any aid from the Egyptian governors in the endeavour to suppress slave-dealing. Nuggars or river boats laden with slaves were coming down, and even the government steamers had their living cargoes. One of them had 292 slaves on board, and among these unhappy wretches were some porters, free men who had come to Lardo bringing ivory and corn. The governor, Ibrahim Fansi, had seized them, and sent them down the river to be sold into slavery. Happily for them they had been met by one who delivered them. Gessi first went southwards towards the lakes to get reinforcements from the different stations. Returning, he landed his troops at Rabat-chambē. His line of march lay to the west, and the land was flooded. For three hours one day the water was up to the necks of his men. He could find few porters, and the state of the country was such that he could not make a start till the 26th of August, 1878. After a march of five days he arrived at a place where he heard that Suleiman the son of Zebehr had broken into open revolt, and had proclaimed himself Lord of the Bahr Gazelle. He had surprised an Egyptian garrison in Dehm (the town of) Idris, had massacred the troops, and seized the government ammunition. Those of the neighbouring chiefs who did not submit to his rule he had attacked and put to the sword. The women and children he had caused to be murdered, or had carried them away to slavery; everywhere he had robbed the people of their stores of grain. In some places there was nothing left for them to eat but the leaves

of trees, and they were dying of hunger. For some months Gessi was cut off from Khartûm, and, therefore, from communication with Gordon, by the sudd or grassy barriers which had again formed in the Nile, had prevented the passage of the boats, and doubtless had helped to flood the country. He sorely needed reinforcements, for he had but 300 regulars, two guns, and 700 very inferior irregulars very badly armed; but Gordon had no men to send even if the barrier of the Nile had not existed. Meantime the treacherous Arabs of the Bahr Gazelle, who had appeared friendly, but were really waiting to see which side was likely to be the strongest, were joining the enemy Suleiman, whose followers numbered 6000 men, while, even when Gessi had received some of the reinforcements which he had sought in the country, he could only count upon 1300 men, and with these he began to fortify his position at Rumbek. His difficulties were increased by the treachery of some of the Egyptian officers. In one district the commander of the troops was carrying off, not only the cattle of the natives but their young girls; and this scoundrel flatly refused to obey Gessi's orders to present himself at Rumbek or to send his troops thither.

Gessi did not regard khedival prohibitions and the evasions of the Cairo government. He went to work in grim earnest, and in fact nothing but dauntless determination would have enabled him to achieve the purpose which he steadily pursued. He waited no longer for a reply from Khartûm, but prepared to advance. Numbers of his men, losing heart because of delays, deserted him, but he put an end to this by prompt and energetic punishments. One of the ringleaders he shot in the presence of all the troops, and seven others he flogged. All the reinforcements had not come in, but on the 17th of November he set out on the onward march, for the fields of grain were ripening in the higher lands, and he heard that the enemy had given orders to fire both the standing crops and the long grass along the route that he would have to follow. He and his followers could travel but slowly, because of the luxuriant vegetation and the necessity for avoiding the portions of the country that were flooded, beside which he had to take

with him a vast number of women, children, and slaves till he reached a place where he could leave them, while he pushed on with only the men who could fight. The country was a solitude. The remnant of the people, who had escaped the raids of Suleiman and his gang, had fled and left their villages and their crops. At three rivers which he had to cross all the boats had been destroyed, and he had to carry his army over on rafts made of reeds. In the fourth river (the Wau), crocodiles swarmed. It would have been dangerous to attempt such a passage, and a large hostile band of men was on the other side and commenced firing. Gessi ordered his men to lie down, and fired a shell into the midst of his assailants, many of whom fell. Their village was soon in flames and they fled. The next morning all was silent, and the troops crossed the river in three fishing-boats lent them by a friendly chief. They occupied a village on the other side, where Gessi made a stockade in which he could leave the women and children and the wounded. The natives came in great numbers to welcome him. Nearly ten thousand men, women, and children had been swept away from the villages of the Bahr Gazelle and dragged into slavery by the son of Zebehr. Gessi decided to take one man from each village who would be able to recognize and claim his own people. Now that they had help, the villagers were rising on all sides, and seizing on the slave-dealers who were settled in the country; those who refused to yield they killed.

Considerable reinforcements now came in, and the onward march was resumed. Soon after starting the head man of a tribe met them crying out that a band of Arabs had just carried off the people of one of his villages. A strong body of Gessi's troops gave chase to the marauders, took twelve of them prisoners, and brought them back with 160 men, women, and children whom they had stolen. The little army then marched to Dehm Idris, where Suleiman had slaughtered the Egyptian garrison. He had left one of his captains in possession there. Gessi reached the place in the middle of December, 1878, and captured it at once. Then the struggle began. Suleiman, supposing that the floods, the rivers, and the condition of the country would prevent any force from

arriving from the south, was preparing to march north-eastward against Shakka, but hearing that Gessi was actually at Dehm Idris, turned aside to attack him, making sure of a victory, as he had under his command a host of more than 10,000 men.

On the afternoon of December 27th, Gessi heard of the approach of the enemy, and all that night his men worked at strengthening their camp with a barricade of timber and earth. It was well they had done so, for the next morning their position was attacked on all sides. Four times the enemy attempted to storm the intrenchments, but the resistance was so fierce and stubborn that each time they were driven back with great loss. The fighting had been so severe that Suleiman waited till the 12th of January, 1879, when, having been reinforced, he again made a furious assault on the camp. Deserters declared to Gessi that the chief slave-dealer and his captains had met in solemn conclave and sworn on the Koran either to conquer or die. Gessi was not the man to be frightened, small as his force was and badly as he needed a supply of ammunition. His men, too, were ready to fight to the death, for they knew what they had to expect if they were vanquished. He posted his troops among the long grass and brushwood outside the camp, and the enemy on approaching were met with a volley which drove them back. Later in the day the slave-dealers made another onset; but it was evident that their black soldiers had little heart left for fighting, and were driven on by the Arabs, who were in the rear, with drawn swords pricking them on and slaying those who faltered. This assault was no more successful than the first, but Gessi was so short of ammunition that his men picked up and recast the bullets that had fallen in the camp. There was little time for rest. Early the next morning the foe came on again, and, after seven hours' stubborn fighting, were again compelled to retreat, to the bitter chagrin of the son of Zebehr, who a few days afterward, hearing that there was a want of ammunition in the camp, ordered another general assault. But on the previous night a small supply of powder and shot had been brought in, and when in the morning a bomb-shell from the slave-dealers set fire to a hut, and the flames spread over the whole

camp, amidst which the host rushed down expecting a victory, they found that Gessi had drawn up his forces in the open ground between the camp and the forest, where he gained so signal a victory that the flying host were chased to their fortifications.

Gessi's tactics were brilliant and his courage and tenacity indomitable. On the 11th of March he received three barrels of powder and two ingots of lead, and felt that he could then attack Suleiman's stronghold, which was on the high ground, and consisted of wooden huts and barricades made of trunks of trees. Having set fire to the huts with congreve rockets, the flames afterwards spread to the barricades in spite of the efforts of the rebels to check them by throwing earth upon the burning timber. The brigands were compelled to sally forth and try to overwhelm their opponents. Numbers of them were driven back with heavy losses, and at last they turned and fled, leaving eleven of their leaders dead on the field. The want of ammunition prevented Gessi from ordering a pursuit. Night had fallen, and his men were faint from want of food. Hunger and privation among the troops, and fever and smallpox in the camp at Dehm Idris, whither numbers of the soldiers' wives and children had followed the march against orders, and others had joined them till there were 12,000 extra mouths to feed, added to the difficulties of the commander, who could get no supplies from the governor of Shakka to whom he had written urgent letters.

But Gessi did not relax his efforts against the bands of slave-hunters. By the beginning of February, 1879, he had returned more than 10,000 people to their homes. Eight slave-dealers, who were taken with twenty-eight children whom they had chained together, were shot in the sight of all the troops. A few days later another gang were hanged. The people of the villages went wild with surprise and delight. The head men came in to throw themselves at his feet and thank him. At last a good supply of ammunition arrived, and he prepared to march against the son of Zebehr at Dehm Suleiman, the place which had been named after the villain himself. Gessi started on the 1st of May, 1879, and four days later he and his followers had come upon the enemy in

a woody ravine about four miles from the stronghold, and had first routed them, and then by a rapid advance cut them off from the place where Suleiman himself was sitting at the gate waiting for their return. The troops rushed to the assault, and as they went in at one gate the chief and two companions mounted their horses and galloped out by the other, having only waited to superintend the massacre of four wretched prisoners. Gessi pursued them for an hour, when, finding himself with only one follower, he returned to the camp, which the hungry and half-naked troops were plundering to supply their needs. Much of the treasure, which was recovered by Gessi from the soldiers and intended to be reserved for the state, was afterwards stolen by a man holding a high position in the Egyptian government.

The forces of the slave-trading chiefs were scattered and gathered into large bands, some escaping one way and some another. With 600 men Gessi started on the trail of the treacherous Suleiman. On their way they came upon the evidences of flight and destruction; hastily made graves, the bodies of murdered slave-children who could not keep up with the rebels and so were ruthlessly slain, burnt crops, devastated and deserted villages, from a hut in one of which a white woman, half-clad and holding a baby to her breast, ran out to greet her deliverers, tears of joy streaming down her face. She was the wife of an artillery officer, who had been massacred by the slave-dealers when they attacked the garrison at Dehm Idris, and she had been carried off. These were the spectacles that awaited Gessi's weary and starving troops as they set their teeth with fresh resolution to hunt down the wretches who were responsible for such misery.

At the village where they found this woman there was enough grain to give them a meal; and they pushed on till they reached a dense forest, where they bivouacked for the night. But their scouts brought news of a camp seen at some distance; and, though this was known to be a caravan of slaves, and the rebel camp was further on, Gessi started at once. The slave-drivers fled from a column of Gessi's force which approached them, but many were

killed, and some of them were made prisoners and fettered with the chains taken from their helpless victims. They were the gang of one of the principal slave-traders in the Bahr Gazelle. The noise of the rifle shots had alarmed the rebels, who fired the village where they were encamped and made off. Only a heap of mouldering wood and ashes remained, but one little child had during the alarm stolen away and hidden himself.

Just beyond the village was a sort of pound, into which the flocks of slaves used to be driven and herded for the night like cattle, on their way down to Egypt. Still onward went the avengers till evening, when Gessi halted by a brook in the forest. No camp-fire was lighted, for it was known that the enemy lay but a few miles further, and the attack was to be made the next morning. An hour after midnight, however, the sentries who were keeping watch as outposts saw seven men approaching, who called out that they had a message for Rabi from "Sultan" Idris. Rabi was a chief who was an ally of Suleiman, and the commander of the rebel band not far off. These men were scouts sent by Idris. They had mistaken Gessi's camp for that of which they were in search; and their message was, that as the "sultan" was only a short distance behind with many men and much merchandise, Rabi was entreated to delay his march that the two forces might travel together.

Gessi was equal to the occasion. He would not see the men, as his speech would have told them that he was not Rabi, but he sent word that as he had a number of wounded with him he could not delay, but would make a halt at some distance further on, and there wait. One man took the message back, the other six were invited to stay and eat, and as soon as their companion had departed they were seized and secured. Gessi then gave the word to march; and by daybreak he came suddenly upon Rabi's camp just as he was making ready to move on. The surprise was complete, and the slave-dealers were utterly routed, many of them being taken prisoners, though Rabi mounted on a swift horse contrived to escape. The flags and all the stores were captured; and no sooner was the fight over than Gessi had the

ground cleared of the evidences of the struggle, and the dead and wounded removed. He pitched his tent in a glade of the forest, set up Rabi's flag, and sent out scouts, who were instructed to fall in with the sultan's force as though they had come upon it by accident, and to act as guides to the camp. This Idris, who called himself sultan, was no more than a chief slave-hunter, who owned a great seriba composed of large farmsteads entirely shut in by tall hedges of straw-plait or thatch, and occupied by the various great slave-traders who had settled in the country. He fell into the trap that had been laid for him. Gessi had posted his men in the glade, where they crouched in the long grass. A storm of wind and rain caused the enemy to hurry on in disorder, that they might find shelter, as they supposed, in the camp of Rabi. As they crowded into the glade a signal was given, and a deadly volley was fired upon them. There was no escape; some threw themselves on the ground, others tried in vain to break through the ring of their assailants. Not a man of them was left standing when the firing was discontinued; but Idris and half a dozen of his body-guard had found shelter under a tree at some distance, and had taken flight when they heard the sound of the shots. The spoils that fell into the hands of the soldiers were very great and of considerable value, including horses, asses, oxen, linen cloth, and copper vessels.

The men were too fatigued and too much exhausted for want of food to continue the pursuit. The rebel bands were broken up, and the way lay through a forest where there were no habitations, and where consequently no grain could be found. The provisions which they had seized would only just suffice to enable them to travel back to Dehm Suleiman, and they started on the following day, to find, on their return march, that the natives had finished the work that they had begun, by rising against their former tyrants and attacking them as they fled.

Gessi had been away nine days, and his return was like a triumphal march. He entered Dehm Suleiman with his followers, who dragged the chained and captive chiefs of the slave-traders with them, while a long train of the common prisoners carried the

vast store of ivory which had been taken among the spoils and set apart as the property of the state. So great was the stock of elephants' tusks that in one week 1500 porters were sent off laden with them, and another large train followed a few days afterwards.

Gessi, looking older and haggard for want of sleep, needed repose, and his men settled down for a short rest. Some expeditions were sent out to cut off stray bands of the slave-hunters, but no more could be done for some little time.

On the 25th of June, 1879, Gessi met Gordon at Toashia, to report to him that the last of the bands of robber slave-dealers was crushed. Gessi was made a pasha, with the second class order of the Osmanlic and a gift of £2000. Gordon, having arranged with him for the future of the Bahr Gazelle, was just about to start on his return to Khartûm, and Gessi was to go back that he might follow up the son of Zebehr. There would be no security against another revolt and a renewal of the slave-traffic till this man and his remaining confederates were brought to justice, for Zebehr was still plotting, and nothing but a complete breaking up of the gangs in the Bahr Gazelle, and the thorough sweeping out of the traders in Shakka, would suffice to put an end to the atrocities that had been systematically perpetrated.

Gordon had been all this time pursuing his arduous journey, travelling at night to avoid the terrible heat, often in want of food and with little water, many of the wells being dry. He could not do as Gessi had done, for there was no actual rebellion, and therefore the slave-dealers were not shot, but those who had gangs of slaves illegally obtained were put in chains till they could be sent to prison; the male slaves were placed in the ranks of his army, the women were told off to be wives (!) of the soldiers, the children were to be sent to Obeid. There was nothing else to be done, and he had to be continually on the alert to intercept the slave caravans which were hidden in the woods or in the long grass away from the road by which he and his followers were travelling. He had to be equally watchful of his own men. When one caravan came in he noticed that the captured camel had no water-bags on him, and as he felt sure it would not have come unladen, he made

inquiry, and discovered that the men who captured the caravan had taken five of the slaves and two donkeys and the water-bags. What could be done with such people? "I declare," he wrote from Edowa, "if I could stop this traffic I would willingly be shot this night; this shows my ardent desire, and yet, strive as I can, I can hardly see any hope of averting the evil. Now comes the question—Could I sacrifice my life and remain in Kordofan and Darfour? To die quickly would be to me nothing, but the long crucifixion that a residence in these horrid countries entails, appals me. Yet I feel that if I could screw my mind up to it, I could cause the trade to cease, for its roots are in these countries. The East Soudan is now quiet and free from the slave-trade. But I do not think I can face the cross of staying here, simply on physical grounds. I have written to the khedive to say I will not remain as governor-general, for I feel I cannot govern the country to satisfy myself. Now, as I will not stay as governor-general of the whole Soudan, query, shall I stay as the governor of the West Soudan and crush the slave-dealers? Many will say it is a worthy cause to die in. I agree if the death was speedy, but oh! it is a long and weary one, and for the moment I cannot face it."

But he remained and prosecuted the object of his dangerous and almost desperate journey, for he was encouraged by the news he received from Gessi, and began to believe that he and his brave lieutenant would after all be able to put an end to the slave-trade. He hoped to make a clean sweep of Shakka when he reached that den of iniquity, from which he was then only a day's journey, and to give a death-blow to the slave-dealers, of whom there were about a hundred in the place. Having arrived at Shakka he heard that Gessi wanted no more troops or ammunition, so he determined to recall the men who were *en route* and send them to Dara, where he intended to go in ten days and try to capture Haroun.

"When one thinks of the enormous number of slaves which have passed into Egypt from these parts in the last few years," he wrote, "one can scarcely conceive what has become of them. There must have been thousands on thousands of them. And

then again, where do they all come from? For the lands of the natives which I have seen are not densely peopled. . . . We must have caught 2000 in less than nine months, and I expect we did not catch one-fifth of the caravans. Again, how many died *en route*?"

He proposed to reinstate the family of the Sultan Ibrahim at Darfûr, and telegraphed to the khedive to send up the son of the sultan. The thievish employés made quiet or just government impossible, and the only thing to be done was to restore the old régime. His telegram was not answered, and the heir whom he would have restored was kept in Cairo. The letter that Gordon did receive was one asking for £12,000; while his men in camp at Shakka were fifteen months to two years in arrears of pay, and were more than half naked. So he answered: "When the nakedness of my troops is partially covered I may talk to you. In the meantime send me up at once the £12,000 you unfairly took in customs on goods in transit to the Soudan."

He no longer cared what he said, for he had discovered that no one could keep the incendiary materials of the Soudan quiet until he had been there some years, and it would then end in the Cairo finance having to meet the Soudan deficit. It was only by hard camel-riding that he could keep his position among the people. The slave-dealers had left Shakka in dismay, and he hoped that the place was clear of them for ever. But he had begun to ask himself how it was possible permanently to suppress the traffic under such a government as that at Cairo.

The government of the Egyptians in those far-off countries was nothing else but one of brigandage of the very worst description. "If the liberation of slaves is to take place in 1884 (in Egypt proper) and the present system of government goes on there cannot fail to be a revolt of the whole country."

This is significant in the light of the insurrection fomented by the Mahdi in the following year. "Our government will go on sleeping till it comes, and then have to act *a l'improviste*. If you had read the accounts of the tremendous debates which took place in 1833 on the liberation of the West Indian slaves, even on

payment of £20,000,000, you would have some idea how owners of slaves (even Christians) hold to their property. . . . It is rather amusing to think that the people of Cairo are quite oblivious that in 1884 their revenue will fall to one-half, and that the country will need many more troops to keep it quiet. Seven-eighths of the population of the Soudan are slaves; and the loss of revenue in 1889 (the date fixed for the liberation of slaves in Egypt's outlying territories) will be more than two-thirds, if it is ever carried out."

He had begun to estimate Ismail Pasha by another standard, though he still thought of him kindly, and afterwards deplored his misfortunes. "No one is ever obliged to enter the service of one of these states; and if he does he has to blame himself, and not the Oriental state. If the Oriental state is well governed, then it is very sure he will never be wanted. The rottenness of the state is his *raison d'être*; and it is absurd for him to be surprised at things not being as they ought to be according to his ideas. He ought to be surprised that they are not more rotten. I admire the khedive exceedingly; he is the perfect type of his people, thoroughly consistent to all their principles—a splendid leopard! Look at the numberless cages out of which he has broken his way when it seemed quite impossible for him to do so. Nubar once summed him up thus: "He is a man of no principle, but capable of very chivalrous impulses; and if he was with a better entourage he would do well."

It would seem as though Gordon had become convinced that the ultimate suppression of the slave-trade was impossible unless a European governor, free from the intrigues and treachery of the Egyptian government, could be permanently in authority. "If you put aside the suppression of the slave-trade, now that there is no revolt in the East Soudan, I have no hesitation in saying that an Arab governor suits the people better, and is more agreeable to them than a European." This too is significant when we know that five years later, while he was endeavouring to hold Khartûm, he proposed that the arch-traitor Zebchr, who still survived, should be restored to a command. But of that most extra-

ordinary conclusion we shall have to speak in a later page of this history.

Zebehr's son Suleiman, fleeing from Gessi who was boldly pursuing him, had sent as emissaries to Shakka four or five of his followers who had escaped with him. Probably he did not know what frequent communications had been made to Gordon by Gessi, and these men were ready with a hypocritical message that Suleiman was still loyal to the khedive. One of the men was chief secretary to Zebehr himself, and the others were old offenders against the government, and had been concerned in the massacre of the government soldiers in the Bahr Gazelle. Gordon had them tried by court-martial, and they were found guilty and shot, a sentence which hastened the flight of the slave-dealers from the country. Gordon then set out for Kalaka, where he suspected that the marauding Arabs, who were employed to root out the brigands, had not done so effectually. He had determined to form a regency for the government of Darfûr—consisting of the ex-vizier, whom he had liberated from prison at Suakim in December, 1877, and the ex-commander-in-chief of the late sultan. More than one-third of the population had been carried into slavery. Kalaka was in a state of extreme excitement at the news of Gordon's approach. Four slave-dealers had been stopped by the Arab tribes, and he expected to catch a great number of them; they were at their wits' end where to go, for there was no refuge left, the Bedouin tribes being on the look-out. Gordon was now determined to make a clean sweep of them whether the khedive liked it or not.

For the next two months the story of his journeys is one painful narrative of privations, dangers, and terrible spectacles of wretched and destitute creatures who were delivered from their captors, and to provide for whom was a constant and difficult problem. The slave-dealers, whom he could not always punish by shooting them, were frequently flogged, stripped of their possessions, and sent adrift; but much discrimination had to be used, because of the legality of the traffic within certain limits. The slave *hunters* were, however, summarily dealt with, mostly by being stripped and sent "like Adams" into the wilderness.



ISMAIL PASHA.
KHEDIVE OF EGYPT. 1865-1879.



At the very outset one great object of his journey was to prevent Zebehr's bands from breaking into Darfûr and joining the *soi-disant* sultan there, who was in revolt in the hills. He therefore set out for Dara with the resolution to stamp out the brigands from every station on the way. His troubles, however, had come much more from his own people than from without. He despaired of the government. Over and over again he could trace the miseries to the lust of some official for the paltry sum of £15 or so.

So arduous and engrossing were his exertions that he lost count of the date of the month for some time; but on the 1st of May, "so they say," started on his journey, in a monotonous country all sandy plain with jungly trees.

From Dara to Fascher, Kobêit Kakabieh,—near which a large body of brigands tried to rob the rear of the column,—Kolkol, Fascher; where he had a telegraph from the khedive to go to Cairo at once, and started for Oomchanga on his way back to Khartûm, and thence to Cairo.

There, too, he heard from Gessi of the capture of the stronghold of Zebehr's son, and, thinking this was a proof that Suleiman was crushed, prepared to go quickly on the return journey. But he was stopped by the report that the brigand chiefs had escaped from Dara, and with a large following were marching into Darfûr. There was danger of their forces joining those of Haroun, and as Gessi and Yussuf Bey, the commanders of the troops who had defeated Zebehr's son, were separated from the main body of their troops by a river which might at any time be swelled into an impassable torrent, he determined to start again for Dara through Toashia.

The story of this journey is again one of repeated breaking up of gangs of slave-dealers and the liberation of their unhappy captives. At Toashia on the 19th of June, 1879, he wrote: "Upwards of 470 slave-dealers have been driven out of this place since I came here two days ago. This evening we were surprised at a caravan of 122 slaves coming in; the slave-dealers had come in here with them, and, hearing I was here and having no water,

they abandoned their slaves and fled. The slaves were badly distressed by thirst, thirty had died on the road. They had come from near Dara." The water was putrid. From Oomchanga to Toashia, during, say a week, 500 to 600 slaves had been caught. The slaves captured at Toashia had been four or five days without water.

We have seen, by the foregoing narrative of Gordon's governorship and his indefatigable exertions, what was the condition of the Soudan, and what were the prospects of the attempts to suppress slavery in the outer territories of Egypt at the time that he was preparing to relinquish his command. It is necessary for the proper understanding of the question of the relations of Egypt and the Soudan to European intervention in the administration, that we should form some conception of the magnitude of the evils to be encountered, and the corruption and inefficiency of the government at Cairo. Before we revert briefly to the general financial condition of Egypt, and the course of action which led to the deposition of the Khedive Ismail and the accession of Tewfik, we will in a page or two close the story of Gordon's experiences in that terrible journey to Toashia by reading in his own words one or two pictures out of many harrowing scenes. On the road to Shakka he had written:—

"All the road is marked by the camping-places of the slave-dealers, and there are numerous skulls by the side of the road. What thousands have passed along here! . . . I hear some districts are completely depopulated, all the inhabitants having been captured or starved to death. If our government, instead of bothering the khedive about that wretched debt, had spent £1000 a year in sending up a consul here, what a deal of suffering might have been saved! . . . As for slaves, I am sick of them, and hope soon to see the last of them; poor creatures! I am sorry I cannot take them back to their own countries, but it is impossible to do so. . . . There must have been over 1000 slaves in this den, and yet the slave-dealers had had warning of my approach; and at least as many as 500 must have got away from me. The Bedouin Arabs are up all over the country, and so are the black

tribes, I hear, at Bahr Gazelle. We have got at the heart of them this time; but for how many years has this been going on?

"Just as I wrote this I heard a very great tumult going on among the Arabs, and I feared a fight. However, it turned out to be caused by the division of the slaves among the tribes; and now the country is covered by strings of slaves going off in all directions with their new owners. The ostriches are running all about, and do not know what to make of their liberty. What a terrible time of it these poor, patient slaves have had for the last three days—hurried on all sides, and forced first one day's march in one direction, and then off again in another. It appears that the slaves were not divided, but were scrambled for. It is a horrid idea, for, of course, families get separated; but I cannot help it, and the slaves seem to be perfectly indifferent to anything whatsoever. Imagine what it must be to be dragged from your home to places so far off—even further than Marseilles or Rome. In their own lands some of these slaves have delightful abodes, close to running water, with pleasant glades of trees, and seem so happy; and then to be dragged off into these torrid, water-forsaken countries, where to *exist* only is a struggle against nature!"

As he pursued his journey the vast number of skulls and unburied remains of the wretched slaves, who had been killed or had fallen by the way, aroused his pity and indignation.

"Why should I, at every mile, be stared at by the grinning skulls of those who are at rest? I say to Yussuf Bey, who is a noted slave-dealer, 'The inmate of that ball has told Allah what you and your people have done to him and his.'

"Yussuf Bey says, 'I did not do it;' and I say, 'Your nation did, and the curse of God will be on your land till this traffic ceases.' . . . Just as I wrote these words they came and told me that another caravan of eighteen slaves had been captured, with two camels. I went to see the poor creatures. They were mostly children and women—such skeletons some of them. Two slave-dealers had escaped. Now fancy all this going on after all the examples I have made! Fancy, that in less than twenty-four hours I have caught seventy! There is no reason to doubt, but

that seventy a day have been passing for the last year or so. You know how many caravans I have caught—some seventy or eighty; besides those 1000 I liberated (?) at Kalaka. It is enough to cause despair. Thus, in three days, we have caught 400 slaves. The number of skulls along the road is appalling. We shall capture a number more at the wells to-night, for as the slave-dealers thought I should act on what Abel Bey told me (*i.e.*, that there were no slaves or slave-dealers here), and as they had deceived the Italian, they had not taken the precaution of filling their water-bags. Thus they are unable to flee, as there lies three days' journey around here without water. Now, the wells here are guarded. The number of slaves captured from the dealers in this campaign must be close upon 1700! I have no doubt that very great suffering is going on among the poor slaves still at large; for the dealers not yet captured will not be able to go to the wells to-night, and they will not surrender till pounced on to-morrow. The slaves are delighted; they are mostly women and children.

" . . . We have caught more slaves during last night and to-day. The slave-dealers, seeing the wells guarded, let them go. However, some huge caravans, regardless of their having no water, and of the three days' desert, have escaped. They were pursued by some of the natives, but the slave-dealers fired on them, and so the natives returned here. They noticed that one of the fugitives had died *en route*. It is very terrible to think of the great suffering of the poor slaves thus dragged away; but I had no option in the matter, for I could not catch them. The water here is horrible,—it smells even when fresh from the wells. I have ordered the skulls, which lay about here in great numbers, to be piled in a heap, as a memento to the natives of what the slave-dealers have done to their people. . . . To give you an idea of the callousness of the people in these lands, I will tell you what happened to-day. I heard a voice complaining and moaning for some hours, and at last I sent to inquire what it was. It turned out to be an Egyptian soldier, who was ill and wanted water. There were within hearing some thirty or forty people—some of them his

fellow-soldiers—yet not one, though they understood his language, would give a thought to him. . . .”

The vast numbers of slaves passed through the country was appalling, and it was a great work to have broken up the central depôts and to have practically dispersed or destroyed the brutal leaders of the traffic. In 1836 to 1840 it was computed that about 10,000 Abyssinian slaves were sold in the bazaars every year, beside the great number of slaves brought from Kordofan and Darfûr; but the traffic had enormously increased, even though the open slave-markets had been abolished in Egypt, and the capture and sale of the people as slaves was against the law. The increase in the traffic was scarcely more appalling than the continued brutality of it, however; and Gordon made a computation of the number of slaves and the total loss of life in Darfûr and the Bahr Gazelle during the years 1875–1879. It came to 16,000 Egyptian and some 50,000 natives of Darfûr. “Add to this the loss of life in the Bahr Gazelle, some 15,000, and you will have a fine total of 81,000, and this exclusive of the slave-trade, which we may put down for these years at from 80,000 to 100,000.”

Neither Gordon's nor Gessi's work was quite accomplished when they met at Toashia. Gessi had still to pursue Zebehr's son, for the rebels were gathering their forces again. Suleiman's intention was to join Haroun, the claimant of the throne of Darfûr. Early in July, 1879, word was brought to Gessi by a deserter that Suleiman was only three days' march distant. Gessi had already marched to break up the bands of the brigands, and he started at once after their chief with only three companies, or 300 men in all, but each man well armed with a Remington rifle. Directly Suleiman heard of their approach he broke up his camp and fled with nearly 900 men towards the hill country, while Rabi with 700 men hurried off in another direction towards the same destination.

There was no time for delay, and with his usual determined energy Gessi pushed on, left his baggage in a village under the care of twenty of his less capable men, and with the rest marched for three days and nights through the forest, over ground which a heavy rain was transforming into deep mud.

He came abreast of the enemy at night when they were only a few miles distant. At daybreak he surprised them while they were asleep in a village, which he could not surround with his small force, so he posted his men in the woods where the trees prevented the enemy from seeing how few they were in number. He then called upon Suleiman and his followers to lay down their arms and surrender. If they failed to do so in ten minutes he would at once close upon them. They were astonished and alarmed, and not knowing the strength of their assailants agreed to yield. Many of them at the first alarm had contrived to escape into the woods, but the rest obeyed the order to go forward a hundred yards from the village and lay their arms upon the ground.

Suleiman began to weep when he saw the small number of men to whom he and his followers had yielded, and upbraiding one of his chiefs for having told him that there were 3000 while there were only 300 against his band of 700, cried out, "If only my father had been here to take the command, we should never have been beaten."

The prisoners were not bound, but were kept in the village under close guard. After dark, however, an alarm was given that they had managed to communicate with the rebels who were hiding in the woods. Their horses were found saddled and bearing arms and provisions. Their plan was to steal out at midnight, to mount the horses, and with their companions who had escaped, to join the ferocious chief Abdulgassie, who was waiting with a strong force at some distance ahead. "I saw that the time had come to have done with these people once for all," wrote Gessi in his subsequent report. The slave soldiers, who were scarcely responsible, he liberated on condition that they returned to their own country and gave up marauding. They promised cheerfully enough and were sent away under an escort; the ordinary slave-dealers (157 in number) were sent off by another route as prisoners. To the eleven slave-hunting chiefs no mercy could be shown. They had been warned over and over again, and now they were to pay the penalty of their long-continued cruelties and repeated rebellion.

They were all shot, none of them showing any signs of sorrow, though one shed tears at his fate and Suleiman sank to the ground in fear. Abdulgassie's band broke up, and that chief, "the hyæna of those parts," was taken some time afterwards, and Gordon ordered him to be shot for his notorious brutalities. Rabi alone escaped and fled far into the interior of the country. Gessi had now broken the neck of the revolt, and, aided by the tribes who were ready to attack the scattered parties of those who had stolen their children and desolated their villages, he hunted down the remaining bands.

When Gordon arrived at Fogia on the 1st of July, 1879, he found awaiting him a telegram from Cherif Pasha announcing that the sultan had named Tewfik Pasha khedive, and that he was to proclaim it in the Soudan. He merely telegraphed the necessary orders, and acknowledged to Cherif Pasha the receipt of his message. On the 29th of July he left Khartûm, and arrived at Cairo on the 23rd of August in no very complacent mood. He resented the deposition of Ismail notwithstanding the bad faith with which he had acted. "I am one of those he fooled," wrote Gordon afterwards when he had learned a little more of the reasons for the khedive's deposition, "but I bear him no grudge. It is a blessing for Egypt that he has gone." Gordon's own governorship of the Soudan was at an end when he wrote this. He was on his way back from Abyssinia, whither he had been to try to pacificate the king Johannis at the earnest request of Tewfik, the new khedive.

Gordon first felt inclined to reject Tewfik's civilities. He declined the special train, especially as he thought it was likely he would be called upon to pay for it, but he consented to go to lodge at the palace instead of going to an hotel as he had at first intended.

At his interview with Tewfik he said at once that he did not mean to go back to the Soudan, but would go to Massowa, settle with Johannis, and then go home. "He told me that my enemies with his father and with him had urged my dismissal, that he had had terrible complaints against me, at which I laughed, and

he did so also." When departing for Massowa Gordon left word that if on his return he heard that any of the council of ministers had said anything against him, he would beg the khedive to make his traducer governor of the Soudan, which would be a punishment equivalent to a sentence of death. Gordon's latest instructions were that he was to cede nothing to Johannis, and yet was to avoid a war; but Bogos was already in the hands of the Abyssinians. On the road he learned that Walad el Michael had been made prisoner by Aloula, the lieutenant in chief of Johannis, and that his son had been killed. At Goula, the rendezvous, he met Aloula, who referred him to the king, and agreed not to attack Egypt during his absence. After twelve days' journey by a vile road he met Johannis near Gondar. When asked what were his demands Johannis replied: "You want peace—well, I want the retrocession of Mesemme, Changallas, and Bogos, cession of Zeila and Amphilla (ports), an Abuna, and a sum of money from one to two million pounds; or if his highness likes better than paying money then I will take Bogos, Massowa, and the Abuna. I could claim Dongola, Berber, Nubia, and Sennâr, but will not do so. Also I want territory near Harrar." These preposterous claims had been suggested to the king by the Greek consul at Suez, who was with him at the time. Gordon asked Johannis to put his demands in writing; but this he did not quite like to do, nor was he ready to withdraw them. After some delays, during which Gordon was treated with scant hospitality, a letter was forthcoming just as he had started without it. A present of money accompanied it, which Gordon sent back. All that the letter said was, "I have received the letters you sent me by that man. I will not make a secret peace with you. If you want peace ask the sultans of Europe." Gordon had started for Kalabat intending to go to Khartûm, but the king had him arrested and brought back through Abyssinia. On his journey he was again and again arrested, insulted, and had to suffer many indignities. He perhaps would not have reached Massowa alive had he not spent a large sum in bribing his assailants. The khedive had taken no notice of his urgent request by telegraph, while he was a prisoner, that a war

steamer and an armed force should be sent to Massowa. When he reached that place on the 8th of December, 1879, he was rejoiced to see the English gunboat *Sea-gull*. Then he felt that his misery was over.

Shortly before his departure he had given up the district Ungoro, and the stations had been evacuated by Egyptian troops. Massimi and Kissima had been given up two years before. The Victoria Nile was now the boundary of the khedive's territory, and new stations were formed to defend it. Gordon returned to England almost worn out, and with a desire to rest in comparative obscurity; but that dream was not to be realized.

He had sent in his resignation on his way back to Egypt, and the khedive in his affectedly European way had written: "I should have liked to retain your services, but in view of your persistent tender of resignation am obliged to accept it. I regret, my dear Pasha, losing your co-operation; and in parting with you, must express my sincere thanks to you, assuring you that the remembrance of you and your services to the country will outlive your retirement."

This was cold-blooded enough, but influences at Cairo would account for it. Already affairs in the Soudan had undergone a change, that may be said to have threatened a return to the disorders and the atrocities which Gordon had striven so hard to suppress. In the equatorial provinces, of which Dr. Emin Bey had been made governor, many improvements were made, and Lado, his head-quarters, was greatly increased in size and importance. But the kind of reaction that was imminent may be understood from the fact that Raouf Pasha, the man whom Gordon twice turned out because of his oppression and dishonest dealing, was made governor of Khartûm; another pasha was appointed to Massowa and the adjacent coast; and a third to Berber, Zeila, and the district of Harrar.

As to Zebehr, the papers left behind by his son Suleiman proved him to be such a traitor that his trial was inevitable. He was a pasha of Egypt, and had caused the revolt in which the Egyptian troops had been massacred; he had been the chief slave-

trader, and had caused the devastation of vast tracts of territory, the stealing of multitudes of women and children, the murder of thousands of wretched natives, the desolation of unnumbered homes. His secret papers were laid before the council. He was tried and sentenced to death, and—he was pensioned with an allowance of £100 a month.

But what became of Gessi, who, as governor of the Bahr Gazelle, had completely stamped out the slave traffic, had largely restored the ivory trade, and had begun successfully to encourage agriculture? When Gordon had left the Soudan and there was no strong central government, slave-dealers reappeared in other parts of the country, and the caravans of miserable captives were again on the routes to Lower Egypt and the Red Sea ports. Raouf Pasha was the elect of Cairo, and Gessi soon found that it would be impossible to hold his position under such a régime, so he resigned his post in September, 1880, and went his way to Khartûm. On the journey the steamers in which he and his followers made the voyage were caught by the sudd, and everybody suffered dreadful privations—sickness and famine. He arrived at Khartûm, where he was received with only half-concealed hostility, and, broken in health, contrived to reach Suez, where, on the 30th of April, 1881, he died from the effects of his previous sufferings. He was succeeded in the governorship of the Bahr Gazelle by an Englishman named Lupton (Lupton Bey), who had, it is said, been formerly known as a newspaper reporter or contributor, and had left Fleet Street for a life of adventure in the doubtful regions of political intrigue at Cairo or the uncertain pursuit of official advantages in the Soudan.

Such were the events which followed the resignation of Gordon and the retirement and death of Gessi; and they were almost immediately followed by the insurrection (in May, 1881) which arose and spread with alarming rapidity in support of the pretensions of the "*Mahdi*," or false prophet, of whose rebellion the strange story will be told in a later page.

It would be of little advantage to enter the bewildering maze of Egyptian finance, and yet it is necessary for the purpose of keeping to the main narrative that we should take a brief glance at the conditions which led to the deposition of Ismail Pasha, and indirectly, at all events, to that European intervention, the ultimate results of which have not yet been witnessed nor its effects estimated. When Ismail succeeded his uncle, Said Pasha, as viceroy of Egypt in 1863 he was already a personage of high reputation and great authority. He was at that time thirty-three years old. He had received what in Egypt is called a European education, and doubtless possessed considerable accomplishments and remarkable ability. On his return from Paris in 1849—for he had been well veneered and French polished—he was so conspicuous a member of the viceregal family that he excited the jealousy of Abbas Pasha, who vainly endeavoured to crush him. On the accession of Said Pasha, however, Ismail was appointed to a high position in the administration, and was sent on special missions to Paris and Rome. He also acted as regent during his uncle's absence at Mecca and in Europe.

As to the character of Ismail, we have already seen what were the opinions of Gordon, who had a sincere admiration for him, and of Nubar Pasha, minister for foreign affairs, who was an Armenian and a Christian by profession. At all events Ismail was determined to be every inch a king, though he only succeeded to the pashalik, which was subordinate to, if not an actual dependency of the rule of the Sultan of Turkey. With remarkable energy for having his own way, and a certain adroitness, that was not altogether dissociated from a capacity for administration, he began under favourable conditions, which he utterly squandered because of his extravagance and the fatal recourse to repeated loans, of which the latest was only entered into for the purpose of staving off the demands of those that had preceded it. Unhappily, too, these loans, or the enormous interest upon the debts, had to be raised by oppressive taxation, which fell most heavily upon the wretched small farmers and peasantry, to whom the enlightened and educated "Khedive" Ismail was scarcely less ruthless a taskmaster than the semi-civilized Pasha

Mohammed Ali had been to their fathers. That Ismail should have acquired vast landed estates for himself and for the members of his family, has been adduced as a proof of his sound judgment and prudence or administrative ability; but the acquisition of estates by a prince of the reigning family in Egypt is scarcely surprising when it is noted that even subordinate officials contrived to amass immense property. In the latest year of Ismail's rule, except for the continued improvements in agriculture, the extension of public works, and the addition of palaces and public buildings, to pay for which a stifling debt was killing real prosperity, the country was much in the same condition as had characterized it forty years before. An examination of our own government blue-books for 1879 will show that official places were almost openly sold, and that the price was known almost as accurately as the quotations of the slave-market; that the fellaheen were seized to recruit the army, unless in the case of individuals who could bribe the officer; that taxes were demanded long before they were due, and their payment enforced by the kourbash or other punishments; that the system of forced labour was continued, the wretched people who were compelled to work for the purpose of maintaining the canals and water-courses having neither wages, rations, nor material found for them.

The reckless borrower, the extravagant magnifico,—who with occasional generous impulses scarcely hesitates to ruin a dozen unfortunate small tradesfolk, and who, while keeping a splendid house and a host of servants, and royally entertaining a circle of acquaintances between whom and himself there is scarcely a sentiment of friendship untainted by suspicion, descends to despicable shifts and expedients for the purpose of deferring the payment of his cook and his laundress, and will undergo extreme humiliation for the sake of securing a little ready money “to carry on with,”—is a well-known figure in private life, and works mischief enough in society. When the same disposition regulates the career of a ruler over a great country, and a people unable to struggle out of centuries of misgovernment, the spectacle would be universally appalling, but for the fact that so many of those

who are in a position to witness it are selfishly interested in doing their best to perpetuate the evil, while there is still enough wealth in the land to offer a reasonable prospect of the periodical payment of exorbitant interest and the ultimate extinction of even the more doubtful obligations.

Almost immediately on his succession Ismail Pasha sought to obtain from the Porte an acknowledgment of his virtual independence as ruler of Egypt. Previous viceroys had been obliged to acknowledge the precedence of the grand vizier at Constantinople, their own legitimate pretensions, in spite of their power and the extent of their territory, differing little from those of the governors-general of provinces, except in the particular of the succession having been made hereditary, not to the eldest son but to the eldest agnate of the family. Ismail's negotiations with Stamboul resulted in 1866 in the succession being granted from father to son, and in 1867 another firman gave him the title of *Khédiv-el-Misr*—*Khédiv* or *Khédewi* being in fact a Persian title of which the exact meaning is not clear, but at all events conferring a rank much superior to that of a mere governor or to the position of viceroy. The tribute was, of course, increased, and at each successive step (for there were several concessions) the fees and backsheesh amounted to an immense sum. It was not till 1872 that the latest restrictions were removed, and then the annual tribute to be paid to the sultan was about £700,000, while the black-mail or "presents" which had to be given to everybody who had anything to do—to the sultan Abdul Aziz himself and to the couriers who brought the messages—had during the seven years of negotiation exceeded the tribute itself in amount. Among the remaining restrictions was that of the number of the military and naval force to be raised and maintained in Egypt; but the Egyptian contingent and fleet of Said Pasha in the Crimea, and the military aid given by Ismail to the sultan in the Russo-Turkish war were in themselves both evidences of, and reasons for, the liberty of action which the Porte allowed in respect to the forces of the khedive, which in 1866 had been permitted by a firman to Ismail to be raised to a strength of 30,000 men.

Ismail had already a large family (according to European notions) when he succeeded to the throne: the Princess Tawfideh, married in 1878 to Mansour Pasha, a nephew of Mohammed Ali; Prince Mohammed Tewfik Pasha (heir-apparent), who was born in 1852, and married, in 1873, to Emineh Khanum, by whom, in 1874, he had a son, Abbas Bey; Prince Hussein-Kiamil Pasha, born in 1852, and married to a daughter of the late Achmet Pasha, by whom, in Dec., 1874, he had a son, Kemal-ed-dyn Bey; Prince Hassan Pasha, born 1853, and married in 1873 to Khadijah Khanum, by whom, in 1873, he had a son, Aziz Bey; Princess Fatma Khanum, married in 1873 to Toussoum Pasha (son of Said Pasha), who died in 1876; Prince Ibrahim Helmy Pasha, born in 1860; Prince Mahmoud Bey, born in 1863. Prince Fuad Bey, Princess Djemileh, Princess Emineh, and Prince Djemal-ed-dyn Bey, were born after their father's accession.

Though Ismail professed, and was believed to take the autocratic control, he of course had a privy-council and ministers. The privy-council, of which Mohammed Tewfik became president, acted as a court for suggesting administration, and reported on the budgets and the measures of the various departments; but the khedive had the sole confirmation of their decisions. The minister of finance till 1876 was Ismail Pasha Sadyk, who was so great a favourite of the khedive, and a man of such ability and ambition, that he is credited with having almost usurped supreme authority in his own department, and dictated to the other ministers, especially to Prince Tewfik, who, as minister of the interior, should have had the right of appointing the governors and officers of the provinces. Ismail Sadyk was an adept in the art of black-mailing, and of raising money, either by cruelly squeezing it out of the wretched fellaheen, of whom he had been one, or by "financing." To him is sometimes attributed the condition of insolvency into which the finances of Egypt drifted, and he was dismissed in November, 1876; but his master probably sacrificed him, as he could sacrifice anybody, to the pressure of outside opinion, and he had little to learn from his minister in the sciences of inflating credit, and "robbing Peter to pay Paul." The expenditure soon

far exceeded the average revenue, which in 1879 was about ten millions sterling, largely dependent on the land-tax, to pay which before it was due the people had to borrow money of usurers and at large interest. The national debt had reached the sum of eighty millions sterling, all borrowed between 1862 and the end 1879, it was therefore evident that the autocratic khedive either would not or could not control the financial administration.

Of the ways of the ministry of Ismail we have had some impression from their manner of dealing with the Soudan and its finances. The ministries of Finance, to which Prince Hassen Kiamil, the son of the khedive, succeeded; Foreign affairs, in which Nubar Pasha held the reins for a good part of the time; Public works, Interior (Prince Tewfik), Commerce, War (Prince Hassan Pasha, third son of the Khedive), Marine, and Public instruction, were, and are still, the departments. An "Assembly of Notables," composed of village sheikhs elected by the communes, met once a year, but nobody quite knew what it did, or what actual authority it exercised. The division of the country into provinces under mudirs or governors, each assisted by a council, of which the chief members are the kadi or judge, whose office has something of a religious character, and the *vakeel*, or deputy-governor, provides for the outer administration, as each province is divided into districts, presided over by a nazir, and every village has its *sheik-el-beled*. The most important towns, as Alexandria, Cairo, Suez, Port Said, Ismailia, Damietta, and Rosetta, possess local self-government, and, as we have seen, the territory outside Egypt proper is governed according to circumstances or to the price paid for the appointments.

Until 1876 there were no regular courts of justice in Egypt before which foreigners who had committed crimes or offences against the law could be brought to trial. Each of the European powers has an agent or consul-general accredited to the khedive, and with a consulate at Alexandria in summer and at Cairo in winter; and there are, of course, consuls, vice-consuls, and consular agents at the seaports and large towns. Till the date mentioned foreign offenders could only be made answerable to the consuls of the countries to which they belonged, and consequently there were

seventeen consular courts. The confusion and miscarriage of justice was quite notorious, so that it became necessary to make some alteration in this system, and in 1869 Nubar Pasha exerted himself to induce his government to apply for the appointment of an international commission, which, after considering the matter for about seven years, succeeded in establishing mixed tribunals of natives and foreigners for the trial of cases between persons of different nationalities, and between natives and foreigners. These tribunals consist of courts of first and second instance, and the law on which they proceed is the modification of the Code Napoleon which was long ago adopted in Egypt; the languages used in the courts being English, French, and Italian. The court of first instance consists of seven judges—four Europeans and three natives, and no case can be decided by fewer than five—three Europeans and two natives. The court of appeal consists of eleven judges—seven Europeans and four natives, and no case can be decided by fewer than eight—five Europeans and three natives. The consular courts, however, continue to exercise jurisdiction in criminal and civil cases between foreigners of the same nationality.

We have already seen that in 1862, the last year of the reign of Said Pasha, the expenditure exceeded the revenue by about £300,000, and the public debt was £3,292,300. On the 1st of January, 1882, the nominal amount of the Egyptian debt was £99,254,920, to which it had increased from £76,000,000 as fixed by the report of Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert in 1876.

Said Pasha, evidently, had not left any very heavy financial responsibilities to his successor. But a new era was supposed to have opened for Egypt when Ismail came to the throne, and began to push on public works and improvements with even more energy and with a far greater recklessness of cost than had distinguished his enterprising grandfather, Mohammed Ali. The result has been, that railways, some of which are incomplete, have been established; harbours formed; a complete telegraph system secured over the country; Alexandria renovated, and vast improvements made, not only in the modern city, but in the harbour and the

depots; Cairo transformed into a brilliant and delightful city, an almost cosmopolitan place of resort. The commerce of Egypt, as well as its agriculture, and especially the growth of cotton, has also been immensely extended. These rapid developments of conditions which are usually regarded as indications of national prosperity, found admirers, or, at all events, apologists, especially among those who were deeply interested in obtaining highly profitable contracts for carrying out engineering and other public works, and by those officials whose appointments depended on the prosecution of the various enterprises. On the other hand, however, were those who declared that the brilliant achievements of Ismail were only effected by the ruin and bankruptcy of the state and the oppression of the people of Egypt. The latter opinion began to be shared by many of the bondholders and creditors who had helped to advance the loans, and had been by no means careful to condemn the extravagance of the khedive, or to perceive how insupportable was the burden laid on the native population, until a note of alarm was sounded, and fears were entertained about the capacity of the Egyptian treasury to provide for the fulfilment of the engagements of the government.

It is not too much to say that from the time of Mohammed Ali there had been scarcely any radical changes in the mode of administration, as it affected the people, and especially the fellahen—the agricultural population; while the employment of foreigners, and the manner of promoting official appointments, contracts for public works at enormous charges, and mercantile or manufacturing speculations forming considerable additions to the expenditure and controlled by alien directors, aroused widespread dissatisfaction. This was not allowed to slumber either by the old conservative Egyptian pashas, who hate and continually endeavour to frustrate the endeavours of Europeans in the service of the khedive, or by the increasing party of "nationalists," who twenty years ago adopted the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," meaning thereby independence of the Turkish government, but have given it greater and bitterer emphasis since it has been directed against Europeans employed by the government of Egypt or taking the direction of

the affairs of the country. At the same time it must be remembered that such intervention by Europeans became inevitable when the "sinews of war"—the money that was to prevent insolvency and enable the Egyptian government to complete the enterprises which it had undertaken, had been provided by European capitalists—and the debts thus incurred were necessarily secured by being made a charge on the revenue, which itself depended on the method of administering public affairs. The khedive may be said to have pawned his country, and with it the authority of its governing organization; and perhaps the whole of the disputed question of the rights or claims of bondholders may be sifted down to the initial inquiry, whether anything can justify a ruler in making such a pledge, or his creditors in accepting it, knowing that it must involve, not only the resources of the country, but the liberties and the national claims of the people from whom those resources have to be drawn. But there is another side to the question. The development and the progress of Egypt would have been indefinitely protracted, perhaps would have remained impossible; unless Mohammed Ali had shown the example,—which was too precipitately followed by his grandson,—of seeking the aid of Europeans, and especially the practical and industrial aid of the English, in those enterprises which alone can insure the material prosperity and the influence of a nation. It would have been impossible to achieve any such plans with the aid of native officials, it has been impossible ever since. Egypt has never yet succeeded in obtaining a native government the officials of which, from the khedive to the pashas and downward to the collectors of taxes and the messengers and hangers-on of the viceregal court, have not been corruptible by bribery. Bribery and corruption have always been recognized as the foremost inducements for seeking to obtain government employment. Only in cases where they have led to awkward consequences, because of their affecting the welfare or the opinions of Europeans, have they been counted as crimes, or even as grave delinquencies. We have seen how they worked with regard to the maintenance of slavery, and also of active rebellion in the Soudan, and it was from Cairo itself that they were effected.

Whatever may have been the grounds of complaints made—mostly by interested Egyptian pashas and officers—against Europeans holding offices, or employed on public works by the khedival government, the real ground of complaint should have been that of the common people—the people to whom it was made impossible that they should really hold any property or accumulate any personal material interest in the country because of the rapacity of their rulers, who handed down bribery and oppression as the watchwords of government, and feared nothing so much as the scrutinizing eye of the European, whose rank and character had led to his being invited to investigate their proceedings.

Another word may be said while speaking on this point. There was nothing out of place in the fact that when European advice or intervention was required, England had always taken a prominent place in the direction of Egyptian affairs. Though the resident English are much fewer than the Italians and French (the approximate proportions being as 8 English to 12 French and 25 Italians), England is not only a creditor for a great proportion of the debt (a position which more than once has unhappily induced us to consent to the adoption of a high-handed control over the Egyptian revenue, which resulted only in jealousy, hatred, confusion, and rebellion), but has also far larger commercial relations with Egypt than those of any other nation; so large, indeed, that they amount to more than those of all the other nations of Europe added together. Of the staple exports from Egypt we take four-fifths of the cotton, eleven-twelfths of the beans, nine-tenths of the wheat, five-sixths of the maize, nine-tenths of the other edible cereals except rice, almost all of which goes to the Levant; four-fifths of the flax, and nearly all the linseed; about half the sugar; three-fourths of the wool; and from the interior, by far the greater part of the ivory and gum arabic. These returns are on an average of ten years made in 1882, and in the six years, 1874–1879, the total exports from Egypt were in value £74,603,000, of which Great Britain took £52,589,000; France, £8,194,000; Italy, £3,683,000; Austria, 3,362,000; Russia, £3,259,000; Turkey, £2,542,000; leaving the remainder to be distributed elsewhere.

In the same period the imports into Egypt were £29,282,000, of which there were supplied by Great Britain £16,247,000; by France, 5,494,000; by Austria, £3,131,000; by India, China, and Japan, £1,424,000; by Italy, £1,289,000. These figures will show that England necessarily had a considerable influence in any European management which Egypt either solicited or endured; but it should be added that in 1875 the government of Great Britain had become the owner of nine-twentieths of the shares in the Suez Canal by the advice of Mr. Disraeli, who was then prime minister. Said Pasha had originally subscribed for 177,642 shares out of 400,000 shares of £20 each; but in 1875 some had been disposed of and 176,602 were left, for which we gave £4,000,000. The khedive had previously attempted to sell them to a French financial company; on his failure to do so, his offer to transfer them to the English government was accepted, with the proviso, that during a period of nineteen years, for which the dividends had been alienated from the shares, he was to pay five per cent on the purchase money. It was represented that at the end of that time, though the shares might have become more valuable, a large amount of capital might be required for the maintenance and improvement of the canal. Opinion on the policy of purchasing these shares was divided. There were those who held that it was a sagacious stroke to secure for England a large if not a preponderating interest in what was likely to become the highway to India, and where, while English shipping would far exceed that of any other nation, it was already evident that some resistance would have to be made to the demands of the French shareholders for the maintenance of heavy dues. On the other hand it was contended that the fact of British shipping being the chief means of making the canal a paying enterprise would give us all the control that would be necessary; and again, we were reminded that at the outset Lord Palmerston had opposed the construction of the canal, not only because of the physical difficulties that attended it and were regarded by some of the most eminent engineers as being fatal to its remunerative success; but because he foresaw political difficulties in consequence of it, and

was said to believe that one day the question would arise in reference to Egypt, of England becoming a great Mediterranean power. He also feared that the cordial alliance with France, which he always so warmly advocated, would be made more uncertain owing to the question of the Suez Canal.

The cutting of a waterway between the two seas was no new idea. It was as old as the Pharaohs. A canal had been made ages before, and had been restored, and lengthened, and improved, and then had fallen into ruin, and had disappeared, silted up by the inevitable sand, which was the obstacle that Robert Stephenson pointed to as insuperable when he was elected on the commission formed by England, France, and Austria, at the request of Mohammed Ali, to consider the question of a ship canal across the isthmus at its narrowest point, from Tilreh (Pelusium) to Suez. So a railway was made from Cairo to Suez; and Lieutenant Waghorn (who had recommended the canal to Mohammed Ali, to whom he alleged that the levels of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean were nearly identical), was busy completing his scheme for an overland route, while the young Ferdinand de Lesseps was a subordinate in the French consulate at Cairo. For four-and-twenty years de Lesseps cherished a fixed idea that the canal uniting the two seas might, could, and should be made; and having studied the estimates of the sea levels, and given much of his spare time to the subject, he had an opportunity when he was again in Egypt, in 1854, of laying his plan before Said Pasha. In the following year another international commission was appointed, and advised, that instead of striking the Mediterranean at Pelusium the canal should be carried through Lake Menzaleh, and enter the sea some seventeen miles farther west, where a deeper approach would be found. This and some other modifications were accepted. The final concession for the work was signed by the viceroy in January, 1856, and the opposition of Lord Palmerston, added to the enthusiasm that the work was to be committed to their countryman—stirring up the enthusiasm of the French, de Lesseps was able to float his "*Compagnie Universelle du Canal maritime de Suez*" in 1858, with a capital of £8,000,000 in £20

shares, on nearly every bourse in Europe. A little more than half the amount was subscribed (mostly in France), and in 1860 Said Pasha took up the remainder for £3,500,000. In April, 1859, the work was begun, though the consent of the Porte was not obtained till 1866; but the labour was tremendous, and by the end of 1862 only a narrow channel had been made from the Mediterranean to Lake Timsah—about half-way across. The fresh-water canal which was to complete the fresh-water communication between Cairo and Suez was carried to the same point.

Thus, early in the enterprise it became pretty evident that Egypt had been brought into a bad bargain. To begin with, Said Pasha had engaged to furnish by *corvée*, or the system of forced labour, four-fifths of the workmen required, to whom the company agreed to pay about two-thirds the price of such labour in Europe (a rather vague arrangement if the difference between English navvies and French or English agricultural labourers is considered), together with rations and shelter. This meant that every month 20,000 fellahs were to be drafted from their homes and their own agriculture; and when the impolicy of such an arrangement was shown to Ismail Pasha he (in 1864) refused to continue it. At the same time the political mistake made by Said in ceding to a foreign company the sole possession of the fresh-water canal, and a broad belt of land along the whole of the maritime ship canal was pointed out, and the khedive determined that the grant must be rescinded. It happened that Napoleon III. was desirous of keeping on fair and friendly terms with England, which was the power most interested in the claims of the Suez Canal Company being restricted to reasonable commercial limits, instead of being inflated into what might eventually become national or political demands; and it happened also that the enterprise needed funds—a large sum in hard cash or its equivalent—so that when the various points were submitted to Napoleon III. himself for arbitration, he met the case by giving the company an enormous indemnity of £1,520,000 for the removal of the enforced labour, £1,200,000 for the land along the canal bank, except 200 metres on each bank which was retained, and £640,000 for the fresh-

water canal from Ras-el-Wady to Suez—£3,360,000 in all. Payment was to be by sixteen instalments of 12 per cent Treasury bonds, falling due between 1864 and 1879; but by a subsequent convention the term of payment was shortened by ten years, and the whole sum was paid by 1869. In addition to this sum, was an amount in cash of £400,000 for the repurchase of the Wady domain which the company had bought of Said Pasha five years before for £74,000.

By the time the work was completed, what with debenture loans issued at 60 per cent and redeemable at par in fifty years by lottery drawings; the surrender of remaining rights and privileges; and the sale of establishments on the Isthmus, the quarry and harbour at Mex, near Alexandria, and the workshops at Damilha and Boulak for £1,200,000, which the Egyptian government paid for by raising a loan on the coupons of its shares for twenty-five years (till 1894)—the net capital of the company had increased from eight millions to a little less than seventeen millions, and additional payments had swelled it to something like nineteen millions, about the total cost of the work including interest during its construction. This large total, however, represents only about £12,000,000 of net money, while the actual cost of the canal was about £17,518,729—the difference of nearly £6,000,000 having been chiefly represented by indemnities paid by the Egyptian government and forming no charge upon revenue.

The actual interest and sinking fund annuities amounted to £818,400, to be reduced as the loans were redeemed.

The total cost of the enterprise to the Egyptian government, including purchase money for the original shares, the cost of some small works, and of the missions to Europe, litigation, and the superb fêtes to celebrate the opening of the canal in November, 1869, was £10,764,720, while the interest added to the various sums from their respective dates to September, 1873, amounted to £6,663,105, making a total of £17,427,825, or very nearly the amount of the entire cost.¹

Of course the khedive Ismail achieved vast improvements, and

¹ *Egypt as It Is*, J. C. M'Coan.

established an enormous number of useful public works in a very short time. It was the attempt to multiply works of national importance, and to convert Cairo into a kind of oriental Paris without counting the cost, combined with the corruptions of the government, which led to the bankruptcy of Egypt and the dethronement of the khedive. The Suez Canal can scarcely be counted among the unprofitable enterprises, especially as a large part of the money was regained by the purchase of the Egyptian shares by the British government, for it has secured to Egypt the national importance that must belong to a country through which the traffic passes between Europe and the great empire of the East. The fine harbour of Alexandria and the harbour of Suez also were great and necessary works. Some of the lighthouses were useful, and the schemes for railway communication in Egypt proper were so energetically carried out, that in 1879 there were 1000 miles of railway as against 245 at the accession of Ismail Pasha in 1863; while the immense network of canals in the Delta, used for storing and distributing the surplus water of the inundation, is one of the most remarkable features in the country. The railway system in the Delta is very complete, and an alternative route (on the left bank of the Nile), between Cairo and Alexandria, was carried into Upper Egypt and the Fayoum. A railway also was constructed (as a continuation of a branch of the old desert line between Cairo and Suez) for 98 miles along the fresh-water canal to Ismailia, and thence nearly due south by the side of the same channel and the maritime canal to Suez. As the earthworks on these lines were all formed by forced labour the cost was reduced, but the capital had to be borrowed at 12 per cent interest. Of the projected and abandoned railway in the Soudan we have already seen the account, as given in the story of Gordon's efforts to reduce the expenditure there.

Of the wonderful canal system which fertilizes the cultivable country we shall have to note some particulars hereafter. At the harbour of Alexandria the improvements made by the khedive were of the utmost importance. The modern harbour itself lies within the upper curve of a bay formed by the two projecting

headlands of Ras-el-Teen on the north-east, and Cape Adjemi and Marabout Island on the south-west, and measuring six miles in length by an average of two in width. It is landlocked on every side except on the south-west, from which quarter, however, the prevailing wind comes during eight or nine months in the year. It had always been a serious drawback that the "sea," which was thus caused, was a great obstacle to the loading or discharging of vessels in the roadstead by means of stone lighters, which was the plan employed, and the khedive was most anxious to remedy it, especially when the Suez Canal was likely to compete with the ordinary ports and routes of commercial transit. In 1870 he had determined to commence the work, and contracted with Messrs. Greenfield & Co., a large English firm, for constructing a great breakwater, an inner harbour mole, and a line of quays which should provide the necessary shelter and accommodation for the increasing trade of the port. The work began in 1871, and, briefly stated, the ultimate plan was the formation of an outer breakwater commencing at a point 50 metres south-west of the Ras-el-Teen lighthouse, extending nearly 1000 metres in that direction and then curving to s.s.w., running in a straight line 2350 metres further, or in all for above two miles across the mouth of the harbour, inclosing an area of more than 1400 acres of still water, deep enough for vessels of the largest class. The principal entrance to the port is therefore round the south-western end of the breakwater, which is 1500 metres from the shore; and the narrow passage of Ras-el-Teen gives ingress and egress only to small craft and shore boats. The outer sea wall is constructed of vast blocks of concrete, formed at the neighbouring quarries of Mex of sand and lime, and flung down on the sea side with an inner front of rubble. The upper portion of the wall is of solid masonry with a uniform surface twenty feet wide, and rises ten feet above the lowest and seven above the highest sea level. About 2500 concrete blocks, weighing 20 tons each, and 130,000 tons of large and small rubble stones were sunk in the foundations. Toward the shore a broad mole stretches out 900 metres from the mouth of the Mahmoudieh Canal and the harbour terminus of the

Cairo railway; a line of quays 1240 metres long, extending from the same point along the Marina to a point near the admiralty dock, complete this great work. The quays constructed in the same manner as the inner mole, and with abutting iron jetties, alongside which ships could load or discharge in all weathers, and a branch railway connecting the mole and quays with the Alexandria and Cairo line, and so with the whole railway system of the interior, may be said to have been the final provision, the full benefit of which was to have been secured by the line to Khartûm, by which it was expected to bring the merchandise of the Soudan to the Mediterranean. The total cost of the harbour works was £2,000,000; and the walls at Suez harbour, which were only second in importance to those at Alexandria, and were continued and extended during successive years, cost a total of above £1,500,000.

We may for a minute see from what sources the taxes were derived, which, after reducing the fellaheen to a misery little short of that which they suffered under the rule of Mohammed Ali, were totally insufficient to discharge the continually augmenting debts incurred by the khedive. There is no need to enter into details of such items of indirect revenue as railway profits, customs, dues, &c., and we will only mention the land-taxes and tax on date-trees, stopping for a moment, however, to note that in many cases, such as customs supervision, and taxes on trades and professions, the Europeans residing in Egypt were exempt from the imposts laid upon the natives. Foreign ships, even the fishing-boats and shore boats owned by Greeks and Maltese, were free from the search of the custom-house officers, who could only overhaul the cargo when it was landed. This gave the opportunity for extensive smuggling. Foreigners were also allowed to grow tobacco without being called upon to pay the special taxes levied on native farmers, and to follow freely trades on which special taxes were laid if they were pursued by natives. This distinction arose from the conditions of what were called the "capitulations," or the series of obligations imposed on the Turkish government at successive periods for the protection of subjects of the Christian

powers. These concessions, which began in the time of Mahmoud II., increased till they included the right of trading freely throughout the empire with only such customs duties as might be fixed by treaty; the exemption from all arbitrary taxation; the inviolability of domicile, so that the house of a foreigner could not by law be forcibly entered without the knowledge and concurrence of the consul representing his nationality; the settlement by their own consuls of commercial disputes between themselves; and the right of the protection of their own consuls or their representatives at either civil or criminal trials to which they might be parties before the native tribunals.

All these provisions of the Porte extended to foreigners in Egypt, which was under the government of the sultan; and it may readily be supposed to what lengths the exemptions were carried during the extensive employment of foreigners in the service of the ruling pashas, and to what exasperation the distinctions gave rise among people who were themselves oppressed almost out of existence, while the foreigners living in their country were allowed to go easily, and were entitled to protection or redress by appealing to their own consuls, who so far held the administration of justice in their hands. The abolition of the loose administration by the petty consular tribunals (of which about seventeen were in Cairo, representing various nationalities), and the institution of the mixed or international courts, led to the abolition of much injustice, especially as regarded trials for debt. But these courts are of comparatively recent introduction, and did not remove the exemptions of foreigners from special taxation, though they have united the native and consular authorities in the trial of foreigners and the prosecution of claims against foreign criminals and debtors.

The land-tax, applicable to a total area of land under cultivation amounting to about 5,000,000 feddāns,¹ varied in its incidence. In 1877 by far the greater proportion of the land, about 3,600,000 feddāns, paid a rent charge averaging about twenty-two shillings a feddān, and the remaining portion was held under a privileged tenure represented by a kind of quit-rent of about seven shillings a

¹ A feddān is about equal to an English acre.

feddān. The revenue from both those taxes in 1876 amounted to about £4,300,000.

The Egyptian code published in 1875, and compiled for the use of the international courts which then came into existence, divides real property into four categories: houses and lands ("*Mulk*"), over which private individuals may have complete rights of property; property held in mortmain by religious houses; and the *Kharaji*, in which almost the entire soil of the country must be comprised, and thus described, "Les biens *haradjis* ou tributaires sont ceux qui appartiennent à l'état en dont il a cédé, dans les conditions et dans les cas prévus par les reglements l'usufruit aux particuliers." The fourth division are the *Moubah* or untitled lands, to which anyone may acquire a free prescriptive right by occupation and cultivation, whereupon, however, they become practically included in the *Kharaji*. Of the "*Moukabala*" (or compensation) and "village annuities" most of us have heard or read when endeavouring to unravel the mysteries of Egyptian revenue. The former was introduced in 1871 to redeem half the land-tax for the purpose of paying off the floating debt without having recourse to a foreign loan. The majority of Egyptian landowners had no legally regular title-deeds, and in return for their paying six years' land-tax in advance, either in one payment or six yearly instalments, the government agreed to give them regular titles, and afterwards to reduce the tax to one-half. The attempt to carry out the proposal was a failure. The poorer landowners could not pay in advance, though they may have strained every nerve to save, beg, or borrow money. About £8,000,000 was realized, and £27,825,000 had been the estimated amount. Then came a muddling attempt at compromise, which broke down also, and left the Egyptian treasury saddled with a promise to pay £2,500,000 a year of its most easily collected revenue. This attempt lasted till May, 1876, when the council of the government, under the pressure of some French financiers who held the larger proportion of its treasury bonds, unified its entire debt on terms which professed to provide for its redemption in sixty-five years. This involved the abolition of the *Moukabala*

and the consequent confusion and dismay of the unfortunate proprietors who had paid up; but the scheme fell through because of the refusal of England to accept it; so the Moukabala was restored, the contributory landholders were to be recouped, and Mr. Goschen for England and M. Joubert for France brought in a project, part of which was, that no interest or bonus should be paid on advances, but that the whole of the reduction of the tax should come at once into force in 1876.

The “village annuities” were instituted in 1870, when the reduction on the price of cotton as a reaction from the rise caused by the American war, prevented the Egyptian growers from repaying the advances they had received from merchants and money-lenders during the inflation of the market. The government took up the debt of about £1,000,000, and issued village bonds, spread over seven years and bearing interest. The period was afterwards extended to twelve years, so that the annuities would expire in 1885, the treasury being repaid by the original debtors at the rate of £160,000 a year.

But apart from the land in occupation by holders and agriculturists, there were the *Dīaras* or “administrations,” the “domains” of the khedival family, which included manufactories, mills, and various important enterprises, as well as cultivated land of enormous value, but as deeply involved in debt as the possessions of the state government. Ismail Pasha had followed the example of his predecessors, and had secured the possession of land for himself and his family. Of course the manner in which the right and title to these vast estates was acquired could not be strictly investigated; but he and his family laid claim to about a million of acres of the best land in Egypt. The finances, which means, of course, the debts of these vast estates, however, had been so mixed up with those of the state, that there was some difficulty in disentangling them, and it was not till the end of 1876 when the settlement of the state debt was being arranged, that the two administrations were separated. The amount of taxation then was about 25s. per head of the population, an oppressive burden to the wretched *fellaheen*, and the exemption of foreigners from certain imposts con-

tinued, much to the dissatisfaction of the less patient of the Egyptian population at Cairo and elsewhere.

Sir W. Gregory in a book upon Egypt says:

"I will venture to say that ninety out of every hundred of my countrymen are not aware of the injustice under which the Egyptians are labouring—the stately palaces, built by Europeans and by those who have obtained European nationality, in many instances by very questionable means, are untaxed; the humble dwelling of the Egyptian, by the side of these mansions, is taxed at the rate of 12 per cent on the valuation. But this is done through the capitulations with Turkey, it will be said—that is true enough; but it is perfectly easy for England to take the lead, and to let the Egyptians know we are taking the lead, in endeavouring to relax, under proper safeguards, this portion of the capitulations. Again, let a Maltese, or a Greek, or an Italian, practise a trade, or mount the box of a hackney-coach as driver, he is exempt from the tax on professions as being under European protection; but an Egyptian, striving to earn his bread in a similar manner, is taxed in doing so."

It may be imagined what were the sentiments of the deluded landholders, who had been induced to part with the instalments for which it was now doubtful whether they would really obtain any advantage. "Egypt for the Egyptians" began to acquire a new significance, and there were already symptoms of coming aggression. In 1878, amidst the tumult of the Russo-Turkish war, the affairs of Egypt again came to a crisis, in which it became apparent that the scheme prepared by the Right Hon. J. G. Goschen and M. Joubert had not satisfactorily solved the difficulties of finance, though it had been well understood that Mr. Goschen and the financial firm of Fruhlings & Goschen, to which he had formerly belonged, had considerable experience in Egyptian affairs, and had been mainly interested in some of the earlier loans.

The conclusion that was come to was that an entirely new effort should be made, and, therefore, a committee of inquiry was appointed, in which Mr. Rivers Wilson, who had formerly held an important office in the English treasury, took the principal part.

By the month of August a very full and detailed report of the result of the labours of this committee was ready to be presented to the khedive.

A summary of this report, afterwards published, revealed not only the financial imbroglio but extraordinary instances of fiscal oppression. No tax in Egypt was regulated by law. The superior authority asked, the inferior authority demanded, and the lower authority took just what the treasury ordered, and there was no appeal. New taxes were imposed at discretion, and were occasionally quite absurd. For example, when a bridge was built the charge for it was imposed on the boatmen whose boats were impeded by the bridge, not on the passengers whose journey was facilitated. All who did not own lands paid the tax on professions, because, not being land-owners, they might take to professions if they liked. Egyptians were not allowed to own scales, because they might evade the weighing tax; while the salt tax was levied according to population, which was never counted, but fixed by an order which was never varied. The conscription was forced on anybody who could not bribe the sheikh, the regulation price for exemption being £80, which an Egyptian peasant could no more raise than an English labourer could. "These taxes are all levied by *moral pressure*," said the inspector-general; and the commission found out that "moral pressure" meant the *threat of torture*. Another curious fact they discovered. In 1874 the viceroy had invited the natives to subscribe to a new reimbursable loan (*Rouynamch*), of £5,000,000, the subscribers to receive a perpetual annuity of 9 per cent on their capital. The amount subscribed was £3,420,000. One coupon was paid, and that only to some of the subscribers.

It soon became evident to the khedive that he must surrender to those who were conducting the inquiries; and the committee announced that it had accepted an offer of Prince Mohammed Tewfik, the hereditary prince, made on the advice of Nubar Pasha, to cede to the committee all his estates, the annual rental of which amounted to £30,000. Princess Fatma and Prince Hassein Hamil Pasha, the daughter and the second son of the khedive, had made known their intention to join in the family sacrifice; and

following these examples, the mother of the khedive had also relinquished her estates, worth about £20,000 a year.

The presentation of the report was almost immediately followed by an announcement that the khedive himself would give up all his private estates to the financial commission so as to reserve nothing from the public revenues of Egypt, would accept absolutely the European system of constitutional government, and make Nubar Pasha, a man of high ability, the head of the administration; while Mr. Rivers Wilson, with the assent of the British government, was to be minister of finance. Nothing could have been apparently more straightforward than the declarations of the khedive. "Rest assured," he said, "that I am seriously resolved. My country is no longer African. We form a part of Europe. It is proper, therefore, to abandon our old ways and to adopt a new system more in accordance with our social progress. Above all, we must not be satisfied with mere words, and for my own part I am determined to prove my intentions by my deeds; and to show how thoroughly earnest I am, I have intrusted Nubar Pasha with the formation of a ministry. . . . I am firmly determined to apply European principles to the Egyptian administration, instead of the personal power hitherto prevailing. I desire a power balanced by the council of ministers, and am resolved henceforth to govern with and through this council, the members of which will be jointly and severally responsible. The council will discuss all important questions, the majority deciding. Thus by approving its decisions I shall sanction the prevalent opinion. Each minister will apply the decisions of the council in his own department. Every appointment or dismissal of higher officials will be made by the president of the council and the minister of the department with my sanction. The officials will only obey the chiefs of their own departments."

Here was the promise of a change which would have had the most important consequences, and was hailed with the greatest satisfaction in western Europe; but again the jealousy and restless vanity of a political party in France would not allow the opportunity to be secured for effecting a genuine reform in Egypt. The

acquisition of Cyprus by the British government had aroused their anger, and they were constantly opposing what they represented to be the preponderance of English influence in Egypt. Eventually the attitude of the French government led to a compromise which was afterwards found to be incompetent to secure the successful adoption of the proposed administrative reform. A French minister of public works, M. de Blignières, was chosen as Mr. Wilson's colleague, with control over all railways, canals, and ports (except Alexandria), and with substantial influence in the cabinet; and two commissioners of the public debt, an Englishman and a Frenchman, were appointed, the governments pledging themselves to maintain them in power. The khedive also pledged himself that if he dismissed either the French or English members of his government he would dismiss both.

It was not very long before this proviso at least was claimed. After the concession of the khedive, which almost amounted to a complete surrender, it was supposed that the influence of the French and English ministers would so guide Egyptian counsels that even the involved finances of the country might be eventually put straight; but the too obvious domination of the European representatives in combination with the prime minister, Nubar Pasha, who had been restored to power, and the sudden dismissal of a number of Egyptian officers in the army and the civil service, was the occasion of demonstrations which ended in a serious riot.

CHAPTER III.

High-handed Proceedings. Demands of the Khedive. Military Riots in Cairo. Resignation of Nubar Pasha. The French and English Ministers restored to Power. Their Summary Dismissal. "The National Party." Protest of Germany and other Great Powers. Deposition of Ismail Pasha. Accession of Tewfik. The "Control." Military Riots. Tewfik a Cipher. Arabi Bey. Military Dictatorship. Outrages in Alexandria. The Allied Squadrons. French Defection. England Alone. The Bombardment of Alexandria.

Those who hoped that Ismail would be converted into a constitutional ruler were doomed to be disappointed; nor was it reasonable to expect that, with Nubar Pasha, Mr. Rivers Wilson, and M. de Blignières as the actual government, he would continue to be satisfied with the shadow of authority, especially as he had by a single act of concession given up not only his autocratic power but his property; for he also had relinquished his "domain" or landed estate. It was believed that if he had been conciliated and treated with the respect due to his position he might have been "managed;" but Nubar Pasha, who had been reinstated as prime minister on the strong representations of the European ministers, was determined to reduce the khedive to a merely nominal place in the government of the country, and the English minister of finance, Mr. Rivers Wilson, was much of the same mind. The result was that the khedive was in active opposition to the government which had been forced upon him. It was discovered that he encouraged the disaffection of the officials and pashas whose authority and privileges were suppressed or threatened by the new ministry, who had disregarded the demands of a large number of officers of the army discharged without settlement of their long-standing arrears of pay. The khedive had demanded on his own behalf that he should have more practical authority in the cabinet council, should have a right to summon it and to propose measures to it, that all measures should be submitted to him before being laid before it, and that he should preside at all its deliberations.

On the 18th of February, 1879, a riotous demonstration was made at Cairo by 400 of the discharged military officers. They

assembled in front of the ministry of finance and insulted Nubar Pasha and Mr. Rivers Wilson. The khedive drove to the spot and addressed the rioters to induce them to disperse, but either they knew that he was only trying to save appearances or they were too much excited to obey him. On the following day Nubar Pasha, who believed that the demonstration had been countenanced by the khedive, resigned his office, and the two European ministers also tendered their resignations. They would have insisted on the reinstatement of Nubar Pasha and appealed to their respective governments, but Mr. Vivian, the English consul-general, advised the English government against forcing the khedive to re-establish the authority of a minister with whom he could not sustain friendly relations, and eventually the diplomatic representatives of England and France were directed to inform Ismail that the restoration of the minister would not be insisted on if it was agreed that the khedive should not in any case be present at cabinet councils, that his son, Prince Tewfik, should be appointed president of the council, and that the English and French ministers should have an absolute right of veto over any proposed measure. As the proposal was conveyed more in the form of a menace of the consequences of refusal than as a conciliatory measure, the khedive formally accepted it, and the cabinet of Lord Beaconsfield in concert with the French government took the responsibility of ruling the internal affairs of Egypt. This high-handed policy was the outcome of the employment of European government officials not only to inquire into, but to interfere in, the financial affairs of the country; and yet it may be contended that it would have been impossible to unravel the skein of Egyptian accounts without such representations on behalf of European creditors as would amount to a dictatorial representation of the consequences of refusing to admit the authority of the commissioners. The actual interposition may be said to have begun with the mission of Mr. Cave, whose long and careful inquiry and report in 1876 showed that the unified debt of Egypt should be estimated at £91,000,000, which had been incurred in twelve years by a country whose annual revenue during that period had not averaged £8,000,000.

From that time the reliance of the khedive on English support, and his desire to employ English officials, had diminished, and yet he was now a mere cipher, and as the constant jealousy of France had made it necessary to accept her co-operation on every occasion, Egypt was now under the control of the two governments, much to the dissatisfaction of the other powers. The position was complicated by disputes and disagreements between the foreign ministers themselves, and it soon became evident that a crisis was coming. There were many difficulties to contend with, and the ministers, though they had prepared the way for some important reforms, had achieved little except contracting for a loan with Messrs. Rothschild for £8,500,000 (nominal) at seven per cent on the security of 4,350,000 acres of land which the khedive had surrendered for the purpose of paying off the floating debt of £6,276,000. By the omission to effect legal mortgages on the ceded estates, other judgment creditors were able to forestall the holders of the floating debt, and there was a great deal of loss and trouble in consequence.

A new cabinet, with Prince Tewfik as president and the two European ministers still in office, was formed by the khedive in March, 1879, but a second report of the commission of inquiry was presented, with a plan for the provisional regulation of the finances. For this Mr. Rivers Wilson held himself responsible, and though it was first presented confidentially to the khedive, it transpired that the English minister had represented Egypt to be in a state of bankruptcy. This aroused enough public indignation to enable the khedive to act upon his original privilege, and on the 7th of April he abruptly dismissed the ministry and formed a native council responsible to the obsolete chamber of notables, which seems to have been revived for the occasion, as it had been at other times when Ismail wanted to have his own way.

He then brought forward a financial project of his own, which was supported by the "national party," consisting chiefly of the officials and land-owners whose extravagance, oppression, and robbery had been exposed by the commission. The new proposals would have restored the system by which they profited. This

national project was embodied in a decree after nearly every European official of high rank had resigned, and an old friend and supporter of the khedive—a Turk named Cherif Pasha—was made president. The English government strongly remonstrated with the khedive, and warned him that he had broken his special engagements, but no action was taken, and things went on till May, when the German government instructed its consul-general to declare that the decree could not be held to have any legal force, as, by the arbitrary settlement of the Egyptian debt, it involved the abolition of acquired and recognized rights, and as it assailed the competency of the mixed courts and the rights of the subjects of the empire, the viceroy would be held responsible for all the consequences of his illegal conduct. This protest was afterwards repeated by the other five great powers, and the concurrence of the sultan as suzerain was obtained for whatever measures the powers might adopt.

On the 19th of June the two diplomatic representatives of England and France went together to the khedive, and on behalf of their governments advised him to abdicate in favour of his son Tewfik, unless he wished them to appeal to the sultan, in which case he would be deposed without being able to count upon receiving a pension, or upon the maintenance of the succession in favour of his son. Ismail would then have withdrawn his decree and submitted his plan to the approval of the powers, but it was too late, and on the 26th of June the sultan sent his imperial iradé by telegram from Constantinople, deposing Ismail and conferring the government upon his son Tewfik, who on the same day was proclaimed khedive without any protest or disturbance. Egypt was tired of its ruler. On June 30th Ismail Pasha, with his sons Hussein and Hassan, his harem, and a numerous suite, embarked for Naples.

Tewfik began his rule with a character for honesty of purpose, which he deserved, as he had voluntarily given up his possessions and reduced his civil list. He charged Riaz Pasha with the formation of a ministry, and after much consultation the principle of two controllers was restored, and Mr. Baring for England, and

M. de Blignières for France, were to have full powers of inquiry, were to receive periodical accounts of the receipts and expenditure from each administration, were to make suggestions to ministers without ("at present") taking part in public business, and were to have a seat and deliberative voice in the cabinet. They were not to be removed without the consent of their governments, and had authority to appoint or dismiss subordinate officials.

The interference of our government in the internal affairs of Egypt was regarded with dislike by some foreign powers, especially by Italy, and had not given general satisfaction in parliament, nor could the high-handed assumptions of the British representatives be altogether defended. The explanations which were given when the subject was brought before the House at the end of the session of 1879 were by no means conclusive; but the interposition had now another aspect, and it was thought desirable to wait to see what would be the effect of the new arrangement.

In April, 1880, a Liberal government under Mr. Gladstone succeeded that of Mr. Disraeli; but the arrangements made under the control, of course, continued, and though there were many difficulties and disagreements because of the rivalries of officials, the current of affairs in Egypt was comparatively tranquil, and continued so throughout the year. The law of liquidation drawn up on the recommendation of the commissioners of the great powers had been passed, and in February, 1881, the report of the controllers-general stated that it "drew an absolute line of demarcation between the past and the future, settled the conditions in which all public debts, prior to Dec. 31, were to be regulated, fixed the amount and interest of the consolidated debt, appropriated to it certain revenues, and laid down the rules by which the other sources of income were to be distributed between the service of different branches of the administration, and the paying off of the consolidated debt."

There were some genuine attempts at reform, and the year 1881 had opened with the promise of progress. A trustworthy statement of revenue and expenditure showed an income considerably in excess of the estimates of the financial year 1880. Tewfik

was justly credited with a desire to mitigate the burden of the fellahs, who received him with respect and loyalty when he appeared among them; and he was admired for his honesty of purpose, his unostentatious and domestic manner of living, and his genial kindliness; but the time had not yet come when a firm grasp and a prompt and heavy hand could be dispensed with in dealing with officials, and in suppressing attempts at revolt among the military leaders, whose grievances were, or rather had been, undeniable. Just before Ismail's fall, soldiers had been seen begging in the streets. A portion of the army had been disbanded and left unpaid. Under the new government the soldiers, like other officials, were regularly paid; but their pay was far below that of other public servants, and when, for economical reasons, the regiments were reduced a number of officers were placed on half-pay without being provided with other employment. Under a despotism these alleged grievances could only be removed by the head of the state, who might regard a demand for redress as an act of treason, and punish it by death or the kourbash; but now there was something like a constitutional government, and the ministers, rather than the head of the state, had to bear the responsibility.

The revolts began by ill-feeling between the Circassian and Arab officers, and a quarrel between Ali Bey Fehmy, the Arab colonel of the 1st Regiment of Guards stationed at the palace of Abdin in Cairo, and a Circassian officer, of whose influence he was jealous. Osman Pasha Rifky, minister of war, who was a Circassian, took the part of his countryman; and Ali Bey Fehmy and two other officers in command of regiments in or near Cairo thereupon sent a strongly worded letter to the prime minister, Riaz Pasha, complaining of the favouritism shown to Circassian and Turkish officers. The letter was referred to the minister of war, who on the morning of the 1st of February held a council of war in the barracks at Kasr-el-Nil, and put the three colonels under arrest there. But Ali Bey Fehmy had provided against this contingency, and two battalions of his men marched to the barracks, drove the guards back at the point of the bayonet, broke

open the prison, released their and his friends, and carried him back in triumph to their quarters opposite the palace of Abdin; the members of the military council having precipitately retreated from the windows of the room in which they had met, not without some rough treatment by the mutinous soldiery.

Festivities had been going on at Cairo to celebrate the marriage of some members of the viceregal family, and the khedive and his ministers, who had been hastily summoned, witnessed from the balcony of the palace at Abdin the return of the mutineers. An aide-de-camp sent by the khedive to the rioters while they were at the barracks of Kasr-el-Nil had failed to pacify them, and they now demanded, not only the reinstatement of their colonels, but the dismissal of the minister of war. The colonels had visited Baron de Ring, the French consular agent and consul-general, and Mr. Malet, the English diplomatic agent, to assure them that they intended no hostility to foreigners. Mr. Malet, of course, at once informed the khedive of the interview. Baron de Ring, who had for some time been jealous of his compatriot M. de Blignières (whose straightforward impartiality and friendly co-operation with his English colleague did not please the agent), had already been stirring up strife; and after the visit of the colonels he began to carry on secret negotiations with them for overturning the ministry. This was afterwards discovered. The khedive wrote to the president of the French republic, and Baron de Ring was recalled and replaced by M. Sienkiewicz.

When the riotous soldiers demanded, there and then, the dismissal of the minister of war, the khedive took counsel of the consuls-general of England and France; but it was soon discovered that the troops in and near Cairo were not to be depended upon to suppress the mutiny, and there was nothing for it but to yield; the minister of war being replaced by Mahmoud Pasha Samy (previously minister of religious institutions), who was acceptable to the soldiers, and after whose nomination they retired to their barracks, so that by two o'clock in the afternoon order was restored, and half the people in Cairo had not known what had happened.

The danger now lay in the apprehensions of the mutinous officers that they would after all be punished; and the khedive, acting on the advice of the English consul-general Mr. Malet, called together the officers of the garrison, and while deprecating their recent insubordination, and expressing a hope that they would for the future observe the first duty of soldiers and obey the head of the state, assured them of his pardon and his good-will to the army. Perhaps their experience and the traditions of Egyptian government made them incredulous of pardon, and they continued to take means for securing themselves against deferred vengeance by commencing secret communications with all those who were disaffected to the government and dissatisfied with their own position or the political situation in Egypt. The agitation became formidable; but the ministry, though they knew of it, took no steps, or were without the requisite force for opposing it, though they wisely commenced an inquiry into, and the adoption of remedies for, some of the grievances complained of.

On April 20th a decree was issued for raising the pay of all ranks from 20 to 30 per cent, and for the appointment of a commission, of which four foreign general officers in the Egyptian employ—among whom was Major-general Sir Frederick Goldsmid, English administrator of the Daira Sanieh—were members: to inquire into the army regulations, rules for promotion and retirement, the condition of those on half-pay, and other matters. Many meetings of the commission were held, when it became evident that all the non-European members were united, and that the Turkish officers had not, as had been expected, opposed the unreasonable proposals of the military agitators. The head of the party was Arabi Bey, or, to give him his full name, Said Ahmed Arabi, who, it is said, was born in Lower Egypt, and claimed to be one of the fellahen. Of somewhat imposing presence, tall stature, and considerable eloquence, Arabi was a recognized leader among his fellows even before he was raised by Ismail Pasha from the position of a private soldier to the rank of a commissioned officer. He had entered the army while he was yet a boy, and in 1881 had arrived at middle age. For the greater part of his career, in

which he had repeatedly re-entered the ranks under the short-service system, he had the character of an agitator, always endeavouring, as his friends alleged, to obtain the abolition of abuses; but as this necessarily involved insubordination, he had been cashiered even if he had not suffered the indignity of the kourbash. However, like some other popular agitators, he was able so effectually to assert himself that he was afterwards reinstated, and Tewfik had raised him to the rank of colonel of a regiment. That he had a keen recollection of the punishment he had suffered, and desired to retaliate on those who were, as he believed, instrumental in disgracing him, is more than probable, and he had employed much of his time during his exclusion from the army in thus acquiring some knowledge of science, so that he was regarded by the common soldiers, not only as a champion, but as a person of superior attainments, and had also obtained a reputation for piety. He was, in fact, just the sort of leader to attain to a kind of dictatorship among the troops; and he perhaps represented the temper of the majority of the officers when at a meeting of the military commission he declared that if ordered by the minister of war to take his regiment to the Soudan he would not obey; a statement which was strongly reprovved by Sir Frederick Goldsmid, in reply to whom Arabi made some lame excuse.

It soon became evident that the authority of the khedive was insufficient to control either the arbitrary and almost aggressive attitude assumed by his minister Riaz Pasha, or the growing mutiny and arrogant claims of the soldiery. It was not till the end of July, however, that another crisis came, and it was hastened by an accidental event at Alexandria, where an artillery soldier was run over by a carriage and killed. The coachman was arrested, but was discharged without punishment, and some of the comrades of the artilleryman, in opposition to the commands of their officers, showed their dissatisfaction by carrying the body of the dead man through the streets to the palace of Ras-el-Teen, where the khedive was staying, as he was then on his visit to Alexandria. The khedive promised that their case should be considered, but soon afterwards they were brought before a court-martial and heavily



ARABI PASHA.

ACHMET ARABI

LEADER OF THE MILITARY REVOLUTION IN EGYPT, 1911.

PHOTOGRAPH BY H. J. LONDON, 1911.

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sentenced, the ringleader to hard labour for life, and the others to three years on the galleys at Khartûm. The severity of the sentence aroused and excited the army, and Abdullah Bey, commanding a negro regiment at Toura, and one of the colonels who had been concerned in the mutiny at Cairo, wrote to the minister of war and to the khedive in disrespectful terms. The minister of war, afraid to punish the writer, allowed him to withdraw the letter on his assurance that he had no mutinous intention. At this the khedive was displeased and dismissed the minister, whose place was taken by Daoud Pasha Zigen, the cousin of Tewfik, who began to show more firmness towards the leaders of the agitation. But a strange combination of misunderstandings precipitated matters. The ministry of Riaz Pasha was already weak, and the khedive had already talked of dismissing it, though he had not the resolution to do so. M. de Blignières also was openly opposed to them, and there seemed to be confusion in all directions.

On the 3d of September the khedive left Alexandria and returned to Cairo. At this juncture the minister of war ordered the removal to Alexandria of the 4th Regiment of infantry, of which Arabi Bey was colonel. This order, which had in reality been determined on by the former minister of war, was regarded with no little apprehension by the leaders of the military party, who regarded it as preliminary to a *coup d'état*. The acting agent of England had strongly advised that it should not be issued. Mr. Malet was at that time on a mission at Constantinople, and it appeared that the military leaders fancied that he had gone on behalf of England and France to concert an armed intervention against a possible revolt at Cairo.

There was great excitement, and meetings were held where it was decided that a demonstration should be made to intimidate the khedive and compel the resignation of ministers. It was afterwards said that he knew of this intention, but relied on the loyalty of the 1st and 2d Regiments of infantry, and on the cavalry and artillery, to overpower the mutinous regiment of Arabi Bey if necessary.

On the night of Thursday, September 8th, the khedive and his

ministers had returned from the great fair of Santah, whither they had been in state. The French consul-general had not returned from Alexandria, and M. de Blignières was away on private business. Mr. Colvin, the English controller-general, had returned from his leave of absence that morning.

At one o'clock on the following afternoon Daoud Pasha, the minister of war, received a letter from Arabi Bey saying that at three o'clock the same afternoon the army would present itself on the square of the palace of Abdin to demand the execution of the political programme which their leaders had agreed upon, namely—the dismissal of Riaz Pasha and all his colleagues, the summoning of the chamber of notables, and the carrying out of the recommendation of the military commission, the most important part of which was the augmentation of the army to 18,000 men.

Arabi had also sent a circular to the different foreign representatives assuring them that there was no design against the lives or property of foreigners. The minister of war took the letter to the khedive, who was at the palace of Ismailia. Ministers were at once summoned, and also Mr. Colvin, the controller, and Mr. Cookson, the English acting agent and consul-general. Mr. Colvin advised the khedive to go in person to the barracks at Abdin, where the 1st Regiment of the Guard, on whom he could rely, was stationed, put himself at their head, march with them to the quarters of the 2d Regiment at the citadel, and so forestall Arabi at the square at Abdin. This advice was accepted, and Mr. Colvin, as an Egyptian official, accompanied the khedive. Everything went well, the troops received the khedive with loyal respect, and if he had marched at once at their head to Abdin, and there awaited the arrival of Arabi Bey from Abassieh, whence he had to bring his regiment, the day might have been his own. But Tewfik wished to avoid a conflict, and so insisted on driving to Abassieh before returning to Abdin, where he told his ministers to wait for him at the palace. He found the barracks empty. Arabi had marched his men off three quarters of an hour before the khedive reached the place, and was in the Abdin square with his troops and eighteen pieces of artillery to blockade the palace,

the subalterns of the artillery having compelled their colonels to follow him. The khedive returned in a hurry to find the square in front of his palace surrounded by 4000 troops, cavalry in the centre, and loaded cannon pointed to his windows. Both his loyal regiments had joined the mutiny. He had to get into his palace the back way. Mr. Colvin urged him to make a personal appeal to the troops, and with that gentleman on his right, and the American General Stone, chief of the staff of the Egyptian army, and three officers of his household, he went down the great staircase of the palace towards the group of colonels, of which Arabi Bey and Abdullah Bey, both on horseback, were the centre.

"Get off your horses," said the khedive; and they obeyed immediately. Mr. Colvin suggested that they should be ordered to give up their swords; but the khedive was not equal to that, he only called upon them to sheathe their swords, and this was repeated twice before they obeyed. The khedive asked what it was that they wanted, and Arabi Bey replied that they came in the name of the people to ask for the liberty and the grant of the three points formulated in the letter sent that morning to the minister of war.

"Have you forgotten that I am the khedive, and your master?" asked Tewfik.

Arabi answered by a verse from the Koran: "The ruler is he who is just; he who is not so is no longer ruler."

The khedive retired under pretext of considering the demands submitted to him. Mr. Cookson, who had just arrived, addressed himself, by desire of the khedive, to Arabi Bey as the spokesman of the army; pointed out the disastrous consequences to themselves and the country of the course they had taken, and asked what were their demands. Arabi Bey repeated, "Dismissal of ministers, convocation of the chambers, and execution of the military commission." He also said that they were there to defend the liberties of Egypt, which England, the opponent of slavery, ought never to crush.

Mr. Cookson returned to the khedive and told him that, in his opinion, if the ministers would consent to resign office, the other

points would not be insisted on. Riaz Pasha at once agreed, and Mr. Cookson then announced this to the officers, making the concession conditional on the troops being at once withdrawn, and adding that he could not recommend his highness to accede to the other two demands without reference to Constantinople. Arabi Bey assented, and the khedive was to choose his own ministry; but some of the officers clamoured for Sherif Pasha, and the khedive, on being told of this, accepted their selection.

A letter from the khedive was handed to Arabi Pasha, who read it aloud amidst shouts of "Long live the khedive!" and the troops were ready to vacate the square, when Arabi and his colleagues asked that they might be received by the khedive to present their excuses and receive his pardon. This ceremony was gone through, and at half-past seven o'clock the troops were all marched off to the barracks.

All this time the country was quiet enough. It soon became evident that the champions of liberty were intent almost entirely on their own advantage, and that the riot was purely military; but there was reason for great anxiety. The country was for a time without a ministry; the khedive was in the power of the army. Neither England nor France would interpose, and an appeal to the Porte for 10,000 soldiers to put down the military revolt elicited nothing but the evidence, which was more distinctly displayed afterwards, that the sultan would only give his aid on the condition of revoking the concessions that had been made to Ismail Pasha, and reducing Egypt to a political position which would not be acceptable either to its ruler or to the two great European powers on whom he depended.

For some time it appeared as though Sherif Pasha would not be able to induce Arabi and his co-mutineers to consent to such terms as would alone enable him or any statesman to accept office in such a crisis. Fortunately, the determination of the colonels to summon the notables from the provinces to make a demonstration in their favour solved the difficulty. When these persons arrived they supported Sherif Pasha, for they had a direct interest in preventing the arrest of regular government, and cared

more for peace and quiet than for questions of liberty, which were found to be for the benefit of military officers. Their attitude reminded Arabi and his party that it would be safer to come to some settlement before their conduct brought intervention either from Constantinople or from Europe, and at last it was agreed that the officers should quit Cairo, leaving to Sherif Pasha to choose his own cabinet, and to decide the right time for granting constitutional liberties to the country. On the other hand it was conceded that Mahmoud Pasha Samy should be restored to the position of minister of war.

The engagements entered into were for a short time loyally carried out. On Sept. 22 the khedive signed decrees regulating the leave, the retirement, the pay, and the promotion in the army, on the lines put forward by the military commission.

On the 4th of October appeared a decree for the opening of the chamber of delegates; the interval of three months before the meeting of the chamber, would be employed by ministers in preparing for its consideration bills relating to pressing questions, especially those of the mode of appeal against taxation, of forced labour, and of provincial councils. On the 6th of October Arabi Bey and Abdullah Bey withdrew with their regiments from Cairo, the one to Wady and the other to Damietta.

The excitement had now, however, gone through the country, and was maintained by all those who were opposed to foreign control, mainly because it had deprived them of posts in which, however small the official salaries, there had been great opportunities for speculation. There may, there must, have been some to whom the interposition and the control exercised by foreigners in the internal and financial affairs of Egypt was a deep grievance, apart from any merely personal considerations,—but the greater number who now joined in the disaffection, instigated by the military leaders, were either fanatics, who detested alike the foreigner and the progress which he represented, or creatures who had found in the older governments opportunities for enriching themselves by fraud, cruelty and oppression. The “national party” seemed to revive, and the violent and unscrupulous articles

which appeared in the local newspapers, and were said to be inspired by Arabi Bey and his companions, tended to inflame the hatred of all who were disaffected, and led to the adoption by Riaz Pasha of a stringent press law, which gave the minister of the interior absolute power to suppress, without judicial process, any printing-office or newspaper.

Of course these disturbances seriously injured the commercial relations of the country during the year 1881, but that year closed fairly, the khedive, who opened the first session of the new parliament on the 25th of December, stating that it had always been his desire to summon the chamber of delegates, and expressing his conviction that wisdom and moderation would reign in its deliberations, and that it would respect all international engagements.

The apparently conciliatory arrangements did not have any lasting effect. Scarcely had the chamber of delegates, summoned by the ministry of Sherif Pasha, assembled when it became evident not only that Arabi Pasha would not abate his pretensions, but that the minister himself was inclined to propitiate him, or at least to recognize the possibility of his claim to represent a national movement. In the first week of the new year, only a few days after the supposed settlement of the immediate demands of the military party, he had returned suddenly from Wady, and was actually appointed under-secretary of war. Such a sop was not likely to appease his appetite for power. A manifesto appeared in the *Times* professing to be a statement of his declarations, and though it was not regarded as authentic, events proved that it represented his views. It insisted that for the time the army represented the people and was trusted by them, that Egypt was sick of the European control and of its highly paid and often incompetent officials, and that Europeans should be replaced by Egyptians even if it should be found expedient to carry out the financial policy which the control had inaugurated. The British and French governments, representing the expressed opinions of Europe, addressed to the khedive an identical note stating their intention to "ward off by their united efforts all causes of external or internal complications which might menace the *régime* established

in Egypt," or in other words to maintain the joint control for the good of Egypt, the peace of Europe, and the benefit of the bondholders. The chamber of notables, however, claimed the right of regulating the national budget, and, in spite of the demur of the controllers, found that their pretensions were supported by the sultan, who, claiming Egypt as a part of his possessions, resented the interference of the European powers in her internal affairs. Sherif Pasha could not obtain a compromise. He had consented to give Arabi Pasha an office in the government, and he now offered to increase the numbers and pay of the army; but the notables were having their turn, and insisted on the abrogation of the arrangement of 1879, by which the Anglo-French control had been constituted. All he could do was to resign, and the khedive, shrinking from the responsibility of forming a new ministry, left it to the chamber to choose their own. After some difficulty an administration was selected with Mahmoud Pasha Samy as nominal president. Ali Sadek Pasha was made minister of finance, and Arabi Bey became war minister. It had been intended that Ismail Ayoub Pasha should take the ministry of finance; but he refused office, alleging that the controllers had threatened to quit the country accompanied by the consuls if such a ministry was formed. Arabi retorted that if that were so there was nothing to be done but to prepare for immediate defence. The ministry *was* formed, however, and the president of the council tried to face two ways, assuring Sir Edward Malet, the English controller, that the government would observe all national obligations, and representing to the notables that measures would be adopted that would subject ministerial responsibility to the vote of the majority.

M. Gambetta, who was then president of the French republic, urged upon Lord Granville, the British minister for foreign affairs, to take immediate measures for intervention to prevent anarchy, amidst which not only Egypt but all European interests would suffer. The English foreign office had favoured the introduction into Egypt of such representative institutions as might promote a better government and prevent a return to the arbitrary power exercised by Ismail; but it was impossible for them to admit that

a military revolt should initiate the rule of the chief mutineer, and under the name of popular representation place the khedive and the country under a despotism which recognized no external responsibilities.

At the same time our government was reluctant to intervene by force of arms to suppress what professed to be a national movement, nor had M. Gambetta actually proposed to support the khedive by material force. The question was what kind of intervention would be effectual in case of Egypt falling into anarchy. The English government had a strong objection to the occupation of Egypt by themselves, as it would create opposition in both Turkey and Egypt, and excite the suspicion and jealousy of the European powers, who might make demonstrations on their own part which would lead to very serious complications. Such an occupation would also be as distasteful to the French nation as the sole occupation of Egypt by the French would be to this country. They also considered that a joint occupation by France and England, while it might diminish some of the objections referred to, would seriously aggravate others. On the whole they believed that a Turkish temporary occupation, under proper guarantees and with the control of England, and France, would be the least objectionable, and in this view the other great powers for the most part concurred. As the new government of Egypt had declared its intention to maintain international obligations, neither France nor England considered that a case for intervention had arisen; but Lord Granville represented that should the case arise they would wish that any such eventual intervention should represent the united action and authority of Europe. In that event it would also, in their opinion, be right that the sultan should be a party to any proceeding or discussion that might arise.

But Arabi was master of the situation, and it was believed, on pretty good evidence, that he had reason to count on support from Constantinople. Under his direction the council discussed measures transferring to ministers the authority to settle the budget without reference to the controllers, who thereupon protested to their respective governments and to the khedive, who received from

those governments a joint note, and about the same time a conciliatory Anglo-French note was addressed to the Porte assuring the sultan that his sovereignty over Egypt would not be questioned or limited. On the 12th of March M. de Blignières resigned his post, but nothing more was done immediately, as M. Gambetta had been succeeded by M. de Freycinet, whose policy was one of inaction, for he objected or appeared to object, under any circumstances, to intervention either by France and England united, or by the Porte, under conditions which gave those two governments control in the interests of Europe.

On the 15th of March it seemed that a temporary understanding, or rather a truce, had been come to between the khedive and Arabi, who was made a pasha, while seventeen of the officers who had supported him were promoted to be colonels. The denunciation of European officials was revived, and the khedive was compelled to receive deputations professing to represent the general discontent of the country on this subject.

It is worth noting that a return made by Mr. Cookson showed that, in 1882, as many as 1324 employés of various European nationalities held appointments, and received £373,704 per annum. The foreign office, therefore, thought it advisable to go more fully into statistics, which showed that the foreigners in the Egyptian service were as two to ninety-eight natives, and that the salaries paid to European officials did not amount to sixteen per cent of the total cost of administration.¹

Meanwhile, Arabi was assuming a dictatorship, though not without a sharp contest with the khedive, who was, however, becoming helpless.

In April a plot was discovered in which a number of Circassian officers were implicated. In the promotions which had taken place the Circassians, who had previously held a conspicuous place in the army, had been passed over in favour of Arab officers. There were about forty of the Circassian officers, the chief of whom was Osman Riftei, the former minister of war, who had, it was declared, laid a plot for getting rid of both Arabi and Tew-

¹ *Annual Register*, 1882.

fik, and reinstating Ismail. It was reported also that they intended to dispose of Arabi on the old plan of murdering him. The conspiracy was discovered, or rather betrayed: thirty-one Circasian officers were arrested, thrown into prison, and tried by a secret court-martial. Arabi suspected that Sherif Pasha had instigated the plot, and endeavoured to ensure a tragic and striking punishment of the ringleaders as a warning against foreign demands. The court took a different view regarding the conspiracy, as having been instigated by Ismail Pasha and his agent, Rahib Pasha. Tewfik was therefore advised to discontinue the payment of the civil list of the ex-khedive, and to degrade and banish the Circasian officers. Sir Edward Malet strongly advised the khedive to refuse his warrant to these sentences, as the trial had been a secret one, and after considerable delay Tewfik took this advice and commuted the sentences, and only placed the accused officers on half-pay. A violent remonstrance was the result, during which the president of the council spoke in slighting terms of the foreign representatives, and implied that if the sentences on these Circasians were not more severe there would be a general massacre of foreigners. These words were afterwards denied, but the chamber was convoked without notice being given to the khedive, who was treated with the utmost contempt, though the foreign consuls were informed that the safety of Europeans would be guaranteed.

The latter assurance, however, was stimulated by the intimation that France and England had ordered two iron-clads to Alexandria, and the Egyptian ministry, waking up to the awkwardness of the situation, added that their guarantee would hold good in the event of the intervention of the Porte alone.

M. de Freycinet, whose uncertain and hesitating policy and objections to every apparently practicable means of intervention had brought matters to a dead lock, had been reluctant to agree to Turkish occupation of Egypt in any form, lest it should lead to an armed intervention by the Turks. He wanted to ensure that the intervention of the sultan should be no more than a "moral" one. Lord Granville had stated his own objection to any armed intervention, but had added that if such became necessary, and the

presence of troops was unavoidable, the troops of the sultan would be the best considering all the circumstances.

On the 5th of May the French cabinet had decided on what they probably regarded as only a display of material force for the sake of producing a moral impression, and proposed that six French and six English ships of war, of draught light enough to enable them to enter the harbour, should be sent to Alexandria.

France had hitherto left upon England the whole burden of finding a mode of intervention, just as she afterwards left to us the burden of carrying out the results of the demonstration which she had proposed, and gave us no assistance but rather harassed and impeded us in the dangers and difficulties which followed; but it was considered necessary by our government loyally to maintain that co-operation which their predecessors had deliberately created. Despatches and circular notes by the score had been flying about among all the cabinets of Europe; there seemed to be no way out of the difficulty, and now the proposition made by the French government brought about immediate co-operation by which it was hoped the protection of the khedive, the restoration of a legitimate government by the defeat of the rebellious chamber and its mutinous chief, and the preservation of guaranteed international interests, might be effected.

There were of course many people who regarded Arabi's demands as genuine claims prompted by patriotism, and declared that the national support which he had obtained was so obvious as to require us to hesitate before consenting to any forcible means whatever, or even the menaces which the mere appearance of vessels of war would imply. It was true that there had been considerable encouragement to the attitude assumed by the mutinous ministry by the pronounced disaffection of a large number of persons. As early as March 20th, however, Mr. Cookson had pointed out to Lord Granville that many of the notables and others having a stake in the country were seeking to withdraw from the alliance with the military party and to escape from its domination; that adherents of Ismail Pasha were showing themselves and were ready to hail his return; that he counted on the

support of France, as he thought his restoration would enable her definitely to rid herself of the probability of Turkish intervention; and that there was much disorder and disorganization in the provinces. This at all events showed that Egypt was imminently liable to complete anarchy on the one hand or on the other, either to reaction against the military dictatorship of a rebel and usurper, or the armed suppression by Turkey not only of revolt but of independent government.

On the 15th of May the sailing of the combined fleets from Suda in Crete was telegraphed. The French and English governments had instructed their representatives to advise the khedive to take advantage of the arrival of the ships to call for the resignation of the Arabi ministry, to place Sherif Pasha or some such person at the head of affairs, and to connive at the deportation of Arabi and his colleagues should the incoming ministry be inclined to such a measure. Tewfik had no grasp, no decision, and affairs became worse rather than better in consequence of the policy of the western powers. Sir E. Malet and the French representative at Cairo joined in an ultimatum demanding the dismissal of Arabi, Ali Fehmy, and Abdoullah Pashas. Nothing came of this, and a few days later the English naval force at Alexandria was increased, and invitations were issued to the European powers to a conference at Constantinople, while by the reluctant consent of the French cabinet the presence at Alexandria of a Turkish man-of-war was asked for in order to show that the sultan was in accord with the European powers. Dervish Pasha, who had been on a special mission from the sultan to the khedive, was requested to put a stop to the military works which were being pushed forward on the fortifications of Alexandria.

Those fortifications consist in the first place, of a wall with towers, beginning at the east harbour, and inclosing the town to the north, east, and south. Four fortified gates break this inclosure, those of Ramleh, Rosetta, Moharrem Bey, and the one near Pompey's Pillar. Towards the south and south-west there are only small and insignificant open bastions; but the actual harbour defences are of great importance.

Fort Marabout is built on an island to the extreme west, and was armed with two 12-inch 18-ton guns, two 9-inch 12-ton guns, twenty 32-pounders, and five mortars. Fort Mex, with the adjacent works and batteries, numbered fifty-six guns, of which seven were heavy rifled Armstrongs. Among the adjacent works was a redoubt with seven guns; a tower with two; Fort Kamaria with five; Omuk Kubebe with eighteen cannons; and Fort Tsale. Towards the inner harbour lies Fort Gabarrie, and Fort Napoleon still farther north-east. The Lighthouse Battery, on the southern front of the Ras-el-Teen peninsula, was armed with six rifled muzzle-loaders, one rifled 40-pounder, and twenty-eight smooth-bores. Between this and the Hospital Battery were eight rifled breech-loaders, and twenty-seven smooth-bores, mounted on earth-works. Then came Fort Ada with five rifled muzzle-loaders and twenty smooth-bores; and on the north-east, Fort Pharos, with eight rifled muzzle-loaders and thirty-seven smooth-bores, which took a prominent part in the fight that afterwards ensued.

The heaviest artillery in these forts consisted of 18-ton and 12-ton guns of the old Woolwich pattern, which were made by Sir William Armstrong at Elswick, for the Egyptian government, in 1868 and subsequent years. The guns of a larger size fired 400-lb. Palliser shells, with a charge of 50 lbs. of powder. These shells are capable, with a favourable angle of impact, of piercing 12-inch armour-plates.

There have been so many glowing descriptions of the modern city of Alexandria and its environs that there is little occasion to interrupt our narrative by dwelling on the features of this attractive city. Though the ancient portion has entirely disappeared, it suggests the history of ages. Napoleon Bonaparte said that Alexander rendered himself more illustrious by founding Alexandria than by his most brilliant victories; and that it should be the capital of the world.

Modern Alexandria occupies only a part of the ancient site, being built chiefly on the isthmus that connects what was once the classic island of Pharos with the mainland, on which the old city stood. Successive alluvial deposits have widened this mole—the

ancient Heptastadium—into a broad neck of land, the seaward end of which is occupied by the palace of Ras-el-Teen, the arsenal, and several government buildings; after which, towards the mainland, comes the modern town, the development of which has been eastward, toward the Ramleh railway-station, connected with the city by fine rows of houses, forming boulevards, and let out in shops below and flats above, like the houses in Paris. In this direction, too, an excellent road along the Mahmoudieh Canal attracts, on Fridays and other fête days, crowds of private carriages, many of which might figure in the Bois de Boulogne or Hyde Park. "One half Europe, with its regular houses, tall, and white, and stiff; the other half Oriental, with its mud-coloured buildings and terraced roofs, varied with fat mosques and lean minarets," is the way in which Eliot Warburton described it above half a century ago, and that description still gives the idea of the place. But the modern improvements effected in the city, the lighting, paving, and even the scavenging, have made it equal in such respects to many second-class towns in France or England, so far as the Frank quarter of it is concerned.

Another writer, describing the aspect of out-door life in the quarter probably between the custom-house and the square named after Mohammed Ali, in the vicinity of the consulates, the English church, and the principal hotels, says, "Here came a file of tall camels laden with merchandise, stalking with deliberate, solemn steps through the bazaars; there rode a grand-looking native gentleman in all the pride of capacious turban and flowing robes; yonder passed some ladies on donkeys, enveloped in black *babara*, and the more remarkable white muslin veil, which universal out-door costume of Egyptian women only suffered two dark eyes to gleam from behind the hideous shroud. And if the carriages we saw had a sinack of Europe they were driven and attended by men in oriental dress, and, even stranger still, were preceded at their best pace by a bare-legged Arab, who shouted to the passengers to get out of the way—the shrill cries of this active *avant-courier* resounding on every side; and fortunate is the stranger who is not run over in the narrow streets by some cantering donkey, or

knocked down by some tall camel laden with heavy boxes as he stands staring at the unwonted scene. . . . But with all its sights and sounds . . . Alexandria is but semi-oriental at least, and no more resembles Cairo than Calais is to be compared to Paris."

A motley crowd was to be seen in Alexandria at the time that the Europeans there were about to be threatened with renewed attacks and when British vessels of war were already preparing to defend them, and but for the restraining influences of civilized policy might have landed enough men to overawe their assailants. Ten years before there were 212,000 inhabitants in Alexandria, of whom 48,000 were Europeans, the remainder being made up of Arabs, Turks, Copts, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Maltese, and a mixed group of Levantines.

The British squadron, which with that of France anchored off Alexandria on the 20th of May, consisted of eight iron-clads of a weight and construction which had not yet been tested in actual warfare, and five gun-boats. The iron-clads were:—

The *Alexandra* (Flagship): armed with two 25-ton guns, and ten of 18 tons each; armour, 8 to 12 inches thick. The *Inflexible*: armed with four guns of 81 tons each; armour, 16 to 24 inches thick. The *Temeraire*: armed with four guns of 25 tons each, and four of 18 tons each; armour, 8 to 10 inches thick. The *Superb*: armed with sixteen guns, four being of 25 tons, and four of 12 tons each; armour, 10 to 12 inches thick. The *Sultan*: armed with eight 18-ton guns, and four 12-ton guns; armour, 6 to 9 inches thick. The *Monarch*: armed with four 25-ton guns, and two of 6½ tons each; armour, 8 to 10 inches thick. The *Invincible*: armed with fourteen guns, two being of 12 tons each; armour, 5 to 6 inches thick. The *Penelope*: armed with ten 12-ton guns; armour, 5 to 6 inches thick. The gun-boats *Bittern*, *Cygnets*, *Beacon*, *Condor*, and *Decoy* were each armed with three guns, and furnished with Gatling and Nordenfeldt guns, and with torpedo apparatus. The total force was 3539 men and 102 guns.


This formidable naval force was under the command of vice-admiral Sir Frederick Beauchamp Paget Seymour, who may be

called a veteran, since he was in his 61st year. He had entered the navy as a boy, and passed through the grades till he became commander of H.M.S. *Harlequin* in 1848. He was on the staff of General Godwin in the Burmese war in 1852, where he led the storming party of the Pegu Pagoda, and was afterwards appointed to the command of the *Meteor*. From 1868 to 1870 Sir Frederick was private secretary to the first lord of the admiralty, and was subsequently, from 1876 to 1879, in command of the Channel fleet and the Mediterranean squadron.

On the news of the arrival of the fleets the ministers had presented themselves to the khedive at the Ismailia Palace and made their submission. The French and English consuls proposed that the khedive should issue a decree proclaiming a general amnesty, and at the same time asked the president of the council, the minister of war, and the three military pashas to quit the country for a year. Arabi at first declined either to resign or to leave the country. Everybody believed that France and England would not despatch troops, and that France would not permit a Turkish intervention.

On the 20th of May the ministry resigned in a body, alleging that the khedive in accepting conditions from France and England had acquiesced in foreign interference, in violation of the firmans. Tewfik was bold (too late), he accepted the resignations, told the ministers that it was for him to arrange relations between himself and the sultan, and summoned the chief personages of state, members of the chamber, and merchants, with the superior officers of the Cairo garrison, to consider the situation. General Toulbeh at once told him that the army rejected the joint note, and only recognized the authority of the Porte. On the following day Arabi held a demonstration. The deposition of the khedive was proposed, but was negatived; but it was demanded that Arabi should be reinstated as minister of war, or the life of the khedive would not be safe.

The presence of the allied fleet at Alexandria seemed to increase the anxieties of the foreigners there. The Egyptian troops at once began to form batteries and earthworks, and within



ADMIRAL FREDERICK B. P. SEYMOUR, C.C.B.
 1ST BARON ALCESTER

ADMIRAL SEYMOUR WAS CHIEF OF THE BRITISH FLEET AT THE L. DEFEAT OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET AT THE BATTLE OF PORT ARTHUR, 1904-1905.



the city the feeling against Europeans was that of undisguised hostility. During twenty-four hours, from the 26th to the 27th of May, the town was in continual danger of being stormed by the soldiery, who actually had demanded and received cartridges to be used against Europeans. It was evident even then that a mistake had been made in not providing a sufficient force to land and protect the inhabitants of the city, for all the squadron could do was to silence the forts, and when they were destroyed the soldiers, smarting under defeat, would turn upon the Europeans.

Tewfik was powerless. Dervish Pasha's mission from the sultan was only to see whether he could reduce the khedive's authority still further, and gain an influence over the Egyptian army for the ultimate extinction of Arabi, when the Porte would hold the fate of Egypt in its hands. No ministry could be formed. Anarchy was really imminent; and the principal inhabitants of Cairo asked for the reinstatement of Arabi and his colleagues, to prevent, as they alleged, an insurrection and the slaughter of the Europeans.


Arabi then became sole dictator; and it cannot be denied that he had remarkable powers of administration and, in appearance, an earnestness and sympathy with his countrymen which led numbers of them to regard him as a patriot. Probably he was not destitute of those qualities which belong to the patriot who thinks that the well-being of his country depends upon its submission to his advice and authority. He ordered the Alexandria forts to be placed in a position for defence, and the soldiery began to work upon them day and night. Repeated orders that they should cease were issued by the khedive and the English admiral. For some time the remonstrances from the admiral were met by a denial that the men were so engaged, but this falsehood was discovered. Long lines of earth-works were erected to cover the entrance to the harbour, and a strong light suddenly thrown upon them from one of the vessels showed the men at work upon them by night. Arabi had drawn round Alexandria the principal regiments of the Egyptian army.

On the 11th of June the spark that caused the conflagration

fell. A riot broke out in the town, commencing with a street brawl between a Maltese and an Arab. This appeared to be the mere cover for the riot which the military conspirators had planned that they might attack the foreigners. An Arab gave the signal for a Mussulman rising, in which the rioters assaulted, wounded, and killed a great number of Europeans and pillaged their houses. Mr. Cookson, the British consul and judge, was dragged out of his carriage and severely injured, the Greek consul-general was attacked, and a French consular dragoman with several French and British subjects were killed. The total loss of life was variously estimated, but the largest number was said to be two hundred.

Some officers and men of the British squadron were among the victims; with some exceptions the troops and police held aloof till the mischief was done. There was no direct evidence that Arabi had a hand in these outrages, but he was the head of the party which instigated them. He was still regarded by numbers of his countrymen only as a patriot desiring the independence of Egypt from foreign control; but though some of his actions and the apparent personal observance of the engagements he made with Europeans to some extent bore out this assumption, his conduct was also explicable by referring it to native craft, and the sultan's open encouragement of him, added to his defiance of the demands of the western powers, made a reckoning inevitable.

The khedive and Dervish Pasha, accompanied by the European consuls-general, had hastened to Alexandria, leaving Arabi in supreme power at Cairo. The uneasiness of the Europeans increased with the violence of the Arabs. The dictator had been recognized by the sultan, who conferred on him the highest rank of the medjidie. It was uncertain whether the Porte intended to suborn him or to crush him. He was now openly preparing resistance at Alexandria and a raid on the Suez Canal. International jealousies were suspended. The conference met, and a protocol was signed by all the powers and intrusted to the western powers. Efforts were made to induce the Porte to act under strict limitations as mandatory of Europe.



MASSACRE AT ALEXANDRIA.

EUROPEANS RESISTING ATTACK AT CORNER OF SISTER STREET.

JUNE, 1882.



After the Alexandria massacre the European representatives had applied to Dervish Pasha, as the sultan's representative, to insure the protection of Europeans in Egypt. Dervish replied that neither he nor the khedive had the power to do so, and being without troops must decline the responsibility; it was then found necessary to apply to Arabi himself, who at once undertook to make the orders of the khedive respected. Then, strangely enough, Dervish Pasha was ready to share the responsibility with Arabi for the execution of the khedive's orders, and the suppression of the inflammatory addresses and publications, but the apprehensions of the Europeans were so little allayed that a general exodus had taken place, totally paralysing trade even, before the khedive and Dervish Pasha had left Cairo.

The delusive delays of the sultan kept up the uncertainty of the situation. France, it was pretty well known, would not intervene, and it was supposed that if Turkey did not consent, England would not act without support. Those who thought so did not know England. Arabi, as Mr. Gladstone said, had thrown off the mask, and was aiming at the deposition of the khedive and the expulsion of the Europeans. England had determined to act, if possible, with the authority of Europe, with the support of France and the co-operation of Turkey; but if necessary, alone. Alone she had to stand, for when it became necessary to proceed to active measures, the French squadron withdrew and went to Port Said. Alone she has had to continue those strenuous efforts which arose from conditions which none could foresee, and involved principles from the assertion of which, in the estimation of a large number of our countrymen, she could not honourably or consistently have shrunk. Alone she has, at all events, attempted (even if it has been mistakenly) to vindicate right and justice against fanatic lawless barbarism. Perhaps the attempt has resulted in serious material loss; but it has at least shown the world that England is not merely a name in Europe, and that her old renown for courage and endurance may yet be perpetuated. It has done more, for after all we have not stood alone. Men of the same race and breed came from the Antipodes and stood with us. Our brethren,

children of the mother country, in the great colony in which the men and women are English still, and recognize the empire that claims them and us together, unostentatiously joined our ranks when there was nothing to be gained by it, no material reward, few honours, little of what is called glory; and the arrival at Suakim of that phalanx of stalwart and efficient soldiers from New South Wales will never be forgotten, for the English in England have taken the event to heart.

In spite of broken pledges and orders from the khedive and the sultan, Sir Beauchamp Seymour reported that the works on the fortifications at Alexandria were still actively carried on, and it became necessary to act with decision. The admiral's remonstrances had been met by persistent denials and by evasive replies. On the 7th of July, he decisively intimated that he should not hesitate to commence a bombardment of the forts if his request was not complied with. Three days later he sent an ultimatum demanding the cessation of work on the fortresses, and the immediate surrender of those nearest to the entrance to the harbour. If these terms were not complied with in twenty-four hours the bombardment would commence. By that time most of the European inhabitants had embarked on board the ships which had been provided to receive them; and no satisfactory reply having been received from Arabi, the British ships at night-fall on the 10th began to take up positions for the attack.

July had opened threateningly, the state of tension at Alexandria was extreme, the irritation in the fleet at seeing the Egyptians throwing up batteries and mounting heavy guns under their very eyes grew hourly greater, while the Egyptians, confident in their numbers, in the strength of their forts, and in their fanaticism, had no doubt whatever of their power to repel any attack the fleet might make. They knew, too, of the preparations which England was making for war, and thus the outbreak of hostilities became hourly more imminent; still, when on the morning of Monday, July the 10th, the last of the European residents in Alexandria embarked on board ship, and Admiral Seymour sent in his ultimatum, people could hardly believe that a serious engagement

between the British fleet and the forts of Alexandria was about to commence.

Rarely has such a scene, as that which the harbours of Alexandria presented, been witnessed. The transition from peace to war is generally gradual, and long before a hostile fleet appears off a town which it intends to bombard, the harbour is deserted by shipping, the defenders are at their guns, and a broad space of water separates the parties about to engage in battle. But there was no such line of separation here; although already many of the merchant steamers had left, crowded with fugitives, there were many still in port.

Boats moved to and fro between them, the flags of the various nationalities flew from the peaks and mast-heads, the rolling masses of smoke from the funnels, the hoarse roar from the steam-pipes, the movements of the sailors as they prepared to cast off from their mooring-buoys, and the low thud of the propellers, as one after another the steamers glided slowly out from the harbour, all told of departure. But a departure, it would have been thought, on some distant expedition; no looker-on could have dreamt that all this life, and stir, and movement was but a prelude for a deadly conflict between the ships of war and the town, whose houses were reflected in the still water of the landlocked harbour.

There the population gathered on the now deserted walls, and gazed wonderingly at the departing ships. Groups of soldiers stood on the ramparts of the forts on the sand-hills between Fort Gabarrie and Fort Mex. Knots of women on the flat-topped roofs of the houses looked wonderingly at the scene. Even those most assured that hostilities were about to commence, could hardly credit their eyes, or believe that this peaceful spectacle would be succeeded by a tremendous struggle.

As the morning went on, the movement of departure accelerated. Scarce a breath of wind was blowing. The various ensigns drooped against the masts. The eastern sky was bright overhead. The deep blue of the sea was unbroken by a ripple. The white-clothed crews of the men-of-war were clustered in the rigging, and the decks of the merchant steamers were black with


the fugitives, who, as the vessels steamed out of harbour, gazed at the town, and in low tones chatted of what would happen to the houses, and stores, and possessions they had left behind.

There were still boats passing between the ships and the shore as the last lingerer put off. In some cases there was difficulty in getting on board. The two English engineers on board the tug *Champion* were seized by the Arab crew, and were being carried away, when the gun-boat *Bittern* started in pursuit and rescued them. The director of customs was stopped on his way, and taken, with the cash-box which was carried with him, before Arabi, who confiscated the cash, but allowed him to go on board.

Now the men-of-war of the various nationalities began to move out. These steamed out in regular squadrons, saluting as they passed the flagship of the English admiral, the bands playing the national airs, and, in the case of the Italian vessels and the American warship, the crews manning the rigging and cheering lustily, their greeting being heartily answered by our tars. There was less demonstration from the French vessels, for the officers and men were alike sore and humiliated. It was the quarrel of France as much as of England, and up to the last moment the crews had thought that in the approaching struggle they would fight side by side with us.

It was not until that morning that their admiral had received definite instructions from his government, that they were to draw off and take no part in the conflict. On board our own men-of-war all was preparation, for it was possible that at any moment Arabi might take the initiative, and might open a fire from all the forts commanding the harbour upon the men-of-war still within them. The men were at their quarters, the heavy guns were laid on the ports in readiness for instant action, the water-tight compartments closed, the topmasts struck, and sandbags piled on the upper battery-decks to protect the men working the Gatling guns and the rifle-men posted there.

At eleven o'clock the *Invincible*, *Monarch*, and *Penelope* moved out from the inner harbour and cast anchor in the outer harbour. At one o'clock a steam launch towing a large boat full of Egyptian



FLIGHT OF REFUGEES FROM ALEXANDRIA.

JUNE, 1882.



officials was seen approaching the flagship. It contained Raghed Pasha and other members of the ministry. They had an interview with the admiral, but on being told that a letter had been already sent on shore with a demand that the forts commanding the harbour should be immediately dismantled, they returned to confer with Arabi.

In the city a great commotion reigned, crowds of the better class of the inhabitants were leaving the town. The streets were full of an excited populace eager to commence the work of plunder from the deserted houses of the Europeans, but, so far, strong bodies of the Egyptian troops who paraded the streets checked any attempts at plundering. In the quarter inhabited by the Greeks and Levantines all was quiet. These people, for the most part fishermen, boatmen, and employés at the wharves and warehouses, did not care to leave, but, barricading themselves in their houses, awaited the result.

By three o'clock the whole of the vessels in the harbour, with the exception of the three English men-of-war, had left. Outside, facing the sea forts, from Fort Pharos to the breakwater, lay the *Téméraire*, *Alexandra*, *Superb*, *Sultan*, and *Inflexible*; while behind them were the gun-boats *Bittern*, *Decoy*, *Cygnets*, and *Condor*; and behind these again lay, as a background to the scene, a great fleet of steamers, men-of-war, and merchantmen, curious spectators of the tremendous struggle which was about to begin.

At nine o'clock at night the *Invincible* and *Monarch* quietly steamed out of harbour. All lights were extinguished and perfect quiet prevailed fore and aft, the screws scarcely revolved, for the greatest care was necessary. The entrance to the harbour is, even at daylight, extremely difficult for vessels with a large draft of water, doubly so at night, especially as the Egyptians had extinguished the harbour light, and the exact position of the ships could only be ascertained by the lights in the shore batteries.

It was an anxious time, for at any moment the guns in these batteries might open and a hail of shot and shell be poured upon the ships; while the slightest mistake in steering would lay them ashore, a target for the enemy's guns on the morrow. There was

a sigh of relief on board, prepared and ready as all were for the worst, when the difficult passage was passed and the vessels anchored outside.

It was now ten o'clock, and the crews at once turned in. At four in the morning steam was got up, and the crews were piped to quarters. At half-past four the ships got under weigh and quietly assumed the positions which had been marked out for them. As the light increased the scene became gradually visible. The *Penelope*, *Monarch*, and *Invincible* were facing Fort Mex and the other batteries on the sand-hills; the *Alexandra*, *Superb*, and *Sultan* were lying near each other, facing Forts Ada, Pharos, and Ras-el-Teen; while the *Téméraire* and *Inflexible* were steaming slowly towards the *Invincible* to aid her in her attack upon Fort Mex.

The *Penelope* and *Invincible* being broadside ships prepared to anchor, while the *Monarch*, being a turret vessel and having an all-round range for her guns, was to fight under steam. On shore, the Egyptians could be seen grouped round the guns in their batteries, and evidently prepared to resist. A grim satisfaction lit up the faces of the crews as the word was passed round that the Egyptians were going to fight, for the sailors had, up to the last moment, feared that when the time came the Egyptians would not reply, but would allow their forts to be destroyed without firing a shot in their defence.

At a quarter past five the *Helicon* despatch boat, which had remained alone in the harbour, was seen steaming out. As she approached she signalled that she had Egyptian officials on board. When she reached the flag-ship it appeared that the officers were bearing a letter from the ministry to the admiral deprecating hostilities and offering to dismount their guns. The admiral felt that, however willing the Egyptian ministry might be to agree to his demands, they were powerless in the face of the opposition of Arabi and the army. He replied, however, in writing, that his demand was not only that the guns should be dismounted, but the forts dismantled, and that an hour would be given for the receipt of a reply again to his demand. While the admiral was discussing

the matter in his cabin with the principal Egyptian official, the other Egyptian officers mingled and conversed with those of the *Invincible*. They acknowledged that they had no hope whatever that Arabi would give way, and that they looked forward to the approaching hostilities as the only means of settling the deadlock which prevailed on shore, and determining whether the khedive and his ministers or Arabi and his officers were to govern Egypt.

After the *Helicon* had steamed away to shore a pause ensued, the crews still stood at their quarters ready for action. Scarce a word was spoken on board the great ships, and the slow beat of the engines, the word of command to the helmsman, and the striking of the ships' bells alone broke the silence. At half-past six the order was passed round the decks, "Load with common shell!" Another half hour passed, and then at seven o'clock the signal was made to the *Alexandra* to open the engagement by firing a single gun.

The great puff of white smoke burst out from her side, and the heavy boom came across the water. Every eye was fixed on shore. There was a stir among the groups of soldiers at the guns of the various batteries, and it could be seen that they were hard at work loading for her reply; then the signal was run up for the whole fleet to engage the forts.

In an instant the roar of the cannon of the broadside-ships crashed out, with the still deeper boom of the heavy guns in the turrets; while from the ships near the shore arose a steady continuous tapping like the beating of a drum, which told that the Nordenfeldt guns were at work in the tops. In an instant the ships were shrouded in white smoke, which piled up higher and higher as the firing continued; there was scarce a breath of wind blowing, and the vast quantity of smoke produced by the immense charges of gunpowder used in the guns hung round the ships, completely impeding the view of the gunners, and well-nigh hiding the vessels themselves from the sight of their opponents on shore and the spectators in the great fleet of merchantmen.

In no way appalled by the mighty roar, by the howling of the huge shell smashing into ruin and splinters everything they struck,


or by the hail of bullets from the machine-guns in the tops, the Egyptian artillerymen returned the fire of the fleet with steadiness and resolution. The scene was grand in the extreme. For the first time since the introduction of what are now considered as heavy guns, ships and forts were engaged in conflict.

A great problem, hotly discussed for years by military and naval men, was at last in process of solution. Now was to be seen in actual practice what was the effect on buildings and forts, masonry and earthwork, of the enormous masses of iron discharged by the huge weapons which skill and science, aided by tremendously powerful machinery, had constructed. Now was to be proved whether earthworks on shore were, or were not, a match for the iron-clad sides of modern vessels of war.

Few more picturesque scenes could have been chosen for the solution of the problem. Facing the *Alexandra* and her consorts were the batteries of the Pharos or lighthouse of Fort Ada and of Ras-el-Teen. Behind the last-named was the palace of the khedive; in line with this, behind the other forts, were barracks and storehouses, every outline and angle showing hard and distinct in the clear air of an Egyptian morning; behind them rose gradually the mass of the city, with its flat roofs, its houses painted white, brown, pink, or yellow, according to the taste of their owners, with here and there a dome or minaret.

Away on the right, where the *Invincible* was engaging Fort Mex and the other batteries along the shore, the sand-hills rose from the water's edge, dotted here and there by white houses, and surmounted by numerous low windmills. The results of the fire were speedily visible, great gaps appeared in the masonry of the buildings, yawning cavities in the smooth sand at the foot of the batteries marked the spot where the huge shell had exploded, the embrasures through which the Egyptian guns were replying were torn and widened, and although this could not be seen from the ships, every wall and house facing the sea was marked and pitted with the hail from the machine-guns. It would have been thought by those looking on that it was scarcely possible for men to stand by their guns before such a fire as this, but the Egyptian artillery-

Scale of Miles.





men showed that whatever might be the value of Egyptian troops in the open field, they could fight their guns with a pluck and determination equal to that which the troops of any army in Europe could have displayed.

Around the ships the water was torn up by shot and shell, they hammered on the iron sides, hummed between the masts, and flew far out to sea, throwing up fountains of spray as they danced along the water before sinking. Fortunate was it for the fleet that the Egyptian artillerymen had had but little practice with the heavy Krupp guns which formed the chief part of the armaments of the forts. Had they done so the British ships could scarcely have maintained their position, but very few of their heavy bolts struck the vessels, most of them going overhead. The aim of the smaller guns was much more accurate, their shot striking the vessels continually, but falling innocuous from the iron sides.

A very few minutes after the firing began, the *Téméraire* grounded slightly, and the *Cygnet* and the *Condor* gun-boats went to assist her. She was soon afloat again, and the *Condor*, which was commanded by Lord Charles Beresford, then steamed away to engage Fort Marabout, which was assisting Fort Mex by keeping up a distant cannonade with her heavy guns upon the *Invincible* and her consorts. For a time the tiny gun-boat was the mark of all the heavy ordnance of the fort, but, steaming slowly backwards and forwards, she continued to send the shot from her seven-inch rifle-guns and her two sixty-four pounders into the fort. The *Cygnet*, *Decoy*, *Beacon*, and *Bittern* hastened away to aid the gallant little craft, and the signal, "Well done, *Condor*," was made by the admiral from the mast-head of the *Inflexible*.

The boom of the fire from fort and fleet was now continuous, the air quivered with the deep roar of the heavy guns, the hum of shot and shell, the rush of the rockets which the *Monarch* was firing, and the continuous angry rattle of the Nordenfeldts and Gatlings.


So dense was the smoke which clouded the ships that between each round of the heavy guns the sailors had to pause for a while

until it lifted and they were able to take aim again, the smoke again instantly shrouding the view and preventing them from seeing when the shot had struck. The midshipmen were placed in the tops where they were above the smoke, and whence they signalled to the deck the direction in which each shot had struck, thus enabling the sailors to correct their aim without seeing their target. By eight o'clock the *Monarch* had silenced a small fort opposed to her, set fire to the buildings and dismounted the guns, and she then joined the *Inflexible* and *Penelope* in their duel with Fort Mex.

By nine o'clock all the guns in that fort were silenced except four, two of which were heavy rifle guns well sheltered and handled, and the *Téméraire* was signalled to come up and aid the others in silencing them. The Egyptian officers could be seen whenever the smoke cleared away setting an example of coolness and courage to their men, jumping upon the parapets, and exposing themselves to the shots of the machine-guns to ascertain the effects of the fire. To the left the forts opposed to the *Inflexible*, *Sultan*, *Superb*, and *Alexandra* had soon begun to show the effects of the fire—the Pharos at the end of the point suffered most heavily, one of its towers was knocked down, its guns were absolutely silenced, while those of Fort Ada and Ras-el-Teen slackened considerably.

At half past ten the Ras-el-Teen or Harem Palace was discovered to be on fire, and in another hour the fire from the forts had all but subsided. The signal was therefore made to cease firing. As the smoke cleared away the effects of the five hours' artillery duel became visible. The shore presented a line of crumbling ruins, the forts were knocked out of all shape, yawning gaps showed themselves in the buildings behind them, guns could be made out lying dismounted or standing with their muzzles straight in the air.

The ships showed signs of the encounter in rigging cut away, yards damaged, splintered bulwarks, and dented sides. The *Penelope* had been seriously struck five times, and eight men wounded and one gun disabled; the *Invincible* had been struck many times, but only six shot had penetrated, she had six men wounded; the armour of the *Superb* had been penetrated, one man



BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA BY THE BRITISH FLEET.

VIEWED FROM THE LIGHTHOUSE BATTERY. 11TH JULY, 1882.



had been killed and one wounded; two of the *Alexandra's* guns were disabled, she had one killed and three wounded; the *Sultan* had two killed and seven wounded; the *Inflexible* had one killed and two wounded.

The ships during the afternoon kept up an occasional fire upon the forts to prevent the Egyptians from repairing damages. Now that there was less smoke their aim was much more accurate than before, several small magazines were exploded, and a shell from the *Inflexible* blew up a large one in Fort Ada and completed the ruin of that fort.

At one o'clock the admiral called for volunteers on board the *Invincible* to go on shore and destroy the guns in Fort Mex, which the fire of the ships had failed to dismount. The service was a dangerous one, for, although the fort was silenced and no man could be seen in the battery, any number of troops might have been lying behind ready to oppose a landing; there was, however, a rush of volunteers ready to undertake the enterprise. Twelve men were chosen, Lieutenant Bradford was in command, and Major Tulloch and Lieutenant Lambton accompanied him, the guns were loaded, and the men stood at the Nordenfeldts and Gatlings, ready to open fire to support their comrades should opposition be attempted.

The surf was heavy on the shore and a landing was impracticable. The boat, therefore, lay to off the shore, and Major Tulloch and a party swam ashore and made their way into the fort. It was found to be deserted. The havoc wrought by the fire of the guns was so terrible and complete that the masonry was torn and shattered in all directions. Most of the guns were dismounted and their carriages smashed. Numbers of dead, shattered and torn by the explosion of the shells, or pierced by the fire from the machine-guns, lay about in all directions.

Two ten-inch guns were found still in position. Charges of gun-cotton, which had been brought ashore by the swimmers, were exploded in them, bursting them at the muzzle and rendering them unfit for service; the party then swam off again to the boat, and returned on board the *Inflexible*. Although the fire of the enemy

had been silenced, there were no signs of surrender on the part of the Egyptians, and when day closed the fleet prepared to resume the action in the morning. Fort Marabout and several of the batteries on the shore had still to be silenced. Forts Pharos, Ada, and Ras-el-Teen were mere heaps of ruins, but two heavy guns in a battery near the last named had continued throughout the day to reply steadily in spite of all the efforts of the fleet to silence them.

These guns were mounted on the Moncrieff system, being mounted on platforms, which, when the gun was ready for firing, rose to the level of the parapet, sinking again the instant it was discharged; the pieces, therefore, were entirely protected from fire, unless struck by a chance shot during the few seconds they were exposed above the battery. In the morning, however, the wind rose and a long heavy swell got up, the iron-clads rolling heavily at their anchorage. At eight o'clock the admiral summoned the captains of the ships of war on board the *Invincible*, and it was agreed to postpone the bombardment, as, with the vessels rolling so heavily, accuracy of aim would be impossible, and the shots might fly high and damage the town, which it was particularly desired to avoid.

At half-past ten the *Téméraire* signalled that parties could be seen at work at the Moncrieff battery, and asking whether fire should be opened upon them. An affirmative signal was made, and the *Inflexible* and *Téméraire* opened fire. Only six rounds of shot and shrapnel shell were fired when the Egyptians were seen running back to the shelter of the buildings behind the battery, and a few minutes later a white flag was hoisted at the Pharos.

Lieutenant Lambton was ordered to go inside with the *Bittern* to inquire if the government was ready to come to terms. His return was awaited with great anxiety by the fleet, for all were most anxious to know what was passing inside the town. Not only had the Ras-el-Teen Palace burned all night, but the flames of a great conflagration in the heart of the town rose high in the air, and as this fire could be made out to be in or near the European quarter, the numerous refugees on board the merchant steamers

were full of anxiety respecting the fate of their houses and property.

At three o'clock the *Bittern* steamed out again, and Lieutenant Lambton reported that his mission had been fruitless, the white flag, indeed, had been only hoisted by the officer in command of the troops, who had retired on the ships opening fire, in order to enable himself and his men to get away unmolested. As the *Bittern* had steamed in large bodies of troops were seen evacuating the barracks behind the forts.

Lieutenant Lambton found that the ministers had no proposals of any kind to make. He informed them that we did not consider ourselves at war with Egypt, but had simply destroyed the forts which threatened our fleet, and that we had no conditions to impose upon the government, but were ready to discuss any proposals they might make to us. Loufti Pasha, the military governor, had conducted the interview on the part of the government; he had been in command of the troops on the previous day, and admitted that they had suffered very heavily from the effects of the fire.

Lieutenant Lambton informed him, on the part of the admiral, that should he agree to the occupation of the forts by our troops the Egyptians would be allowed to evacuate them with the honours of war. As Loufti could give no definite reply whatever, the *Bittern* returned to the fleet. The sea had now got up so much that the bombardment could not be resumed. A few shots only were fired and the fleet then waited for the sea to subside. While the *Bittern* was absent the *Achilles* arrived and took up her position with the fleet ready for the recommencement of hostilities. News, too, came by telegraph that the *Orontes* with marines had arrived at Malta, and she was at once ordered to come on with all speed.

Had a regiment or two of troops been available they could have been landed at once, and in that case a great part of the terrible destruction which took place in Alexandria would have been averted. Unfortunately, the admiral had no such force under his command, and, in face of the large body of troops commanded by Arabi, and

the hostile population of the town, which was still protected by a number of land batteries, could not venture upon landing until the enemy gave some signs of surrender. At five o'clock a shell from the *Invincible* set Fort Mex on fire, and a few minutes later a white flag was hoisted there.

The *Helicon* was sent in from the authorities stating that the admiral would not notice white flags unless hoisted by authority, and that if again flown he should consider them as signs of a general surrender, and should act accordingly.

As the evening approached, fires were seen to break out in other quarters of the town, a dense pall of smoke hung over the city, and, as darkness fell, the whole place was lit up with the lurid light of the flames. The greatest anxiety was felt on board the fleet, for it was feared that Arabi had determined to destroy the city entirely, and the unfortunate refugees and merchants on board the steamers were distracted at the total ruin which appeared to await them. The *Helicon*, after being absent for a considerable time, returned with the news that no communication had been opened by the enemy, that the barracks and arsenal were deserted, and, as far as could be seen, the whole town evacuated.

The conflagration became more and more terrible, fresh fires continually breaking out, and it was no longer possible to doubt that the mob were plundering and burning the city, and that all the Europeans remaining there were being massacred. Admiral Seymour determined to make an attempt to ascertain the position of affairs. The steam pinnacle of the *Invincible* was lowered, and Lieutenant Forsyth with an armed crew started up the harbour. Mr. Ross, one of the contractors for the supply of the fleet with meat, volunteered to accompany it and to land. As he was thoroughly acquainted with the city, the offer was accepted, and the boat put off.

It was a strange journey for the little craft up the harbour; the ships of the fleet were no longer in sight, the harbour was dark and deserted, not a light was to be seen in the houses near the water, not a sound to be heard on the shore. As the pinnacle

proceeded on her way, her screw being occasionally stopped to enable those on board to listen for sounds which might tell of the presence of the enemy, a faint, roaring, crackling sound could be heard from the spot where, in the background, great sheets of flame were leaping up.

Louder and louder rose the sounds as the pinnacle proceeded up the harbour. Now the dull crash of falling walls and roofs rose above the roar of the flames, but still no signs of human presence were manifest. On nearing the wharf the pinnacle lay still for a minute or two, and then, as all was quiet, steamed up and Mr. Ross jumped on shore, and the boat backed on for a few yards, and there lay, the men musket or rifle in hand in case an attack should come. A quarter of an hour passed slowly, then a footfall was heard, the screw moved again, and, as the bow touched the wharf, Mr. Ross leapt on board, and they steered out again for the fleet. The explorer reported that he had met no living soul, that quarter of the town was entirely deserted; he had pushed on until his further advance was arrested by a barrier of flames.

The great square was on fire from end to end, the European quarter generally was in flames, and looking down the burning streets he could see by the litter which strewed the roadway that the houses had been plundered before being fired. The news excited the greatest indignation on board the fleet. Under the cover of the flags of truce, which had arrested the action of the fleet, Arabi had unmolested carried out the evacuation of the town and the destruction and ruin of the European quarter. Not only was the destruction of property enormous, but the gravest fears were entertained for the lives of the Europeans who had remained in the city.

Nothing could be done that night but to watch the ever-increasing conflagration, and to discuss the fate of the European population on shore, and the situation which had been created by the retreat of Arabi. Before daybreak boats were sent on shore, and it was found that all the forts had been evacuated. As soon as it was light, a number of persons were seen gathered by the

edge of the water in the harbour, and telescopes soon showed that these were Europeans. The boats of the nearest men-of-war were lowered and rowed to shore, the crews being armed to the teeth. They found about a hundred Europeans gathered on the wharf, many of these were wounded.

On the previous day, when rioting had broken out, they had, according to previous agreement, assembled at the Anglo-Egyptian bank, which was a strongly-constructed building, and there, through the afternoon and later on into the night, they had defended themselves desperately and successfully against the attack of the mob. As the evacuation of the city had proceeded, the assailants had drawn off, and they had towards morning made their way through the now deserted streets down to the water.

They reported that Arabi, before he left with the troops, had opened the gates of the prisons, and the convicts, joined by the lower class of the town and by the Arabs, who had for some days been hovering round the place ready to take their share in the plunder, had proceeded to sack the city, to kill every Christian they could find, and to set fire to the European quarter. From their post at the bank they could hear the sounds of shrieks and cries, and the crack of rifles and pistols. Numbers of wretched fugitives, trying to make their way to the bank, were cut down or beaten to death before their eyes, and they believed that they themselves were the sole survivors of the European population.

This, however, turned out not to be the case, as in some of the streets inhabited by the Maltese and Levantines these had barricaded their houses, and had opposed so desperate a resistance that the mob, knowing that little plunder was to be obtained there, had drawn off from the attack, and had retired to sack the wealthier portions of the town, where booty was to be obtained in abundance for the carrying away. Several fresh fires were seen to break out in the town, and, as this was a proof that a portion of the lower class of the population still remained and were continuing their work of plunder, the ships of war, which had hitherto been most careful to avoid firing at the town, now sent shells wherever flames

were seen to arise, in order to scare the ruffians from their work of destruction. This appeared to have a good effect, as from the time the firing began no fresh conflagration was seen to break out. The party of Europeans brought off from the shore were taken in the ships' boats to the merchant steamers lying behind the fleet, when their narratives confirmed the worst fears of the fugitives there, and destroyed the last hope that remained that their houses and property had escaped destruction.

The *Invincible*, *Monarch*, and *Penelope* now steamed into the inner harbour. From the tops people could be seen moving about plundering and setting fire to houses. The three ships could only land a contingent of three hundred men for shore service, and the admiral determined to land them, although the risk was unquestionably great, as the fugitives reported that Arabi with nine thousand men was lying just outside the gate in readiness to enter and destroy any force that might be landed from the ships. Virtually, however, nothing was done to check the work of destruction until eleven A.M. the next day (the 14th), when the rest of the fleet entered the harbour, and a party of blue-jackets were landed and took possession of Ras-el-Teen Palace. At noon two of the khedive's aides-de-camp came in from Ramleh Palace to say that the khedive was there with three hundred soldiers and was in considerable danger. By the orders of Arabi the palace had been surrounded by Toulbeh Bey with two cavalry and one infantry regiment. A party of armed soldiers entered the khedive's apartment and declared that they had orders to kill him and then burn the palace. By dint of lavish promises and money a portion of the force were bought over, and these escorted the khedive and Dervish Pasha to the Ras-el-Teen Palace, where they arrived at four o'clock in the afternoon. The khedive was received by a force of five hundred blue-jackets and marines, and the Egyptian escort were not allowed to enter the palace.

The arrival of the khedive was a great relief to the British admiral. Hitherto the position had been most anomalous. We were not at war with Egypt, for we were indeed fighting the khedive's battle against Arabi and the party which defied his

authority, and we had bombarded the forts of Alexandria because these forts threatened our ships; but the khedive and his government had declared neither for nor against us. We had, previous to opening fire, negotiated with the government, and not with Arabi direct; but the government, really incapable of enforcing its orders upon Arabi, puzzled and bewildered at the singular situation which had been created, had contented itself by returning evasive answers.

To bombard the forts which threatened us without being at war with the country in which they were situated was a singular proceeding; but it would have been a step further in the same anomalous course, had we landed and occupied Alexandria without permission from any authority, and simply on the plea of humanity. There would, indeed, have been plenty of precedents for such action. In the disturbances, revolts, and military *émutes* which are constantly breaking out in communities like the petty republics of South America, it is no unusual thing for marines and sailors to be landed from European ships of war, which may happen to be in the harbour, to protect the lives and property of the European inhabitants. But such action in Egypt, a country in which there had been for years an extreme rivalry and jealousy between ourselves and France, was a more delicate matter.

Up to the time when the messenger arrived it was not known what had become of the khedive, whether he had fallen a victim to the troops or had been carried off by Arabi to be used as a puppet by him. His safe arrival at the palace put an end to all the difficulties; he became, in fact, our puppet, instead of that of Arabi, and henceforth our operations were conducted nominally by his orders or on his behalf. It was then by his authority that we at once landed the troops and began to suppress the disorders. A strong body of sailors and marines advanced into the town, carefully feeling their way, for nothing authentic was known as to the proceedings or position of Arabi.

A good many natives caught in the very act of pillaging and burning were at once shot, but nevertheless fresh fires continued to break out in various parts of the town. The scene in the city

was terrible. The grand square was entirely destroyed; all the houses in the European quarter, without an exception, had been plundered, and most of them were burning fiercely. The streets were almost impassable from the ruins of fallen houses, and from the heaps of litter of all kinds, smashed furniture, bedding, merchandise, clothes, boxes, in fact, the entire contents of the houses, save the articles carried away by the plunderers.

The troops had the greatest difficulty in making their way along. The streets were thick with smoke, and as they advanced, the plunderers could be seen issuing from the houses and making their way off laden with spoil. Several parties of fugitives had during the day made their way down to the wharves, and as the troops advanced, windows and doors were opened and many Greeks and Italians, with their families, came out and greeted the rescuers with tears of joy and gesticulations of enthusiastic welcome. For four days these poor people had been expecting instant destruction. Many had become insane from the long reign of terror.

Numbers of bodies of murdered Europeans were found in the streets. Fort Napoleon and the other land forts were soon occupied and the guns spiked, for the force was too small to hold them, and had Arabi's troops returned, they could from them have shelled the city. The American fleet had now entered the harbour, and the naval officer in command, moved by the terrible scene of destruction, took upon himself, without orders from home, the responsibility of aiding us in restoring order, and landed a hundred and twenty-five men to assist us. It was by this time known that Arabi had retired with his army to the neck of land connecting the line of sand-hills forming the sea-coast with the land, having on one side Lake Mareotis and on the other the Lake of Aboukir, and there encamped on the line of the railway and the fresh-water canal at a distance of ten miles from the city.

The Rosetta gate of Alexandria, through which the road in that direction passed, was guarded at night by a strong force under Major Phillips. By eleven o'clock at night all the members of the khedive's government, with the exception of Arabi, were assembled

in the palace of Ras-el-Teen, and the ministry nominally resumed their functions as the governing body of Egypt. In the course of the day all the guns in the sea batteries had been spiked or burst, and the officers of the fleet were able to ascertain the exact result of the fire of the ships. It was found to have been even greater than had been anticipated, the forts were in a complete state of ruin, the strongest walls had crumbled into dust before the explosion of the great shells.

In the first battery entered, the ground was torn up, the wall shattered, and the whole place dismantled. One of the two ten-inch rifle guns which it contained had been dismounted, the gun having been tilted backwards, making a complete somersault, crushing as it fell several of the artillerymen. It was an Armstrong gun, and its shot had struck the *Alexandra* several times before it was silenced. Numbers of dead were found in the batteries, which all presented a scene of havoc and destruction as complete as that which was first entered. The Egyptians had themselves dug deep pits in the rear of their batteries, and most of the dead had been thrown by them into these as they fell. Upwards of 400 of the Egyptians had fallen in Forts Pharos, Ada, and Ras-el-Teen.

On Saturday, the 15th, the work of suppressing the marauders began in a methodical manner. Captain Fisher, R.M., who had been placed in command of the town and forts, left the palace with a strong force of sailors, with four Gatling guns, and marched right round and through the city and reinforced the posts at the gates. At Fort Gabarrie Midshipman Stracey, who was in command, reported that during the night an armed body of Bedouins had approached the fort; they were challenged, and shots were fired; two of them were killed and the rest fled, leaving their booty behind them.

At the Rosetta gate the guard observed a party of Egyptian soldiers plundering the adjacent houses. When challenged the soldiers fired a volley; the marines on guard replied and killed four of the plunderers, the rest fled. At other posts it was found that some thirty men had been arrested for plundering during the night. These were afterwards flogged, the order being now

issued that all plunderers were to be flogged, and that incendiaries caught in the act were to be shot.

Lord Charles Beresford had been appointed to the command of the police arrangements of the town, having a strong marine force under his orders, together with three hundred disarmed Egyptian soldiers. Large numbers of the Arab population were also set to work in clearing away the ruins. Fire-engines, and two steam-engines belonging to the town, were set to work; and Lord Beresford used dynamite and powder to blow up the houses and arrest the progress of the flames. While Major Fisher's column was passing round the walls another force two hundred strong, under Major Phillips, landed at Ras-el-Teen, and moved towards the centre of the town.

Passing through the native quarter, which was found untouched either by shot or flames, but few of the inhabitants were seen in the streets. Each of these displayed a white handkerchief tied to a small stick. As the governor's quarters were passed half a dozen soldiers turned out; each wore a red ribbon tied on his arm, this having been adopted as the sign of allegiance to the khedive. The governor himself came out and greeted Major Phillips with a humility and deference which formed a very strong contrast to the arrogant insolence which, during the negotiations, he had displayed to the English officer with whom he then came in contact.

The column next passed through one of the low Christian quarters. Here they had to pick their way often in single file, the narrow street being bordered on each side by smouldering ruins, and the roadway strewn with rubbish of all kinds, the remains of the loot. They then entered what had been the great square; the equestrian statue of Mohammed Ali still stood in the centre, and behind it rose the Palais de Justice. The fountains still played in the centre of the garden. Along both sides and one end of the square the ruin was complete. Volumes of smoke still rose from behind the façades of the houses, bleached white by the intense heat to which they had been exposed; there were great gaps in this line of skeleton walls, where the whole face of the houses had fallen across the road.

A horrible smell of burning flesh from time to time assailed the nostrils of the party, and told of bodies of murdered Europeans upon whom the heated walls had fallen. Many trembling Europeans came out from the houses to inquire if the danger was over. Several Arabs were found looting and were taken prisoners. In spite of the patrols by the troops, fresh fires continued to break out; these were, many of them, in the native quarter, the Arabs appearing to take this opportunity of wreaking their spite against those with whom they had private quarrels. There no longer remained any doubt that the work of burning and spoliation had been carried out by the troops of Arabi, under the instigation of his officers.

On the 17th the *Tamar* with the marines, and the *Agincourt* and *Northumberland* with the 38th Regiment and the third battalion of the 60th Rifles arrived. Sir Archibald Alison also arrived from England, and his small contingent was allowed to land, but there were at present no hostilities with the army of Arabi. Captain Maude with a small escort of the khedive's cavalry made a reconnaissance to within half a mile of Arabi's outworks. His army was found to be strongly posted on the neck of land between the two lakes. Politically the situation was most singular; the members of the government were all creatures of Arabi. From the palace of Ras-el-Teen telegraph wires extended along the line of railway which ran through Arabi's camp, and a constant exchange of communication was kept up between the rebel leader and his friend the minister of the khedive.

Tewfik had ordered Arabi to come in to Alexandria, but the command was of course disobeyed. The English admiral pressed the khedive to declare Arabi a rebel. This was of great importance, as it was of the utmost necessity that the population of Egypt should be made to understand that the war was being made, not upon Arabi as the leader of the Egyptian army and the representative of the cause of Egypt, but against Arabi acting in defiance of the authority of the khedive and his government.

The khedive, however, could not be induced to issue the proclamation. Surrounded as he was by Arabi's friends, and wholly uncertain as to the length which England was prepared to go to

uphold him in power, he feared to break altogether with the party of which Arabi was the leader. The influence of Arabi's party with the population was far greater than had been believed; the majority of the people of Egypt viewed him as their champion, they regarded the khedive as a prisoner in the hands of the English, and his proclamations as emanating from them rather than from him. Arabi was the champion and defender of Egypt, and Tewfik a prisoner and tool of the English; any proclamations that the latter might issue against the former, therefore, weighed nothing in their minds.

Order was by this time restored in the town. Several frays had taken place between the Greeks and the native population, the former, finding themselves now safe, indulging in retaliations upon the natives, several of whom were stabbed; and the proceedings were only stopped by the execution of two Greeks who were taken red-handed in the act of murder. Much alarm was caused by the report, which turned out to be correct, that Arabi intended to cut the fresh-water canal, upon which the city almost entirely depended for its supply of water.

Directions were issued that all the wells in the city should be cleaned out and made available, that the cisterns should be all filled, and water stored wherever practicable. A daring effort was made by some of the native engine-drivers on the railway to make off with several engines and a number of carriages and trucks to Arabi, to whom they would have been of the greatest utility in bringing up troops or supplies from the interior. Fires were got up, and the trains were actually in motion when the attempt was fortunately found out, and the drivers stopped and arrested. A strong guard was placed in the railway depot to prevent any repetition of the attempt. The shops gradually opened, and the country people began to bring in supplies. The rubbish was so far cleared away in the principal street as to admit of passage along the centre. The refugees from on board the ships were landed, and those who were fortunate enough to find their houses still standing, although with everything in them smashed or destroyed, began the work of rendering them again habitable.

Had the line regiments, marines, and sailors marched at once against Arabi, there can be no doubt that they would easily have defeated his dispirited army; but the reluctance of our government to commence actual hostilities caused delay, which enabled him to regain the prestige which he had lost in the country from having been driven from Alexandria, and allowed him to strongly fortify his position, to bring up heavy artillery, and to add immensely to his army.


For some time after the bombardment of Alexandria Cairo and the rest of Egypt remained quiet watching events. It was only when it was found that the English remained apparently inactive shut up within the walls of Alexandria, that the belief in the star of Arabi revived, and the whole country again threw in its lot with him.

END OF VOL. I.

THE WAR
IN
EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.









GENERAL GARNET JOSEPH WOLSELEY, G.C.B.

1ST VISCOUNT WOLSELEY.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN EGYPT, IN 1882.
 REPRODUCED FROM THE PHOTOGRAPH BY J. & A. WHITTAKER.





THE WAR IN EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN

AN EPISODE IN
THE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE;

BEING
A DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF THE SCENES AND EVENTS OF THAT GREAT DRAMA,
AND SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS IN IT.

BY
THOMAS ARCHER, F.R.H.S.,
AUTHOR OF "FIFTY YEARS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROGRESS,
"PICTURES AND ROYAL PORTRAITS," ETC.

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THE WAR

IN

EGYPT AND THE SOUDAN.

CHAPTER IV.

Calling out the Reserves. British Forces sent to Egypt. Sir Archibald Alison. Reconnaissance. Skirmishing. Arabi's Camp. Events in Alexandria and the District. Arrival of the Guards. Duke of Connaught. Lord Wolseley. Suez. Port Said. Ismailia. The Suez Canal. Conduct of M. de Lesseps. The Struggle. Fight at Kassassin. Battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Opinion in England, France, and Italy. Defeat of Arabi. His Trial and Sentence.

IN spite of the protests of M. Gambetta and his friends, the French government still hesitated to follow the English initiative. The majority of the chamber, shrinking from intervention, which it was supposed might be prejudicial to French interests in Tunis, gave a hostile vote on M. de Freycinet's demand for funds to provide for the protection of those interests in the Suez Canal. England was still left to act alone; the powers did not interfere; the delays at the Porte as to entering the conference and settling the terms of military co-operation left English policy practically unfettered. The despatch of an expeditionary force to secure British interests and to restore order was resolved upon with scarcely a show of opposition, though Mr. Bright, who had sanctioned the despatch of the fleet to Alexandria, left the cabinet on the ground that he could not consistently promote further intervention. Mr. Gladstone asked on the 24th of July for a vote of credit for £2,300,000, which he proposed to meet by an increase of the income-tax. The vote was passed, and consent to the employment of an Indian contingent was also granted. The prime minister denied that Arabi was a national leader, and charged the ruin of Egypt upon "lawless military violence, aggravated by

wanton and cruel crime." The war office and the admiralty prepared for the campaign with unusual energy and promptitude. It was impossible, however, to crush Arabi at once; the insurgent army, encouraged by the delay, threatened Alexandria, the khedive, and Sir A. Alison's force.

On July 25th a message from the queen called out the first Army Reserves. On the 27th the first instalment, consisting of the royal marines, left Portsmouth, and before the end of the month the guards had sailed from London, and by August 15th two divisions, each divided into two brigades of infantry, and cavalry, and artillery, were on their way. A staff corps of the three squadrons of the household cavalry, two regiments of dragoons with artillery and other reserves, a siege train, commissariat, transport, and medical department, were despatched from this country. The nominal force conveyed to Egypt from England, and irrespective of the troops, British and native, ordered from the garrisons in the Mediterranean or brought from India, was given in the official return as follows:—Cavalry, 118 officers, 2174 sabres, and 2006 horses; artillery, 56 officers, 1514 men, 1214 horses; engineers, 30 officers, 876 men, 222 horses; infantry, 270 officers, 6958 rank and file; medical, transport, and commissariat branches, 38 officers, 1384 men. These were the preparations made for retaking Egypt for the khedive. The troops despatched from India were two English battalions, the 1st Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Manchester, two Bengal and one Bombay battalions of native infantry, with one 9-pounder field-battery and one mountain-battery, each of six guns, and three regiments of Bengal cavalry with some sappers and miners from Madras. The force was accompanied by about 3500 followers, including transport drivers, 1700 horses, 840 ponies, and nearly 5000 mules, some regimental and others for general transport purposes. They carried with them a month's provision for the sea-voyage, and three months' for the land-campaign. The first battalion despatched from India was the 1st Seaforth Highlanders, which left Bombay on the 22d of July, and landed at Suez on the 8th of August; the rest of the force received their orders about July 24th, and began

to leave Bombay on August 5th. The bulk of the Indian contingent arrived in the Canal by degrees, while the operations for securing the base at Ismailia were in progress. The total of all troops from England, the Mediterranean, and India amounted to 40,560 officers and men of all ranks for the expeditionary force. Sir Archibald Alison was the first general officer to reach the seat of operations. He had been sent out with the advanced guard of the army, and was in command at Alexandria, having reached the city when he had only a small force at his disposal, while the town was still burning, and the insurgent populace had to be held at bay at the same time that the army of Arabi was outside the gates. Sir Archibald, who was afterwards in command of the Highland Brigade, had with him the 60th, now the King's Royal Rifles, and the South Staffordshire Regiment; he had also a fine battalion of marines and a large force of sailors. His first act was to push out reconnaissances in all directions to discover the whereabouts and the strength of the insurgent forces. In these duties an iron-clad train, invented by Captain Fisher and manned by sailors, did very important service; the railroad being the only practicable road towards the east, where it was subsequently found that Arabi was entrenching himself in force at Kafr-Dowar.

There was no longer any mistake about his intention or ours. Other massacres had taken place in other places, and it was necessary that we should pursue the work we had undertaken with prompt vigour. At this stage skirmishes and outpost engagements were of almost daily occurrence along an extended line, having the result, at all events, of retaining some 20,000 Egyptian troops in position, instead of permitting them to scatter over the country, and thus indefinitely to prolong the war.

The first skirmish took place on the 22d, when 300 rifles under Colonel Ashburnham went six miles out by rail in support of a small body of mounted infantry under Captain Sutton. After the train halted, the mounted infantry went six miles further until they encountered some fifty of Arabi's cavalry. A few shots were exchanged on both sides, and the mounted infantry then returned, after pulling up several rails to break the line of the railroads.

A peasant whom they found at the furthest point they reached reported that Arabi was receiving great reinforcements, and that he had upwards of a hundred cannon. His position at Kafr-Dowar was unquestionably exceedingly strong; the ground in front was flooded, its flanks were covered by the canal and lake, and his men were at work entrenching the positions.

On the same evening a body of his infantry and cavalry, with a gun, advanced as far as the water-works, within a mile of Ramleh, and reconnoitred that neighbourhood. A large body of his troops were also seen reconnoitring the country towards Aboukir. On the evening of the 23d the *Malabar* arrived with the 46th Regiment and a wing of the 38th, and Admiral Seymour, thus reinforced, determined at once to move out and occupy Ramleh, a position of the greatest importance. Standing as it does at the northern end of the spit between Lake Mareotis and Aboukir, its possession effectually prevented Arabi from taking the offensive against Alexandria. Moreover, at Ramleh were the water-works which supplied the city, a palace of the khedive, and a large number of houses belonging to the European merchants of the city, Ramleh being indeed the summer suburb of the better class of residents in Alexandria.

The fresh-water canal sweeps round at the foot of the sandhills of Ramleh, and is spanned by only one bridge, the swing-bridge of the railway. This bridge Arabi had not destroyed, intending no doubt to return and complete the destruction of Ramleh. At an early hour of the 24th a wing of the 60th Rifles and a squadron of mounted infantry, taking with them a Gatling-gun and a light field-gun, advanced to Ramleh. The mounted infantry were in the advance, and after reconnoitring the place and finding it unoccupied by the enemy, they placed vedettes along the canal. When the rifles came up parties were posted along the canal, and a company took possession of the railway bridge.

The enemy had by this time discovered the approach of our troops, and a body of the enemy's cavalry were seen galloping along the line of railway towards the canal. When they were within five hundred yards of the bridge the rifles fired a volley, but

their aim was so bad that only one horse was hit. The cavalry turned and rode back for some distance and halted out of rifle range, while some of the party galloped to Arabi's camp with the news of our presence.

Ere long two guns were seen approaching from Arabi's camp. These at once unlimbered and opened fire with shell. Our men replied with their rifles. The enemy's fire was by no means effective, the shells for the most part singing over the heads of our troops, while, so far as we could see, the fire of our rifles was in no way more deadly. The scene from the top of the water-works hill was exceedingly pretty. Behind lay the sea with the magnificent vessels of war scattered along the coast watching Aboukir forts and other points. In front was the low flooded country, with palm-trees rising above the morning mist, which still lay over the flat, with the tiny puffs of smoke spurting out from the side of the broad canal at our feet, and the larger wreaths rising from Arabi's guns.

In the distance the smoke of locomotives was visible; and as it was probable that Arabi might be bringing up reinforcements, the general flashed a heliograph message for additional troops. The rise from which the general was viewing the scene was the highest ground within a radius of ten miles from Alexandria, and is memorable for the fact that Sir Ralph Abercromby used it as his headquarters at the battle of Alexandria.

At nine o'clock the fire ceased, and soon afterwards a portion of the 46th Regiment who had just landed from the *Malabar*, arrived by train with two 9-pounder guns, one from the *Sultan*, the other from the *Alexandra*, with parties of sailors to work them. The troops were now set to work to fortify the position, the bridge was stockaded, rifle-pits were dug, and entrenchments thrown up. Arabi, however, made no advance, but from the hills the glitter of bayonets and the white cotton uniforms of a large body of his troops could be seen in advance of his position, while swarms of figures moving about actively behind them showed that he, on his part, was entrenching his end of the neck. Thus the rival forces were now fairly face to face, within artillery range of each other.

Late in the afternoon six 40-pounders, brought out by the *Malabar*, were taken by rail to Ramleh, and placed in position on the heights. Their fire completely commanded the neck of sand between the two positions, and they could, indeed, have easily plumped shell into the middle of the camp of Arabi himself. The work of getting them into their place was severe, as they had to be dragged by hand over the loose sandy soil thickly mixed with pebbles. Long cables were attached to them, and every available man lent his aid. It took two days before the four 40-pounders, the two light guns, and two Gatlings were fairly in position in the battery on the sandhills.

The face of the hill was lined with sheltered trenches, and was now in a position to resist an attack by the whole force of the enemy. The 60th Rifles and the 38th Regiment were quartered in the palace and barrack, a short distance in rear of the hill. There was still a good deal of looting carried on in Ramleh.

The troops from Aboukir forts made their way along the shore at night and sacked deserted houses, and were aided in their work by parties of wandering Bedouins. The position of the Aboukir forts was anomalous. The troops there were known to have joined Arabi, and bodies of men were seen constantly moving between them and his camp. The fleet could easily have silenced these forts and driven out the garrison, as from the fortifications of Alexandria; but they were restrained by orders from home, the fiction being still maintained that Arabi and his army were simply mutineers against the khedive, and that we were only at Alexandria to protect the lives and property of the European population there.

In the afternoon of the 25th Sir Archibald Alison and his staff rode forward along the road of railway, a few yards beyond the canal. The enemy were on the alert, for from the heights a line of white specks could at once be seen moving forward, while parties of cavalry advanced on their flanks. As there was no intention to bring on an engagement the general retired on their approach.

On the morning of the 28th Arabi in turn made a reconnais-

sance, the enemy's vedettes advancing to within five hundred yards of our outpost. They were driven back by a volley from our piquets, as were a body of cavalry who afterwards reconnoitred on our side of the channel. The khedive sent the Egyptian corvette *Shackha* to Aboukir with two officers to communicate to the garrison of the forts the khedive's proclamation declaring Arabi a rebel.

The two officers approached the shore in a cutter, escorted by the pinnacle of the *Minotaur*, which was lying at anchor watching the forts. When they arrived within speaking distance, the khedive's officers addressed the officers and the men on the walls of the forts, promising a full amnesty on their submission. They then began reading the proclamation, but an officer on the ramparts shouted to them that unless they retired at once fire would be opened upon them, and they therefore rowed back to their ship.

From the tops of the *Minotaur* trains were seen arriving behind the forts with large reinforcements, while large numbers of men were at work mounting guns and in preparing for defence. For some days Captain Fisher, R.E., with the assistance of Lieutenant Poore, had been at work constructing an iron-clad train, similar to those used by the Americans during their civil war—and already referred to. It consisted of six trucks protected with iron shields, the engine being in the centre, a Nordenfeldt gun looked over the bows of the leading truck, three Gatlings over the stern of the last truck, two field-guns were carried in one of the other wagons, and later on a heavy siege-gun was also mounted. Breast-works of sand-bags ran round the side of the trucks. The train was manned by two companies of the *Alexandra* blue-jackets and one company of those of the *Inflexible*. It was provided with mines, electric batteries, and appliances for taking up or destroying the line of railway, and was intended for making reconnaissance towards Arabi's camp, or to support any body of troops advancing in that direction.

Sir Archibald Alison himself, speaking at a banquet held in his honour at Glasgow after his return (in October, 1883), referred in

interesting terms to the operations which were carried out for the purpose of discovering what were the movements contemplated by Arabi. He said: "On one occasion I considered it right to press the enemy pretty hard to find out their intentions. I placed the Rifles and the South Stafford, and a regiment which had just joined me, under a gallant officer in whom I had every confidence, and left that column to itself. I went out with the troops which I knew had not been in action before. I went out in an armour train with the sailors and with the marines. I wanted to see how they would get on when they were first in action with the Egyptians, and I also wanted to see how the Egyptians fought. I never saw a finer body of troops in my life, or men who behaved more magnificently than the marines did on that occasion. A reconnaissance is the thing that tries a soldier more than anything. You have first to drive back the enemy, then halt and maintain your position, and last of all, you have to retire in the face of the enemy. That tries a soldier in every possible way. The marines were tried in that on that occasion, and they behaved in a way that the most veteran soldiers could not have excelled. I had also with me a large detachment of blue-jackets in the armour train. When we got the train as far out as we could get it—out to where the railway was broken—we left a 40-pounder to fire over our heads. The blue-jackets went with us with a couple of 9-pounders, and, advancing alongside of us, yoked themselves as horses into their own guns. They were exposed to a tremendous fire, because they could not get shelter on the top of the embankment. One of my staff, Major Hutton, told me an anecdote that he himself heard of these men. He heard one of them say to the other, 'Bill, they calls this a reconnaissance; I believe it's a jolly lark.' That shows what sailors are. I look back upon the period when I was in charge at Alexandria with the utmost pleasure. So much for the navy, or rather for the marines, and so much for those regiments I have mentioned to you as being as fine as any in the whole of Her Majesty's army. There was one officer there, Captain Fisher, of the *Inflexible*, who was in charge of the sailors, and he is one of the finest officers I have ever met in my life. I used to send for

him when there was anything difficult to do, and ask him if he could do it. He never said no, and I always knew that it would be done."

Arabi had cut the line beyond the Mihalla station, and in order to discover how serious was the damage, and how long a time it would take to repair it, a reconnaissance was made with the new train on the 28th. The expedition left Fort Gabarrie at five o'clock in the afternoon. General Alison and Colonel Duncan accompanied it, and the train was closely followed by another with three hundred marines on board; a small party of mounted infantry, composed of men of the 60th Rifles, under Captain Hutton, accompanied the train—gliding along the margin of Lake Mareotis, disturbing the wild fowl, which rose in clouds from its shallows as the train passed slowly along. It continued its way until it reached the spot where the line had been broken. Two railway engineers who accompanied the train inspected the damage and found that it could not be repaired so that the train could proceed, for it would require a full day's work to place it in order.

The news caused intense disappointment to those in the train. It had been hoped that they would be able to steam forward right up to Arabi's lines and to effect a lodgment there, for which purpose entrenching tools had been brought with them. The general, however, determined to take advantage of the protection afforded by the guns of the train to push forward another reconnaissance to a point beyond that which he had reached on the previous day.

A score of the blue-jackets left the train and advanced with the mounted infantry. General Alison, accompanied by Captain Dormer and Lieutenants Lambton and Erskine, advanced with their escort to within 800 yards of Arabi's entrenchments, and from the railway embankment took notes of the details of the works. The enemy's infantry now began to show in force upon the left of the line, while a body of some fifty cavalry formed up on the line of railway and appeared to be about to charge.

Upon the mounted infantry and blue-jackets opening fire both the cavalry and the skirmishers fell back at once. A battalion of

infantry now advanced in extended order. Had they pushed forward rapidly they might have cut off the general and his party. The sailors in the iron-clad train prepared for action, the men at the machine and field guns stood ready to open fire at once, while the rest, rifle in hand, prepared to leap out when the order was given, and to run forward to attack the approaching enemy.

The Egyptians, however, had apparently no desire for fighting, for they advanced so slowly that the general and his officers were able to complete the notes they were taking and to return to the train unmolested. As they approached it a white cloud of smoke rose in front, a sharp report was heard overhead, followed by the whiz of shrapnel bullets, showing that the enemy's artillerymen had at last got to work. Then two rockets flew harmlessly over the train. In reply a sullen boom broke out from Ramleh heights, a shell from one of the 40-pounders sung overhead and burst among the advancing Egyptians. These at once took the hint and fell back, two more shells following them in their retreat. As the distance was over four thousand yards no damage was done by the shell, but it enabled the gunners to find out the range, a knowledge which would be useful in further operations.

On the following evening the iron-clad train starting from Gabarrie and a train with a company of 60th Rifles and of marine artillery with a working party of engineers left the Ramleh station to go forward to mend the break in the line. It was necessary to do this, not only in order to make reconnaissance towards the enemy's positions, but to obtain communication between the two lines in order to be able to shift engines and rolling-stock from one to the other.

The junction of the Ramleh line with that of Gabarrie to Cairo was a short distance beyond the point where the line was torn up, and as, in case of a forward movement, it might be necessary to have all the engines and rolling-stock on one line or the other, it was a necessity to mend the line, and to hold the station at Mihalla, at which was the junction of the two lines.

The force was commanded by Colonel Newson. On arriving at their destination the train came to a stop, the troops alighted,

the mounted infantry advanced, followed by the marines and 60th in skirmishing order, while a strong body of engineers set to work to repair the break. Although the moon shone brightly, and the train must have been visible to the enemy, the Egyptians made no signs of an advance. The engineers worked splendidly; in two hours the repairs were effected, and a train of sixty trucks was passed from the Ramleh line on to the Gabarrie section, along the line of which the rebel army had retired from Alexandria.

There were many signs of the disorder and demoralization which had prevailed among them. Broken carriages lay by the road; many dead bodies, apparently those of occupants of the carriages who had been dragged out and murdered, lay by the side of the railway; arms and accoutrements were scattered about in all directions, showing how great was the panic among the enemy; and there could be no doubt that if at that time 1000 or 1500 men could have been promptly landed from the fleet and sent off in pursuit, Arabi's army would have disbanded and fled in all directions, and the rebellion have been extinguished at a blow.

At two o'clock in the morning, having completed their work, the trains returned to Alexandria. There was no fear of the enemy returning and again breaking up the road at this point, for it was now under the protection of the guns of the Ramleh batteries, and our vedette close up to the spot would at once have detected any movement by a body of men in that direction. There was the less chance of this, as it was seen in the morning that Arabi's outposts had been withdrawn from time to time to a point much nearer to his line of entrenchment.

On the night of August the 2d the enemy for the first time took the offensive, and attacked a small post some distance in advance of our lines. This post consisted of a small building and a clump of palm-trees on the bank of a canal a short distance of the isthmus leading to the enemy's camp, and was not intended to be held in case the enemy showed in force. It was that night held by a company of the 60th Rifles under Major Ward. The moon was nearly full and the night bright overhead, but near the ground the light mist, rising from the marshes and shallow lakes,

hung over the country, and prevented objects from being seen at a short distance off.

Under cover of this mist a body of Arabi's cavalry advanced towards the post; the sound of the horses' footfalls was muffled by the deep sand, and they had approached close to the advanced sentry when he first made them out. As he perceived the dark body through the mist he challenged and at once fired. The sergeant and four men in support behind him ran up at the sound of the rifle, but the enemy's horse came on at a gallop, and the little party, after firing upon them, ran back to the main post, where the men had at once turned out on hearing such a fire.

The cavalry halted and opened fire with their carbines upon the clump of palm-trees. As Major Ward was ignorant of the force advancing against him he retired from the palm-trees and fell back upon a ditch behind, and opened a steady fire upon the cavalry. These soon fell back, and the piquet then, in accordance with the orders issued for the conduct of outposts in case of night attacks, fell back along the canal until they reached the pumping station, which was fortified and strongly held, and formed, in fact, our first defensive position.

When the cavalry were first seen coming down, four of the piquet had caught up their rifles and run to the rear, with the sudden panic common among young soldiers when first exposed to night attack. They were placed in arrest for retiring without orders. The matter would not have been worth a moment's notice had not a grossly exaggerated account of the affair been telegraphed to England by a correspondent, who was, in consequence, at once recalled.

No more was seen of the enemy that night. They had hoped, no doubt, to catch the little party off their guard, and on finding a stout resistance opposed to them retired at once. A dead horse was found in front of the post, but any of the enemy who may have been disabled or killed by our fire were carried off by their comrades. The post was reoccupied at daybreak. Rumours were current among the natives in the city that Arabi intended to make a great attack upon the town, and every precaution was taken at

Ramleh, while the troops in the town were held in readiness to turn out at a moment's notice, and the ships prepared to land strong bodies of men in order to aid in suppressing the rising which would almost certainly have taken place in the city if Arabi had attacked.

The iron-clad train went out on the morning of the 3d to see if any signs of activity on the part of Arabi were observable, but on arriving at the point where the line had been before broken they found the rails had again been pulled up, this having no doubt been done under cover of the cavalry attack. The 38th Regiment, the 60th Rifles, and the naval brigade advanced some distance along the isthmus, and the general with a small escort went on ahead; but it was seen that the Egyptian infantry were drawn up six miles away, and that there were no signs of any unusual activity on their part.

Skirmishes went on almost daily between our mounted infantry and parties of mounted Bedouins, who were constantly attempting to come along the shore from Aboukir for the purpose of plundering at Ramleh. On the fifth a reconnaissance in force brought on some sharp fighting. Its object was to discover whether there was any truth in the reports current among the natives that the great bulk of Arabi's force had been withdrawn.

The force consisted of the iron-clad train, seven companies of marines under Colonel Tewson, six companies of the 60th Rifles, four of the 38th, and four of the 46th. The marines were to march with the iron-clad train along the line of railroad; the 38th and 46th, with a gun, were to advance on the left bank of the canal; while the 60th, also accompanied by a gun, were to cross the canal by a wooden bridge which the engineers had thrown over it at the foot of the Ramleh heights, and were to advance along the right bank of the canal. The forces were to unite at the point where the canal and railway approached closest to each other, near the enemy's end of the isthmus.

The iron-clad train was made up of a truck with the 40-pounder gun in front, followed by another with its ammunition, a Nordenfeldt, some Gatlings, and two 9-pounders being carried by the other

wagons. From a flag-staff on the front wagon flew the Union Jack, a pennant streamed from another on the centre truck, while the white ensign flew from the last wagon; so the sailors went into action with all their colours displayed.

The eight hundred marines were carried in a train immediately behind. The infantry of the line had started first, and when the train arrived at the break, close to the Mihalla junction, the 60th were already advancing in skirmishing order along the embankment of the canal, to the left of the line. The 38th and 46th were spread out on the other side of the canal. The enemy were visible in front occupying a long ridge on the other side of the canal towards the village Kamshid Pasha. To the left of the village were two guns mounted in an earthwork, while on the extreme right large masses of the white-coated soldiers of Arabi could be seen moving among clumps of trees.

As soon as the train reached the break in the line the marines left their trucks and advanced along the embankment. The sailors got the two 9-pounders out of the train and placed them in readiness for action. Scarcely had they done so when a puff of white smoke broke out from the Egyptian battery, and a shell fell close to the line of rails. This, a few seconds later, was followed by another, which fell among the piled arms of a party of sailors who had, on arriving, at once set to work to repair the breach in the line.

The enemy had evidently laid their guns so as to command the spot where they knew that the train would be brought to a standstill. The sailors were not long in replying, and in a few moments shells from the 40-pounders and the two field-guns answered the fire, and the artillery duel was continued until the Egyptian guns were silenced. In the meantime the 60th Rifles were engaged with the enemy.

As soon as they had crossed the canal a large force was seen extending in skirmishing order about a thousand yards ahead, the rifles similarly extended. When the latter had advanced a hundred yards further the enemy disappeared from sight, and were seen to have taken up their position in a ditch running across their

front, and behind which extended a thick cover of bush. The Egyptians were the first to open fire. The 60th advanced by rushes, half of each company running forward and then lying down and firing, when the other half ran beyond them and in turn lay down and fired. The gun which accompanied them, and which was worked by sailors, kept pace with them along the towing path of the canal, the tars advancing with the greatest coolness, and from time to time sending a round of shrapnel against the enemy, to whose fire they were exposed without shelter.

The Egyptian fire was wild in the extreme, the men aiming far too high, and the bullets whistling harmlessly over the heads of the advancing rifles. When within two hundred yards of the enemy's position Colonel Ashburnham formed his men for attack. Two companies were in the first line, two in support a short distance behind, the other two in reserve. The rifles worked their way forward towards the long line of white smoke which marked the position of the enemy. The movement was made by small parties leaping to their feet, running a short distance forward, and then lying down quietly until the whole line was brought up, when the movement was repeated.

When the 60th arrived within a hundred yards of the ditch the Egyptians could be seen in parties of twos and threes creeping up from the ditch into the bush behind. When the order was given to advance to the attack, the 60th leapt to their feet with a cheer, and, fixing their bayonets as they ran, dashed forward. This was too much for the Egyptians, who rose like a great covey of partridges from their place of concealment, and diving into the bush, fled in panic, many of them throwing away their arms and accoutrements. A party took refuge in a hut in the middle of the jungle, but a well-aimed shot from Captain Morrison's gun on the embankment plumped into the hut, and those within it instantly fled after their comrades.

On the other side of the canal the 46th and 38th had also been engaged; they were preceded by the mounted infantry under Captain Parr and Lieutenants Piggot and Vyse. These officers with six men went ahead to reconnoitre, and suddenly found themselves

in front of a large body of the enemy, who opened fire upon them. The little party dismounted and returned the fire, expecting support from behind, but by some error, instead of support being sent forward, an order came to them to retire; but by this time two of the little band were dead and two wounded.

Lieutenant Vyse, a most popular young officer, was struck in the thigh with a bullet, and the arteries being severed he bled to death in a few minutes. His comrades would not leave his body behind, the other two officers and the two unwounded men carrying it off under a tremendous fire of the enemy, while the two wounded men, who were still able to use their rifles, brought up the rear, firing upon the enemy as they retreated. Had it not been for the extreme inaccuracy of the enemy's fire the little party must have been annihilated. The 38th and 46th were now engaged in a distant fire with a body of the enemy's infantry, but they ceased to advance further, and the 60th, as they were preparing to follow up the retreating Egyptians, were also halted by the order of Colonel Thackwell, commanding the 38th, the senior officer in this part of the field.

This order, which deranged all the plans of the operations, was caused by one of those errors which often mar the success of the best-designed military movements. Colonel Thackwell had been ordered to halt at a white house on the embankment, the house intended being situated at the point where the railway and canal were closest together.

There was, however, another white house on the embankment, a mile short of this point, and Colonel Thackwell, supposing that this was the house alluded to, halted the whole of the left attack, thus leaving the marines, who were still advancing steadily along the railway embankment, exposed to the whole brunt of the enemy's attack. The main position of the enemy at this point of their line was a large house surrounded by entrenchments where they had some guns in position; they had, too, a very strong force on the embankment of the canal whose fire took the marines in flank.

The sailors had dragged one of their field-guns along the railway with the marines, and with this they opened a brisk and well-

directed fire against the guns in the battery by the house, and they were aided by their comrades in the iron-clad train, now more than 2000 yards in their rear, as these sent shell after shell from the 40-pounder into the enemy's battery. The marines, seeing that they were not supported by the other column, left the railway and charged across the low intervening ground against the enemy on the bank of the canal, and after firing a volley charged them with fixed bayonets.

The Egyptians did not await the attack, but fled in terror along the canal. Many were shot down, and numbers in their panic leapt into the canal and were drowned, or shot as they swam across. From the fortified house a very heavy fire was now poured into the marines. The enemy had been strongly reinforced, and although their guns had been silenced by the sailors' field-gun and the 40-pounder, their musketry fire was extremely heavy. Large reinforcements of the enemy were now seen coming up from their camps, and these opened fire at long ranges, aided by the fire of some field-guns and the discharge of rockets.

The sailors' two guns admirably directed kept these bodies of troops from advancing; but as trains were seen coming up from the camp with fresh troops, and the object of the reconnaissance had now been gained both by ascertaining the position of the enemy's front line of defences and by proving that Arabi's army still occupied his camp, the order was given to the marines to retire. The movement was performed in admirable order, and was covered by Major Donald, who, with fifty men, advanced boldly close up to the enemy's position by the white house, and prevented them from assuming the offensive by a steady and well-directed fire until the main body had crossed the low ground and regained the railway embankment, when the covering party fell back and joined them.

The marines had retired slowly and steadily in alternate companies, one line facing the enemy while the other retreated; this in turn then halted, and the other passed through it. There was no hurry or confusion. Whenever a man fell, the one next to him called for a stretcher and waited, rifle in hand, until the

carrying party came up and took him to the rear. The sailors had by this time repaired the breach in the line, and the iron-clad train coming up, its fire effectually checked any inclination the enemy may have felt to press the retiring marines. With the greatest promptitude the 9-pounders were hoisted into the truck, the marines scrambled into their train, and the force fell back. The marines and sailors lost two killed and twenty-two wounded; the left attack had only five wounded, in addition to those of the little party of mounted infantry.

The Egyptians suffered heavily, large numbers having been killed or drowned by the marines, while a good many had fallen to the fire of the 60th. Fifteen dead and six wounded were found lying in the ditch, all hit in the head and shoulders, which alone had been exposed when they raised them above the bank to fire. Seven men were found killed by the shell which exploded in the hut in the jungle, and some forty others were found dead among the bushes.

The Egyptian soldiers had fought but poorly, refusing to advance to the attack although towards the end of the day they were in overwhelming numbers. Their officers, however, had behaved with courage and spirit, and could be seen with sword and gesture endeavouring to get their men to go forward. Six prisoners were made by the marines, among whom two were officers. According to their statement Arabi had with him at Kafr-Dowar 12,000 men of the regular army and 4000 Bedouins. One of the officers also reported that a large force consisting of 5000 regular infantry, 5000 Bedouins, 1000 cavalry, and 12 Krupp guns were entrenching themselves on the sweet-water canal near Ismailia.

On the 6th the enemy could be seen scattered over the scene of the fight collecting and burying their dead. On the afternoon of the 7th a train was seen approaching from Kafr-Dowar. It had an engine in front and another behind, the latter being probably added to take the train back should the leading engine be disabled. It came to a standstill about 1000 yards beyond the Mihalla junction, about six miles from Alexandria on the Cairo line, where that line divides for goods and passenger traffic.

Blocking parties then alighted and began to pull up the rails. The 40-pounders on the Ramleh heights at once opened fire. Their aim was accurate, for, although the distance was 4400 yards, the first shot just passed over the heads of the working party on the embankment. The men at once threw down their tools and fled from the exposed position, and after ten rounds had been fired the train was withdrawn. On this day the 75th Highlanders landed at Alexandria.

On the 10th of August Sir John Adye, chief of the staff, arrived at Alexandria with the Duke of Connaught. The whole of his brigade of Guards arrived within the next two days, and astonished the people of Alexandria by their martial appearance. On the 11th a cable to Port Said was completed, and telegraphic communication made with the entrance to the canal.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been ill with fever before leaving England, and had been advised to make the journey by sea, arrived at Alexandria on the 15th of August, five days after his staff, and the khedive then issued decrees giving full power to the British to undertake operations and occupy the country. It was time that prompt and effectual measures should be taken, and fortunately the Seaforth Highlanders, having arrived at Suez on the 8th, were able at command to move rapidly northwards. Other troops soon began rapidly to arrive at the canal, where on landing they found that the supply of water had been cut off by the erection of dams across the canal.

On the 9th the enemy again attempted to tear up the rails, but were again driven back by the guns at Ramleh. The *Superb* went down and fired a few shell at the enemy's working parties engaged on the fortifications at Aboukir.


For some days little was done; the Highlanders and Guards were now encamped at Ramleh; the Egyptians could be seen busily fortifying the ground on which the last fight had taken place; reports constantly came in from the canal of large gatherings of troops between Ismailia and Zagazig. On the 15th the mounted infantry, forty strong, under Captain Parr, made a dashing reconnaissance towards the enemy's lines. The party was accom-


panied by Colonel Gerrard, brigade major of General Graham's division.

They started at three o'clock in the morning and rode quietly across the sandy desert on the margin of Lake Aboukir, and reached the cultivated land in front of Kafr-Dowar just as the morning light began to steal over the sky. They were then halted, and Colonel Gerrard with Lieutenant Piggott and six men rode forward for a near inspection of Arabi's position. Taking off their helmets, which would at once have attracted the attention of the Egyptian sentries, they hung them to their saddle-bows, and rode forward bare-headed, passing along the flanks of the enemy's position within hailing distance of the Egyptian sentries.

It was not until broad daylight that the suspicion occurred to the enemy that the little mounted party so close at hand were English. By this time many valuable notes and sketches had been taken; and when a scattering fire was suddenly opened upon them the party were ready to return, having accomplished their work. They, therefore, turned and started at a canter towards the main body. As they did so a party of the enemy's cavalry, apparently aroused by the fire, issued from a clump of palm-trees in the desert and endeavoured to cut them off; they seemed, however, but half awake, as it was doubtful whether the little party were really enemies, and did not gallop at full speed. Colonel Gerrard and his escort were thus able to reach the main body of the mounted infantry before they were overtaken. Captain Parr gave the order to retire by sections of fours. Seeing them retiring, the enemy, who had halted, galloped on in pursuit. Captain Parr at once halted his men and dismounted. Twelve of them opened fire upon the pursuers, who numbered about sixty men and were led by a striking-looking Bedouin chief. The first four shots flew high, but they sufficed to check the speed of the pursuers; the men then got the range, the Bedouin chief and one of his followers fell dead, and the rest, wheeling abruptly round, galloped off, and the mounted infantry returned quietly without further molestation to camp.

While this reconnaissance was proceeding, another of a very





different description was being made upon the other side; Lieutenant Smith-Dorien of the *Invincible* obtained permission to reconnoitre the enemy's position alone. Starting in the darkness, he made his way along the edge of Lake Marcotis until he neared the enemy's lines, then, stooping low on the sands so that his figure should not show against the water, he again made his way forward.

He succeeded in finding out the nature of the entrenchments upon which their working parties were engaged, and so close was he to them that they heard the sound of his footfall on the sand. There was a shout, and the light of a lantern was turned in his direction. He lay still among the bushes. One or two of the Arabs moved out a few paces towards where he was lying, but, seeing nothing, concluded that they had been mistaken. Lieutenant Smith-Dorien then crawled away; but on his way back glimpses of him were more than once caught by the sentries, and several shots were fired in his direction, and it was with the greatest difficulty that, keeping among the bushes bordering the lake, he made his way back to the lines.

On the 16th Sir Garnet Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Wood, and Sir E. Hamley landed; and the next day the general rode out to Ramleh, accompanied by the Duke of Connaught and the other generals, and inspected the British positions, and the formidable entrenchments which Arabi had now raised there.

On the 17th orders were issued for the troops to prepare to embark; and it was given out at headquarters that it was the intention to effect a landing by a great portion of the troops at Aboukir Bay, and after the forts there had been silenced by the fleet, that a movement would be made round Lake Aboukir upon the rear of Arabi's position, while the troops at Ramleh would simultaneously attack the enemy in front. This report gained little credence among the officers: the distance along the shore to Aboukir was short, and, were the forts silenced by the ships, the force could have moved along the spit of sand between Lake Aboukir and the sea in a far shorter time than it would take them to embark and disembark from the transports. The cavalry

especially could have trotted round from Ramleh in less time than would have been occupied in disembarking their horses.

The news, however, deceived those whom it was intended to keep in the dark. Arabi was known to be kept thoroughly well informed of all that passed in Alexandria by Bedouin spies who were constantly moving in the vicinity of the town, or by the villagers who came in with provisions; therefore the report that the British troops were embarking on board ship would be carried out, and it was very important that Arabi should be kept in the dark as to the intended operations.

Having the railway behind him he could have telegraphed to the forces gathered on the sweet-water canal to advance at once to Ismailia, and could have planted batteries on the banks of the canal, and have sunk merchant steamers passing along it, and so have blocked for a long time its passage to the fleet and army. This danger was not chimerical, for it was known that preparations had been made for blocking the canal, and twenty-four hours' notice would have been ample for Arabi to carry this operation into effect had he been aware that the fleet and army were about to advance by that route.

The greatest animation and bustle prevailed in Alexandria. The bands of the English regiments and the pipes of the Highlanders rose high in the street as the columns of troops marched down towards the harbour, while the population, European and native, looked on in astonishment at the preparations made for the sudden departure of the army which had so lately arrived there. The troops themselves were in the highest spirits; those who had been longest there were weary of their inaction in the face of a foe they could, they were convinced, sweep before them like chaff. Even the troops left behind, the division of General Hamley, consisting of the brigades of Generals Alison and Evelyn Wood, were not disappointed at being thus left, for they believed that they would have their full share of the fighting.

The movement of Sir Garnet Wolseley upon the Suez Canal may be said to have opened the Egyptian campaign, though the troops had not all been landed and the transport was incomplete.

Sir A. Alison, in charge of the Mediterranean contingent, and afterwards of the troops first landed from England, had held Alexandria, but could not advance from it against the series of entrenchments, one behind another, which had been thrown up by the Egyptian army, dexterous in spade-work as it had always been. The small English force was, however, doing most useful work in preventing Arabi from moving his forces to a more favourable point, such as Ismailia, for the purpose of destroying the Suez Canal or the fresh-water canal. As soon as the general commanding in chief appeared, further action took place. On the 18th of August the whole of General Willis's division embarked in the transports in the harbour, and were on board in a few hours, so admirably did the military and naval force combine in embarking, not only the troops, but horses and guns.

All day on the 18th the work of embarkation had gone on; the huge troop-ships lay along by the quays. Cordons of sentries of the Guards, looking like old campaigners now with their bronzed faces and faded serge tunics, kept back the crowd of spectators while the troops marched on board. The horses, screaming and struggling, were swung up in the slings over the bulwarks, while strong fatigue parties were busy shipping ordnance and stores. The fleet which was preparing to start consisted of seventeen troop-ships; the 60th and 46th Regiments embarked in the *Euphrates*, the *Rohsina* and *Nerissa* took the marines, the *Nevada* the 84th, the *Catalonia* the 50th, the *Batavia* the Grenadier Guards, the *Iberia* the Coldstreams, the *Orient* the Scots Fusileers, the *Osprey* the commissariat, the *Calabria* and the *Holland* the Household Cavalry, the *Tower Hill* and the *Palmyra* the Artillery, the *Viking* the transport corps, and the *Egyptian Monarch* the 7th Dragoons.

As the evening came on, the great ships, clustered with red-coats, moved one by one out of harbour and dropped anchor outside, in readiness for the start which was expected to take place at ten o'clock. The despatch-boat *Salamis* which still lay at the quay was to take Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff, who were not to start till a later hour. Sir Beauchamp Seymour was on board the *Helicon*.

The signal for starting was not given. The night passed quietly, and in the morning the transports were still lying in two long lines off the port with the iron-clad fleet beyond them. The morning was fine, but, as usual on that coast, a long, quiet, regular swell was setting in upon the shore, causing the vessels to roll at their anchors to an extent which would have somewhat interfered with accurate shooting, had they been called upon to engage the forts of Aboukir.

During the morning minute inspections were made of the troops on board the different ships to see that each man had all his kit and appliances ready for landing. On board each vessel the order for the regulation of the troops was posted up, the following being the details as to disembarkation.

“Previous to disembarkment the men are to eat a good meat meal, they will each carry in their haversacks a day and a half’s rations, and will take a hundred rounds of ammunition per man. Each battalion carries two hundred spades of the Wallace pattern; the men will carry the valises in their hands, these will be deposited upon the beach under a guard. Besides the provisions carried by the men, two days’ rations will be carried by the regimental transport. The commissariat will take a further supply. All heavy kits will be left on board the ship, which will form the base of operations.”

At twelve o’clock all was in readiness; the men-of-war had sent down their top-masts in readiness for action. The Nordenfeldts had been hoisted to the tops, and among the great proportion of the troops the question whether a landing at Aboukir was not after all intended was still a matter of doubt. At noon precisely the signal was made, and the *Euphrates*, with the 60th Rifles on board, started at the head of the procession.

Then in a grand procession the ships moved off. The iron-clads went first in fighting trim, with every stick lowered that could be, looking ugly and terrible. Then followed the more graceful transports, moving swiftly through the blue water ruffled by a rising breeze. The fleet arrived off Aboukir in the afternoon, and made some delay, sufficient to confirm the belief, if any existed,

that their destination was the bay, and their object the capture of the forts. The war-vessels anchored in a line nearest to the shore, the transports outside. As night fell—the quickly falling night of southern skies—and darkness obscured land and sea, the fleet passed eastward to its real goal—the Suez Canal.

The procession of the line of fifty vessels to Aboukir was a fine spectacle, as it included twenty ships of the first class, and the sight of the squadron at anchor in the red sunset, which was almost momentarily succeeded by pale moonlight, amidst which the various coloured lights of the ships shone out for miles on either hand, was still more imposing. However, while messengers were galloping fast to bring Arabi to the defence of the forts which they supposed were going to be attacked, the squadron was quietly got under way again, and filed off into the darkness.

The ruse seems to have succeeded admirably. Nobody expected that we should seize Ismailia, and take possession of the canal. M. de Lesseps, who was in a condition of anglophobia even greater than that which was afterwards displayed by a portion of the French press and some of the people of Paris when we had accomplished the enterprise, had actually given a dinner on the 18th to the troops at Ismailia in honour of Arabi, and no British troops had arrived up to that morning.

The arrogant, but rather impolitic gentleman was, of course, exceedingly enraged at the subsequent occupation, not only of the chief port, but of the canal itself, and gave expression to several denunciations of our bad faith in taking possession of what had been declared to be a free international canal.

At Alexandria the day had not passed off quietly, the enemy were seen in unusual numbers at work upon their entrenchments, and emboldened probably by the knowledge that a large portion of our force had embarked upon the ships, they showed unusual daring and courage, several parties pushing along the railway embankment until within rifle shot.

Upon a couple of volleys being fired they fell back, but upon Sir Evelyn Wood going round to inspect the outlying piquets he was fired upon by a working party among the bushes, and it

was therefore determined to send out a reconnaissance to discover their intentions. At half-past three in the afternoon a wing of the 49th advanced from a point below the waterworks, moving along both sides of the canal. When they reached the clump of palm-trees forming an advanced post, and which had been the scene of more than one skirmish with the enemy, the troops on the left side of the canal were thrown out in skirmishing order, while those on the right kept along under cover of the embankment.

A few shots from the advanced line of skirmishers sent the enemy's vedettes to the right-about, but almost immediately afterwards a brisk fire broke out from a considerable force of the enemy concealed in ditches in front of a maize field on the left. Their fire was as usual wild and high, and the troops being ordered to lie down on the sands, the bullets whizzed innoxiously overhead, while a cool and steady fire was opened upon the line where the Egyptians were concealed. At half-past four the Egyptian batteries, at the bend of the canal, opened a heavy fire with several 18-pounders, 9-pounders, and rocket tubes.

Their infantry did not show out of cover, but from the heaviness of their musketry fire it was calculated that about a battalion and a half of their infantry were supporting the batteries. The Egyptian guns were well worked, and their shell continually burst in very unpleasant proximity to the troops, while the rockets erratically rushed across the fields, causing more mental discomfort than bodily harm.

The effect of rocket firing is indeed at all times, except when directed against cavalry, moral rather than physical, the rushing noise of the missiles, the extreme uncertainty of their direction, and the effect, when one actually strikes, are calculated to shake the nerves of young soldiers, but they soon learn that the danger is in no way proportional to the noise; but upon cavalry the effect of rockets is disconcerting in the extreme, the horses cannot be got to stand steady under the fire, and offering, as cavalry do, a much fairer mark than infantry, who can lie down under fire, there is to them a real danger from the rockets, which, on striking, either explode with great effect or, turning perhaps at right angles,

may rush along a line, overturning and injuring all they happen to strike.

The Egyptians, finding that the fire of their light batteries did not succeed in driving in our little force, opened upon them with a 64-pounder and a 4-ton gun in position at their centre post at Kindji-Osman, while a large body of cavalry and three battalions of infantry extended beyond the embankment on the sands on the left. General Wood accordingly ordered the troops to fall back slowly for about a hundred yards, and although the enemy's fire was extremely severe the movement was executed in perfect order, notwithstanding the fact that the vast majority of the soldiers were now for the first time in their lives in action.

While the movement was going on a welcome relief was afforded by the guns at Ramleh opening fire upon the enemy's batteries, while a few minutes later the iron-clad train steamed up from Gabarrie and at once engaged the enemy, the first shot from the 40-pounder plumping into the enemy's position on the right, whence a galling fire had been kept up on the 49th. The attention of the enemy's artillerymen was speedily diverted by these new assailants; the infantry sheltered among the palm-trees on the left, and from the windows of a farmhouse on the right of a canal, checked the advance of the Egyptian cavalry.

The order was now given to retire. As no advantage was to be gained by a continuance of the skirmish the iron-clad train steamed back close along the embankment, keeping parallel with the retiring infantry, while a few well-aimed shells from the guns at Ramleh sent the Egyptian cavalry, who were manifesting an intention to charge the retiring troops, to the rear.

Singularly enough, in spite of the heavy fire of the enemy but one man of the 49th was wounded. This was owing partly to the fact of the extremely bad aiming of the Egyptians, partly to the fact that the troops on the left were lying down in extended order, while those on the right were sheltered by the embankment. One man of the 49th had an extraordinary escape. A shell passed between his legs, and it exploded and carried away the seat of his trousers, he was knocked over by the explosion and covered

with mud, but upon being picked up was found to be entirely uninjured.

Early the next morning (the 20th of August) the 42d and 74th arrived and marched out at once to Ramleh, where, encamping with the Cameron and Gordon Highlanders (the 79th and 75th), they completed the Highland brigade. At half-past four in the afternoon General Wood pushed forward the 49th and 38th to the point which was occupied the day before on the embankment of the canal, the 79th and 75th simultaneously advancing on the left. The advance was supported by two field-pieces and the iron-clad train, the enemy's infantry at once fell back, but a duel was carried on for some time between the guns of Ramleh and their batteries; when some of the Egyptian guns had obtained the range of the infantry the advance was halted, General Wood rode forward along the canal and examined the earthworks at a distance of 600 yards.

Two squadrons of the Egyptian cavalry threatening a charge, Captain Rathbone's company of the 49th was sent forward against them. The Egyptian guns were turned on the little party and eight shells burst among them, but the ground being soft the shells penetrated deeply before exploding, and although covered with mud, only four of the men were wounded. General Wood having completed his observations the reconnaissance fell back to Ramleh, having discovered that Arabi's force of infantry appeared to have been materially weakened since the preceding day. No doubt a considerable proportion of these had been marched to Aboukir to oppose the expected landing, for large bodies of men could be seen working in the vicinity of the forts there.

On the 21st of August a correspondent of the *Times* recorded a characteristic incident. Sir A. Alison led out of the works at Ramleh four companies of the Black Watch to reconnoitre. He pushed them out in the open, while Sir Evelyn Wood was directed to cling to the canal bank with two companies of the Berks. After a time the demonstration drew the enemy from his sullen attitude, and rifled projectiles were sent to meet the English troops. Two of them dropped near the men, and then the Egyptian gunners became attracted by the appearance of a one-

armed officer sauntering along with the easy pace of one trained in the ways of Pall Mall. That officer was selected as their mark, and plied with shell, one of which dropped forty yards in front of him, another just beyond him. The officer sauntered slowly in the direction of cover, but would by no means quicken his pace. Five projectiles plunged into the ground or dashed the dust around him within a few yards. The practice was not bad, for a single figure is a small mark. The English 40-pounders then came into action, and soon dominated the fire of the Egyptian guns. No more is reported of the officer, who was Sir Archibald Alison; but he probably continued to saunter, pondering on the question of the value of artillery fire in the field, and perhaps wondering why it is said to be so demoralizing. The men were settling down to the same coolness. In the skirmish of the day before the shell fell around and among the troops, one projectile actually knocking off the helmet of a private of the Gordon Highlanders. Human instinct of self-preservation generally causes a line to sway on such occasions like corn before a strong wind, yet the young British soldiers did not so much as bend their heads.

All the afternoon of the 20th the great fleet of transports and men-of-war lay facing the forts of Aboukir. The little *Cygnets* steamed inshore; but, although the heads of the Egyptian artillerymen could be seen through embrasures crowded round their guns in readiness for action, they were apparently unwilling to commence the encounter, and the *Cygnets* returned to the fleet. Later in the afternoon the transport officers were signalled to go on board the men-of-war for orders, and upon their return the suspicions which had all along been entertained became certainties, and it was known that the fleet was after dark to proceed to Port Said, and then down the canal to Ismailia.

As soon as the darkness fell the fleet left its anchorage and steamed away in two lines, the lights showing each vessel its appointed station as before. Morning found the long lines of steamers making their way quietly across the tranquil sea at a distance of forty miles from Port Said.

While the army was thus moving towards the canal the British

vessels of war in the canal were preparing the way for them, Rear-admiral Hoskins being in command of the force there. At three o'clock in the morning of the 20th Commander Edwards with the boats of the squadron occupied the canal dredges, barges, &c., as far as Kantara. Captain Fairfax occupied Port Said, and Captain Fitzroy landed his troops in Ismailia, and at once proceeded to shell the enemy out of Nefiche, two miles from the station. At the same time the naval brigade, under Captain Hastings, *Euryalus*, advanced from Suez and attacked a force of the rebels who were encamped at Chalouf. The Egyptians fired heavily, but wildly, for a short time, but the sailors and Highlanders rushed on with such vigour that they at once abandoned the position they held and tried to escape across the sweet-water canal. Two of their guns were captured, and some two hundred of their men killed or drowned in crossing the canal; the English loss was only two men wounded and two drowned. As soon as the leading vessels of the fleet arrived at Port Said they began to enter the canal, the ordinary traffic being at once arrested.

Thus on the 20th we occupied Port Said, and the same afternoon the transports were in the canal and on their way to Ismailia. Before ten o'clock at night the fleet and transports had entered the canal, and before his departure from Port Said Sir Garnet Wolseley had caused a proclamation in Arabic to be posted up declaring it to be the intention of the British army to restore order and strengthen the authority of the khedive, while no harm would be done to those who respected that authority, but that those who resisted it by arms would be treated as rebels. The traffic on the canal was only temporarily suspended that the British vessels might have a free passage; and the company, or M. de Lesseps, having refused to allow pilots to go on board these, they made the transit without such assistance, leaving a force to occupy Port Said, and occupying a building at the entrance to the canal, formerly the Dutch hotel, which we had purchased for £78,000. Very soon the canal officials and others who were about to evacuate the town remained, as order was quickly established,

Arabs using threatening language being arrested, and about fifty soldiers captured by our men being sent to Alexandria as prisoners. Thus it was observed that the whole English force was made available against the enemy, and could be picked up in four-and-twenty hours and concentrated either at Suez, Ismailia, Port Said, or Alexandria.

As soon as the leading vessels reached Ismailia the disembarkation commenced. The Egyptians were known to be but a short distance away. When on the morning of the 20th the British sailors had landed from the *Orion*, the Egyptian troops in the town, anticipating no such movement, were surprised and almost surrounded, but just managed to make off after firing a volley, by which Commander Kane was slightly wounded.

In the course of the day a railway train had been seen from the tops of the *Orion* approaching. The trucks were crowded with the white-jacketed troops; a shot was fired from the 25-ton gun, sighting at four thousand yards. The aim was accurate, the shot struck a truck in the centre of the train and smashed it in fragments, several of the carriages following ran off the line, and the train was brought to a stand-still. The Egyptians at once retired along the line of railway.

This shot was a triumph of scientific gunnery, for it was fired without the gunner seeing the enemy. The high ground behind the fresh-water canal prevented any view of the line of railway being obtained from the decks of the ships, but Lieutenant Carysfort of the *Orion*, foreseeing the probability that the enemy would bring up troops by train, had laid the 25-ton gun upon a point of the railway out of sight, the elevation and erection being determined by calculation and by the use of the azimuth compass, the line of the direction in which the gun was laid being accurately marked down in the main-top of the ship. Lieutenant Carysfort took his station here, and when he saw that the train was passing across the line indicated he shouted the order to the gunners below. In an instant the cannon was fired, and Lieutenant Carysfort had the satisfaction of seeing the accuracy of his calculation verified, and the train instantly disabled and brought to a stand-still.

All night the ships of war held themselves in readiness to land and defend Ismailia should the Egyptians return, but the night passed quietly, and early the next morning the leading vessels of the fleet from Alexandria, having on board the marines, 60th Rifles, and 46th, arrived, and at once began to land the troops. Every hour the force received additions, as one by one the great transports steamed from the canal into Lake Timsah, until a mighty fleet had gathered in its usually quiet water, for, as soon as the transports with troops were fairly under weigh, the ships laden with stores and munitions of war in Alexandria harbour were sent off to them, and in two days after the arrival of the first ship in Lake Timsah upwards of fifty transports and store vessels were lying there.

As soon as the transports had entered the canal was again thrown open to the ordinary traffic, and after the temporary stoppage of three days the merchant steamers began to pass up and down as usual, crews and passengers looking with wonder as they passed across the eastern end of Lake Timsah at the mighty preparations which had been made by England to crush the Egyptian mutiny.

Ismailia afforded no accommodation for the quartering of troops. The place, indeed, although spoken of as a town, is really but a small village, consisting principally of the houses of M. de Lesseps and some of the principal officials of the canal standing in well-kept gardens, a palace of the khedive, the railway-station and adjoining buildings, a small settlement of canal and railway employés, and a native quarter with two or three thousand inhabitants.

Ismailia owes its existence solely to the construction of the canal. Ten years before a barren waste of sand had extended alike where the village with its bright green foliage stood, and the amphitheatre bordered by low sand-hills, in whose breast the waters of Lake Timsah glittered in the sun, but the construction of the canal and the letting in of the waters of Lake Timsah had given it importance. It was the nearest point on the canal to Cairo, the railway between Alexandria and Suez passed within two

miles of it, and a short branch from Nefiche was constructed to the place.

The fresh-water canal passed along some two hundred yards back from the lake and between it and the station, and its waters afforded the means of transforming the sandy waste into an oasis of green foliage. M. de Lesseps had, directly he commenced the work of the canal, perceived that Ismailia would be the central point, and had spared no pains to prepare it for the important position it was to occupy. He named the embryo town after the khedive, and persuaded the latter to build a palace for himself there.

De Lesseps had erected a handsome mansion for himself and many others for the chief officials under him. Stores and buildings had grown up apace, and the work of beautifying the desert commenced at once. Wide roads were laid down, rows of young trees were planted and kept carefully watered. An arm was laid out from the railway across the bridge over the canal down to the water, the slopes between the canal and the lake were planted and irrigated without difficulty, while the water was raised by machinery for the fertilization of the gardens of the palace and mansions. So that at the time the English fleet arrived there Ismailia appeared to nestle in a wilderness of bright green foliage.

The means of landing were sadly deficient, for hitherto there had been no traffic whatever at Ismailia, which, lying at the western end of the lake, lay far out of the course of vessels passing along the canal. Occasionally, when a vessel ran aground and was delayed for a day in crossing the eastern end of the lake, passengers, glad to escape for a few hours from the monotony of the sand-hills, would land at the little pier and spend a short time there, while many of the pilots who took the vessels up and down the canal made it their headquarters when off their term of duty; but with this exception Ismailia lay quiet and apart from the great wave of traffic which used Egypt as the highway between the East and the West, presenting an appearance of life only for the few weeks in the year when the khedive stayed in his palace there, and the pashas, who, in imitation of their ruler, had also built

mansions in Ismailia, took up their residence there during his stay.

A few groups of Arab children at play in the bare inclosure in front of the station, a troupe of laden camels making their way along with the crops from the irrigated grounds to the distant cities, the white sails of the boats in the sweet-water canal, and the smoke of the distant steamers as they crossed the eastern end of Lake Timsah, were the only signs of life, save that here and there the black tents of some encampment of wandering Bedouins, rose among the sand-hills, and little groups of dark-robed men could be seen sitting in the shade in the heat of the day, smoking their long pipes and discoursing on the doings of the infidels.

In the early hours of the morning and late in the afternoon the air of Ismailia quivered with the incessant song of the countless cicadæ in the trees and bushes, but when the sun was high and poured down with his full power even these ceased their song, and nought save the occasional whistle of a passing train as it swept along through the junction at Nefiche broke the silence of the place.

But within a few hours of the arrival of the British fleet the aspect of the place changed, the lake was alive with boats laden with stores for the shore, and as fast as they arrived at the landing-place groups of sturdy sailors and fatigue parties of troops landed the contents and dragged them up the avenue across the bridge over the canal to the level ground beyond. The carts and transport animals were soon landed and at work, and the streets of the little town were thronged with soldiers of every branch of the British army, gazing with wonder and interest at the little Arab tenements and the occupants who stood scowling at their doors, and who, in their turn, wondered at the tall figures of the Life Guardsmen, the stalwart forms of the Guards, the picturesque dresses of the Highlanders, and the busy energy and activity of this army of unbelievers which had, as if by magic, descended upon Ismailia.

There was no lack of noise now; the sound of music filled the air as the regiments marched from the landing-place to the spot where they were to encamp. The arrival of the transport-wagons

and guns was unceasing. Officers shouted commands to the teamsters and transport men. The soldiers and sailors laughed and joked as they laboured at their heavy work, while every half-hour the bells of the transports came across the water. General Wolseley and his staff at once took up their quarters in the palace, which the khedive had placed at their disposal; the troops erected their tents; the transport and cavalry animals were piqueted in long lines, and in two days the quiet town was transformed into a large and busy camp.

The water in the canal was found to be falling, and the natives reported that it had been cut near Tel-el-Kebir, where Arabi, with as was said 40,000 troops and sixty guns, had strongly entrenched himself. It was, therefore, determined to push a reconnaissance ahead to occupy as long a strip of the canal as possible, so as to command so much fresh-water. The force told off consisted of the Household Cavalry, thirty men of the mounted infantry, a detachment of the 19th Hussars, the 46th, and the marines.

They were to be commanded by General Graham. A portion of this force were already stationed at Nefiche, these were to be relieved by the 50th Regiment, which was to occupy that station. No opposition was expected, for the enemy were supposed to have but a small body of men between Ismailia and Tel-el-Kebir. Three guns of the horse-artillery accompanied the force, and General Wolseley with his staff rode out with them. It was still dark when the Horse Guards rode out from Ismailia, the 84th were stationed at Nefiche, the 50th Regiment joined the column as it passed.

The morning was faintly breaking now, but from the sand-hills near the station no sign of the enemy was visible. Behind, on every hummock and eminence, right and left, stood the British sentries guarding Ismailia from attack, but in front the dreary waste of sand showed no signs of life. The morning breeze was raising the fine particles of sand, and as these swept over the ground they blurred the details and outlines, and the stunted patches of scrub here and there seemed to rise from the surface of an impalpable yellow fog rather than solid ground.

Following the line of the railway, the force advanced until it neared Ramses, eight miles from Ismailia. As the column came near enough for a view to be obtained of the sand-hills round Ramses the field-glasses of the officers enabled them to perceive dark bodies of men on every eminence right and left of the station at Ramses, and almost immediately guns placed in batteries opened fire upon the column.

The infantry advanced in skirmishing order and took possession of the dam which the enemy had constructed across the canal between the villages of El Magfar and Mahuta. The enemy's guns had now opened. The 84th and the marines at once set to work to throw up sheltering trenches. The three guns took up their post on a lofty mound, while the Household Cavalry, after making one charge and driving in the enemy's skirmishers, drew up behind a sand-hill ready to advance should the enemy move forward to attack the little force. General Wolseley at once sent back to Nefiche for the 46th, and to Ismailia for the brigade of Guards and a battery of artillery.

All day long the cannonade was kept up between the two forces. The enemy were constantly receiving reinforcements from the rear, trains could be seen coming up in rapid succession laden with troops from Tel-el-Kebir. Two regiments of cavalry were seen drawn up in readiness to charge; at one time these swept round upon our right flank, but they refused to come near enough to give the Guards, who were burning to be at them, a chance of charging them, for the fire of their numerous artillery was too heavy for them to ride far out on to the plain to attack them.

The enemy's guns were well served, and their shell fell fast in and around the British force. Little harm was done, however, the percussive shells sunk deeply into the sand before exploding, while the time-fuses of the shrapnel were cut so badly that they exploded high in air. Captain Parr of the mounted infantry and Lord Melgund were wounded, five men were killed and nine men wounded. No less than forty-eight cases of sunstroke occurred.

The day was a trying one for the men, the sun blazed down upon them with terrible force as they lay on the sand behind the

low entrenchments they had thrown up. They had no water, and as the enemy would not advance there was nothing to do but to suffer the heat and thirst doggedly. Late in the afternoon the brigade of Guards arrived upon the ground, and the firing ceased upon both sides. Some hours earlier four guns had arrived to the assistance of those which, under the command of Lieutenant Hickman, R.A., had so long sustained a duel with the vastly superior force of the enemy. It was the brilliant manner in which these guns were fought, and the extreme accuracy of their fire, which had deterred the enemy from advancing.

In the course of the evening the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards came up. Two Gatling guns manned by sailors had accompanied the column in its advance, and had been all day in readiness to give an efficient support to the infantry should the enemy advance upon the position, and these were now reinforced by a detachment of their comrades from the fleet in a steam-launch which came up the fresh-water canal with a Nordenfeldt gun.

As morning broke the troops prepared for an advance against the Egyptian position at El Magfar, but as they moved forward they found, to their intense disgust and disappointment, that the enemy had withdrawn their twelve guns from the positions which they had occupied on the previous day, and had altogether disappeared. The general now determined to push forward as far as Kassassin; here there was a lock on the canal, whose possession would ensure a supply of water for the troops as far as that point, and would enable stores and provisions to be carried up by the ships' launches and boats.

It had already been discovered that the carts sent out with the expedition were wholly unfitted for the country. Their wheels sunk deeply in the sand, and the horses and mules, which had not yet recovered from the effects of the voyage, and were unaccustomed alike to the extreme heat and to the soft unsteady ground, were unable to drag along anything like heavy loads. Unfortunately the troops on their landing at Ismailia had not succeeded in capturing any of the railway-engines, and very few trucks or carriages had fallen into their hands, consequently, so far the

railway was not available as a means of transport; the possession of the canal, therefore, so long as sufficient water remained in it for the passage of steam-launches and boats, was simply invaluable.

The enemy had not fallen back far, and the general determined to pivot his force, whose left rested on the canal, by sweeping the right round across the desert and then bringing them down upon the canal,—a movement which, if successful, would have caught the whole of the enemy's troops behind El Magfar as in a net. The 84th were on the left, next to them was a battalion of marine artillery, and beyond these the 38th. The next to the 38th was a battery of artillery, then came the brigade of Guards, while the 60th Rifles formed the right of the infantry lines, the battalion of marines being in reserve.

On the extreme right were the cavalry and a battery of horse-artillery; these were commanded by General Drury Lowe. The movement commenced by the advance of the cavalry and horse-artillery far out in the desert, while at the same time the battery between the 38th and the Guards began to throw its shell into the enemy's position, while the infantry advanced slowly up on the left, more rapidly on the right.

The enemy's artillery opened at once, but they fired only a few rounds. The sight of the cavalry, which, far out on the plain, were already bearing somewhat down towards the canal, was altogether too much for them. They perceived at once that their line of retreat was menaced, and would in a few minutes be cut. They at once limbered up their guns, while the infantry rushed into the trains which had brought them from Tel-el-Kebir, and these immediately began to steam away, the cavalry and artillery galloping off at the top of their speed, raising great clouds of dust as they went.

When our force approached the enemy's position they found that the village of Tel-el-Mahuta was deserted. Behind it the enemy had with great labour erected a formidable series of entrenchments. One earthwork completely barred the railway, and if defended could not have been carried without heavy loss. Behind this many store-tents full of provisions were found. While

the infantry were marching without opposition into the village, the cavalry made a wide circuit among the sand-hills and came down upon the railway near the Mahsamah station.

The horse-artillery at once became engaged with an enemy's battery of seven Krupp guns near the station, while the cavalry were at work to the rear of the Egyptian camp there. The infantry were drawn up to defend it, but after firing a hasty volley, which caused some twenty casualties among the cavalry, they broke and fled wildly as the long line of horsemen charged down upon them. Another minute, and the cavalry were among them cutting them up in all directions. A party of Egyptian cavalry drawn up in order made a show of charging down upon the flank of our men, but a squadron of the Life Guards wheeled round in readiness to meet them, and the Egyptians at once galloped off. When our cavalry were first seen charging down upon the Egyptian camp a train in the station had at once started, and as soon as the charge was over the dragoons started in pursuit. It had not yet got up its full speed, and they came up to it and endeavoured to arrest its course by firing at the driver. The man, however, stooping low by his fires, escaped their shots, and gradually, to the intense mortification of the men, the train drew away from them, and they brought their panting horses to a stand-still.

The train would have been an invaluable capture, as the engine would have enabled us to utilize the railroad. The cavalry had, however, good reason to be satisfied with the result of the morning's work; the seven Krupp guns which had been engaged with the horse-artillery were captured, 120 standing tents, a large number of Remington rifles, and an immense amount of stores and ammunition fell into their hands, and seventy-five railway wagons loaded with provisions were found in the station.

The infantry went into camp at Mahuta, while a battalion of Guards went on to Mahsamah to enable General Lowe to hold that position should the enemy take heart and endeavour to recapture it. As the troops had passed over the ground which the Egyptians had held the previous day signs were evident of the terribly destructive fire of shrapnel-shell when burst at exactly

the right spot. One of the first of these shells, fired by Lieutenant Hickman, had burst over two of the enemy's guns, and had killed the whole of the men working them and every horse in the teams. During the rest of the day not another shot was fired from these two guns.

The services of the sailors were at this time invaluable. Not only did all the hard work of landing the stores fall upon them, but owing to the complete failure of the transport the advance troops were wholly dependent upon their efforts for food. The obstructions which the Egyptians had thrown across the canal were removed, and the ship-launches towing boats laden with provisions and stores plied unceasingly up and down the canal, of which some twenty miles were in our hands. The Indian contingent were now coming up from Suez, and on the 25th, the day on which the second fight took place, the Bengal Lancers, 19th Hussars, and the artillery of the contingent landed at Ismailia.

These light and active cavalry, horses and men both accustomed to heat, were infinitely better suited for the work and climate than were the heavy horses and men of the Household Cavalry. For a charge nothing can be finer than the heavy cavalry of the British army, but they are wholly unsuited for the constant and fatiguing duties of scouting during a campaign, more especially across deep and heavy ground.

On the 26th of August a reconnoitring party of the 7th Dragoon Guards occupied Kassassin lock on the fresh-water canal, and the York and Lancashire Regiment (the 84th), the Duke of Cornwall's Regiment (the 46th), the royal marine artillery, and two guns of the royal horse-artillery also moved out there. The Household Cavalry, the 4th and 7th Dragoons, the 3d Bengal Cavalry, the 30th Bengal Lancers, and the mounted infantry were all on that day gathered at Mahsamah. At Mahuta were the three regiments of Guards, the 60th Rifles, a company of royal engineers, and eight guns of the royal artillery. The West Kent Regiment were at Nefiche, while at Ismailia were three companies of royal engineers and seven guns.

An armoured railway truck, with a 40-pounder and a Gatling gun, went up to the front drawn by sixteen horses. Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff had returned to Ismailia.

On the afternoon of the 27th a most important arrival took place. An engine with nine trucks steamed in from Suez. The Egyptians before evacuating that town on the landing of the blue-jackets and marines from the men-of-war had carried off with them all the engines and railway stock, and no assistance could therefore be obtained from that quarter.

The engine which had arrived had been shipped at Alexandria and brought down the canal. As there was no possibility of landing it at Ismailia it had been taken on to Suez and there put on shore. The train was made up and filled by sailors from the *Euryalus* and *Ruby*, who brought with them a Gatling and a 7-pounder. A half company of Madras sappers and miners accompanied them in order to repair the road should it be found that the wandering Bedouins had at any point pulled up the rails. The line, however, was found to be in fair working order, and the journey from Suez to Ismailia was performed in five hours.

While General Drury Lowe was surveying the village of Kassassin a respectable-looking man came up and entered into conversation with him in French. While they were talking an Egyptian officer who had been taken prisoner passed under an escort. As he went by the Egyptian officer exclaimed: "That man is Mahmoud Fehmy—Arabi's second in command." The man was at once arrested, and acknowledged that he was Mahmoud Fehmy. His capture was of the utmost importance.

Mahmoud Fehmy was the most distinguished pupil whom the military school at Cairo had produced. Before the commencement of the military movement he was inspector-general of fortifications. When Arabi rose to power he supported him warmly, and was appointed by him minister of public works. He designed the lines of entrenchment at Kafr-dowar and at Tel-el-Kebir. At the latter place he was nominally the adviser of Rached Bey, who commanded the troops there, but practically he was in command of the force.

He had been charged with being one of the authors of the massacres and incendiarism at Alexandria. His capture had been the result of accident. He had come out from Tel-el-Kebir in a train to reconnoitre, and when near the village had stopped the train, alighted, and ascended a hill. While he was absent the engine-driver caught sight of our soldiers, and at once turned on the steam and retired with the train. When Fehmy came down the hill with the servant who had accompanied him, ignorant of the reason of the sudden retirement of the train, he walked on the line until he came to the village, which he expected to find occupied by Egyptian troops. When he discovered the position of things, with great coolness and presence of mind he at once walked up to the English general and entered into conversation with him in the character of a resident proprietor of land in the neighbourhood of the village, and had he not been detected by the Egyptian officer he would doubtless have passed unsuspected, and would have been able to retire from the village and make his way back to Tel-el-Kebir.

After his capture he chatted freely with our officers. Among other matters they learned from him that there were five field-batteries of Krupp guns, besides three batteries of guns in position.

Soon after daybreak on the 28th heavy firing was heard in the front, and the troops at Mahsamah at once saddled up and fell in in readiness to march to the assistance of General Graham at Kassassin. An officer, however, presently arrived from him with news that the firing was in the enemy's camp, and could only be explained upon the supposition that either the Egyptians were fighting among themselves, or that they were having a sort of field-day, practising defensive operations in case of attack.

At eleven o'clock, however, the flags of the signaller on some sand-hills above Kassassin were seen in motion, and the news was telegraphed that the enemy were approaching. The Household Cavalry and the 7th Dragoon Guards at once moved forward to Kassassin, and the 19th Hussars were sent forward by General Willis to Mahsamah from Mahuta, while the Guards fell in under

arms and prepared to march should they be required. This, however, was not the case.

The enemy's force consisted of two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. They halted at a distance from the camp, and an artillery duel was kept up all day between the Egyptian battery and General Graham's two guns. The enemy then fell back. Their conduct appeared to our men to be inexplicable, but the probable intention of Arabi was to keep our men under arms the whole day in the blazing sun, and so to fatigue and exhaust them before he delivered the attack in force which he had prepared.

The cavalry returned to Mahsamah. Their horses were unsaddled, but they and their riders had scarcely begun to eat when, from the place from which they had just returned, the roar of guns again broke out. It was late in the afternoon, but the sun was still beating down fiercely, and the hot withering wind was raising the sand-clouds so high in air that it was impossible to see what was going on, but through the dust and haze white smoke wreathing up from many points showed where the guns of the enemy were hard at work.

Heavier and heavier grew the cannonade, and to this was now added a steady and continuous roll of musketry. It was evident that the camp at Kassassin was this time attacked in earnest. The trumpet sounded again, there was a hasty putting on of jackets and accoutrements, a last mouthful of food and drink of water were taken, and then the saddles were replaced on the backs of the weary horses, the bits forced into their unwilling mouths, and the cavalry and artillery are again on their way out into the desert.

General Drury Lowe was ignorant of the strength with which the enemy were attacking the camp, but that they were in force was certain from the heavy and continuous firing, and he determined to repeat the tactics which had succeeded so well in the previous fight, and to work round into the rear of the enemy. It was a bold step to take with men and horses already weary with a long day's work in heavy sand, under a blazing sun, but in this way, far more than in any other, could efficient aid be given to the little force defending itself against tremendous odds. If successful

a stroke here would disorganize the whole attack, and the general had sufficient confidence in his men to make the attempt, backed though the enemy might be by a vastly superior force of cavalry, with men and horses fresh and ready for work.

The little force in Kassassin were indeed hard pressed, some 13,000 picked troops of the enemy, with forty guns, were attacking them, Arabi's plan being to crush one after another of the little British posts which were strung out one beyond the other in a manner which, against a European foe, would have entailed certain disaster, but though sorely pressed, Graham's little force held firmly to their positions.

On the left, next to the canal, were the marine artillery, then came the 46th (the Duke of Connaught's) light infantry, next to them the 84th (York and Lancaster), the slight earthworks sweeping round again in a semicircle to the canal. The mounted infantry under Lieutenant Piggott were out in front. Hundreds of shells burst in the little camp, and the Egyptians fought steadily and well, for knowing their immense superiority in numbers, and fighting under the eye of Arabi himself, they were this time confident of victory.

The cavalry were still making their way round over the desert. They were screened by sand-hills from the sight of the enemy, and although they occasionally broke into a trot, the tired horses sinking fetlock deep in the sand could not be kept at that pace. Nor indeed could they be pressed, for it was above all things necessary to have a reserve of strength when the time came to hurl them against the enemy, but none the less did the men fidget with anxiety and impatience to aid their comrades at Kassassin. The sun had sunk now, and the red angry glare in the west had grown dim and faded away, and now the moonlight streamed palely over the gray sand which rose in such clouds under the horses' hoofs that each squadron could scarce see that before it. Still the rattle and roar of the combat on the left never ceased, and the horsemen knew that the infantry were still stoutly holding out against the enemy.

By 7 o'clock the cavalry were fairly in rear of the firing, and



wheeled in that direction, advancing very slowly to allow the artillery to come up. Now they could see the flashes of the enemy's guns on the low sand-hills around Kassassin gleaming on the horizon like the flicker of excessive summer lightning. Slowly they approached the scene of conflict; it was almost dark, but as they crossed a low sand-hill the black mass showed up against the bright moon-lit sky, and the sharp crack of a field-gun followed by a sudden rush of a shell through the air and an explosion far away in the distance showed that the enemy had at last discerned the approaching squadrons.

Almost instantly nine flashes broke out one after another from the Egyptian guns fifteen hundred yards away, and almost simultaneously the sky above the cavalry seemed to be torn in pieces as by a mighty hurricane as the nine shells screamed on their course and burst, sending the showers of hissing shrapnel in all directions. As yet, however, the Egyptian gunners had not got the range. The cavalry moved down a slight hollow to the right, and the next salvo of shells flew harmlessly to their left.

Again they moved forward, and the gunners kept sight of them, another volley of shells burst over them, but the iron storm swept over and around the troops, and but few were struck down. Now tiny flashes flickered over the sand-hills, and the sharp ping of bullets told that the enemy's infantry were at work. Our battery had now come up, and in a few seconds after taking up their ground our guns spoke out their answer to the enemy's fire, and their shells could be seen to explode in quick succession among the guns of the Egyptian batteries.

The cavalry now advanced from the left, the 7th Dragoons, who were in front, opened out right and left to allow the Household Cavalry to advance between them. Already Herbert Stewart, Drury Lowe's brigadier major, had passed down the line the word, "The cavalry are to charge the guns." Sir Baker Russell was in front, and gave the word "charge."

Colonel Ewart led the Life Guards, and as the trumpet sounded the horses, wild with excitement, and seeming, like their riders, to have forgotten all their fatigue in their impatience to get at the

foe, broke into a gallop at the well-known signal, and like a thunderbolt the Household Brigade with the 7th Dragoons on either flank dashed forward through the darkness and hurled themselves upon the foe.

The Egyptian infantry opened a wild fire as they saw the dark wave thundering down upon them with the sabres gleaming in the moonshine like a white crest above them. Then, panic-stricken at the onslaught, they broke and fled. In an instant the horsemen were among them cutting and slashing. Many were cut down, more threw themselves on the sand and let the tide sweep over them. The advance was unchecked, and, passing over the remnants of the infantry, the Household Brigade charged in among the Egyptian guns. The gunners were sabred as they stood, the guns were captured, but there was no pause. Breaking up into squadrons now the cavalry broke up the masses of flying infantry and pursued them far across the desert, until, utterly worn out and exhausted, the horses came to a stand-still, and the men dismounting flung themselves down on the sand beside them as wearied as they.

The magnificent charge had decided the fight. No sooner had the guns of the horse-artillery opened upon their rear than the Egyptian attack on the camp began to waver. The thought that the British were upon their line of retreat to Tel-el-Kebir struck them with something like a panic, and even before the horsemen were in motion the infantry on the slopes above Kassassin had begun to fall back, but not unmolested. The defenders, too, had heard the outburst of fire which told that the long-looked-for aid was at hand, that the British cavalry and guns were in the rear of the enemy, and, leaping to their feet with a cheer, the British marines and infantry sprang over the low sheltered trenches which they had for hours stubbornly defended, and advanced upon the enemy.

The Egyptians did not await the attack. The deep dull thunder of the cavalry charge, followed by the cessation of the fire of their own battery, told its tale, and at once the thirteen thousand men, who had advanced a few hours before confident in their power to

crush the little force at Kassassin, were hurrying away a mere horde of fugitives, intent only upon regaining their lines at Tel-el-Kebir. Their losses in the retreat were small. The numerous hollows between the sand-hills shrouded them from the view of the cavalry, who, indeed, were now incapable of further pursuit. Some, indeed, pressed the fugitives close up to their entrenchments, but the greater part, after resting their horses, made their way back to Kassassin weary and exhausted, but in the highest spirits over their successful charge.

From their ignorance of the country they were unable to find the guns they had captured; and when in the morning a search was made for them it was in vain, for it afterwards turned out that the Egyptian cavalry as they fell back came across the guns, and, finding no foes near them, harnessed up and carried them off to Tel-el-Kebir. Unfortunately the cavalry, in their haste to press forward and complete the rout of the enemy, omitted to spike the guns before advancing.

This decisive blow so shook the confidence of Arabi's soldiers that it was some time before they again ventured out of their entrenchments. Indeed there is little doubt that had General Graham had two or three more infantry regiments at hand he might have advanced at once upon Tel-el-Kebir, which he could have carried with scarce a shadow of resistance by the dispirited Egyptians.

Our losses were comparatively slight. Surgeon-major Shaw was the only officer killed; Major Forster and Captain Reeves, and Lieutenant Cunningham of the Duke of Cornwall's Infantry were slightly wounded, as were Lieutenant Piggott and Lieutenant Edwards of the mounted infantry, and Major Townshend of the 2nd Life Guards. Some seven or eight men were killed, and about seventy wounded.

In the morning the enemy's dead were found scattered over the space of a mile and a half of ground. Our wounded were taken into Ismailia by boats along the canal, thus avoiding the pain and exhaustion of the long journey across the sand. During the day parties of troops went out and brought in the Egyptian wounded

lying scattered over the plain. The news of the fight had been passed along the line, and the Duke of Connaught got the brigade of Guards at Mahuta under arms and marched towards the scene of the engagement, until met by the news that the victory was already won and the assailants of the garrison of Kassassin in full retreat.

The cavalry had returned before daybreak to Mahsamah as there was no forage for their horses at Kassassin. When they paraded it was found that Lieutenant Tribble of the 7th Dragoon Guards and seven men of the Life Guards were missing, having in the darkness and in eagerness of pursuit become separated from their comrades. Most of their bodies were subsequently found.

The Indian cavalry now came on and joined the Household Brigade. The force at Kassassin was strengthened by another infantry regiment. The time passed heavily while the force waited until the supplies of provisions and ammunition should be accumulated in readiness for the advance.

Life was not pleasant at the camps along the canal. The food of the men and officers was tin-meat, rice, and bread, an inappetizing fare in a climate where the heat renders men indisposed to eat. Swarms of flies harassed the men and horses terribly, but the greatest privation of all was the want of good water. For this they were entirely dependent upon the canal. This was muddy and thick from the work required to be done in it to remove the dams which Arabi had thrown across, and what was worse, it stank from the numerous putrid carcasses of animals and bodies of men which floated in it.

The troops firmly believed that the enemy had tried to poison the water by throwing corpses into it, but this was highly improbable as the Khoran commands that those killed in action shall be buried with proper ceremonies, and the throwing of their dead into the canal would have created the strongest feeling of resentment among the Egyptian soldiery. It is probable that the bodies of dead found in the canal were those of the men wounded in the first action, who had endeavoured, but in vain, to make their retreat across the canal.

Almost daily reconnaissances were now made by the light and active Indian cavalry brigade under General Wilkinson, nearly

to the enemy's entrenchments. On the 29th, and again on the 30th, they pushed out. In each case Arabi's piquets retired as they advanced. The Egyptians were seen working busily at their entrenchments, and sketches were made of these. On the 31st the enemy's cavalry, after our own had retired, returned the visit by galloping up close enough to see what was going on at Kassassin. The work of getting forward supplies proceeded with extreme slowness. Only one of the engines which had now been brought was available for work on the railway, the others having broken down, and there being no means of repairing the machinery, even the one at work was constantly getting out of order and coming to a stand-still.

The troops in the advance camps were indeed almost entirely dependent for their food upon the navy, whose launches plied up and down the canal, which was, however, so shallow in many places that there was great difficulty in getting past, and only lightly laden boats could be taken up. For two days the horses of the cavalry were entirely without corn. Those of the Indian cavalry fared far better than the horses of the English troopers, for they had brought with them from India their usual following of grass-cutters, and these foraging assiduously over the country found in little hollows where in the rainy season pools had been formed, and on the outskirts of the few little villages along the line, sufficient green food to keep their horses in fair condition.

Practically the expedition was without transport of its own. The carts brought with them were useless. No steps had been taken to collect transport animals, and had it been required for the force to move away from the line of the railway and canal, they could not, however urgent the need, have advanced a day's march in any direction. The difficulties arose to a great extent from the fact that the advance had been made with much greater rapidity than had been expected.

It had been originally intended that the army as it landed should remain massed around Ismailia until ready to advance in a body; but the early successes had led to a small force being pushed on, and the attacks on the enemy had compelled the general

greatly to strengthen these posts, thus necessitating the feeding of a great number of men and animals at a distance from the base, an operation for which no provision had been made, and which necessarily threw a very heavy strain upon the transport.

The infantry of the Indian division, with their artillery and commissariat corps, landed at Ismailia between the 28th and 31st of August. Some relief was afforded by the arrival at Ismailia of Sultan Pacha and Ferrid Pacha, two Egyptian officials of high standing and influence. They had at first embraced the cause of Arabi, but had now come over to us. They at once opened negotiations with the Bedouins, and sent out proclamations to them inviting them to come in and to bring in their camels for transport and sheep and cattle for provisions, promising them good pay and treatment at our hands.

It may be convenient to pause here for a moment to cast a backward glance at some of the events and occurrences which preceded this stage of British intervention, but which we have necessarily left unnoticed during the heat and conflict of battle.

In England, the government, while necessarily endeavouring to carry out the financial scheme of their predecessors, had been committed to armed intervention against a rebellion, which, its promoters had, truly or falsely, declared to have been due in a great measure to the assumptions of the European controllers of a right to deal with the revenue and the internal government of the country. Most people in England had become aware that the policy of the western powers in relation to Egypt had been mainly grounded on the indebtedness of that country to the subjects of these powers who had become bondholders or otherwise creditors, but few people were informed of the actual amount owed by Egypt to Europe and of the work undertaken by the Dual Control. In 1881 the capital of the Egyptian debt was returned as—

Unified 4 per cent debt,	£57,776,340
Privileged debt,	22,608,800
Domain Loans at 5 per cent,	8,500,000
Daira Sanieh Loans at 4 to 5 per cent,	9,512,880
	<hr/>
	<u>£98,398,020</u>

To these was to be added the unsecured floating debt, amounting in round numbers to £5,000,000, so that the total reached a little over £103,000,000. The principal part of this debt had, as we have seen, been contracted by the khedive Ismail, and it was because of his appeal to England and France to help him out of his difficulties that the Dual Control was appointed, Lord Salisbury having agreed to it at the pressing solicitation of France. The authority and functions of the controllers have already been noticed—they were, as we have seen, defined by a decree of the khedive in 1879; and in April of the following year another decree appointed an International Committee of Liquidation, composed of seven members, who were required to examine into the financial position of Egypt and to draft a law of liquidation regulating the relations between Egypt and her creditors, the creditors of the issue of the Domain Loan being, however, excluded from the conferences of the committee. This commission estimated the normal resources of Egypt at £E.8,319,292,¹ and divided the sum into £E.3,799,262 for the service of the debt, and £E.4,520,000 for the administrative service. It was calculated that receipts would increase, and that this increase with the customs and the sum saved each year from the decrease in the capital of the debt would allow an annual increase in the sum set apart for administrative purposes; but the Commission of Liquidation, having made a reduction of about £2,000,000 sterling in the interest on the debt, decided:—

1. That all surplus derived from the revenues of the assigned administrations (customs, railways, and four mudirihs²), to whatever figure it might amount, should never be used except for the redemption of the debt.

2. And that even, in certain cases, the revenue of non-assigned administrations should contribute to this service, to complete an annual redemption equal to one-half per cent of the nominal capital of the unified debt.

Thus the revenues of the assigned administration could not be used for the endowment of the administrative service, and the only normal resource justifying the increase of the budgetary

¹ About £8,500,000 sterling.

² Prefectures or provinces under mudirs.

expenses beyond £E.4,520,030 was the disengaged surplus from the unassigned administrations. The disengaged surplus in 1880 was only £E.140,000; but it was found possible to add to this amount, in order to augment the resources of the extraordinary budget, a further sum of £E.394,000, because moneys voted to the department of public works were not spent. The surplus for 1881 fell to £110,551, and in preparing their budget for 1882 the controllers-general estimated that the surplus expenses would considerably exceed the probable resources of the extraordinary budget. The budget of the ministry of war for 1881 stood at £E.368,000. During the year it was increased by an annual surcharge of £E.54,000, and Arabi, as minister of war, insisted upon a further increase of £120,000 for 1882, making the total of the budget of the war department £542,000.

This was at the commencement of 1882; but after that, as we have seen, the control virtually ceased to exist; and in July, *after the intervention* of the British fleet and the bombardment of Alexandria, Tewfik had proclaimed the dismissal of Arabi Pasha from office as minister of war, and subsequently gave authority to the British forces to occupy and defend the country against the army of the rebels. This determination was deferred as long as there was any probability of Tewfik regaining authority in conjunction with Arabi, and there were many reasons for doubting the good faith of the khedive even at the time that he was obliged to rely on the protection of our marines against the insurgents and against the emissaries of the man who had been permitted to retain the office of minister of war and to control the government of the country.

It must be remembered, however, that the position of the khedive with regard to the sultan was an uneasy one. There were not wanting evidences of a desire on the part of the government at Constantinople to take advantage of the revolt and the condition of anarchy at Cairo, to send not only a commission but an armed force, the result of which might have been so to reduce the authority of the khedive as to eventually abolish the engagements which had been made with the viceregal family, and to rescind the

guarantees which had placed Egypt in a position of comparative independence of Turkish domination. The sultan energetically opposed the despatch even of one vessel of war from England and one from France to Alexandria for the reception and protection of Europeans, who would, it was believed, be in serious danger, in case of the hostilities which were expected to take place there. The situation was very difficult, and but for the judicious diplomacy of the Earl of Dufferin, who represented the British government at Constantinople and was ably supported by Sir Edward Malet, that difficulty might have been insuperable.

The sultan, however, fully appreciated and professed his readiness to recognize the large interests which Great Britain possessed in Egypt, and regarding England as a great Mussulman power he thought that we ought to pursue the same policy as, and to co-operate with Turkey, instead of persistently adopting the French view. On being assured that England had no other desire than to maintain the *status quo*, which amply secured to us all we wanted, namely, the freedom of the Isthmus of Suez and reasonably good government for the Egyptian people, with the maintenance of his own sovereign rights as already defined in international arrangements, he inquired of Earl Dufferin whether the English government objected to Tewfik Pasha, or if they wanted to remove him.

It was a suggestive question; but in reply Earl Dufferin said that he was not aware of any such desire. Apart from political dangers, another deposition would have borne hardly on Egyptian funds, for though by his own request Tewfik's allowance had been limited to £E.100,000 a year, the ex-khedive and all the family had to be provided for, and there was also Prince Halim, a son of Mohammed Ali, who in 1870 had agreed with the ex-khedive in consideration of an allowance of £60,000 a year for forty years to abandon all rights of succession, to give up all property belonging to him in Egypt, and to renounce for himself and his family and dependents the right of inhabiting or returning to Egypt. On the conclusion of this contract bonds had been deposited in Prince Halim's name with the Bank of England each for £30,000 payable

half-yearly for forty years, and with a right reserved to his highness for discounting two years' bonds, or £120,000 in advance. As in 1866 the prince had sold the bulk of his properties in Egypt to the Egyptian government for £1,210,000, and the engagement had been made on political grounds, the Commission of Liquidation, when they came to consider it, regarded the money value of the consideration given by the prince as altogether out of proportion to the allowance, which represented a capital of £2,400,000. They therefore in 1879 recommended that the allowance should be reduced to £E.10,000 a year, and by a decision of the Egyptian government it was reduced to £E.15,000 a year, and all the bonds except the four which the prince had the right of discounting were declared null and void.

Prince Halim, of course, protested, and tried, though unsuccessfully, to show that the value of the properties he had surrendered was greater than the sums he had received. This was proved to be very far from the truth, the lands and houses which he had given up having been of comparatively small value, and the calculations made by the prince of the value of successions which had fallen in, being entirely erroneous. The commission, however, restored to him the right to any future successions, relieved his children from the renunciation which he had made to their prejudice, permitted his allowance to date from the 1st of January, 1880, instead of the 1st of January, 1882, as had been proposed by the government, and provided a sum of £E.150,000 for the payment under the general conditions of the liquidation of bonds which to that extent the prince might have discounted.

These particulars may be found suggestive in the future consideration of Egyptian difficulties; and it should be noted that during the military revolt and the subsequent conspiracy and rebellion, there were grave suspicions that both the ex-khedive Ismail and Prince Halim were behind the scenes, and had prompted disaffection and resistance to authority.

With regard to Ismail, it is quite certain that his friends were then, and have since been, vigilantly waiting for an opportunity to promote his restoration to the khedivate, and his friends were

numerous and influential. A writer in a leading daily newspaper puts the case emphatically in the following words:—"He was a great borrower; we cannot wonder, therefore, that he has devoted champions on every European bourse. He was a patron—a liberal, a lavish patron—to all whose calling it was to minister to pleasure or add external magnificence to a state. Naturally he was popular with those whom he employed. We may say more: he was a speculator, a prince of boundless enterprise, a promoter of public works, an agriculturist on the largest scale. Therefore he earned the good-will, and, no doubt, retains the confidence of all who find interest or profit where great engineering work is to be done, or commerce to be invited to new channels. Many foreigners made fortunes in Egypt during the reign of Ismail Pasha; many more found employment, at any rate, of a remunerative kind. Is it surprising that these, and others who would fain fare as well, should wish to see on the throne once more the prince who was so prodigal of good things?

"Unfortunately it is not in the diaries and account-books of the French or English colony that the records of the Egyptian people are to be sought. In the history of the fellahen the gloomiest pages must be devoted to the days when Ismail held sway. He had grand ideas, to be sure. He appreciated the advantages of European skill and honesty in developing the resources of his dominions. Still more acute was his perception of the magic that lurked in the employment of European capital. But what good came of it all to the toilers of the Delta and the Nile Valley? Did it lighten the pressure of their poverty to know that the new opera-house at Cairo was one of the prettiest in the world, and that *Aïda* was produced there for the first time in a style to move the envy of La Scala? Did it mitigate the tortures of the kourbash for the victim to learn that palace after palace was rising at the capital, and in all kinds of out-of-the-way spots up the Nile, as monuments of the unscrupulous ostentation of the prince? We shall be told of the railways, of the canals, and, above all, of the part played by an enlightened khedive in the accomplishment of M. de Lesseps' great work. We admit, of course, that the outlay

in these departments contrasts favourably with the utter waste in various forms of court display. But when the advantage to the people is in question, the test to be applied is a very simple and a very conclusive one. Man for man, were the people of Egypt better off under the europeanized Ismail than under the feeble Said or the vigorous but comparatively unenlightened Mehemet Ali? Everyone knows that their condition was infinitely worse, and that when the sultan issued his firman deposing Ismail it had reached the breaking point of wretchedness. Or, apply another test. Did the expenditure on public works pay? The bankruptcy of the exchequer is sufficient answer. A business that yields no dividends is obviously a losing concern to all involved, and in the Egyptian copartnership the many suffered for the follies of one man. The one European accomplishment which the khedive thoroughly and absolutely mastered was the art of borrowing; and his triumph is seen in the suffering and decrepitude of Egypt as we have known it in recent years. If good finance is good policy, bad finance is the sum and substance of national disaster. Every evil of Egypt dates from the unhappy time when Ismail gambled—and gambled in the most reckless manner—with the resources of the state.”

It need scarcely be said that the suspicions of an attempt to restore Ismail and of a coincident plot by Hamil were additional causes for intervention, and early in the year 1882 it had become evident that the responsibility of that intervention would fall upon England.

We have already seen with what difficulties our government had to contend in consequence of the objections of the new French ministry to follow the previous policy of M. Gambetta, and act in concert with England; or, on the other hand, to support the proposal of our foreign office that the sultan should be called upon temporarily to occupy Egypt under the control of France and England, and with definite guarantees and conditions.

During the delay and indecision caused by the difficulty of obtaining any decided concert with France the English ministry were reticent on the subject of their policy in Egypt, and the

pressure and taunts of the opposition failed to produce any expression of their intentions. It was not till the second week in June that Sir Charles Dilke laid on the table of the house the first instalment of the papers relating to Egypt, and they referred only to events which had occurred in the early part of the year. We have seen that in the next stage of negotiations the European powers were invited to a conference at Constantinople where we were ably represented by Earl Dufferin. The French cabinet reluctantly assented to the presence of a Turkish man-of-war at Alexandria, and repeated efforts were made to induce, first the khedive, then the sultan, and finally Dervish Pasha (who had been on a special mission from the sultan to the khedive) to put a stop to the military works which were being pushed forward on the fortifications of Alexandria. These latter representations remained without result, and yet so unwilling was our government to undertake the responsibility of acting alone that it was not till every effort had been exhausted to secure the alliance of France, and Alexandria was in a state of lawless riot, that our fleet prepared to take active measures.

Mr. Gladstone had declared in the House of Commons that the government would protect Tewfik's life and position against any pretender, and would oppose to the uttermost the substitution of Halim Pasha, whom Arabi was supposed to support. There was a strong feeling in some quarters that our government was too submissive to French influence, or too considerate of French susceptibilities. The English government had, in fact, endeavoured to sustain three principles, by which they sought to guide any action that might be taken:—To retain the co-operation of France, and fully to carry out the system of dual control which had been instituted by their predecessors, also with a view to propitiating French interests. To respect the claims and the position of the Sultan and the Porte, and at the same time to refuse to allow them to act independently in Egypt:—a difficult matter, because the sultan, as chief of the Mohammedan religion, was of importance in relation to many of the native rulers in India as well as to those in Algeria and in Tunis, where the French had, by their persistent demands, caused an irritable and resentful feeling. Lastly, it was

necessary for us to do our best to maintain something like a settled and regular government in Egypt, that we might thereby secure our predominating influence on the highway to India, and also guard against the imposition upon the country of an international control, which would inevitably lead to European discord and ultimate confusion.

For the latter reason our government was ready at the first meeting of the conference at Constantinople to adhere to what was called the self-denying protocol, first suggested by the French. By this abstinence from undue claims to interference the two western powers were afterwards able to ask for the co-operation of the sultan, and while inviting him to send troops to restore order in Egypt, could impose restrictions which would have made such an expedition little more than, if as much as, a police force under the Dual Control. Of course there were delays. The sultan did not readily consent to the terms on which his interposition would alone be accepted, and while the conditions were being discussed and settled the riots and massacres in Alexandria, the bombardment of the forts, and the withdrawal of the French fleet from active co-operation, left England the sole representative of "the united action and authority of Europe."

In reviewing the events of the first half of the year, Lord Granville, writing to Lord Dufferin on July 11, the day of the bombardment of the Alexandria forts, thus summed up the situation:—

"The record of events in Egypt during the last few months shows that the whole administrative power has fallen into the hands of certain military chiefs, devoid of experience and knowledge, who, with the support of the soldiers, have set at naught the constituted authorities, and insisted on compliance with their demands. Such a condition of affairs cannot fail to be disastrous to the welfare of any civilized country. There seemed to be a moment when a firm assertion of authority by the khedive with the countenance of the sovereign power, backed by evidence of the support of England and France, and with no uncertain prospect of material intervention if the necessity arose, might suffice to

produce submission on the part of the officers, and to bring the movement within bounds. The attempt was made and unhappily has failed.

“Her majesty’s government now see no alternative but a recourse to force to put an end to a state of affairs which has become intolerable. In their opinion it would be most convenient, and most in accordance with the principles of international law and usage, that the force to be so employed should be that of the sovereign power. If this method of procedure should prove impracticable in consequence of unwillingness on the part of the sultan, it will become necessary to devise other measures. Her majesty’s government continue to hold the view expressed in their circular of February 11th, that any intervention in Egypt should represent the united action and authority of Europe. They have, in fact, no interests or objects in regard to Egypt which are inconsistent with those of Europe in general, nor any interests which are inconsistent with those of the Egyptian people. Their desire is that the navigation of the Suez Canal should be maintained open and unrestricted; that Egypt should be well and quietly governed, free from predominating influence on the part of any single power; that international engagements shall be observed; and that those British commercial and industrial interests which have been so largely developed in Egypt shall receive due protection and shall not be exposed to outrage—a principle which is not applicable only to Egypt, but is essential for our national progress in all parts of the world. The policy pursued by them has been consistent: they have loyally acted up to their engagements with France; they have been anxious also that the other powers should be informed and consulted in all matters affecting the position of the country. The action to which their admiral has been compelled to resort has not altered their views in this respect.”

The action of the government in ordering what was represented to be an armed intervention in the affairs of Egypt was denounced by some speakers both in and out of parliament; and questions were asked whether the bombardment of Alexandria had been

for the purpose of protecting British interests or to protect the interest of British and French bondholders; but the majority of members in the house, and a still larger comparative majority of the people outside it, did not take this view of the case, and approved the definite though tardy decision that had been come to. Mr. Gourley moved an adjournment of the house for the purpose of obtaining some explanation of the government policy, and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, on seconding the motion, characterized the intervention and the bombardment as a national crime, declaring that we were at war, having no distinct information what we were fighting for, and without there having been any declaration of war. He protested against what had taken place as "an act of international atrocity," and "a cowardly, and cruel, and criminal act." Like most violent statements this carried few people away with it, and Mr. Gladstone's reply was received with considerable satisfaction, though he declined to discuss the reason of the withdrawal of the French fleet, or our exclusive exercise of our responsibility. He would not admit that we were at war with Egypt. Our action there was to break down a military tyranny which the government knew was in defiance of the orders of the sultan and of the wishes of the khedive. The government had abjured every selfish object, and it was not against the people of Egypt, but against those who were oppressing the people, that operations were being directed. The measures taken at Alexandria were strictly measures of self-defence, and the sufferers by them were those who sought to establish a system of military violence in spite of the wishes and against the interests of the Egyptian people.

Even the withdrawal of Mr. Bright from the cabinet did not in the slightest degree influence the conclusion at which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues had arrived. Mr. Bright's explanation of the reasons for his retirement were brief enough. In fact he began by saying he had no explanation to make. "There seems nothing to explain, and I have nothing to defend. The simple fact is, that I could not agree with my late colleagues in the government in their policy with regard to the Egyptian question.

It has been said, Why have I not sooner left the government? Why have I postponed it to this time? I may answer that by saying, that my profound regard for my right honourable friend at the head of the government, and my regard also for those who now sit with him, have induced me to remain with them until the very last moment, when I found it no longer possible to retain my office in the cabinet. The fact is, that there was a disagreement to a large extent founded on principle; and now I may say, that if I had remained in office it must have been under these circumstances—either that I must have submitted silently to many measures which I myself altogether condemned, or I must have remained in office in constant conflict with my colleagues. Therefore, it was better for them and better for me—the house will, I am sure, unanimously agree to that—that I should have asked my right honourable friend to permit me to retire, and to place my resignation in the hands of the queen. The house knows—many members at any rate who have had an opportunity of observing any of the facts of my political life know—that for forty years at least I have endeavoured to teach my countrymen an opinion and doctrine which I hold, namely, that the moral law is intended, not only for individual life, but for the life and practice of states in their dealings with one another. I think that in the present case there has been a manifest violation both of international law and of the moral law, and, therefore, it is impossible for me to give my support to it. I cannot repudiate what I have preached and taught during a rather long political life. I cannot turn my back upon myself and deny all that I have taught to many thousands of others during the forty years that I have been permitted at public meetings and in this house to address my countrymen. Only one word more. I asked my calm judgment and my conscience what was the part I ought to take. They pointed it out to me, as I think, with an unerring finger, and I am endeavouring to follow it.”

Mr. Gladstone had also, no doubt, inquired of *his* calm judgment and his conscience, and probably felt that this country was justified in interposing between the revolted troops and the

rebellious followers of Arabi on the one hand and the Europeans and the people of Egypt on the other, even though a large proportion of those people were believed to be ready to support the revolt which would end in anarchy, succeeded by tyranny and oppression. The premier commented but briefly on Mr. Bright's statement, expressing the regret of those who were, and still desired to be, Mr. Bright's colleagues. He declared that he agreed with that gentleman in thinking that the moral law was as applicable to the conduct of nations as to that of individuals, but he differed from him in this particular application of it.

It was then that we were committed to a military intervention, and the decision of the government was supported by public opinion. It was expected, however, that the delay which subsequently occurred was for the purpose of effectually suppressing the revolt, and—when after the bombardment of Alexandria no troops were landed, and it was known that the forces of Arabi had been able to retire unmolested and take up a defensive and offensive position—great dissatisfaction was expressed in many quarters at a hesitation which appeared to be inexplicable, and was believed to be unnecessary. Thus the opposition to the government consisted both of those who contended that it was impolitic, if not criminal, to have done anything at all, and those who declared that we had not done enough, and had lost the opportunity of interposing effectually, first by waiting on France, and afterwards by permitting weak and unimportant scruples to cause delay, which would be followed by more serious consequences than if we had at once occupied Alexandria, and not only prevented the destruction of a large part of the city and the loss of many lives, but cut off the troops of Arabi from retreat, forced them to surrender, and crushed the revolt.

In the debate on the vote of credit all shades of opinion were expressed. The government was severely blamed by many members of the opposition, as well as by a few of those who in general supported it; but the ministry was strong enough in its following to obtain the support both of parliament and the country; and, as we have seen, when once it was determined to call out the

reserves, and send an adequate force to Egypt, the troops and all the equipments were despatched with remarkable promptitude and almost unexampled efficiency.

Doubtless one reason for the complacency with which the long-delayed but now determined attitude of England was regarded both here and abroad, was the emphatic declaration of Mr. Chamberlain on behalf of the ministry, that the government had done all in their power to enlist the action of the sultan on their side, and that they had at no time shown any distrust of the Chamber of Notables. This was in reply to Mr. Gorst, who had accused them on both points. Mr. Chamberlain also dwelt with emphasis on the danger to Europeans all over the East, if Arabi were to be allowed to defy the powers; and he repeated the assertion previously made, that the Egyptian ex-minister of war was a mere military adventurer and opposed to the national party. It was only for the purpose of putting down the revolt, and liberating the true exhibition of national feeling, that the government had undertaken armed intervention. When this object should be effected they would recall the forces without attempting to carry out any selfish purpose.

All the time that these discussions were going on, the diplomatic conferences were being held at Constantinople, where the difficulty was at once to secure the support of the sultan, and to prevent his influence from taking the form of an armed occupation of Egypt. He was urged to proclaim Arabi a rebel, and to countenance the occupation of the country by a force under the command of French and English generals. After apparently interminable delays and adjournments that each representative at the conference might consult his government upon every proposal, and upon verbal alterations suggested for insertion in the protocols, the difficulty was solved by the successive events which made decisive action necessary for the preservation of the country from anarchy. On the 28th of July the German ambassador in Paris notified to the French government the resolution, agreed to by Austria, Russia, Germany, and Italy, of placing the canal under the joint protection of the six great powers. It was on the following day that the

French ships withdrew from all active co-operation, and on the 2d of August Admiral Hewett occupied Suez on behalf of the khedive, while at the same time it was agreed—on the proposal of the Italian ambassador—that a purely maritime service for the police and supervision of the canal should be established, with the proviso that the land police service should be only temporary. The next business was the arrangement of the military convention, and the text of the proclamation against Arabi. Drafts of these documents were constantly passing between the powers, and again numberless alterations and suggestions occupied many days. Although it had been authoritatively stated that on the 10th of August Ottoman troops would start for Egypt, the month passed without a single Turkish soldier being landed there, and as we know, the campaign was concluded and the rebellion suppressed without Turkish intervention or co-operation.

To understand the attitude of the French government and their withdrawal from active co-operation with England after the combined fleets had reached Alexandria, it is desirable to glance briefly at the course of events in relation to the policy of the ministry of M. de Freycinet, which had succeeded that of M. Gambetta.

In the early part of the year, when the English and French controllers-general were protesting that if their powers were restricted by the Egyptian Chamber of Notables so that they would have no control over the budget, they would be unable to prevent national bankruptcy, fears had arisen in France that the cabinet of M. de Freycinet might be led by England to consent to an armed intervention. On the 23d of February that minister stated that he firmly hoped no intervention would be necessary, and that the result would be obtained by the attitude of the government. "The chamber must hope that we shall not take part in any military intervention. The chamber may be certain that as long as we are on these benches no adventure need be feared." This was all very well; but only six weeks had then elapsed since it had become evident that there would be a struggle between the khedive and the military party who had joined Arabi, and the consuls of France and England had been instructed to assure Tewfik of the

support of both powers. It was but five weeks since the Porte had thereupon remonstrated, declaring the action of France and England to be unnecessary and contrary to precedent. The effect of this declaration of the sultan's government had encouraged the Egyptian ministers to menace the European control, and to compel the khedive to sign the decree conferring on the Chamber of Notables the right to vote the budget, and thus to abrogate the powers assigned to the controllers by the decree of 1879, which gave them the right to investigate every part of the Egyptian financial system, and made them rank with ministers, having a voice in all questions concerning the financial situation of Egypt.

When the report of the controllers was presented to the khedive it showed a surplus of revenue over expenditure of £600,000 yearly for 1880-1881, a surplus which was devoted partly to public works and partly to the redemption of the debt; but the budget of the chamber for 1882 had imperilled the liquidation scheme by exceeding the amount of the allowances fixed by the Commission of Liquidation, and by increasing by nearly one-half the military estimates. At the same time the execution of reforms in provincial administration and all other projects of improvement had been arrested by the military disturbances.

Then came the defiance of the khedive's authority by his ministers, and the events already referred to in these pages, the result of which was that M. de Freycinet—who, in February had firmly hoped that no intervention would be needed—telegraphed on the 15th of May to M. de Noailles, the French minister at Constantinople, saying that the governments of France and England had decided to send to Alexandria a squadron then in course of formation at Suda, and instructing him so to communicate with the sultan, by means of a moderate hint, as to aid in preventing all Turkish meddling in Egypt. It will be remembered that the English government had been anxious to secure the restricted co-operation of the Porte, and that France resisted it, not perhaps without good diplomatic reasons if we regard the subsequent intrigues of the Turkish government. Now that there appeared to be an intention actively to co-operate with England, and the

English and French ambassadors were to act in concert, the Porte, as we have seen, declared that there was no necessity for the despatch of a French and English squadron, and even went so far as to assert that order had been restored in Egypt. When the Egyptian ministry had refused to resign, or to banish Arabi, and endeavoured to compel the khedive to reply to the demand of the French and English representatives by affirming the incompetence of England and France to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt, M. de Freycinet suddenly changed his opinions, and after having for three months refused to consent to the English proposals for a limited Turkish intervention, declared that if such intervention took place at the request of England and France it would be unobjectionable. A council held at the Elysée, on May 29th, agreed on a proposal for a conference in which France, England, and a Turkish delegate were to take part, in order to arrive at a provisional settlement of the existing crisis, but not for the purpose of preventing the conference, then in preparation, at Constantinople, and in which the other powers were to be represented.

Then followed the application made to the sultan by the Marquis de Noailles and Lord Dufferin to declare in favour of the khedive. Dervish Pasha was sent to Alexandria as commissary by the Porte and the riots broke out in Alexandria. The situation was again changed, the conference at Constantinople met on June 22d, and in the French chamber M. de Freycinet said that after the exchange of views which had just taken place, the great powers had recognized, on the invitation of France and England, the expediency of deliberating on the present situation in Egypt: the government of the Republic and the English government had consequently prepared to convene the representatives of the six great powers in conference.

It was then that the hand of Prince Bismarck began to be seen in the operations. The French people thought that they were in a dilemma: that they were being drawn by England into an enterprise which, if they actively prosecuted, would leave them exposed to the attack which they believed would then be made on

them by the German chancellor. This apprehension was sufficient to embarrass the French ministry, and the result was that the French men-of-war at Alexandria took no part in the bombardment, but steamed off to Port Said, leaving only two small gun-boats.

The position of the French ministry was precarious enough before; it now became disastrous. M. de Freycinet made an effort to maintain its existence by assuming that the protection of the Suez Canal was a question entirely separate from that of affairs in Egypt, and in this our government assisted him by joining in a representation to the conference that as all action should receive the sanction of Europe the conference itself should designate the powers who in case of necessity should protect the canal. Bismarck, however, was reluctant that France should, even in conjunction with England, be appointed conservator of European interests in the canal, and persistently refused to join in any such arrangement. A last effort was made by the French minister, and again the English government joined him in informing the conference that France and England were ready to protect the canal, and inviting other powers to join them. This was on the 24th of June, but some days elapsed and none of the other powers accepted the invitation.

It became evident that the De Freycinet cabinet could not much longer retain office; and Bismarck, who, though he wished to have them in his grasp, had no desire to replace them by a less vacillating or a stronger and more determined government, thought he saw a way out of the difficulty by inducing Turkey to accept the invitation of the powers to send troops to Egypt. He had not, perhaps, counted on having to deal with England, but the aspect of affairs had changed. We had been rapidly gathering our forces, and our government now demanded, that before Turkish troops should be landed in Egypt the Porte should conclude a military convention. The other powers had left the work to France and England. England had been deserted by France and left alone. Alone she would stand, but her position must be recognized by the powers who had promised their moral support. By requiring this convention before a Turkish soldier should be permitted to land in Egypt, we practically took the matter of intervention out of the hands of the

conference. Prince Bismarck had now to effect a diplomatic change of position, especially as he appeared desirous of saving the De Freycinet cabinet; and it was understood that he therefore instigated Italy to propose what he had before been instrumental in preventing, namely, a joint European protection of the canal by France and England with the consent of the other powers.

When the debate on the naval credit was opened in the French chamber on the 19th of July, it was believed that the powers represented in the conference would comply with the request of England and France and issue a mandate giving them the joint-protection of the canal. The alliance and co-operation with England was warmly commended by M. Gambetta, who said, that even at the cost of the greatest sacrifice that alliance should not be broken off. The position of France was, it seemed, to be ensured by the mandate of the conference conferring upon her the joint-protection of the canal, and the naval credit passed the chamber by a very large majority. But when the bill came before the committee of the senate, the minister had to repeat the intelligence that the conference had not consented to give the mandate. This was so serious a change, that on the motion for raising a second credit for the purpose of the protection of the canal, the debate was turned against the ministry; and M. Clemenceau said, that in contemplating the possibility of English, French, Italian, and German troops side by side on the banks of the canal he could distinguish the handiwork of a man who was preparing a conflagration in Europe. Almost as large a proportional majority voted against the credit as had supported the government in the former vote of the chamber; the De Freycinet cabinet resigned, and France had practically no more connection that year with affairs in Egypt or with the subsequent campaign.

It was believed by astute politicians that this was the aim of Prince Bismarck, who, being anxious to avoid any European complications, opposed the endeavour to form an Anglo-French alliance for the occupation of Egypt, which, he said, might lead to a conflict similar to that which had followed the Austro-Prussian occupation of Schleswig-Holstein; and when England took the

matter into her own hands, though it was in apparent opposition to his proposal for Turkish intervention, he gave our government the support of Germany.

Having thus given a backward glance at the conditions which had ended in the intervention of England—who commenced active operations with the decision and promptitude which were alike necessary for the successful suppression of the rebellion and the compensation for previous delays—we may return to the prosecution of the campaign and its operations after the fight at Kassassin to the final victory at Tel-el-Kebir.

We left our troops resting after the battle at Kassassin, with the people of the country bringing provisions into camp, in consequence of the assurances of the two pashas who had joined our forces, and were using their influence to negotiate with the Bedouins for the purchase of provisions.

The first result of their negotiation was that on the 1st of September the nomads brought in 200 sheep, which furnished a welcome ration of fresh meat to the troops. On the same day a large number of labourers arrived from Cyprus. This afforded a vast relief to the over-worked men at Ismailia; hitherto no native labourer had been available, and the whole work had fallen upon the sailors, the Royal Engineers, Indian Sappers, and the men of the regiments last landed. The sailors had, indeed, been doing the chief work of the expedition. Upon them fell the enormous labour of landing all the stores for the expedition. It was they alone who had supplied the troops along the canal with food, and some soreness had been felt that, whereas the toil of the expedition fell upon their shoulders, they had hitherto been unrepresented at the front. This feeling was, however, allayed by the invitation by the general to the admiral to furnish a naval brigade of 200 men with machine-guns to go to the front.

Two more engines had now arrived, and on the 2nd of September Sir Garnet Wolseley and Admiral Seymour went up with Admiral Hoskins, the Duke of Teck, and several others, to inspect the situation in front. They started early in the morning

from Ismailia in a steam-launch. At Mahuta they took train to Kassassin, but on the way down the engine, as usual, broke down, and the engineer officer in charge reported that it could not be repaired on the spot. There was nothing to be done but for the party in the train to make their way on foot to Mahuta, and soon the generals, admirals, and staff were tramping along through the sand.

At Mahuta the steam-launch was ready, and the party were taken back; the distinguished officers having had some feeble taste of what marching through the sands in the sun meant, and this hour's work no doubt enabled them to appreciate all the better the continuous labour of the men at Mahsamah. The Household Cavalry had now established a hospital. No medicines whatever had been sent up from Ismailia; but Dr. Hume-Spry impounded the contents of one of Arabi's field hospitals, which was captured at Mahsamah, and established a hospital for the Guards. The beds were made out of materials found in Arabi's camp together with all appliances, no conveniences whatever for the sick being forthcoming from Ismailia.

Large numbers of men were treated in this impromptu hospital for wounds, dysentery, sunstroke, and ophthalmia. The canal continued to fall steadily at the rate of an inch a day, and the large ships' launches could no longer be taken up. The heat, contrary to expectations, was increasing rather than diminishing, and the men suffered severely from the glare on the shadeless desert. In front the cavalry vedettes of both parties watched each other vigilantly night and day, and whenever an attempt was made on our side the enemy's cavalry appeared in such force that nothing short of a serious engagement would have enabled the reconnaissance to be carried out.

Colonel Tulloch, however, made one or two daring rides close up to Tel-el-Kebir and ascertained the general disposition of the enemy's camp. But although the line of railway and canal as far as Kassassin was completely in our hands it was by no means safe for small parties, still less for single individuals, to proceed from one camp to the other. The wandering Bedouins, although ap-

parently friendly and ready to bring in sheep and other provisions for sale, could seldom resist the temptation of taking a shot at any single man whom they might see. Several of our sentries were killed in this way, as well as men strolling a short distance from the camp.

An effort was made to punish these people; and a party of the Royal Irish, with the 13th Bengal Cavalry, went out from Mahsamah on the 4th to a village a mile distant on the other side of the canal. They started before daybreak and surprised the village asleep. It was found, however, to be inhabited only by peasants, who declared that they had been robbed of everything in the way of stores and supplies by Arabi's troops when stationed on the canal.

The work of accumulating stores went on slowly. No railway men had been sent out from England, and although the Royal Engineers are supposed, in addition to all their multifarious accomplishments, to possess a knowledge of locomotive work, that knowledge was so slight that the delays and stoppages were perpetual. For some time only two trains could be despatched daily with supplies, and these took five hours to do the twenty miles to Mahsamah.

The troops were poorly fed, "tin meat" being the staple of their food, impure water from the canal their drink; nor had they the alleviation of the two small luxuries of which soldiers think so much. Although the carriage of tobacco is so light that a camel load would have supplied the whole troops for two or three days none was sent to them, nor did they receive the allowance of rum, which, mixed with water and taken before bed-time, would have at once acted as a restorative after the fatigue of a day's work under a blazing sun, and would have corrected the effect of the poisonous decaying matters of all kinds in the water.

Arabi used every effort at this time to induce the Bedouins to block the Suez Canal, but his success was small; a few ships were fired at by wandering parties, and the pipes conveying fresh water from Ismailia to Port Said were once cut, but nothing further was done; nor, indeed, could the Arabs, had they been allowed

unmolested to gather upon the canal and endeavour to obstruct it, have effected anything in that direction.

The canal is of great extent, being large enough for two vessels of a large size to pass each other. Nowhere is it much above the level of the surrounding country, and at these places the bank is of great width and slopes so gradually down that an enormous quantity of earth would have to be moved to enable the water to escape. The only way in which the canal could have been blocked would have been by sinking a large and heavily-laden vessel across it. This might have been managed by a well-placed torpedo or possibly by a battery of field-guns; but as the Arabs possess neither torpedoes nor cannon they were impotent to arrest the stream of vessels which passed up and down the canal.

Arabi, on his part, was taking every advantage of the long delay in our advance. He was constantly strengthening his intrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir, had brought up all the troops from Cairo, and had fetched from Damietta the black regiments which formed the *élite* of the Egyptian army. His troops made frequent reconnaissances to endeavour to discover what we were doing, and several trifling skirmishes took place between them and our mounted infantry and cavalry. The frequent appearances of strong bodies of Arabi's cavalry within sight of our outposts kept the troops continually on the alert; for although the enemy seldom ventured within gun-shot distance of our pickets, they might at any moment sweep down in force, and the troops were therefore obliged to stand to arms whenever large bodies of the enemy's cavalry were in sight.

Some engines arrived from England at the end of the first week in September, and thenceforth the work of accumulating stores at the front progressed more rapidly. The troops were now moving gradually forward. The regiments which had hitherto remained on board ship were landed, and it became evident to the impatient troops that the end of their sufferings was approaching, and that the attack was soon to begin. The initiative was, however, taken by the Egyptians.

Early on the morning of the 9th a long line of Egyptian soldiers was seen marching down towards Kassassin from west and north-west, their white uniforms showing clear in the horizontal rays of the rising sun. Towards the north the ridges were crowded with them, and heavy masses could be seen on the south bank of the canal. At six o'clock the Bengal Lancers, stationed above the camp, were suddenly driven in by a large body of the enemy's cavalry, while columns of steam arising in the misty air behind showed that several trains were coming up from Tel-el-Kebir. Two of the Indian vedettes galloped off to camp to give warning of the approaching attack.

False alarms, however, had been so frequent that the news was received with languid disbelief, and the troops proceeded to fall in slowly and reluctantly. Trooper after trooper came galloping in from the front; and General Graham was at last convinced that the enemy this time were in earnest, and the infantry and guns were ordered to move out of camp. But the 13th Bengal Lancers, who had smartly turned out at the first alarm to support their vedettes, were now being driven back by the advancing masses of the enemy. The circle of sand-hills round Kassassin were already in their hands, and just as the column was marching out of camp thirty pieces of artillery opened fire in a semicircle upon it.

Their shells plumped in numbers into the camp, exploding among the tents and throwing the dust high in the air. Horses and cattle, panic-stricken at the sudden din, broke their fastenings and piquet ropes, and careered wildly through the camp, while the Indian followers shouted and ran and tried in vain to arrest the stampede of the animals. The attack of the enemy was, indeed, skilfully and well arranged, and it was not the fault of their leaders if the assault turned out a failure. Our infantry were in imminent danger of being outflanked. The commanding positions were all in the enemy's hands, and line after line of his infantry and cavalry could be seen coming up across the sand-hills.

But General Graham's force was now vastly larger than it had been on the occasion of the previous attack. He had under him six battalions of infantry, the Household Brigade, and Indian cavalry,

and two batteries of artillery; and the aspect of affairs changed as soon as we took the offensive. General Drury Lowe, with the cavalry, rode out far to the right of the camp, and, threatening the enemy's left, forced them to desist from continuing their flanking movement against us on that side.

The enemy's cavalry rode out parallel with our own, and both parties went far out into the desert, each endeavouring to get round the other, occasionally halting, while the horse artillery on both sides opened fire. In the meantime our artillery at the camp had come into play, and although inferior in numbers to that of the enemy they were not long in obtaining the mastery over them. Their infantry had advanced on either side of the canal and railway and on the slopes of the sand-hills, and at a distance of 800 yards opened a continuous rifle-fire.

The marines and the 60th Rifles advanced to meet the enemy coming by the lines of the railway and the canal, while the 84th Regiment moved forward against those descending the slopes, and while the rest of the infantry now formed in support, three regiments came into action and opened fire. The roll of musketry on both sides was heavy and continuous. The Egyptians, however, numerous as they were, could not withstand the advance of our troops, and before they had covered half the intervening distance the enemy hesitated, fell back, and were soon in full flight.

The collapse was sudden indeed. The enemy had, as was learned from a wounded prisoner who fell into our hands, eighteen battalions, and these armed with breechloaders and occupying the commanding positions should have committed tremendous destruction upon the six English battalions advancing against them. Their fire was, however, so wild and hurried that we had only two men killed. So hasty was the retreat of the enemy that they left three guns behind them, two of which fell into the hands of the marines and the third was captured by the 60th.

So incessantly did the Egyptians retire when our troops advanced that it was difficult to believe that a serious attack had ever been intended, and it was for some time supposed that Arabi had only intended to make a reconnoissance in force; but the

statements of all those who fell into our hands were distinct that Arabi's orders were that Kassassin was to be carried, and the failure arose simply because the Egyptians would not face our troops.

The effect of this affair was naturally to inspire our troops with the most profound contempt for the Egyptians, and there can be no question that had General Graham's force at once moved forward Tel-el-Kebir might have been taken at once and without the loss which afterwards attended the assault on that place. Our infantry pursued the enemy right up to his works and the artillery engaged the guns there, while General Buller, who accompanied the cavalry, was actually in consultation with General Drury Lowe upon the expediency of the column pushing forward to Zagazig and so entirely cutting off the retreat of Arabi's army, when a messenger arrived from General Wolseley, who was still at Ismailia, ordering the troops to return to Kassassin.

During its turning movement the cavalry came in contact with five regiments, each a thousand strong, coming from Salahieh with the intention of coming down upon the right rear of the camp and so entirely surrounding us. They made, however, no resistance to our cavalry, but broke and ran at once, their retreat being hastened by the magnificent practice of Borrodaile's horse-artillery battery. Whenever the enemy made an attempt to stand, the guns opened their fire, bursting shell after shell over them, while the cavalry pushed round on the Egyptian flank, and thus 5000 infantry were driven off the field and hustled into Tel-el-Kebir by the cavalry and horse-artillery only, an occurrence almost without precedent in war.

During the long advance the cavalry captured one gun with its entire team, which was abandoned by the enemy in consequence of one of our shells bursting just overhead as they were limbering up. At one spot twelve bodies of men, killed by a single shell, were counted, while at another twenty-five lay dead, killed by the explosion of three shells; altogether from sixty to seventy men had been killed by the horse-artillery battery, and the vast superiority of shrapnel over percussion shells was again

proved, for although the enemy's fire was exceedingly accurate its results had been almost nil.

Our own infantry fire had not been so effective, indeed the enemy fell back before our men were near enough for anything like accurate shooting, and only some five-and-forty dead were left on the ground over which the infantry advanced. It was fortunate for the enemy that when they ran our cavalry was so far away on the right; had they been near at hand they would have cut up the flying Egyptians with great effect.

At the sound of firing the Guards started from Mahuta and arrived at sunset, greatly disappointed to find that they were again too late to take share in the fighting. The following morning the Highland Brigade, of four regiments, also marched into camp. Kassassin now presented a very animated appearance. The little village had rapidly grown into a tented city three miles long by half a mile broad, whose streets swarmed with guards, rifles, Highlanders, infantry of the line, marines, blue-jackets of the naval brigade, artillerymen, men of the Household Cavalry, Indian cavalry, Indian sepoy, and camp-followers.

Of artillery there were now gathered there sixty guns, and the storm which had been so long gathering was about to burst upon Tel-el-Kebir. On the evening of the 11th Sir Garnet Wolseley and his staff arrived, and the next morning at daybreak reconnoitred the enemy's position. In spite of all the efforts that had been made but five days of reserve provisions for the whole force had been accumulated, but it was certain that great stores would be found in the enemy's camp, and the country beyond Tel-el-Kebir was known to be rich and fertile.

The 87th arrived that morning, and the pontoon train also came up, so that the force would now be able to cross the canal at any point at will. On the afternoon of the 12th orders were given that the force would march that night to attack the enemy. All tents were to be struck by half-past six, and all baggage piled up along the railway opposite the camps of the respective corps, ready for transport in the rear of the army. When this work was completed the regiments were to form up and march to the spots pointed out

to them, where they were to halt and bivouac till ordered to fall in for the advance.

Each soldier was to carry a hundred rounds of ammunition and two days' rations, with the exception of meat. The water-bottles were to be filled with tea. The regimental transports were to carry two days' full rations and thirty rounds of reserve ammunition per man. The naval brigade were attached to the 40-pounder on the railway truck. This gun had rendered good service in the fight two days before. The seven batteries of Royal Artillery were formed into one artillery brigade under General Goodenough. The two horse-artillery batteries were attached to the cavalry, who were to make a detour and come down in the rear of the enemy's position.

A deep sense of satisfaction and relief pervaded the army on the issue of the order. The long period of inactivity, discomfort, and hardship was at last at an end, and the battle was at hand. No one entertained the slightest doubt as to the result, although it was generally felt that an attack upon the position which the enemy had for weeks been engaged in fortifying and intrenching was by no means the trifling matter which it would have been had they pushed in on the rear of the panic-stricken Egyptians after their repulse at Kassassin.

The camp soon presented a busy scene. From end to end the men were at work. Round the commissariat stores were parties of men from each regiment drawing the rations to be carried in the haversacks and by the regimental transports. Line by line the long rows of tents fell to the ground, and as fast as they did so they were rolled up, stowed away in their bags, and carried down to the side of the railway. The men laughed and joked at their work in the highest spirits, and in a marvellously short time the tented city was gone. The spot where it had stood was again a sandy desert swarming like an ant-hill with moving men, and marked here and there by the long lines of the cavalry and artillery horses.

Before dusk the last meal was eaten, and the troops formed up in front of their respective camping grounds. Staff officers rode here and there, and as each brigade was ready one of these officers

led it out across the desert to the place which it was to occupy in the line. No martial music regulated the time of march, no trumpet or bugle calls rose in the air, for the order was that all orders were to be conveyed by word of mouth, and that no bugle was to be sounded until the work was done.

The first move was a short one, being only to the sand-hills above the camp. There each battalion as it arrived in its place halted and piled arms until fourteen thousand men were ranged in their formation ready to advance. Then the order was given that the troops might lie down, and it was soon understood that the movement forward would not commence until one in the morning. For a time the low hum of voices sounded along the line. Here and there rose a flash of a match as the soldiers lit their pipes, each flash being followed by the voice of a sergeant or officer, "Put out that light there," for the orders were that no matches were to be struck. The order was by no means strictly enforced, as it was felt that it did not really apply until the force began to advance.

In an hour the hum of voices died away, the men stretched themselves on the sand, and for a while silence reigned in the desert. At one o'clock the word was passed round, and the men rose and fell in. Never did an army get more quietly under arms. The very orders appeared to be given in lower tones. There was a low stir with the clinking of metal as the men unpiled their arms and fell in, and then the great line moved forward, its footsteps deadened by the sand. There was no striking of matches now, no talking in the ranks. Every man was braced up to tension point by the excitement, for at any moment the challenge of the Bedouin horsemen scattered far out on the plain in front of the enemy might be heard in the still air.

The night was very dark, and the march was directed by the officers of the intelligence department, who rode ahead of the line and who steered their course by compass, for in no other way could the direction be kept across the sand-hills. None who took part in that strange night march were likely ever to forget it. An occasional clash of steel and the deep rumble of the guns and of

the transport animals in the rear, the jingling of the chain-harness, and the crunching of the wheels over the pebble-strewed sand, alone broke the silence. There were frequent halts to enable the regiments to keep touch with each other, for in the darkness it was next to impossible that all the component parts of the long line should march in exactly the same direction.

The cavalry and the two batteries of horse-artillery had moved north with orders to sweep round the enemy's line at daylight. Graham's brigade were on the right of the line. Next to these came the Guards under the Duke of Connaught, who were to act in support of Graham's brigade when the fighting began.

On their left were the seven batteries of the royal artillery, forty-two guns moving in line with a brigade in support. The Highland brigade extended between the artillery and the canal on the line of railway. The naval brigade moved along with their 40-pounder gun on a truck. South of the canal, and somewhat in rear of the general line, the Indian brigade moved forward. After two hours' marching the troops were halted. They were now not far from the enemy's intrenchments. So far no challenge had been heard. Nothing betokened that the Egyptians had any idea that the British army had left its camp. The line was again formed, and when all was in readiness the troops on the right moved forward. They had further to go than had the Highlanders to reach the position assigned to them.

The enemy's intrenchments formed a vast square whose front stretched across the canal. It consisted of lines of solid intrenchments bound together by wattles, the front face being four miles long and the flanking face two miles. At intervals were bastions mounting guns, and protected in front by series of deep trenches. Towards the canal on the right strong works had been erected in advance on some sand-hills, and had the attack been made here the loss of life would have been very great. This part of the line was, however, avoided, the Highlanders leaving these positions on their left.

The Highlanders would attack the front face north of the canal, and as soon as their attack was successful the Indian brigade

would fall upon the line south of the canal. Graham's brigade and the Guards were to attack the north face of the square, and had therefore to continue their march for some distance, and then swing round to face the point of attack.

Daylight was just breaking when the troops arrived within a thousand yards of the enemy's lines. Another short halt was made to enable the fighting line to be formed and the last preparations to be completed. A perfect silence still reigned over the plain, and it was difficult to believe that some fourteen thousand men stood in a semicircle round the enemy's lines ready to dash forward at the low sand-heaps in their front, behind which twice as many men slumbered unsuspecting of their presence.

Swiftly and silently the Highlanders moved forward to the attack. The 74th were next to the canal. On their right were the Cameronians. The Gordon Highlanders continued the line and the Black Watch were on the right flank. The 46th and the 60th formed the second line. General Hamley was in command of the division. No word was spoken, no shot was fired, until the line was within three hundred yards of the enemy's earthworks; nor up to that time did a sound in the enemy's camp betray that he was conscious of our presence. Then a single shot was fired from the line of sand-heaps, and almost instantly a terrific fire flashed along the whole line, and a storm of bullets whizzed over the heads of the advancing troops.

Reference has already been made to the occasion when, after the return of the troops from Egypt, Sir Archibald Alison was presented by the citizens of Glasgow with a sword of honour. That ceremony took place in October, 1883, and in acknowledging the great compliment that had been paid him, the gallant commander of the Highland Brigade, reminding his hearers that the honour conferred on him arose from the desire of the citizens to honour the national regiments of Scotland,—told in brief but eloquent narrative the story of a night—that of Tel-el-Kebir—as it fell to the lot of the Highland Brigade. “The orders of Sir Garnet Wolseley were to march, covered by the darkness of the night, straight over the desert on the enemy's

works—some five miles distant, and to storm without firing a shot the moment we reached them. My division leader, Sir Edward Hamley, agreed with me in thinking that any change of formation in the darkness must be avoided, and therefore the brigade formed for the march in the order in which it was to attack—two lines two deep. The rifles were unloaded, the bayonets unfixed, and the men warned that only two signals would be given—a word to ‘fix bayonets,’—a bugle sound ‘to storm.’ When we had got over the longest part of the way a halt took place to rest the men, and now an incident occurred which shows the extreme difficulty of a night march, and tests the discipline of a force. When the word ‘to halt’ was passed in a whisper from the centre, it took some time to reach the flanks, which thus halted considerably thrown forward, something in a crescent shape. In the darkness of that moonless night none of us observed this, and thus it came about that when the march was resumed the two horns of the crescent swung round so as almost to meet. The instant this was noticed a halt was quietly ordered, and as quietly made. The company of direction was re-dressed, the other companies of the battalion of direction silently formed upon it, the other battalions upon them, and the march was resumed. Such a formation in such circumstances, and so carried out, was a fair test of the discipline of the brigade. I never felt anything so solemn as that night march, nor do I believe that any one who was in it will ever forget it. No light but the faint star, no sound but the slow measured tread of the men on the desert sand. Just as the first tinge of light appeared in the east a few rifle shots fired out of the darkness showed that the enemy’s outposts were reached. The sharp click of the bayonets then answered the word ‘to fix’—a few minutes more of deep silence, and then a blaze of musketry flashed across our front, and passed far away to each flank, by the light of which we saw the swarthy faces of the Egyptians, surmounted by their red tarbooshes, lining the dark rampart before us. I never felt such a relief in my life. I knew then that Wolseley’s star was bright, that the dangerous zone of fire had been passed in the darkness, that all had come now to depend

on a hand-to-hand struggle. A solitary bugle rang out, and with a cheer and with a bound that would have done your hearts good to see, the Highlanders rushed in one long wave upon the works. Then came an anxious moment—the roll of the Egyptian musketry was ceaseless. The first line went down into the ditch, but for a time could make no way. Then first one, then a few, then more figures were dimly discerned reaching the summit and jumping down behind it, and then the battle went raging into the space beyond. While this befell on the centre and right of the brigade, the left—where the Highland Light Infantry were—had a more chequered fight. They came right upon a very strong redoubt. No front attack could succeed—the ditch was too deep, the ramparts too high. The men filing off to each side endeavoured to force a way in on the flanks; and here a long stern hand-to-hand fight, attended with heavy loss, ensued, which was not finished until Sir Edward Hamley reinforced them by a part of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry and some of the King's Rifles. On the right of the brigade also the advance of the Black Watch was arrested in order to detach some companies against a strong redoubt, the artillery from which was now in the breaking light playing heavily on General Graham's brigade and our own advancing guns. So earnest were the Egyptian gunners here that they were actually bayoneted after the redoubt had been entered from the rear whilst still working their pieces. Thus it came about that from both the flank battalions of the brigade being delayed, the charge straight to their front of the Gordon and Cameron Highlanders in the centre caused these to become the apex of a wedge thrust into the enemy's line. The advance of these battalions was stoutly opposed by the Egyptians of the 1st or Guard Regiment, who fell back sullenly before them, and our men also suffered heavily from a severe flank fire from an inner line of works. Here one of those checks occurred to which the troops are always liable in a stiff fight—and a small portion of our line, reeling beneath the flank fire, for a moment fell back. It was then a goodly sight to see how nobly Sir Edward Hamley, my division leader, threw himself amongst the men, and amidst a very storm of shot led them back

to the front. Here, too, I must do justice to the Egyptian soldiers. I never saw men fight more steadily. Retiring up a line of works which we had taken in flank, they rallied at every re-entering angle, at every battery, at every redoubt, and renewed the fight. Four or five times we had to close upon them with the bayonet, and I saw these men fighting hard when their officers were flying. At this time it was a noble sight to see the Gordon and Cameron Highlanders now mingled together in the confusion of the fight, their young officers leading with waving swords, their pipes screaming, and that proud smile on the lips, and that bright gleam in the eyes of the men, which you see only in the hour of successful battle. At length the summit of the gentle slope we were ascending was reached, and we looked down upon the camp of Arabi lying defenceless before us. The fight was won—for by this time our cavalry was circling round the rear of the Egyptian position, and the smoke and cheers upon our right showed where Graham's noble brigade was working its victorious way. One word more, and I have done. My late chief and kind friend, Lord Clyde, left me on his death-bed that sword of honour which you presented to him by my father's hands, to mark your appreciation of his great military services in command of the Highland Brigade and Division in the Crimea. I do feel proud this day to think that I can now lay down beside it that sword which you have just conferred upon me, as the officer in charge of the Highland Brigade in Egypt, and that I can do so without feeling that the reputation of our national regiments has been tarnished in my hands, or the glory they won under him dimmed."

For a short time the fight had been very severe between the troops who charged the intrenchments and their defenders. Well led by some of their officers the Egyptian troops gathered on the edge of their intrenchments, and with the bayonet strove to oppose the rush of the Highlanders. Here Lieutenant Brooks of the Gordon Highlanders was killed; Major Colville and Captain Underwood and Lieutenant Somerville of the 74th; Sir Graham Stirling and Mr. Neill were killed; Captain Keppel, Lieutenant Medwood, and Lieutenant Cary were wounded; Lieutenant

Edwards of the 74th, Captains Coveney, Cumberland, Fox, Park, Livingstone, and Speid of the Black Watch, and Lieutenants Blackburn, Malcolm, and M'Dougal of the Cameron Highlanders, were wounded.

So steady was the Egyptian resistance, so thick the hail of bullets which swept from the redoubts, that for a moment the advance of the Highlanders was checked, but it was for a moment only. The troops dashed in through the intervals between the redoubts and opened a heavy fire upon the flank and rear of their defenders.

There was a moment's irresolution among the Egyptians, thus taken between two fires, then the Highlanders in front dashed up the slopes, and in an instant the Egyptians broke and fled, throwing away their arms in all directions—a mob of disorganized fugitives—and the intrenchments of Tel-el-Kebir were won. The battle was almost over at this point, when Graham's brigade and the Guards made their attack upon the other face of the square nearly a mile away. The light was now more distinct, and the distant firing had roused the Egyptians, and as our troops advanced a heavy fire broke out along the line.

The marines, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the Royal Irish, and the Royal Irish Fusiliers advanced with the greatest steadiness and resolution under the heavy fire, followed closely by the Guards. For a time the enemy stood their ground; but the British rush was irresistible, and the British burst over the line of intrenchments, and the Egyptians, without further thought of resistance, fled and joined the crowd of fugitives who were already making their way at the top of their speed from the other end of the camp.

Lieutenant-colonel Balfour of the Grenadier Guards was wounded, as was Lieutenat-colonel Stirling of the Coldstreams; Captain Jones of the Connaught Rangers, attached to the Royal Irish Regiment, was killed, and Lieutenants Chichester and Drummond-Wolf wounded; Major Strong and Captain Wardell of the Royal Marines were killed, and Lieutenant M'Causland wounded. Colonel Richardson of the 46th was severely wounded.

BATTLE OF TEL-EL-KHEIR THE FINAL CHARGE.

13TH SEPTEMBER, 1884.





The fighting was now practically over, but the troops continued to pour volleys into the mob of fugitives, while the shells from our artillery, flying far overhead, burst among them and added to the confusion and panic of the retreat. The whole of Arabi's camp, with its immense stores of forage and provisions, fell into our hands, and an enormous number of prisoners were taken; for General Drury Lowe with the cavalry had cut across the enemy's line of retreat, and the few Egyptians who had carried away their arms now threw them down, and the fugitives in thousands surrendered.

In twenty minutes from the commencement of the engagement the lines which Arabi and his engineers had so carefully prepared, and which they regarded as impregnable, were carried, and the army of 26,000 men were either killed, wounded, or prisoners, or broken into scattered bands of unarmed and panic-stricken fugitives.

Never was a victory more complete and decisive. The rebellion of the Egyptian army had collapsed at the first attack of the British, and Egypt lay at the mercy of the conquerors of Tel-el-Kebir.

The total loss to the English was 11 officers and 43 men killed, 22 officers and about 320 men wounded; but the precise number was never officially published, as owing to the immediate advance which took place the returns were not regularly made out, and several days elapsed before Sir Garnet Wolseley received and sent in the regimental returns. The loss of the Highland Brigade considerably exceeded that of the rest of the army. The Indian Brigade had met with but little resistance; the enemy on the south side of the canal, seeing the defeat of their comrades on the north by the Highland Brigade, hastily abandoned their position and fled on the approach of the Indians. As the canal intervened between them and the English cavalry the fugitives on this side for the most part were able to make their escape.

No computation was ever made of the loss of the Egyptians. They lay dead in hundreds where the Highlanders had broken into their intrenchments, and numbers fell when the same brigade

had stormed their lines, while for upwards of a mile the dead lay thickly scattered along the line of retreat of the fugitives. Their loss in killed was estimated at from 1500 to 2000. Upwards of 50 guns were taken, and sufficient tinned provisions for 20,000 men for a month fell into the hands of our troops. Not an instant was lost in organizing the pursuit. General Macpherson with the Indian contingent at once started for Zagazig.

As the Indian cavalry, pushing on ahead, approached Zagazig they overtook large numbers of fugitives, and as the steam from several engines could be seen they were ordered to gallop forward at full speed. Outpacing the rest, two officers and three troopers dashed into the station. Five trains crowded with thousands of fugitives were just getting into motion; but without hesitation the officers rode up alongside the engines and threatened to shoot the drivers unless they instantly brought the trains to a standstill. This was done. In another minute the cavalry poured into the station, and the whole of the fugitives were taken prisoners.

This was a most useful capture; for although it was now certain that there could be no more general resistance, it was, above all things, desired to prevent any large numbers of the beaten Egyptian soldiers reaching Cairo before the arrival there of our troops, as not only would their coming have reinforced the strong garrison already there, but it was more than probable that they would have incited tumult in the city, and might have brought on a general massacre of the Europeans there.

These were very numerous, and had ever since the commencement of the outbreak been living in constant and extreme peril. The authority of the governor, aided by that of the council, had so far kept the populace from rising against them; but the news of Arabi's defeat and the appearance in the town of large numbers of fugitives might well have excited the passions of the mob to a point beyond all control. The great masses of prisoners taken on the field and at Zagazig were not retained; they were no longer formidable, and would only have hampered the movements of the army.

After being stripped of their military accoutrements and regimental tunics they were permitted at once to scatter to their

respective villages, where their tales of the utter rout of their army would be sure to put an end to any idea of further resistance to the English power, which might be stirred up by the emissaries of Arabi, who had fled from the field of battle mounted upon a speedy horse, and had made his escape, as was known, in the direction of Cairo, and might possibly give further trouble.

The Household Cavalry followed in support of the Indian cavalry; and the mounted force reached Belbeis that evening, and after a slight skirmish took possession of the place and halted there for the night. In the morning they started early and pushed straight on to Cairo, keeping on the borders of the desert. As they passed along, the villagers came out of their houses with white flags, all proclaiming themselves faithful to the khedive.

Large numbers of fugitives, principally those who had been on the south side of the canal when the position was attacked, were overtaken. They threw away their arms as soon as they caught sight of the British cavalry, and surrendered as prisoners. To their surprise and satisfaction they found that the English had no desire to capture them, and went on their way rejoicing.

Towards evening the cavalry arrived in front of Abbassiah barracks outside Cairo. Their march had been a remarkable one. It was but forty-eight hours since they had moved out from the camp at Kassassin, and they were now, after the defeat and dispersal of the rebel army and the entire suppression of the rebellion, in front of the capital of Egypt. The promptitude with which the cavalry were sent off from the field of battle to seize Cairo, the length of the march accomplished, and the boldness displayed in pushing on a comparatively small body of cavalry against a city known to be held by ten thousand infantry, and containing a great fanatical population, was greatly admired by continental military critics, who regarded this feat as being even more creditable to British arms than the assault of Tel-el-Kebir itself.

On approaching Abbassieh the troops were met by an officer in command of a squadron of cavalry who were placed in extended order across the plain with white flags tied to their carbines. The

officers informed General Drury Lowe that the town and garrison surrendered, and that no opposition whatever would be offered. He said that arrangements would at once be made for the supply of rations for the men and for obtaining horses for the cavalry.

What perhaps afforded greater gratification to the British general and his officers was the statement that no tumults had taken place, and that the city had remained perfectly quiet. This was indeed a great relief. For some time no news had been obtained as to what was taking place in Cairo, and after the massacres and destruction which had been wrought at Alexandria when the Egyptians were driven thence, it was but too likely that Arabi's arrival there, and the news of the disasters that had befallen his army, would have given the signal for similar disturbances at Cairo.

But although the commanding officer expressed himself so peaceably, the situation was for a short time critical. Ten thousand infantry were drawn up on parade, and had but a single fanatic called upon them to fire, a desperate conflict might have ensued. The firmness and confident bearing of the British, however, had its effect. At General Drury Lowe's command the Egyptian officers ordered their men to pile their arms and to retire to their quarters, a command which was quietly obeyed; while a body of the cavalry entered Abbassieh barracks and summarily disarmed two thousand men within.

In the meantime the general had sent for the governor of the city. Upon his arrival the general told him that he was aware that Arabi was in Cairo, and demanded his surrender. He offered to send a body of troops to surround his house. The governor, however, said that this was unnecessary, and that he himself would deliver him up.

He then returned into the city, and at ten o'clock came out with Arabi and Toulba Pashas. Arabi's manner was very dignified and composed. He said to General Lowe that he had at first no intention whatever of fighting the English, for whom he had always entertained great respect, but that the war was forced upon him, and for this he blamed the khedive. Being a soldier, after fighting began, he went on fighting. Now that all was over the Egyptians

and English were brothers again, and he trusted himself to English honour as a soldier whose army had been defeated.

General Lowe replied that he could not enter upon the subject of the war, his only mission being to arrest him. In the meantime Captain Watson of the Intelligence Department, escorted by mounted infantry and two squadrons of dragoons, made a detour round the city to the citadel and summoned the commandant to surrender. This he did at once. There was a grave discussion how the evacuation of the place by the Egyptians could be managed with the least chance of trouble between the troops, and it was arranged that the Egyptians, after piling their arms, should march out by one gate while the British entered by the other.

In mentioning the losses sustained by the British in this campaign and during the previous disturbances at Alexandria, we must not omit to notice the murder of Mr. Palmer, a gentleman who from comparatively humble beginnings had risen to the position of Professor of Arabic in the University of Cambridge, and was one of the foremost Oriental scholars of our time; well known as the author of a splendid monograph upon Haroun el Raschid. Professor Palmer, a man of very retiring manners and in delicate health, had been prevailed upon to accept from the government an appointment that he might endeavour to propitiate the Bedouin tribes, who at the time of the rebellion and subsequent hostilities were threatening the canal. He left Suez on the 10th of August with Lieutenant Charrington, R. N., and Captain Gill of the Royal Engineers, who had orders to cut the telegraph wires in Arabia to prevent communications between the rebels and the tribes. Professor Palmer had with him a large sum of money in gold for the purpose of purchasing camels for the Indian troops. None of the party returned, and rumours were afloat that they had perished, or had been made prisoners. Various articles which had belonged to them were afterwards discovered, and on close inquiry it was declared that they had been murdered by order of the governor of Nakl, who offered them only the horrible alternative of jumping from a precipice or being shot. Professor Palmer, it was averred, chose the former, and his two companions

the latter. The statement was followed by a strict inquiry, which left no doubt of the guilt of the governor of Nakl, and he with some half-dozen of his followers, who were proved to have been directly concerned in the murder, were pursued, arrested, and executed. An inquiry was again set on foot in February, 1883, by Colonel Warren, who was engaged in tracing the criminal acts of the rebellion to their real perpetrators. It was then found that the money carried by Professor Palmer and his companions had never reached Arabi or the rebel leaders, as the sheikh who conducted Palmer's party had hidden it while the Arabs, who had made the Englishmen prisoners, were discussing whether they should take their lives. The fact of not being able to find the money exasperated the fanatical hatred of the Arabs, and the prisoners were condemned to leap from the brink of a high precipice, and were shot as they fell. Thirteen of the culprits who were engaged in the affair were arrested and tried, and five of the actual perpetrators of the crime were hanged at Zagazig on the 28th of February, 1883.

It need scarcely be said, that when the news reached England of the prompt and decided victory at Tel-el-Kebir the discussions on Egyptian affairs were considerably influenced by that intelligence. It did not in any way alter the intentions of the government, for, as we shall see, when the work of pacification and the formation of a more settled government in Cairo and Alexandria had been organized, our troops began to return to England.

Mr. Gladstone continued to hold the same opinions which he had forcibly expressed in August, 1877, when, writing on the subject of various proposals for the occupation of Egypt, he said: "It is most singular that the propagandism of Egyptian occupation seems to proceed principally from those who were always thought to be the fastest friends of the formula of independence and integrity, and on whom the unhappy Turk was encouraged to place a blindfold reliance. I have heard of men on board ship thought to be moribund whose clothes were sold by auction by their shipmates, and thus in the hearing of the Turk we are now stimulated to divide his inheritance."

Speaking of a proposition to purchase the Egyptian tribute Mr. Gladstone said: "I admit that we thus provide the sultan with abundant funds for splendid obsequies; but none the less would this plan sever at a stroke all African territory from an empire likely enough to be also shorn of its provinces in Europe. It seems to me, I own, inequitable, whether in dealing with the Turk or with any one else, to go beyond the necessity of the case. I object to our making him, or any one else, a victim to the insatiable maw of these stage-playing British interests; and I think we should decline to bid during his lifetime for this portion of his clothes. It is not sound doctrine that for our own purposes we are entitled to help him downwards to his doom."

These views had not been changed by the course of events in Egypt in 1882. On the debate upon the vote of credit at the time that it was determined to send a squadron to Alexandria, Sir Charles Dilke, in defence of the foreign policy of the government, had urged the history of our connection with and obligations to Egypt since the substitution of the joint Anglo-French control in 1879 for the previously existing dual control (of a merely administrative character) established in 1876. He contended that it was by the joint control and European concert left them by their predecessors that the government found itself hampered; but they were, nevertheless, anxious to try every means before adopting an individual policy, however much they may have felt that British interests would thereby be more advantageously defended. The government did not regard the anarchy in Egypt as the result of national feeling, but as the consequence of the pressure of military tyranny, and when that yoke had been broken from the neck of the Egyptians they might fairly be left to manage their own affairs. The desire of the government was to see the growth and spread of a truly national movement, the fruits of which would be as beneficial to this country as to Egypt; and with this view they had looked favourably upon the political movement of the preceding year until it became tainted with militarism. At various times the government had proved their readiness to support any truly national development; had shown no personal

hostility to Arabi Pasha, although no attempt had been made in the early stages of the revolution to gain him to our side. When Arabi became dictator the time was past; for he was then guilty of complicity in the preparation for the attack upon the Europeans in Alexandria on the 11th of June, and, therefore, his soldiers could not be regarded as the friends of freedom. Moreover, the paramount duty of the government was to protect the canal, and, whilst avoiding any attempt to crush Egyptian nationality, to maintain the influence and credit of England and of all Europe in the East. This was the statement of the position taken by the government, and it was evidently addressed to those members of the Radical party who were opposed to an intervention, and represented that we were suppressing, not a revolt, but a national effort to secure freedom and independence. Mr. Richard, who was one of the opponents of an interposition in Egyptian affairs, and who represented that the deplorable events which had happened were the results of the policy of interference in the internal affairs of Egypt, initiated by the preceding government and adopted and perpetuated by their successors, contended that non-intervention was a cardinal point of the Liberal creed. The opposition, however, supported the view that intervention was necessary, and contended, not only that duty, national interests, and treaty obligations furnished a justification for the war, but that the government, having wasted their influence at the outset for the pacific settlement of affairs, were not sufficiently in earnest when they had determined to have recourse to arms; that the plea of self-defence was an attempt to make war while professing peace principles. Sir R. Cross even went so far as to say, that when the Liberal government took office Egypt was in a satisfactory and flourishing condition, and that the disastrous change which had occurred was due to want of foresight, to division in ministerial councils, and to consequent weakness in their action. For the sake of working with the other powers the government had suffered delays which were most prejudicial; and yet, after all, we found ourselves isolated from all the powers, and refused even the assistance of France in the restoration of order in Egypt. He

pronounced the dual vote and the ultimatums to be insincere, and blamed the government for not having originally sent a stronger force to Alexandria, and for proposing a vote, the amount of which was so insufficient as to convict them either of miscalculation or of misleading the house.

Mr. Gladstone, however, pointed to the modifications which had been made on the control in 1879 as having already established an intervention in the internal affairs of Egypt which was certain to end in mischief. In answer to the charge that the government had not sent a sufficient force to Alexandria to prevent the massacres after the bombardment he urged as the principal among many arguments—the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. By the course that the government had pursued they had removed every trace of international jealousy and had obtained the moral support of the powers; but to break with France, as some had recommended, would have been to provoke a sharp conflict in Egypt, to divide Europe into two camps, and to lead to a general war.

With the passing of the vote of credit the important debates on Egyptian affairs may be said to have closed, except that on a motion for permitting the revenues of India to be applied to defray the expenses of the auxiliary forces despatched from that country, ministers were charged with inconsistency for proposing that which they had a few years previously denounced as unpatriotic and unconstitutional. It was contended in reply that the difference lay in the employment of Indian troops beyond the boundaries of the empire, with parliamentary sanction, instead of despatching them upon the prerogative of the crown. Moreover, the Indian contingent would, as on a previous occasion in 1806, under Sir James Baird, limit its operations to Egypt, whereas Lord Beaconsfield, in the case referred to, had brought them to Malta, a distinctly European country. The discussion ended with the adoption of a proposal, suggested by Mr. Stanhope, to the effect that the share of the burden to be laid upon Indian revenue should be subjected to any future decision of parliament.

When the report of the prompt measures taken at Kassassin and Tel-el-Kebir was almost immediately followed by the news

of the brilliant victory at the latter place, a sense of satisfaction pervaded the country, and adverse criticisms of the government were for a time, if not silenced, at least listened to with considerable reserve. The short parliamentary recess left little opportunity for members to address their constituencies, and those who did so and spoke adversely of the government in regard to recent events in Egypt seldom made much impression. Whatever might have been the mistakes or shortcomings of the ministry, the minister of war had been prompt when the time came, and the generals and the men under their command had achieved a success which resulted in increasing the support given to the government by the opposition, and elicited the admiration of foreign critics, though certain French and German correspondents, of whom nobody took much notice, respectively attributed our success to bribery, and to a lucky conjunction of circumstances ending in the utter inefficiency of Arabi's army.

These insinuations, however, weighed nothing against the general expression of the best military authorities in Europe, who gave unstinted praise to the courage and efficiency of our troops. In England the general satisfaction was increased in proportion to the surprise that was felt at the comparative celerity with which the campaign had been effected, and by the decisive manner in which, being once determined on active measures against Arabi and the rebel forces, we occupied the Suez Canal and established our head-quarters at Ismailia.

As a matter of fact comparatively few people knew much about the Suez Canal or Ismailia, except that there had been a good many disputes with M. de Lesseps, and that England had a very important interest in keeping this water-way of 100 miles from Suez to Port Said in the condition of a neutral passage for ships of commerce. To England this highway to India was of course known to be of the greatest importance, though it may easily be understood that France and other European nations and the United States of America had considerable interest in its being maintained. This will be obvious when it is considered that the voyage from England to Bombay by the Cape of Good Hope is

10,860 nautical miles, while by way of the Suez Canal it is but 6020, the saving of distance being 4840 nautical miles. From Marseilles to Bombay by the old route is 10,560 nautical miles, by Suez Canal only 4620, so that 5940 miles are saved. From St. Petersburg to Bombay by the Cape is 11,610 miles; by Suez Canal, 6770, saving 4840, the same as in the voyage from England. From New York to Bombay is, by the respective routes 11,520 and 7920 miles, the latter saving 3600 miles.

We have already gone pretty carefully into the financial story of the canal to the end of the chapter which, at the close of 1875, left England representing about half the capital of the whole enterprise, our government having acquired the original shares at a cost of £4,000,000 which were to carry no interest till 1894, though the Egyptian government was to pay seven per cent on the amount till 1886. When to this is added the fact that of above 1600 ships passing through the canal with a tonnage of about $3\frac{1}{3}$ millions, and paying dues amounting to above $1\frac{1}{4}$ millions, more than three-fourths were English, it will be seen that we had a reasonable claim on at all events the neutralization of the canal, and were justified in protecting it.

Immediately after the opening of the canal in November, 1869, when 48 ships, some drawing 18 feet of water, were able to pass through to Lake Timsah and to continue their voyage to Suez the following day, the regular traffic commenced, and the first ship to go through was an English one. By the concession of 1856 the tariff had been settled (to be equally on ships of all nations) at ten francs per ton and ten francs per passenger, beside pilot dues, charges, amount of water drawn, and other extras. Up to the 1st of July, 1872, the transit dues were levied on the registered tonnage; they were afterwards charged on the gross tonnage till the 29th of April, 1874, when an international commission restored the former rates.

A glance at the map will at once show the enormous importance of the occupation of Ismailia as a basis of operations for troops entering Egypt from the Mediterranean at Port Said or from India and the Red Sea by Suez.

We have already seen with what remarkable success the British vessels, which quietly departed from Aboukir, entered the Suez Canal at Port Said, a town now of considerable importance, with a harbour constantly the scene of the maritime and passenger traffic between Europe and the East, but which owes its existence to the project of the canal. The spot called Port Said, in honour of the Viceroy Said Pasha, was not the spot from which the shortest canal across the isthmus could be made; but it was the place chosen for the commencement of the enterprise, because it was at that point of the coast that deep water was to be found nearest the shore. Here there were eight metres or about 26 feet of water at a distance of less than two miles, and 26 feet was the proposed depth of the canal. Port Said, in fact, stands on the most eligible spot chosen by M. de Lesseps—on a long low belt of sand, from 200 to 300 yards wide, stretching from the Damietta branch of the Nile to the Gulf of Pelusium, and separating the Mediterranean from Lake Menzaleh, though occasionally when the lake is full and the Mediterranean waves are high the waters intermingle across this boundary.

On the 25th of April, 1859, M. de Lesseps, surrounded by a band of Europeans and about 100 native workmen, gave the first stroke of the spade which commenced the formation of the great "silent highway," and thereafter the work went on, at first under conditions of great difficulty, for the pioneers who dwelt on that desolate strip of sand could procure no fresh water nearer than Damietta, thirty miles distant—whence it was brought across Lake Menzaleh in Arab boats subject to delay or loss from adverse winds or storms. It was a hard life, and both provisions and water often ran short. Distilling machinery was afterwards provided, and in 1863 a pipe was laid down to the fresh-water canal, which had been completed to the centre of the isthmus. The ground on which the town of Port Said stands was made by dredging in the shallows of the lake close to the belt of sand. In this way the inner port was formed, and at the same time the area was extended and the dry land raised to a greater height. After the withdrawal of the fellaheen labourers machinery had to supply their place.

Such was the energy with which the work was carried out, however, that in the long ranges of sheds and workshops the material was being formed, and the great concrete blocks being made for the construction of the piers and harbour, while the dredging process was continued and the canal was being cut in Lake Menzaleh. In ten years Port Said became a considerable town—with regular streets, squares, docks, quays, churches, hospitals, mosques, hotels, factories, shops, warehouses, and 10,000 inhabitants; a sea-port easy of approach, and with the safest harbour on the coast, and a plentiful supply of fresh water from Ismailia, a great reservoir—"The Chateau d'Eau"—containing enough for three days' consumption in case of an accident to the service pipes. The central harbour or Grand Basin, called the Bassin Ismail, lies between the outer port and the canal, and joining it on the west the Bassin Cherif, the Bassin des Ateliers, formerly close to the busy scene where the workshops were situated, and the Commercial Basin, north and west of which the chief portion of the town is built. On the Marina close to the seashore the best of the houses are to be found, and further to the west is the Arab village, on the strip of sand between the sea and the lake.

Two great breakwaters or moles form the outer port; that on the west running out to sea at right angles to the shore and perpendicularly to the line of the canal for about 3000 yards; that on the east, commencing at about 1500 yards distance from the other, runs out towards it for 1962 yards, and so approaches it as to make the entrance to the outer port about a quarter of a mile wide, and its inclosed space of water a triangular area of some 550 acres; the depth at the entrance being 30 feet, and the channel through it to the inner harbour about 300 feet wide and 26 feet deep. The moles were constructed with concrete blocks composed of sand and lime, mixed with salt water, and each measuring 12 cubic yards and weighing 22 tons. They were dropped into the sea three at a time from lighters till the water line was reached, and then lifted into their places by powerful cranes. The great difficulty foreseen by several eminent engineers, although it has by no means proved to be insuperable, has been very obvious.

The sand from the Damietta mouth of the Nile drifting along the coast has silted through the western mole and formed a large bank along its inner side near the shore end, so that constant dredging has to be carried on; but it is said that the bank itself will eventually be a barrier against further silting in. From a similar cause the shore seaward to the west of the mole has greatly extended, especially in the angle formed by the mole and the coast, and a sandbank has grown up in the sea a little north-east of the eastern mole, caused by the dredgings from the harbour having been brought out and deposited there. A lighthouse composed of solid concrete, and nearly 160 feet high, stands on the shore close to the commencement of the west mole. The lantern, 20 feet high, contains an electric light flashing every 20 seconds, and visible for 20 miles. Three other lighthouses of the same height but of different construction occupy positions on the 125 miles of coast between Port Said and Alexandria, one being at the Damietta branch of the Nile, another at Boorlos, and a third at Rosetta.

This brief description will give some notion of the great port which forms the Mediterranean entrance to the canal, at which the British naval force entered after leaving Alexandria and Aboukir. Port Said itself is, of course, a place of considerable commercial activity on account of its maritime importance; but there is comparative stillness and solitude not far off, and the visitor who stays for a few days to make excursions on Lake Menzaleh may, if the lake be pretty full, enjoy a quiet almost unbroken, except by the guttural but not frequent remarks of the boatmen, and the cry of the wild fowl, coots, herons, spoonbills, pelicans, and flamingoes with which the water and its numerous mud-islands abound. That these birds make din enough sometimes, however, may be gathered from Mr. J. M'Gregor's account where he says: "We had been told of the enormous flocks of wild fowl to be seen on this lake, and especially in winter. I had seen thousands, myriads of these, and wondered at the multitude in the air. But I never expected to see birds so numerous and so close together that their compact mass formed living islands upon the water; and when the wind

now took me swiftly up to these, and a whole island rose up with a loud and thrilling din to become a feathered cloud in the air, the impression was one of vastness and innumerable teeming life which it is entirely impossible to convey in words. The larger geese, and pelicans, and swans floated like ships at anchor. The long-legged flamingoes and other waders traced out the shape of the shallows by their standing in the water. Smaller ducks were scattered in regiments of skirmishers about the grand army, but every battalion of the gabbling shrieking host seemed to be disciplined, orderly, and distinct."

It will thus be seen that almost at the very commencement of the Suez Canal the scene is one which is eminently characteristic of the country. It may be worth while, as we are now considering the features of the great water-way, to trace briefly the course of the voyage from Port Said to Ismailia as followed by the vessels of the British squadron.

Leaving Port Said, where the canal opens out to a width of 1000 feet before it enters the harbour, and passes the port and the town, to join the open sea beyond the breakwater, the course lies through Lake Menzaleh, and continues almost in a straight line for twenty-seven miles to within less than two miles of Kantarah. The station before reaching Kantarah is Ras-el-Ech, a little island of mud raised above the level of the inundation by dredgings from the canal, and having not far off on the right the islands of Toonah and Tennes, on which there are some ancient remains, and on the left, beyond the marshy plain, the ancient site of Pelusium, where there are a few ruins. In the whole of this portion of the journey of twenty-seven miles the banks are so little above the level of the canal that, from the deck of a large steamship, there is a view of the whole vast expanse of lake and morass with the numerous islets and the multitudinous flocks of birds—rosy pelicans, scarlet flamingoes, snow-white spoonbills, and innumerable ducks, geese, and herons.

The whole of the channel through Lake Menzaleh was almost entirely excavated by means of dredges, the soil having been not more than a foot or two above the level of the lake, and in many

parts actually below it. When it was necessary to remove some surface soil before there was water enough for the dredges to float, the work was done by the natives, whose constant practice in digging canals and making embankments to keep out the water peculiarly fitted them for the task, which was accomplished in the following manner:—The men stood in files across the channel, those in the middle of the file having their feet and ankles in the water. These men leaned forward and took in their arms large clods of earth which they had previously dug up below the water with an implement called a *fass*, which somewhat resembles a large hoe. The clods were passed from man to man to the bank, where other men stood with their backs turned and their arms crossed behind them for the clods to rest on. As soon as one of these men had a load of clods piled on his back, he walked off, bent almost double, to the farther side of the bank, and there opening his arms let the clods fall to the ground. In this way the files of naked labourers made the channel into which the dredges were floated, and various mechanical contrivances were employed to continue the work both here and elsewhere, the principal one being a *long couloir* or iron spout of elliptical form 230 feet long, $5\frac{1}{2}$ wide, and 2 deep, by means of which the contents of a dredger in the centre of the channel could be discharged beyond the bank. This great spout was supported by an iron framework which rested partly on the dredge and partly on a floating lighter. The dredgings when dropped into the upper end of the spout were assisted in their progress down it by water supplied by a rotary pump, and by an endless chain to which were fixed scrapers—large pieces of wood that fitted the inside of the spout and forced onward any lumps of stone or clay. By these means the spouts could discharge their contents at an almost horizontal line, and the water served to dilute the dredgings so that they spread over a larger surface and settled down more completely. The work effected by these spouts was extraordinary, the average discharge being 80,000 cubic yards of soil per month.

Where the banks were high an elevator was employed, consisting of an inclined plane running upward from the water line,

and supported on an iron frame, the lower part of which rested over the water on a steam float, and the upper part on a platform moving on rails along the bank. The plane carried a tramway on which ran an axle on wheels worked by the engine of the steam float. From this axle hung four chains. As soon as the lighter containing seven great boxes filled with dredgings was towed under the lower part of the elevator, the chains hanging from the axle were hooked to one of the boxes, and the machine being set in motion the box was first raised and then carried along swinging beneath the axle to the top of the plane, when by a self-acting contrivance it tilted over and emptied its contents over the bank. It was then run down again, dropped into its place in the lighter, and the operation was repeated with the next box. No such vast dredging operations had ever been undertaken before.

M. de Lesseps in one of his lectures illustrated the amount of excavation effected in one month—2,763,000 cubic yards—by saying: “Were it placed in the Place Vendôme it would fill the whole square and rise to five times the height of the surrounding houses; or if laid out between the Arc de Triomphe and the Place de la Concorde, it would cover the entire length and breadth of the Champs Elysées, a distance equal to a mile and a quarter, and reach to the top of the trees on either side.”

Kantarah (which means a bridge or ford), the station first reached, stands on the highest point of the chain of low sand-hills dividing Lake Menzaleh from the small inland lakes, and was formerly the chief caravan station on the road between Egypt and Syria—that road which was the great highway for the armies of the old-world Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs. Dr. Brugsch Bey considered that the site of the passage of the Israelites through “Yam Suf”—which means “sea of weeds,” though applied to the Red Sea,—was in the neighbourhood of Kantarah, but this is only speculative.

From amidst the sand-hills the canal enters Lake Ballah, the chief of a number of shallow lakes dotted with islets, and thence through a cutting made in a sandy promontory (El Ferdane), and along the edge of a tributary of Lake Ballah to the heights of El

Guisr, the highest point in the isthmus, about six miles long, and sixty feet above the level of the sea. When the canal was being formed the upper surface of the soil at this part, consisting of loose sand interspersed with beds of hard sand and of clay, was removed entirely by the enforced labour of the fellaheen. This was literally *hand* labour, for the Egyptians simply grubbed up the soil with their hands, placed it in baskets, and carried it away to the place where it was to be discharged, thus excavating a channel 25 to 30 feet wide, and about 5 feet below the level of the sea. After the withdrawal of the *corvée* or forced labour, the cutting was completed to its full width and to a depth of 10 feet below the sea-level by means of machinery, consisting chiefly of a locomotive engine working behind it a chain of dredge buckets on an inclined plane. These, on reaching the top of the plane, opened at the bottoms and the contents were received into wagons, which were drawn by locomotives to the top of the embankment along a network of railways. There then remained 16 feet more of depth to be made, and this was effected by ordinary dredging, the soil being carried away by screw steamers and discharged into Lake Timsah. While noting the depth of the canal (uniformly 26 feet), it may be worth remembering that the width at the water-line varies according to conditions; for instance, where the banks are low the width is 328 feet, while in deep cuttings where the banks are high it is 190 feet. The width of the base is 72 feet, and the slope of the bank near the water-line is 1 in 5, while at the base it is 1 in 2. From El Guisr the canal enters Lake Timsah at the north-east corner, where, on the left, may be seen the entrance of a small canal leading to the stone quarries, and on the right a branch which joins the maritime and the fresh-water canals, the difference of level (17 feet) being adjusted by two locks, one just below Ismailia, and the other near the upper part of the town. In 1865 the fresh-water transit between the two seas was begun by means of this connecting canal between the channel already dug from Port Said to Lake Timsah and the fresh-water canal; and during the war with Abyssinia, stores were conveyed by this route. Whether Lake Timsah was originally a

fresh-water lake, receiving the overflow of the Nile by means of the old canal from the branch of the river at Bubastis, or whether its name Bahr-el-Timsah—the Sea of the Crocodile—applies to the shape of the Heroöpolite Gulf, of which it forms a part, need not be discussed here. Perhaps ages ago the Mediterranean and the Red Seas were not divided by what is now the Isthmus of Suez, and the heights of El Guisr were upheaved by some convulsion and made a separation: while afterwards another subterranean shock caused the heights of Serapeum and Chalouf, and so reduced the Red Sea to its present boundary, leaving two inland lakes, the northernmost of which, being nearer the Nile, filled with fresh water, while the eastern branches of the Nile left the other nearly dry when there was no high inundation sending an overplus of water down the Wády Canal. The whole hollow area, about nine miles in circumference, judging from the mark of the old water-line, and with a depression of about 22 feet below the sea-level, was filled with water from the Mediterranean through the channel which was cut from Port Said. A weir was constructed for the purpose, and the operation lasted from the 12th of December, 1866, to the end of April, 1867. Nearly 100 million cubic metres of water were required to fill the lake, and the extra depth needed for the canal was then dredged out, a large area in the centre being also deepened to form a harbour, and the course of the canal being indicated by buoys at regular distances.

The canal skirts the eastern shore of the lake, which is five miles in length. On the western side the sojourner at Ismailia may find good sport, for the marshes abound with various kinds of water-fowl, while in the neighbouring desert gazelles are not uncommon. A visitor writing of Lake Timsah says it is “a large natural basin in the very centre of the isthmus. . . . In this midland harbour we found a fleet of large vessels, some of them men-of-war, some of them even iron-clads. A sense of surprise comes over you at seeing not only a pleasing expanse of water in the thirsty scorching waste (how one wishes it were fresh-water!) but in addition a fleet of mighty ships in the mid desert.”

It has been asserted that where the busy town or village of

Ismailia now stands with its broad road leading from the landing-place to the station, its quays, warehouses, palace, hotel, rows of houses built of the stone from the neighbouring quarries, its streets, squares, and gardens, and its fine water-works, not a breathing animal could have lived a few years ago, before the construction of the canal. This is perhaps an exaggeration, and certainly 20,000 labourers were set to enforced work there, to make the beginning of the present well-known resort of tourists and travellers, and the abode of people engaged in commercial or official occupations. It has now perhaps 10,000 inhabitants divided amongst the French, Greek, and Arab quarters, and the ordinary visitor, the sportsman, or the lover of antiquities, each finds it an agreeable place for a short sojourn. The remains of Pelusium, Arsinöe, Pithom, Rameses, Heroöpolis, the marks left by Persians, Greeks, and Romans, may be discovered at no great distance. It may be noted, too, that in this desert province, was the Goshen of the time of the Israelites, so that it must at one time have possessed something of the character which a portion of it, at all events, has been for some time in the process of recovering. Ismailia itself has evidently somewhat improved in every respect, including climate and general healthfulness, since the time that it was first formed. Mr. M'Gregor in his *Rob Roy on the Nile* said: "Ismailia is like a hothouse without the glass, and all the life in it is exotic. The sun's heat and the Nile's cool water force the arid sand into a tropical verdure. Embosomed in this are French *cafés* and *billards*, with Arab huts and camels; the signboards on booths in Greek, Turkish, Spanish, and American, *ateliers* resounding with hammer and cogwheel, and tents full of half-dressed savages chaffering uproariously, and *boulevards* thronged by the second-rate fashion of a French town, planted, and growing fast too, in the veritable desert. Beside it lie the shores of Lake Timsah, the 'Crocodile Lake,' which had a few pools when the canal was begun, but now is filled with brackish water. Only fresh-water shells are to be found in Lake Timsah, and the crocodile does not live in salt water. These facts serve to confirm the idea that a fresh-water canal had long ago existed here, and that the town, of which

there are ruins at the end of the Bitter Lakes, may have been destroyed by the same upheaving of the land which dried the lakes themselves."

The climate has, in fact, been modified by the vast changes effected, and Ismailia is now temperate, though extremely dry, for a fresh breeze always comes from the lake to mitigate even the noonday heat, and the nights, as is usual in Egypt, are fresh and cool. The absence of dust is also a great advantage. There is excellent sea-bathing all the year round; and provisions of all kinds are fairly plentiful, as supplies come both by railway and canal, while the fish taken from the lake are abundant and of excellent quality. All this is worth noting, as it has direct reference to the enormous changes achieved by the canal, and its immense importance as a highway between Asia and Africa. In the same relation, the admirable water-works at Ismailia are of great value. In the west part of the town are the hotel, the station, the landing-quays of the fresh-water canal, with adjoining blocks of warehouses and the Arab village, beyond which a small canal leaving the fresh-water canal carries the water all round the town, to which it forms a kind of northern boundary, and being thickly planted with willows the sand from the desert on that side can neither choke it nor pass over it into the town. On the completion of the fresh-water canal to Ismailia and Suez it was necessary to provide a regular supply of water to Port Said and the line of works along the northern course of the canal. To effect this two powerful pumping engines were erected at Ismailia, and a double row of cast-iron pipes laid for the whole length of the canal (50 miles), and through these water was pumped continuously, all the principal stations being provided with reservoirs for storing water, and drinking fountains, from which any one may draw, while at every $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles are open self-filling cisterns, where the thirst of man or beast may be assuaged. The water-works at Ismailia, with their gardens, cascades, and walks bordered with choice fruits and beautiful flowers, are one of the great sights of the place; and not far off are the heights of El Guisr, whence may be obtained a grand view across Lake Timsah with the

Bitter Lakes and the heights of Gebel Geneffeh beyond, and in the far distance the dim outlines of Gebel Attakah and Sinai.

In concluding for the present these few descriptions of the various stages of the great water-way, it may be well for us to refer for a moment to the stations on the railway line from Ismailia to Cairo (the Cairo and Suez line), as they are of scarcely less importance in conveying a clear idea of the course taken by the British army, and its progress to the final engagement at Tel-el-Kebir and the occupation of Cairo.

We have already seen that the direct conflict with the rebel army of Arabi began while he was encamped at Kafr-Dowar, on the Alexandria and Cairo line, a district of cotton-fields and marshes, and a resort for sportsmen who go there to hunt wild boars. On the same original direct line to Cairo is Tantah junction, Tantah being, as we have already noted, a large and important town, with a palace belonging to the khedive and offices for the consular agents. Tantah has always been famous for its fairs or festivals, which are held three times a year, and are scenes of great excitement; and it was there that numerous attacks were made on the Europeans at the time of the disturbances in Alexandria.

After breaking up the camp at Kafr-Dowar, Arabi concentrated his forces, as we know, near Tel-el-Kebir—a very beautifully situated village in the centre of the fertile district of El Wady or Wady Toomilat, which was purchased by the Suez Canal Company of Said Pasha, greatly improved, and resold to the Egyptian government under the award of the Emperor Napoleon III., already noticed in a previous page.

From Suez to Cairo is 150 miles by railway. The stations being Chalouf, about twelve miles from Suez, where the line runs within a short distance of the banks of the canal, and where the fresh-water canal, running between the maritime canal and the railway, enters the bed of the ancient canal cut by Darius to join the Bitter Lakes and the Red Sea. Another twelve miles and Geneffeh is reached. It is named from the hills of Geneffeh, which are on the right of the line. Twelve miles further Faid, in the vicinity

of the Great Bitter Lake, and on to Serapeum (ten miles), so called from some ruins, supposed to be the remains of an old temple to Serapis. From Serapeum a small branch canal leads to the fresh-water canal. A little more than eight miles further is Ismailia, and a branch line, two miles and a half long, runs to Nefiche, where the fresh-water canal divides, one branch going to Ismailia where the locks bring it to the level of the maritime canal, and the other branch to Suez. At Nefiche Lake Timsah is first seen. The next station, fourteen miles further, is Mahsamah, not far from a lake formerly filled with water at the time of the Nile inundations, but now serving the purposes of the fresh-water canal, which here leaves the route of the railway, and at a distance passes a place which is variously named Tel-el-Masroota, Aboo Khasheb, and Rameses, the latter having been given it by the French on the conjecture that it was the site of the store city built by the Israelites for Pharaoh, and the place from which they started on their journey into the wilderness. Though there are doubts as to the correctness of this conclusion, and the researches of Herr Brugsch would show that San or Tanis is the locality of the ancient Rameses—there can be little doubt that the place now called Rameses is in the midst of the former land of Goshen, which is biblically called both the land of Goshen and the land of Rameses, and probably extended on the west to Bubastis or Tanis. Leaving Mahsamah the line runs for fourteen miles to Tel-el-Kebir, first by the village of Ras-el-Wady (the extreme point of the Wady district, and almost the limit of the Delta on the east), and afterwards through uncultivated country to the next fertile district—El Wady—in which Tel-el-Kebir is situated. Seven miles further is Aboo Hamed, one of the stations on the caravan route between Egypt and Syria, and the point from which the railway divides the cultivated land from the desert, the vast expanse of sand and sandy mounds bounded only by the horizon and the rapid and luxuriant vegetation which the waters of the canal produces even in that arid soil. Ten miles further is the Zagazig junction, not far from the ruins of Bubastis, but not very attractive, though the ancient town has a good many fair houses, and had a considerable number of

European residents at the time of the massacres by the fanatic insurgents, when the whole population was about 38,000. Zagazig has come to importance since it was made the junction for the railways in the east of the Delta, and is a considerable trade centre for the surrounding districts. Leaving Zagazig the line runs to Bordein close to Tel Basta, on the ruins of the ancient Bubastis, and thence six miles to Belbeis, and onward seventeen miles to Shibeen el Kanater, close to the ruins called the Mound of the Jew, Tel-el-Yahodeh, and supposed to be the site of the city founded by the high-priest Onias, and so named Onion or Onia as mentioned by Josephus. Passing westward through a well-cultivated district to Kalioob, twelve miles, and on to the main Alexandria and Cairo line, Cairo is reached by a further journey of ten miles. By thus briefly following the routes of the canal and the railway we shall note the respective localities of the places already named in the narrative of the campaign after the occupation of the canal and during the subsequent operations, to the arrival of our troops at Cairo.

We have seen how the Indian contingent, rapidly crossing the battlefield of Tel-el-Kebir, marched to Zagazig and occupied it the same day; while the main body of cavalry and mounted infantry, taking a desert road to the south-west, seized upon Belbeis the same evening. There they rested for a few hours and watered their horses, but long before dawn they were away again, and after a journey of thirty-nine miles, a great part of which was under a blazing sun, reached Cairo on the evening of the 14th of September.

The prompt and decided action of our army and the immediate capture of Arabi—followed by his quick surrender—prevented the loss of life and the subsequent troubles of which Cairo might have been the scene in case of an armed resistance. On the 15th of September Sir Garnet Wolseley with his staff and detachments of the Guards, Highlanders, and marines entered the city, and were received by the large crowds of people with many expressions of goodwill, and without any hostile demonstration even from those who may have been among the promoters of rebellion.

There were after-demonstrations, however, of a threatening character, and Sir Garnet Wolseley had to proclaim that if British soldiers were molested he would fire on the native quarter of the town. Upon this, the Ulema promised that he would do all in his power to maintain the authority of the general and prevent disorders, after which the disturbances ceased.

It is now necessary to go back to Alexandria, which, when the fleet sailed with the great bulk of the army on the 19th of August, was left under the guard of one division facing Arabi's army at Kafr-Dowar. The reconnaissance made by General Wood, just as the fleet was starting, to discover the force and intentions of the enemy, has already been described. General Hamley's division was ordered forward to join the troops under General Wolseley as soon as the latter arrived at Ismailia, and General Wood with a single brigade only remained to guard Alexandria.

The position at Ramleh was, however, now very strong. An electric-light apparatus had now been mounted there, and rendered it secure from any sudden night surprise. The enemy continued to work at their batteries, but beyond the occasional firing of shells at parties moving within range, nothing happened for some-time of any interest.

On the 27th of August two 7-inch guns were taken out and placed in position below Ramleh water-works, and a trial showed that they were able to throw shot beyond the enemy's first line of intrenchments. The Egyptians were now working in great numbers in the formation of intrenched works close to their forts in Aboukir Bay. It was supposed that they were forming an intrenched camp there in which a force could be stationed for the defence of the forts against a land attack, should Arabi withdraw his army from Kafr-Dowar to join that gathered at Tel-el-Kebir. Considerable activity, too, was being shown by them to the west of Alexandria, large numbers of Bedouins and others being seen fording the shallow end of Lake Marcotis a few miles beyond Fort Mex.

At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 27th a body of

horsemen with two battalions of infantry appeared on the crest of the hill beyond the village, near the western walls of the fort. Some of them, moving down, took possession of the farthest houses of the village.

A small detachment of the 95th under Major De Solis sallied out from the fort to dislodge them. Passing through the village the troops advanced against the outlying houses occupied by the enemy, and a sharp musketry fire was opened on both sides, until the Egyptians abandoned the houses and retired rapidly to their main body, leaving behind them twelve of their number. The English loss amounted to one killed and one seriously wounded.

The Egyptians at once began to intrench themselves on the sand-hill, and works with embrasures for eight guns were speedily constructed on the crest of the hills on the other side of the lake between the causeway and the village of El Khrei. The sand-hills around it were dotted with the white uniforms of their sentries and working parties, showing that a considerable force had moved round to that side. On the same afternoon H.M. ship *Minotaur*, lying off Ramleh, shelled the Egyptians out of some works which they were erecting near the shore between Aboukir and that place.

On the 29th Lieutenant Handcock with twenty men of the 95th made a dashing reconnaissance against the enemy's position. Leaving Fort Mex before daybreak, they crossed the end of Lake Mareotis by the abandoned railway embankment, known as the Causeway, and reached a point close to the enemy's position, which was found to be strongly intrenched, and held by regular infantry and cavalry. A 40-pounder and two other guns were seen in position in the battery on the crest of the sand-hills. As the day broke the little party were discovered, and the Egyptians poured down to attack them.

The men then fell back along the narrow causeway, checking the pursuit of the enemy by their steady fire, by which seven of the enemy were seen to fall. They regained Fort Mex without a single casualty. On the 30th General Hamley with the Highland Brigade sailed, and the same evening 800 marines were landed from the fleet to reinforce the brigade under General Wood.

The departure of so many troops caused something like consternation among the inhabitants of Alexandria.

On September 3d Lieutenant Smith-Dorien of the 95th, who had organized thirty men of his regiment as a mounted infantry corps, made a dashing reconnaissance in the direction of Kafr-Dowar, riding out with ten of his men along the banks of the canal to within a thousand yards of the enemy's intrenchments. Much fewer men were seen in the enemy's works than on previous occasions, and it was believed that a considerable number of troops had been withdrawn to reinforce Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir.

In view of the small force now at Alexandria it was resolved to cut the dyke at Mex, and to let the sea into Lake Mareotis, so as to deepen its waters and prevent any attack by the enemy on that side. The Bedouins and labourers were still working busily on intrenchments on the Aboukir side of Ramleh, and they were from time to time shelled by the *Minotaur*, while occasional artillery duels took place between the heavy guns in the Ramleh batteries and those at Kafr-Dowar. The hostility of the lower class of the population continued to be evinced by occasional incendiary fires, which were, however, extinguished by the troops before they became serious.

Beyond insignificant skirmishes and exchange of shots between our outposts and the Bedouins, no change took place in the position of the forces facing each other outside Alexandria until the day following the battle of Tel-el-Kebir. Immediately that event became known in Cairo Budras Pasha, under-secretary of the ministry of justice, and Raouf Pasha, ex-Governor-General of the Soudan, were sent off by the Council of Notables at Cairo to Alexandria to inform the khedive that the entire Egyptian army as well as Cairo were ready to surrender. They had arrived at noon on the 14th of September, and a flag of truce was at once sent in to our lines, with a request from these pashas to be allowed to come in immediately to present to the khedive an address and to ask his conditions.

Rabi Pasha, one of the chiefs of the rebel army, also signed

the letter certifying that the troops at Kafr-Dowar were ready to surrender, that the dam across the canal had already been cut, and the telegraph wire reinstated and put in working order. The khedive, in accordance with the advice of the British authorities, insisted upon unconditional surrender, which was at once agreed to by the Egyptians, and at four in the afternoon the surrender of Kafr-Dowar was formally made.

A complete change of feeling took place directly the downfall and capture of Arabi became known, and the khedive Tewfik was once more recognized not only as the ruler, but as the popular ruler of Egypt.

It was arranged that the Egyptian army should march past the English troops and lay down their arms, but no sooner were the Egyptians aware that Arabi had been crushed and that the movement was entirely at an end, than they at once began to make their way to their homes in great numbers. In the evening of the 15th the news of the exodus reached Alexandria, and at day-break the next morning Captain Slade, A.D.C., rode out to the lines and found them almost entirely deserted. General Wood and his staff at once rode out, the 49th and 53d Regiments being ordered to move forward in the afternoon and take possession of the Egyptian position.

Passing along the line of the railway, where strong parties of blue-jackets, engineers, and natives were busy in repairing the line of railway and in removing a solid platform of masonry constructed across it, they entered the line of fortifications which had so long confronted the troops at Alexandria. A fair idea was now for the first time obtained of the enormous amount of labour accomplished by the Egyptians, and of the extremely formidable nature of the works which they had erected. They consisted of three lines of earthworks parallel to each other covering the railway and the canal.

The first line was situated about a mile and a quarter beyond the Milhalla junction, and was called Kourschid Pasha; the second line was four thousand yards in rear of the first, and was called Esbat Sheikh Ibrahim. The third line, covering Kafr-Dowar, was



TEWFIK PASHA,
KHEDIVE OF EGYPT

ENGRAVED BY J. H. STONE



six thousand yards behind the second. The first of these lines was complete, the second was less perfect, and the third was in a still more unfinished state. Had the war continued another fortnight the whole would have been finished, and would have formed a position which, if held with obstinacy, could have resisted any attacks made upon it.

On the extreme left flank of the first line, which rested on Lake Mareotis, was a redoubt mounting five guns. This was connected, by a covered way, with a formidable earthwork covering the railway. The extreme height of the face of these works was forty feet, and the thickness at the embrasures was thirteen feet. Their face was extremely steep, the loose earth being retained in position by a facing of dung mixed with chopped straw. Spacious magazines had been constructed in the thickness of the mounds. The redoubts were armed with twelve field-pieces and two heavy field-guns, and were connected by a continuous line of earthworks with two redoubts, each mounting two guns, on the bank of the canal.

The right of the position towards Lake Aboukir was defended by redoubts similar to those on the left. The front of the whole line was protected by several rows of deep shelter trenches interconnected by covered ways. The other lines of intrenchment were similar in character; and the Egyptians were, when the surrender took place, engaged in the erection of a great central redoubt armed with siege-guns. Riding through these formidable works General Wood entered the Egyptian camp. The scene was a striking one. The rebel tents were still standing in long white rows; in front of them the rifles were piled in proper manner, their polished barrels glittering in the sun.

Hundreds of horses and mules stood picketed in lines, and two batteries of 9-pounder guns were ranged side by side in perfect order; but the army which twenty-four hours before had occupied the camp had entirely vanished, its sole representatives being a group of some thirty officers, who came up and saluted the general as he rode in. Among them, in the uniform of an Egyptian artillery officer, was Lieutenant Ponlucci, an Italian

naval officer, who had a month before deserted from the Italian man-of-war *Castelfiardo*.

The general then proceeded along the line of railway to another military station, where there was another great camp with its innumerable stands of arms, its masses of ammunition, forage, and equipments. A few officers and orderlies alone remained here. Riding on, the party came upon a train crowded with peasants who had but an hour or two before been soldiers. All had left behind them the uniforms which they had, much against their will, been forced to adopt, and were on the point of starting for their homes in their long white shirts. Their departure was, however, to be delayed for a time, as there was plenty of work to be done; and General Wood accordingly ordered them out of the train and told them to go back and join the working parties on the railway.

The general and his party took possession of the train and steamed on to Kafr-Dowar. Here the open space in front of the railway station was filled with a surging mass of fellaheen—the remains of Arabi's army, who were now waiting for trains to take them to their native villages.

There was none of the sullen and downcast aspect which might have been expected among the troops of a beaten army. The dominant feeling in their hearts was evidently joy that the war had come to an end. Shouting, laughing, and jostling each other, they pressed forward with eager good-humoured curiosity to see the English general. Again and again the station-master and points-men, who acted as his assistants, drove them back with a few blows from their sticks; but they always pressed forward again, seeming anxious above all things to impress upon the general how welcome was his presence, and keeping up a chorus of thanksgiving to Allah that the war was over.

The Egyptian military hospital was found to be in excellent order. It consisted of fifteen large tents with all modern appliances and comforts. It was under the charge of Dr. Muhamed Bey Islim, a gentleman who had earned a title to the general respect and gratitude by having saved the lives of twenty-five Europeans from massacre by sheltering them in his house at the risk of his

life. The hospital was found empty, for all serious cases had at once been removed to the tents in the rear, and the thirty-five patients who were in hospital on the previous day had all risen and made off with their comrades when they heard that the army was disbanding.

The Egyptian positions were occupied by our troops in the afternoon, and they took possession of six thousand stand of arms, half a million rounds of ammunition, six batteries of horse-artillery, three heavy siege-guns, an enormous stock of forage and provisions, and eight hundred mules and horses. On the 17th the Egyptian forces opposite Fort Mex marched round the southern shore of Lake Mareotis and surrendered at Kafr-Dowar. The troops in the Egyptian camp were paraded—the 49th, three companies of the 53d, and a wing of the 35th forming up round the open square in front of the station.

Two companies with fixed bayonets lined the platform. The general and his staff came out by rail from Alexandria, and a crowd of the disbanded Egyptians, now working cheerfully as labourers, gathered to witness the arrival of their comrades. At half-past one the Egyptian troops arrived. Though weary with their forced march and covered with white dust, they bore themselves well and marched with regularity and soldier-like order. They consisted of five battalions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries of field-artillery. The soldiers went through the business of piling their arms with sullen indifference, but many of the officers showed plainly how bitterly they felt their humiliation, especially the surrender of their colours.

An hour later a battalion from Aboukir marched into Kafr-Dowar and also laid down its arms. The rank and file of the infantry were at once dismissed and allowed to return to their villages. The officers, numbering over two hundred, were taken to Alexandria, where they were kept for a few days as prisoners before being also allowed to return to their homes. The cavalry were disarmed and marched into Ramleh. The whole of the Egyptian army had now laid down their arms with the exception of three negro regiments at Damietta under Abdullah Pasha, who

had under his command 6000 negro troops, and still maintained a defiant attitude; but he did not long persist, and withdrawing his demands for terms surrendered unconditionally. The "national movement" appeared to have suddenly collapsed, and the insurrection to be at an end, though there was yet to be another scene at Cairo, to complete the strange drama of the revolt of Arabi.

The brilliant success of the campaign, and the rapidity and precision with which it had been conducted, strengthened the hands of the government, and brought no little credit to the commander-in-chief and the generals under his direction who had taken a principal part in the operations.

Sir Garnet Wolseley was elevated to the peerage under the title of Lord Wolseley of Cairo, and Admiral Seymour became Lord Alcester, each receiving a grant of money voted by Parliament. Orders of knighthood were conferred on the generals and admirals of division and the diplomatic and consular agents. Officers were honoured with decorations, and several hundreds of soldiers with medals. Lord Wolseley received a gold casket containing an address, and Lord Alcester was presented with a sword of honour by the corporation of London at Guildhall. Lord Wolseley also received a sword of honour, inscribed "From the people of Egypt;" which was perhaps scarcely so sincere an expression as that which accompanied a pair of handsomely inlaid pistols sent to General Drury-Lowe "from the notables of Cairo," who had good reason to thank the general for the rapid march on the capital, and the subsequent vigilance which saved the city from the fate that had befallen Alexandria.

In March, 1883, the khedive, with the approval of the sultan, asked permission of Her Majesty the Queen to confer a bronze star upon the men of the British army and navy who had been concerned in putting an end to the rebellion, and this decoration was added to other marks of approval already bestowed. The objection was raised by a large number of persons that there was rather too much alacrity and too great a profusion in conferring rewards, as though the impression of the undoubtedly able

achievements of the generals would be too soon effaced if any acknowledgment of them should be delayed. This feeling was probably occasioned by a certain hesitation on the part of the public to accept only the official reports of the military operations and the progress of the campaign, but it was still more to be attributed to the doubts which existed as to the policy which it might be thought necessary to pursue towards Egypt, now that the occupation of Cairo, the forthcoming trial and sentence of the rebels and conspirators, and the reorganization of a settled government, were the subjects demanding a practical solution.

With regard to the want of independent information of the events of the war during the campaign, there was some feeling of dissatisfaction with the objections of the commander-in-chief to the publication of reports of war correspondents appointed by the newspapers until they had received the sanction of the military authorities. The regular reports of "special correspondents" had come to be looked for daily, in time of war, ever since the letters which were sent from the Crimea, and it was remembered that in consequence of the revelations made in those letters many abuses were discovered and rectified. In the Egyptian campaign it may very well be understood that a too circumstantial report of the movements and supposed intentions of the generals in command, might have reached Arabi, and frustrated the intention of rapidly putting an end to the rebellion; but, whatever may have been the reason for editing or prohibiting the details of "special correspondence," considerable disappointment was manifested that the accounts of the most important events of the war were to be given only by the commander-in-chief, and a still more disagreeable result was, that some of those who claimed to have taken a prominent part in the battle of Tel-el-Kebir complained that their services had not been recognized. After a time, however, when some explanations were given, the signs of dissatisfaction gave way to a general recognition of the ability of the generals and the gallantry of the troops who had so summarily carried out their commands.

The future policy to be adopted towards Egypt remained the prevailing topic, and it was felt that the removal of British troops

altogether could not safely be completed until the administration of the laws of the country was effectually restored.

As Lord Dufferin said afterwards, when the work of reorganization had made considerable progress—a succession of unexpected events over which we had no control, and which we had done our best to avert, had compelled us to enter Egypt single-handed, to occupy its capital and principal towns with an English force, and to undertake the restoration of a settled government.

There was considerable conflict of opinion on the form that British interposition should ultimately take, and there were people who agreed with M. Emile de Laveleye the Belgian publicist, who, as long before as July, 1877, had strongly advocated the assumption by England of the protection of Egypt and the control of its government. He had cherished the idea of the English taking prominent authority in Egypt and commencing a great work of civilization in Africa, thus aiding the generous enterprise of the King of the Belgians. He called his own views Utopian, but he persisted in their possibility; the Egyptians, he said, had come to that worst of all possible combinations—oriental disorder served by European financing.—“The lot of the slave in the Southern States of the American Union was paradise compared with that of the Egyptian fellah. As I looked at these poor creatures, working all day long, and often half the night as well, to satisfy the insensate and prodigal rapacity of Cairo, I said to myself, ‘Why does not Europe, that sends cruisers to suppress the slave-trade, send hither a few good regiments to put an end to these barbarities?’ Egypt, in the hands of the English, would recover the splendour of her antiquity. With public works such as those which Mr. W. F. Thornton has described in his excellent book on *The Public Works of India*, the extent of arable land, the numbers of the population, and the revenue, would all enormously augment. Thanks to the annexations conducted by Colonel Gordon, Egypt now extends to the great lakes of Central Africa, and she has thus become, in point of territorial extension, one of the largest countries in the world. Only let her pass under the protection of England, instantly the slave-trade is suppressed, steam navigation connects the in-

terior of the continent with the Mediterranean, and civilization and commerce penetrate into an immense region of admirable fertility, and, by reason of its altitude, habitable by Europeans. By the Cape, by Natal, by the Transvaal, the English are advancing towards the Zambesi. Already they have a station on Lake Nyassa; soon they will have others on Lake Tanganyika and Lake Victoria. The International Exploration Society, formed under the auspices of the King of the Belgians, will send into the country travellers, emigrants, artisans of every kind. It has been shown by Lieutenant Cameron that a telegraphic line could easily be established from Cairo to Natal and the Cape, and he thinks that railways, uniting the centre of Africa to the coast, would not be long in paying their expenses. If, therefore, England consented to fix her attention in this direction, an unbroken current of civilization would speedily cross Africa from Alexandria to the Cape along the line of the high table-lands. The Anglo-Saxon race, mistress of Africa, mistress of America, mistress of Australia, would thus reach the fulfilment of its high destinies."

This, of course, was very flattering, very stimulating to British enterprise, but Mr. Gladstone was no more in favour then, than he was afterwards of absorbing a nation even for the purpose of hastening its prosperity.

"Our first site in Egypt," he wrote, "be it by larceny or be it by eruption, will be the almost certain egg of a North African Empire that will grow and grow until another Victoria and another Albert, titles of the lake sources of the White Nile, come within our borders; and till we finally join hands across the equator with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and the Orange River on the south, or of Abyssinia and Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of viaticum on our journey."

M. de Laveleye had not abandoned his notions at the end of 1882 when he wrote, "Let Europe, let England especially, endeavour to procure for Egypt the inestimable benefit of a good government, and all the friends of pacific progress will bless them. . . . If England draw back before the long and difficult mission of being instrumental in carrying civilization into Africa, and if she will not

even guarantee to protect the true Egyptians against their foreign and native spoilers, and ensure to them the enjoyment of the soil they cultivate, it would have been better for her never to have interfered in Egyptian affairs at all, then her purchase of shares will be absolute folly, the sending of the iron-clads a mistake, the bombardment of Alexandria worse than a mistake, Tel-el-Kebir a useless act of heroism, and all the present interference at Cairo a mere series of issueless contradictions,—and Mr. Bright is right.”

Widely divergent opinions were advocated, among which were the establishment of an English protectorate in Egypt with powers similar to those exercised by a British resident at an Indian court; the formation of a European directorate representing all the great powers; or the establishment of an independent Egypt under the protection of those powers. A return to the dual control was mooted, but former experiences had not been very satisfactory and the control had come to an end, while France was still holding off from any practical co-operation. It was plain that until order was restored and a better form of government instituted, the country could not be abandoned; and as we had by the force of circumstances been led to occupy it, the duty of completing the work of intervention by securing both Egyptian and European interests, and especially by obtaining effectual guarantees for the independence and security of the Suez Canal, was left to us to accomplish. An attempt to absorb Egypt in such a way as to make it part of the British Empire would have been one which no government would have ventured seriously to propose, though even that scheme had its advocates who agreed with M. de Laveleye. The other scheme, the entire withdrawal of the troops, and the consequent revival of the power of the native pashas and the anarchy and corruption which had led us to interpose for the protection of legitimate claims, was pronounced to be intolerable. The policy determined on by the government was stated by Mr. Dodson (who was a cabinet minister) to be not to remain in Egypt a day longer than was necessary. They hoped to see native rule established, for they desired neither dominion in Egypt for their country, nor its annexation, nor the responsibility of its adminis-

tration. The government wanted Egypt for the Egyptians, but with the condition that they would neither bear the domination of any other power, nor acknowledge the preponderance of any other nation. Lord Northbrook and Mr. Fawcett also explained the views of the situation, which accorded with those of the cabinet. The apprehension of the intercourse between England and India being hindered had in a great measure determined the policy of the government, and the anarchy which had prevailed decided the moment for our intervention. As regarded the future, secret treaties and concealed obligations to other countries would be avoided. While the government had no desire to annex or govern Egypt, they were not prepared to see Egypt in the power of any other country, and were not prepared to accept the responsibility of allowing it to lapse into a state of anarchy, considering the obligations already contracted. There was no desire to acquire exclusive power over the Suez Canal; but it was not intended to allow Egypt to fall into such a condition as to make it possible that the canal could be stopped at any time against British ships, whether of peace or war. The attainment of these objects was in entire accordance with the views of all the other powers of Europe. These powers were satisfied that there were no other intentions behind those which the government had always expressed.

Mr. Courtney, the financial secretary of the treasury, had already spoken even more plainly on some matters which were being vehemently discussed, and especially in reference to the interests of the bondholders. Our conduct in Egypt and elsewhere should be that of co-operation with the other powers for the maintenance of the concert of Europe. Having restored order in Egypt and secured the neutrality of the canal for the traffic of all nations, he would, in the words of the great statesman Prince Bismarck, allow the Egyptians to "stew in their own juice." He would rid Egypt entirely from being under the control of the sultan, and he would warn the khedive that his future position depended upon his management of his own affairs, and the problem of Egypt should be worked out by its own people over the area of Egypt itself. The money spent in rescuing Egypt had been money spent in

keeping a going concern going, and therefore in the settlement of Egypt the first claim on the Egyptian revenues should be the repayment of the cost which had been incurred in keeping Egypt going. He hoped we should not extort from the poor fellaheen a single farthing more than they ought to pay. If the interest of the bondholder came between the claims of England on the one hand and the fellaheen on the other—if the fellaheen could not pay—no doubt those who would have to forego something would be the bondholders, and he confessed he should feel a peculiar satisfaction in making the bondholders realize that the war was not entered upon and concluded in their interest.

These, then, were the extra parliamentary utterances of members of the government, the policy of which had been announced in general terms at the opening of the session to be "the maintenance of the sovereignty of the sultan, the authority of the khedive, and the rights of the people," under existing firmans and treaties, in cordial co-operation with France, and with the approval of the other great powers. We have seen that French co-operation had not proved to be a very trustworthy factor in the general scheme, but there had been a sort of acquiescence in the English occupation—which had been heartily recognized by Germany, Austria, Russia, and later by Italy, as giving authority to the English to restore order in the valley of the Nile, and to take upon herself the responsibilities which belonged to that undertaking.

The late Mr. Francis W. Rowsell, who was officially employed in Egypt by our government, writing (to the *Nineteenth Century*) from Cairo in the summer of 1883 pointed out, however, that France had, perhaps, anticipated a different result of Arabi's resistance, and was hardly ready for the surprise which the utter collapse of the rebellion after Tel-el-Kebir was for her. After specifically renouncing her positive right to intervene with us, after refusing to bear any part of the burden of the war, she claimed to be replaced exactly in the same position she had occupied in Egypt before the massacre of the 11th of June. She interpreted our assurances that our object in intervening was to restore the *status quo ante*, to mean that we would neither add to nor subtract from the condition

of things as it existed at the time when that very condition of things provoked the rebellion, or permitted it to break out.¹

This feeling led to the disagreeable relations between France and England at the end of the year 1882 in spite of the earnest endeavours on both sides to avoid them. This feeling, however, had little or no existence among the English and French colonies in Egypt. Men who before the war had become intimately associated by work, by the courtesies of social life, and by the inspiration of a common duty, found no reason for changing, in the smallest degree, their attitude, official or social, the one towards the other. Responsible, reflecting Frenchmen, in every international administration in Cairo, though naturally and pardonably sore at the conduct of their own government in placing them invidiously towards their English colleagues, had too much good sense and good feeling to charge upon those colleagues the results of a situation which they had not made. From the moment when that which was never doubtful to Englishmen, who knew the intentions of their government, became matter of certainty to the French, namely, that save the already defunct control there was no design on foot to give preponderance to English functionaries, the relations of the Anglo-French administrators became closer than before.

The position of the Anglo-French controllers before the rebellion was pointed out by M. Gabriel Charmes in the article to which

¹ Mention has been made in a previous page (p. 244, vol. i.) of the conduct of the French consul-general in encouraging the disaffection and rebellion of the military leaders at the outset of the revolt. In the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, August, 1883, M. Gabriel Charmes, who was at Cairo when the mutiny broke out, admitted that the attitude of the French consul was one of the principal causes of the revolt. "As long as France and England appeared to be sincerely united in Egypt, no one dreamt, even for a second, of the possibility of a revolt. Unfortunately, some weeks before the mutiny in February, a quarrel broke out between the French consul on the one hand, and the English consul and Riaz Pasha on the other. It must be confessed that all the blame lay with the French consul. On a very insignificant question he violently declared war against his English colleague and the Egyptian minister, exciting the whole of the consular body and the entire French colony. The report at once spread in Cairo that France was breaking with England, for in Egypt it is by the conduct of the agents that that of the cabinets is judged. There were great rejoicings in the barracks, and from this unexpected incident the colonels derived courage to revolt. So, on leaving Abdin, the colonels went at once to the French consul, asking for his support. He promised them at least his sympathy, and for several weeks he had them constantly at his house, discussing with them their constitutional theories and regaling them with coffee and cigars. He would doubtless have gone on like this had he not been recalled by the minister for foreign affairs. But the evil was done, and never from that moment did the colonels utterly abandon the hope of having France on their side."

reference has just been made. He says, in speaking of the mutiny—"I well remember with what stupefaction I learned, on the afternoon of February 1, 1881, what had occurred that morning. The Anglo-French controllers were no better informed than myself. Under the pretext that this was a purely domestic question the ministry had actually kept them in ignorance of what was going on in the army, and of the measures that it had been deemed advisable to take for the prevention of mischief. There exists in Egypt a legend about the control. The universal opinion is that the controllers were incessantly endeavouring to direct the policy of Egypt in an arbitrary manner. But nothing could be more untrue. It would be more just to reproach them with having carried forbearance towards the khedive's government and the consuls too far. They would certainly have had the right of arresting with their own hands the military agitation that was about to destroy their work of reform little by little. But they thought that, as the khedive had acted without consulting them, and as the consuls had been asked to give their advice, it was not for them to recommend resistance when the others had counselled resignation. They left to the Egyptian ministers and to the political representatives of France and England the responsibility of what had just occurred without any warning, so far as they themselves were concerned."

Though the opposition took every opportunity of endeavouring to elicit statements from the ministry on the policy which it was intended to pursue in Egypt they did not succeed in obtaining any definite answers, and it must be admitted, now that all the difficulties and vicissitudes of the English occupation are known, that the course of events might have prevented the realization of any settled details of a plan of procedure even if the government had determined on them. Even before the reorganization of the government of Egypt was nearly completed, the news that reached Cairo of the condition of affairs in the Soudan would at once have made the continued withdrawal of our troops, if not impolitic, at least inconsistent with the engagements into which we had entered and the promises that we had made. By what was, perhaps, a too great anxiety to show that our intervention was not dictated by

selfish motives, and to prove that no permanent occupation or domination of the country was intended, the government fell short of prompt and effectual action in the Soudan at the very time that it was needed, and by what appeared to be reluctance to extend to the insurrection in Sennâr the interposition which, in the case of Arabi's rebellion, they believed had saved Egypt, they indefinitely postponed the period at which the country might be left to stand alone. After damaging delay they entered upon a conflict which, though it vindicated the valour of British soldiers and sailors and the invincible courage and address of their commanders, achieved very little, as it now seems, for the permanent pacification of that region which has for ages been a standing problem for civilization. So they sacrificed a vast amount of money and the lives of brave and noble men in a contest with fanatic savages. Mr. Gladstone's foreign administration was too ready to hesitate between the two political forces which threatened the government, and were to be noticed on both sides of the house: those who urged a prompt and effectual assertion of authority in Egypt maintained if necessary by a military force; and those who conceived it to be our duty to get out of Egypt as quickly as possible, and having propped up the khedive to leave him to govern the country in his own way or with the materials that he could find there. The mistake seems to have been either that we interfered at all even after the first disaster to the Egyptian troops in the Soudan, or that we did not interpose with a stronger hand at the first authentic intelligence of the insurrection of the Mahdi. The reported utterances of M. de Lesseps in conversation with a friend in the autumn of 1883 might have been worth considering if he had made them earlier and they had been published. He was represented to have said:—

“Egypt was always, in my judgment, a very difficult country to defend. It is so long and so exposed that its borders may be attacked anywhere. Besides, its population is essentially agricultural—all its inhabitants are farmers, not warriors, and they are not at all the people to resist an invasion like that of the Mahdi.

“In my own opinion it will be best to let the movement alone.

It is not dangerous, and will subside of its own accord if disregarded. It is quite true that there are no forts of importance between the head of the Suez Canal and the position of the rebel army, and that Khartûm is surrounded. But Suez is, after all, a long way from Dongola, and I do not anticipate that the Mahdi will ever go so far north as to inconvenience me. He is far more likely to menace Suakim, and it is quite possible that he may be troublesome there. What I should advise would be that Assouan should be well fortified. It lies just in front of the First Cataract, and is directly in the line of the Mahdi's march if he wants to come north. Strong fortifications there will stop him, and they can easily be manned by Egyptian troops. Yes! Assouan must be well fortified! That is the important place at this juncture. I am aware that the Egyptian troops are not very good, but they are good enough for this work. Whatever you do, let me impress upon you the unwisdom of sending English troops there. They cannot stand the climate. It is too hot for them in that country. I should strongly advise their not being used. As regards your suggestion for the employment of Indian troops, I should say they are not needed. The movement will, in my opinion, subside. You will have no need to employ any troops against the Mahdi at all."

This, however, was not the conclusion arrived at by our government, and it may one day be seen that the greatest mistake of all was that of suffering General Gordon to go to Khartûm with what appears to have been the same kind of doubtful support from the British government as that which he had formerly held from the khedive when he went forth to abolish slave-hunting, and found that nothing would be effectual but the continued personal rule of a British governor-general ready to sacrifice himself and provided with a well-equipped and sufficient armed force. It is even possible that some readers of Gordon's letters from Central Africa may have had grave doubts whether he was at all likely to put an end to a rebellion promoted by the pashas who desired to re-establish the slave traffic, but having at its foundation strong "religious" fanaticism. He had left behind him feelings of honour

and respect for his justice and undaunted courage, but also many bitter enmities. The fact of his having at a late period strongly urged the reinstatement in authority of the arch slave-hunter Zebehr, whom he had sent as a state prisoner to Cairo—whose son had been pursued and slain by Gessi, and between whom and Gordon there was consequently said to be a blood feud—has never been adequately explained.—But we are taking too distant a forecast, and must return to the date of our regular narrative—the parliamentary session of 1882.

It should be recorded that when decisive operations for the suppression of Arabi's rebellion in Egypt were fairly commenced, parliament was almost unanimous in refraining from hostile criticism or embarrassing inquiries.

When Sir Stafford Northcote endeavoured to obtain a promise from the government that an opportunity should be afforded for discussing the policy in Egypt before the close of the session, together with a statement of the cost of the war and the method of apportioning the charges, Mr. Gladstone objected to facilitate the discussion of a policy which was not yet complete. No further vote of credit would be asked for, and, therefore, there would be no means of challenging the government policy except by a direct motion of a vote of censure. Not even the vote of annuities to Sir Garnet Wolseley and Admiral Seymour was brought forward at that time, though the vote of thanks to the officers and men of the army and navy was proposed and agreed to. Mr. Gladstone, however, informed the house that the expenses of the war were covered by the grant already made; and, though it might perhaps be necessary to make a further demand for subsequent expenses, he considered that the cost of the army of occupation should at least be partially borne by Egypt. A few days afterwards (Nov. 14) he made a brief statement referring to the convention which it was proposed to conclude with the Egyptian government. The English army of occupation had been reduced from 30,000 to 12,000, but no definite proposal as to their cost of maintenance had then been made to the khedive. It would, therefore, be necessary to follow the precedent set in 1815, when a portion of

the English army was left in France, when the number of Her Majesty's troops employed in a foreign country was placed upon the estimates. This would be done in the ensuing session, when it would also be shown what amount would be contributed by Egypt for their support. Sir Stafford Northcote objected to this plan as unsatisfactory, but stated that, as the government had it in its power to stop discussion, he would do no more than protest against the course indicated, and wait until the House reassembled.

It will be remembered that the more arduous work of the session related to the proposed new rules of parliamentary procedure, and that at the end of a six weeks' struggle, when those new rules were adopted, the session came to an end, while the severe mental and physical strain demanded from ministers and leading statesmen in the opposition had nearly brought some of them to an end also. Mr. Childers, on whom so much responsibility had fallen in sending the first military expedition to Egypt, was almost prostrated by exhaustion, and Sir Stafford Northcote was the next to fall out of the parliamentary ranks. Mr. Fawcett was also seriously ill, though not from work within parliament, and it was afterwards known that Mr. Gladstone had temporarily succumbed. Some changes had already been made in the cabinet, however. Mr. Childers, when he had recovered, became Chancellor of the Exchequer, thus relieving Mr. Gladstone from the duties of that office in conjunction with those of Prime Minister. The Marquis of Hartington succeeded Mr. Childers at the war-office. Sir Charles Dilke, who had been remarkably successful as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was made President of the Local Government Board in place of Mr. Dodson, who became Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, an office that had not been filled since the retirement of Mr. Bright in July. Lord Kimberley took the control of the India office, and Lord Derby was made Secretary of State for the Colonies—an appointment which, while it gave him a seat in the cabinet, did not call for any emphatic declaration of his opinions on the Egyptian question, which, however, did not seem to differ very materially from those of the government of which he was a member, since he held that we should not remain

in Egypt a day longer than was necessary to restore order, that a protectorate was but annexation in disguise, and any line of policy was to be deprecated which would break up the good understanding between France and England. The question of the immediate withdrawal of our troops was necessarily modified by the urgent request of the khedive, that a sufficient force might remain, since their presence was for some time the sole guarantee of order, and the conduct of the men was for the most part so exemplary that their continued presence was desired by those who sought to establish a regular government with effectual provisions for maintaining the authority of the khedive.

On the occasion to which we have already referred, when Sir Archibald Alison addressed the citizens of Glasgow, he was able to speak with undisguised admiration of the conduct of the men left under his command at Cairo.

“Of the later phase of my command in Egypt, when I was left in charge of the army of occupation, I will only say one word. I had nearly 13,000 men left under my orders. We had just conquered the country at the point of the bayonet. Peace was proclaimed, and at once those men, from being bitter enemies of the Egyptians, sank down into peaceful English soldiers, behaving with a discipline and a restraint which they would not have done in any town in this country. It was a curious sight; but, actually, I believe I had less trouble with our English soldiers in the occupation of Egypt, in Cairo, where there was the Highland Brigade and a battalion of the 60th or King’s Royal Rifles, and another brigade within a couple of miles, than I would have had with the same number of troops in any large town at home. I think that says a great deal for the discipline of our army, which has been attacked in these days. And before I left Egypt, when Lord Dufferin was quitting that country, he paid, I think, the most beautiful compliment I ever heard paid to any body, to our army in regard to their conduct in the capital of Egypt. He said that a great part of the influence that England possessed there was owing to the admirable conduct of our troops under most trying and difficult circumstances, and to our perfect friend-

ship with the natives from the very hour that peace was proclaimed. I had the very same statement made to me by the Egyptian minister of war, and also by the Khedive of Egypt himself."

As we have seen, the re-embarkation of British troops began directly the rebellion was suppressed; Sir Garnet Wolseley considering that a force of from 10,000 to 12,000 men would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the country. By the end of March, 1883, the latest large reduction was made, leaving Sir Archibald Alison the 13,000 men to whom he alluded, and these were considered sufficient for the remaining time during which it might be necessary to continue the occupation of the country. They included one regiment of cavalry (19th Hussars), four batteries of artillery, two companies of engineers, three companies of commissariat and transport and ordnance store corps, and eight battalions of infantry. It was decided, however, that Sir Evelyn Wood should be commissioned to reorganize an Egyptian army, and that to Colonel Valentine Baker (Pasha), an officer of great ability who had previously entered the service of the Khedive of Egypt, should be intrusted the organization of a native *gendarmerie* force. It was at first supposed that this force would be composed of mercenaries, chiefly Albanians under the command of British officers, and subsequent events perhaps showed that it might have been better if this had been the case. However, such a plan would have been highly unpopular, and must have entailed enormous trouble, because of the suspicions it would have aroused, and probably also because of the turbulent character of the men who would have been enlisted. It was at any rate determined to employ a native force, with some native and some European officers. The scheme took the form of a conscription with eight years' service, and of the 10,000 men to form the entire force 6000 were to be infantry, 1500 cavalry, 1100 artillery, and 1400 gendarmes, half the officers being English, and the non-commissioned officers to be selected from the disbanded Egyptian army, supplemented by Russians, Albanians, and Bulgarians. It had been estimated by Baker Pasha that the total expense would

not exceed £368,000 a year. Of course the organization of such a force would take a considerable time, under such conditions as existed in Egypt, and it was therefore necessary to detain a British force there until the plan for the formation of a settled government had been decided upon and commenced. Our immediate difficulty was the dissatisfaction likely to arise in France if, while our troops occupied the country, we appeared to press for the abolition of the dual control, which had, of course, become inoperative, and the re-institution of which was opposed on all hands. The khedive, whether he was under the influence of Lord Dufferin (as the French press declared) or not, was exceedingly averse to the re-establishment of the control, and in fact Lord Granville had instructed Sir Auckland Colvin to resign his office of joint controller, and thus may be said indirectly to have put an end to the existing arrangement. At the same time it was exceedingly undesirable to ignore France in the endeavour to settle the government of Egypt. The situation was a difficult one, for though the duties of the controllers had virtually ceased during the disturbances in the country, the khedive was anxious for the advice and support of Sir Auckland Colvin directly peace had been restored. This was resented by the French foreign office, which protested against what was alleged to be an attempt on the part of Lord Granville to abolish the joint control by indirect means while establishing the right of sole influence in Egyptian affairs. The French minister, however, notified that his government would agree to the abolition of the control when that course was found to be desirable, to which Lord Granville replied that he was at once ready to adopt that course, and suggested that the khedive should appoint one European financial adviser, whose functions should be far less extensive and authoritative than those which had been exercised by the controllers, at the same time it was recommended that the position of financial adviser and other posts should be filled by officials nominated by the French government. This offer was, however, not accepted, and eventually Sir Auckland Colvin yielded to the solicitations of the khedive and was appointed with the consent of our government. The temporary suspension of the mixed tribunals was among the

proposals to facilitate the settlement of the country, but this was not effected for some time afterwards. One important matter which had a place in the plan laid down for the complete restoration of order in Egypt was the neutralization of the Suez Canal, which Lord Granville proposed should be opened to armed as well as merchant vessels of all countries at all times, and that, as on an arm of the sea, no special privileges beyond those of the three miles' limit should be granted to the ships of one power to the exclusion of another, but that all belligerent operations within the canal should be prohibited by convention.

These, then, were the main points of the plan for the restoration of regular government in Egypt in 1883, but we shall see that other events interposed, and that the difficulties of the situation had been beyond ordinary calculation even apart from the cloud of another insurrection, which had already appeared in the distant horizon. Meanwhile the trial of the leaders of the rebellion had to be proceeded with, and the evidence that had been obtained from numerous voluntary witnesses at Alexandria and in the provinces, had already pretty well established the guilt of Arabi and his accomplices, though a great part of that evidence was offered at a time when the military tyranny of the rebels made it dangerous for witnesses to give such testimony.

Lord Dufferin having so well represented England at the conference in Constantinople, it was almost an inevitable conclusion that he should be sent to Cairo, there to take the leading part in restoring to order the tangled skein of the Egyptian government, and providing for the protection of European interests. There was no man more eminently capable of fulfilling a mission requiring united firmness, caution, and conciliatory disposition and manners; nor was there a diplomatist whose previous experiences had better qualified him for dealing with the condition of affairs in Egypt. The Right Hon. Frederick Temple Blackwood, K.C.B., K.P., Viscount Clandeboye and Earl of Dufferin, son of the fourth Baron Dufferin and Helen Selina, daughter of the late Thomas Sheridan, possesses those admirable qualities which distinguish the accomplished Irish gentleman, who has the delightful

characteristics of his educated countrymen without sharing the prejudices which detract from their otherwise inimitable social charm. Humorous, genial, sound in judgment, practical, and possessing a quiet energy which promptly accepts and steadily accomplishes difficult duties, he had already been repeatedly successful in the various high official positions to which he had been appointed. It may be surmised that the noble earl derived from his accomplished mother and her early tuition some of the literary taste and ability which has given him a recognized place in the world of letters. It is to that lady that we owe the well-known Irish songs "Terence's Farewell" and "The Lament of the Irish Emigrant;" and her son's contributions to literature, which include, beside humorous and satirical writing, some serious and thoughtful dissertations on Irish questions, have been most popularly represented by his entertaining book *Letters from High Latitudes*, a bright and pleasant account of a voyage made by the author in the yacht *Foam* to Iceland, Jan Mayen, and Spitzbergen. This pleasure-trip was made in 1855, soon after the mission of Lord John Russell in Vienna, to which Lord Dufferin was especially attached. In 1847, when he attained his majority (his father had died in 1841), the famine in Ireland had caused the most terrible distress in that country, and the young man, who had been a lord-in-waiting to the queen under Lord John Russell's administration, accompanied his friend the Hon. Mr. Boyle on a visit to the desolate district of Skibbereen, where the poverty and suffering were perhaps most conspicuous. The account of what they saw there was afterwards published in a plain statement of facts, which very emphatically called the attention of people in England to the urgent claims for relief put forward on behalf of the starving and destitute peasantry.

In 1860 Lord Palmerston sent Lord Dufferin to Syria with authority to prosecute inquiries on the subject of the massacre of the Christians, and he seemed even at that time to have some special qualification for dealing with the Oriental character, for his accounts of what he saw were striking, and his mission was so well accomplished that on his return he was gazetted K.C.B. and was

afterwards appointed Under-Secretary of State for India, an office which he relinquished in 1866 on his becoming Under-Secretary of State for War. About two years later he was made Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster under Mr. Gladstone's administration, and held that office till 1872, when he was made Governor-general of Canada, and fulfilled the onerous duties of that position to the admiration of the people over whom he exercised authority. In this, as in his lord-lieutenancy of county Down, and in those social relations by which he has been so happily distinguished, Lord Dufferin owed much to the grace and tact of the lady to whom he was married in 1862—a daughter of Captain Archibald Rowan Hamilton of Killyleah Castle. Lord Dufferin may be said to have earned by steady and competent service, united to great capability and the amiable social attractions that bespeak good-will—the successive honours conferred upon him. In 1850 he received the title of an English Baron, and became a privy councillor in 1868, and an earl of the United Kingdom in 1871.

Lord Dufferin arrived in Cairo on the 7th of November, 1882, and so assiduously set about the work of inquiry and reform that he was soon able to sketch out a plan for the reconstruction of a government and the administration of the finances; but before that had been done, or rather simultaneously with his inquiries and plans, the trials of Arabi and his rebel colleagues took place. Some of these lasted for a considerable time, but that of Arabi was concluded before the end of the year.

The khedive, with Cherif Pasha, who was again chief minister, and the other officials had lost very little time in getting hold of the reins of government under British protection and advice, and one of the first things they set themselves to do was to punish those of their enemies, throughout the provinces, who had fomented the rebellion and had been guilty of crimes in their determination to support it. The examinations which had been conducted, and the evidence obtained in the presence of official representatives of this country in Alexandria and other places, left no doubt of the guilt of many of the principal persons who were accused and had been arrested.

As we have seen, it was not only in Alexandria, where the British consul had been felled to the ground and seriously injured and a large number of Europeans killed or severely wounded; but in Cairo, where the Austro-Hungarians were numerous and suffered considerably from the disturbance; and also at Zagazig, Mansourah, Damietta, Tantah, and other places, that Europeans were openly threatened, and the riotous part of the population had been known to arm themselves by the permission, if not with the connivance, of officials. With regard to Arabi himself, there was no doubt whatever that he had been guilty of mutiny, treason, and the violation of the laws of war, which were the charges eventually brought against him at his trial. The difficulty had been caused by the conduct of the sultan and of the khedive, and the manner in which they had delayed proclaiming him to be a rebel until they were compelled to recognize the danger of his pretensions and had to face the occupation of the country by a European force. This led to the surmise that at his trial more important people would be implicated than those who had been his agents or had been recognized as active confederates in the atrocities which had been committed.

As early as June, 1882, Lord Dufferin, who was at Therapia, had heard that the sultan had conferred decorations on Arabi, and on asking the Turkish minister of foreign affairs whether this report was true received the mysterious answer, "The time will come when you will entirely applaud the act."

This was at a time when Europeans were escaping from Alexandria, from Cairo, and from the provincial towns. News of a massacre at Benha, and of the establishment of the military tyranny of Arabi and his companions, had led the French and other foreign representatives at the conference to say that unless a prompt remedy were applied to the increasing anarchy in Egypt all the African provinces would eventually become uninhabitable by Europeans. After the bombardment of Alexandria the ex-governor, Omar Pasha Loutfi, on his way to Cairo, saw the dead bodies of many Europeans who had been killed by the soldiers and plunderers. The towns of Tantah, Damanhour, and

Mihalla had been looted and all Europeans who were found there had been killed. On his arrival at Cairo he found the greatest excitement and panic prevailing. A general council was hastily summoned to meet the minister of the interior, and was attended by about 100 pashas, ulemas, and merchants, and Hussein Pasha Dramali, who was elected president of the meeting, opened the proceedings by reading a letter addressed by Arabi to Yacoub Pasha, directing the latter to call a meeting and to read his letter publicly to them. The drift of this letter was: "The khedive has sold the country to the English; every evening he takes his family on board an English ship of war; he has given orders to the director of the military bakeries that 15,000 loaves be supplied daily to the English and nothing to the natives. The ministers have been imprisoned by the khedive's orders. The telegrams which I (Arabi) receive, purporting to be sent by my colleagues, are all forgeries. Under such circumstances I ask whether it would be advisable to cease military preparations or not."

A telegram from the khedive to Arabi, which was inclosed in his letter, was then read. In this telegram his highness had pointed out that England did not wish to take Egypt; and then followed an explanatory summary of events from the beginning of the crisis to the bombardment, ending by an invitation to Arabi to cease his military preparation and to come at once to the palace at Alexandria to receive his orders.

A sheikh named Hassan Edwi then said that by the order of God and the Prophet the khedive's commands could no longer be obeyed, and that the time had come to declare the holy war, a declaration which was seconded by another sheikh (el-Eish). On Akoosh Pasha, who spoke in opposition to it, refuting the statements made by Arabi, and denying their truth, many of the officers present rushed on him, seized him, and threatened to kill him. Order having been eventually restored, a proposition of the Coptic Patriarch was adopted by the majority of the meeting, and a deputation was appointed to go to Alexandria to hear what was the khedive's version of the story, and to inquire whether the ministers had really been imprisoned.

At this time two prefects and a mudir had been, by Arabi's orders, shut up in the citadel of Cairo, and others had been appointed to supersede them in their offices; Arabi had asked that the sixth part of the male population of every province should be sent to him to join the army at Kafr-Dowar, horses and provisions were everywhere being requisitioned, and the provinces were in a state of anarchy.

The delegates, after visiting Alexandria, went to the outposts of Arabi's forces at Kafr-Dowar, with the intention of discovering what were the terms which he would accept on condition of his yielding and putting an end to the rebellion; but various circumstances made any such arrangement exceedingly improbable. Arabi had read to Raouf Pasha, who visited his camp, a telegram from M. de Lesseps assuring him that if the Suez Canal was allowed to remain untouched, neither France nor any other power would co-operate with England in Egypt, and M. de Lesseps was expected to follow his telegram by special train from Port Said. He used every effort, also, to assure our representatives and generals that if we did not intervene to suppress the rebellion, Arabi would faithfully respect the neutrality of the canal, and he vehemently deprecated any occupation of it by vessels of war for any purpose whatever. It is scarcely likely that Arabi had much confidence in our abstaining from calling him to account for the condition of affairs at Alexandria and the massacres in the provinces, though for the trials of the murderers and incendiaries we had established native tribunals under European inspection.¹ He probably knew by that time that sufficient evidence could be brought against him if he should be proclaimed a rebel and a traitor. The governors of Port Said had been compelled to seek refuge on board an English vessel. However desirous some of his officers and followers may have been to submit to conditions and surrender, Arabi himself had reasons on both sides for holding out. His guilt would be established if he were brought to trial, his own false statements.

¹ The native tribunal established at Alexandria in July consisted of a president, Osman Pasha Nedjeb, a Circassian officer, assisted by six officers of the Egyptian army, two of whom were aides-de-camp to the khedive. Lord Charles Beresford, assisted by Mr. Beaman, watching the proceedings as chief of the police.

his accusations of the khedive, and his mutinous proclamations being sufficient to convict him; but he may have had some strong confidence that the sultan, who had decorated him and with whom he was in secret communication, desired to make use of him for a political revolution, and would support him in maintaining the attitude of patriotism which he had assumed.

In a previous page mention has been made of Mr. Wilfrid Blunt and two or three other gentlemen who professed a deep interest in the welfare of Egypt, and supported the claims of the national party. To this there could be no valid objection, and the representatives of our government were in unison with them, so far as this sympathy was concerned; but as we have seen, Mr. Blunt, and those who held his views, persisted until very late in the day, even if they did not continue to maintain, that Arabi and the mutineers represented the national feeling and ought not to be opposed. It may have been as a concession to this opinion that in an early stage of the rebellion a statement or proclamation of a patriotic character, by Arabi, was published in the *Times* newspaper; but of course that document was very different in character to those which were issued and disseminated in Egypt, and was doubtless designed to enlist sympathy for a causè which Arabi's conduct conclusively showed was not the object of the rebellion.

In December, 1881, Mr. Blunt, who had previously been in the English diplomatic service, and had recently travelled much among the Arab tribes, and devoted himself to acquiring a knowledge of their history and their political organization, had formed the acquaintance of Colonel Arabi Bey at Cairo and of the chiefs of the University of El Azhar. The consequence of this was, that he warmly espoused the cause of the national party, in which he thought he saw the germs of the regeneration of the Mohammedan religion,—on the possibility of which he had already written a good deal. Unfortunately Mr. Blunt in his desire to support the "National" movement sought to publish in the *Times* what he considered to be the programme of the party, and included in it statements which were so likely to arouse the

interference of the Porte, that the result would have been the restraint of the English government from giving powerful aid to a truly national movement towards reform and representative institutions in Egypt. Mr. Blunt eventually yielded to the remonstrances of Sir Edward Malet, withdrew his letters to the *Times*, and was said to have been of considerable service afterwards in removing misunderstandings; but his own misunderstanding of the character and aims of Arabi and his military colleagues, leading him to confound their actions with a desire to promote national liberty and the prosperity of the Egyptian people, still influenced him. In June (1882) he proposed to leave London and return to Egypt, because he had promised Arabi that in the event of a conflict arising between the Porte and Egypt he would fight with the Egyptians. On serious representations being made to him by the foreign office, Mr. Blunt did not go to Egypt at that time, but contented himself with writing a long letter to Mr. Gladstone reviewing all that had taken place up to the 21st of June, and founding his arguments against the diplomatic action of England on statements with regard to the identification of Arabi and the army with the national party, the fall of the Cherif ministry, the action of the controllers-general, the reports of press correspondents, the attitude of the Bedouins, and other matters which were afterwards answered, and the most important of them refuted by what appeared to be unassailable evidence. Whether or not the subsequent conduct of Arabi Pasha produced any change on the opinion of Mr. Blunt, Sir W. Gregory, Lord De la Warr, and others who had apparently regarded him and his military companions as the representatives of liberty and progress in Egypt, they were anxious that he should be defended by English counsel, and that the trial should not be left to an Egyptian court-martial, and they proposed to send proper legal assistance to the prisoner at their own charges, Mr. Blunt being prepared to go to Cairo to help to collect evidence for the defence. The government could not enter into a controversy with Mr. Blunt on the subject, though they did not deny that there was some danger of a purely Egyptian military court being untrustworthy. Mr. Blunt wrote again on

the 27th of September, referring to a report which had that day appeared in the *Times* from Cairo, that a military court to try all offenders would be named the next day, the khedive, Cherif, and Riaz all insisting strongly on the absolute necessity for the capital punishment of the prime offenders, an opinion from which there were few, if any, dissentients. Cherif was represented to have said, "It is not because I have a feeling of spite against any of them, but because it is absolutely necessary for the security of all who wish to live in the country. An English expedition is an excellent thing, but neither you nor we want it repeated every twelve months."

The English government had no objection to the prisoners being properly defended, and there were good reasons for preventing the trial from taking place in a court where evidence might be given under fear, and a sentence of capital punishment might be summarily carried out, without proper and legal forms being observed, for the purpose of satisfying private vengeance, and to stifle any defence which might include revelations likely to damage the prosecutors. People here were strongly in favour of an open trial.

By the 23d of October the plan decided on by the foreign office was settled. Our government had already proposed to hand over to the khedive all prisoners of war taken in Egypt, with the proviso that none of them would be put to death without the consent of the British authorities, and this was agreed to.

The terms of surrender granted to the mutineers included the entire disbanding of the army and the giving up of all arms and forts. The principal rebels were to be given up for trial in the districts where they had committed crimes, but were not to be put to death except with the concurrence of the British authorities; but our government would not take steps to prevent execution in the cases of persons guilty of taking part in the burning of Alexandria, of abusing the flag of truce on the 12th of July, or of being implicated in the murder of Europeans. The lives of those not proved to have committed crimes were to be spared. The English ministry desired to limit their action to an assurance that

the prisoners would have a fair trial, and they did not wish that English officers should sit among the judges. They reserved to themselves the right of appealing to the khedive's humanity of disposition to exercise his prerogative of mercy in any cases where the full execution of the sentence appeared to them to entail unnecessary severity. Lieutenant-colonel Sir C. Wilson, Her Majesty's consul-general for Anatolia, was selected to be present at the trials (but not as a member of the court), to watch the proceedings on behalf of the government.

The Egyptian government refused to allow the pleadings or the defence in any other language but Arabic. A solicitor and two counsel, Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, had gone to Cairo to conduct the defence of Arabi, but the Egyptian government contended that by the code under which the court-martial was convened, prisoners were not allowed to have counsel, the trial would not be public, and no foreign officers would be permitted to assist. They considered that if they allowed Arabi to be defended by native counsel the condition on that point would be met. These claims, however, were not conceded by our government, who insisted that Arabi should be defended by counsel of his own choice, whether foreign or native, who would have free access to him, that interpreters should be provided, and that the trial should be public; and further, that all prisoners should be allowed to choose their counsel, but that the court should be able to control the conduct of the defence, and prevent the trial being unreasonably protracted. It was assumed that the prisoners would be tried on definite charges, and it was considered that if time should be requested to procure the attendance of absent witnesses, counsel should state what facts they are expected to prove, and that the request should be refused if the object were not to prove any fact material to the charges, but to prove any political reasons or motives. The following rules for the conduct of the trials were subsequently proposed by our government:—

“1. Prisoners should be allowed foreign counsel if any are on the spot, and available within the time reasonably fixed for the trial.

"2. The names of such counsel should be submitted to, and accepted by, the Egyptian government.

"3. Native counsel only should be allowed to address the court; foreign counsel should only advise.

"4. No arguments or evidence as to political motives or reasons in justification of the offences charged should be admitted, but only such as go to establish or disprove the truth of the charges made.

"5. No counsel should appear who does not subscribe to the above conditions, which should be rigidly enforced by the court."

It will be seen that these rules were designed to remove the difficulties alleged by the Egyptian government, which accepted them as safeguards against the undue protraction of the trials and the introduction of political questions, which they had anticipated if the prisoners were defended by foreigners. There was a later agreement between the Egyptian government advocate, and the counsel for Arabi's defence, that each accused person would have the right to choose two counsel, one of whom, whether a native or a foreigner, would be allowed to address the court.

It will be seen that there was some apprehension on the part of the Egyptian government that certain evidence in defence of Arabi, Toulba, and the other chief prisoners might implicate their accusers, and that it was thought desirable to confine the evidence to the direct charges brought against the culprits, of having abused the flag of truce by withdrawing the troops and pillaging and burning Alexandria whilst it was flying; of having incited the Egyptians to arm against the government of the khedive; and of having continued the war after hearing that peace had been concluded (the fact that Arabi had been dismissed from his post as minister of war being an aggravation of the offence) and of having incited the people to civil war, and committed acts of destruction, massacre, and pillage on Egyptian territory.

It is now known from a memorandum sent to our foreign office, dated October 20th, that Sir C. Wilson, having examined the charges, recorded his belief that on the then existing evidence no English court-martial would convict the prisoners, except, perhaps,

Toulba and Said Khandeel, of any greater crime than that of taking part in a successful military revolt against the khedive. That was technically saying that the other crimes, for which they might in one sense be morally responsible, could not be personally brought home to them.

The mode of procedure of the trial had been settled, but it was evident that there would be considerable delay in procuring witnesses for the defence, and the necessity for preventing unnecessary postponement was already evident. On October 17th Sir E. Malet wrote to Earl Granville:

"The suppression of the rebellion through the victory of Tel-el-Kebir was followed by complete tranquillity throughout the country, and it is only by degrees that the population is beginning to recover from the blow which made it senseless for a time. According to all tradition, the victors would have made use of the opportunity to ride rough-shod in every direction, and to stifle every voice that did not raise itself in their praise. The reports now coming in from the country seem to show that the people either do not believe in the capture of Arabi or are convinced that he and the British forces have come to an agreement to his advantage. They cannot understand that though conquered he is treated with consideration, while awaiting sentence by a court-martial, because such treatment is unlike anything they have ever seen or heard of. Arabi contrived to inspire the people with the belief that he possessed divine power to restore the supremacy of Islam, and the common saying among the people is that he cannot be put to death, and that he will yet prove himself the 'Mahdi' or Saviour. The more ignorant have a story that he is at present making a forty days' journey through the heavens, and in general his hold on the sympathy of the lower classes has made rapid and dangerous strides since the time when he became the acknowledged leader of the people against armed Christian invasion.

"It is natural that the events of the past three months should have brought home to all parts of the country the fact that a great struggle was engaged, and the bare fact of Mussulmans being on

the one side and Christians on the other, is sufficient to account for the drift of public feeling with regard to it.

"Now that the end has come and that the mass of the population find no evil effects accruing to them, they account for it by the divine powers of Arabi, on the ground that divine power alone could save them under such circumstances. They are beginning to lift up their heads, and an uneasy feeling is again pervading the country. Requests are made to me from many places to send English troops, in order that the fact of the occupation may be brought home to the people; but the military authorities are averse to distributing detachments, on account of the sickness which has attacked those which have already been stationed in the outlying districts. I am not apprehensive of danger, but there is no doubt that the hostility of the lower class of native to the Christian which has been aroused by recent events has not been allayed by our success, and that until the trial of the state prisoners is over, the evil spirit will continue to ferment and increase."

It was a remarkable addition to the strange complications in Egypt that the notion that Ahmed Arabi was the Mahdi or the expected restorer of Islam should have been held by numbers of the people at the very time that another rebellion was being fomented in the Soudan by a pretender to the same mission.

A month before (on the 17th of September) Sir E. Malet had sent to Earl Granville a memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson stating that owing to telegrams sent by Arabi Pasha to the Soudan ordering people not to recognize the authority of the khedive, revolt had broken out in the country and the pretender Mahdi had gained more adherents. The Mahdi had then attacked Don on the White Nile, but had been defeated. The governor of the Soudan asked for 10,000 Remington rifles to be sent in order to arm a force under Said Pasha in order to crush the Mahdi. The memorandum went on to say, "that there had been killed of the rebels by the Egyptian troops, 1000 at Ziara, 1000 at Kordofan, and 300 at another place, and that the Mahdi was then two hours' march from Kordofan (Obeid) and had a large force. The Mahdi," added Sir Charles, "has only two roads by which he can

approach Lower Egypt, viz., by the Nubian desert and Nile valley and by the Darfour slave route. Both are difficult for the passage of large bodies of troops, and could be easily blocked by a small disciplined force. At present, however, should the Mahdi attempt a forward movement, there is no Egyptian force to meet him."

But it was necessary to provide for the protection of Europeans in Egypt itself, and this, of course, delayed the withdrawal of the British troops. It was considered necessary also to send visitors to the prisons in Cairo, Alexandria, Tantah, Zagazig, Damietta, and other places where a large number of criminals were confined, and the many persons who had been arrested for political offences only, or for having taken part in the atrocities accompanying the rebellion, were either suffering captivity as a punishment or were awaiting trial. Serious complaints had reached our foreign office that the condition of the Egyptian prisons was abominable, and that the unfortunate people confined in them were treated with gross cruelty and brutality. Our representatives at various places were communicated with, and it was deemed advisable that British officers should from time to time visit the prisons to guard against the practice of any cruelties. There were about 150 political prisoners at Cairo, 450 at Alexandria, 360 at Tantah, besides numbers at Zagazig, Mansourah, Siout, and other places, and as some of the charges were not of a very serious character, and political and criminal prisoners occupied the same buildings and were often treated in a similar manner, an inquiry was necessary. At Tantah and other places the condition of the captive Egyptians was very deplorable. Some had been half starved, others had been deprived of everything belonging to them, several had been seriously wounded or severely beaten and bastinadoed so that they were in great suffering, many were in irons, and the crowded buildings in which they were confined were unspeakably foul and filthy. This was the case with one of the prisons at Cairo itself, where Sir Charles Wilson made personal visitations, assisted by Lieut.-Col. Stewart, who was afterwards commissioned to make a journey of inspection to all the prisons where a number of persons were confined.

It was stated, however, that the filthy conditions were attributable to the incorrigibly dirty habits of the lower class of Egyptians, and particularly the fellaheen, and that both in Turkey and in Egypt, barracks and all buildings where any numbers of such people dwelt, could not be kept even moderately clean without constant trouble. In the principal Cairo prison, however, and at Alexandria there was a better state of things, and on the matter being emphatically brought to the notice of the Egyptian government great improvements were made. At the same time the increasing number of prisoners and the hardships to which they were exposed was an additional reason for hastening the trial of Arabi and his companions, and it was suggested that as probably only the charge of mutiny and rebellion could be sustained against him, it might be possible to deal with his case by returning a verdict on that accusation, the evidence of which need not be very protracted, and that he might be sentenced—not to exile—for it was suspected that in that case he might come to London and there be fêted by his friends, in which case nothing could have convinced the people of Egypt that his claims had not been supported by England—but to transportation, so that the place of his exile might be determined by the Egyptian government. It was most desirable that the trials should proceed, especially as there were numbers of the accused whose cases would have been met by the punishment of imprisonment that they had undergone—while the arrest at Canea of Suleiman Bey Sami, who was mainly responsible for the burning of Alexandria after the bombardment of the forts, and Moussa el Akbad, who was accused of being the principal instigator of the riots and massacres of the 11th of June, may be said to have completed the captures of the more guilty of the culprits.

Lieutenant-colonel Stewart having been commissioned to proceed to Khartûm to report on the condition of affairs there and in the Soudan, the inspection of the Egyptian prisons was continued by Major Chermside and M. Ardern Beaman, consular-assistant at Cairo. The investigation was very complete, and the reports of the overcrowding of the prisons where political and criminal offenders were huddled together, and the neglect and

cruelty with which many unfortunate creatures, including women and children, were treated, showed that the inquiry and the reforms that were demanded in consequence were highly necessary.

Among other things it was discovered that threats of accusation for complicity in the recent disturbances were being made against individuals for the purpose of extracting money from them, and among the many hundreds of prisoners awaiting trial there were numbers who had committed comparatively small offences, and might well have been left to the general amnesty which was granted after the sentence of the ringleaders, and those whose crimes or whose active participation in the mutiny demanded either sentence of death or punishment by transportation, exile, imprisonment, deprivation of property, degradation from rank, or fine. In the early trials by the courts-martial at Alexandria and some other places the sentence of death was carried out upon a few of the instigators and participators in the burning of the city, the massacres and the brutalities inflicted on Europeans.

The proceedings of the courts were fairly conducted, and British officers watched the proceedings at Tantah and Alexandria, where the commission sat for the trial of prisoners accused of being implicated in crimes such as murder, pillage, arson, theft, &c., and were therefore not released at the same time as the other political prisoners.

The inquiries which had to be made in many cases in order to sift evidence, which in Egypt, as in India, is likely to be given from corrupt or revengeful motives, or to be suppressed or distorted for the sake of a bribe, caused the trials to last a considerable time and the arrests and imprisonments to continue; but it may be believed that for the most part justice was done, and there was a leaning to the side of mercy in most of the sentences where the crimes had not been accompanied by special atrocity; indeed the instructions from our foreign office, no less than the desire of the officers appointed to advise and assist the native tribunals, had considerable influence in mitigating the punishments which would otherwise have been inflicted.

The discovery of the murderers of Professor Palmer and his

companions, and the trial and execution of the culprits, was an early instance of retribution, and it is not easy to say what definite connection that crime had with the rebellion. In a debate in the House of Commons in March, 1883, certain insinuations had been made that Professor Palmer had gone out as a spy, and the reply given by Mr. Campbell-Bannerman, on behalf of the government, seemed to show that Palmer, like Gordon, had been permitted to undertake a mission of an uncertain character, in which he had the imperfect support of the government, or rather that the government stopped short of its support at the very point where they ought either to have accorded it or to have forbidden him to join to his direct commission some independent action for which they as his employers would not hold themselves at all responsible. In explaining what the object of the expedition was, and how it came to pass that Mr. Palmer was sent into the deserts of Sinai, Mr. Bannerman said that at the end of June, 1882, before the attack on the forts of Alexandria, and when there was only a strong possibility, and not even a probability of warlike operations, it became obvious that steps must be taken to secure the tranquillity of the Suez Canal. The necessity for taking some measures apart from any military operation in Egypt itself to secure the friendliness of the Arabs, and also to obtain from them any help they could give in the control of the canal, was very urgent. For that purpose the first lord consulted two persons, Colonel Bradford and Captain Gill. It was suggested that the proper man to be consulted in regard to the whole matter would be Professor Palmer, who had spent a great deal of time in the peninsula of Sinai in connection with the survey, and who was an extraordinary adept at languages. It had been his custom to go about among the people dressed as a native, and he went on his late mission in the same name and dress as on other occasions. He was asked who would be the most likely man to go out to assist Sir B. Seymour as interpreter, and he then volunteered his own services. His own proposal was to go to Gaza and cross the desert to Suez, as he believed he would be able to acquire on that journey a certain amount of

knowledge as to the feeling of the Arabs, and be less likely to attract notice than if he went through the Suez Canal. In that sense it was a semi-secret journey. If it had been known where he was going, steps would, no doubt, have been taken to prevent his attaining the object he had in view. He received no money whatever on that journey. Professor Palmer formed a very sanguine idea of what he could do in the matter. He appeared to have represented that he could secure the allegiance of 50,000 Bedouins. But he received no encouragement from the government in carrying out any such purpose. A telegram was sent from the admiralty which was intended rather to dissuade him. It was, of course, not desirable to snub him, or to imply any rebuke for over-zeal, nor did he (Mr. Campbell-Bannerman) intend to imply that he was a victim to over-zeal. But the telegram directed that Professor Palmer should be instructed to keep the Bedouins available for patrol and transport on the canal. He was not supplied with any money either at home or by the authorities at the canal for the purpose of bribing the Bedouins. He only had £3000, and that was given to him at Suez to provide for his going into the desert for the purpose of securing camels for the use of the Indian contingent. It was certainly part of his mission to use his influence among the Bedouins to get them into a favourable frame of mind towards the British, but there was nothing in the way of bribery to secure their good-will.

Referring to the accusation that Professor Palmer was going as a spy in disguise among the Bedouins, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman stated that he went in his ordinary dress and under the ordinary name he had always assumed among the Bedouins. He wrote to the admiralty saying he thought it most desirable that a naval officer should accompany him as a guarantee that he was acting on the part of Her Majesty's government. Lieutenant Charrington accordingly accompanied Professor Palmer, and took with him part of his uniform.

It is almost impossible to convey an adequate notion of the difficulties which had to be encountered in sifting evidence in a country like Egypt, where tyranny, bribery, and extortion had for

ages attended proceedings in the so-called courts of justice, and false witness could be either compelled by persecution or obtained by presents. In the course of the inquiry numbers of men were found to have been imprisoned on false and vague evidence of their having belonged to the military party. Witnesses were procured by the use of the thumb-screw and the bastinado. One old man of over sixty declared that he had been stolen from his village and severely bastinadoed because he refused to give the evidence required against four men, till at last he was forced by suffering to name four men, who were thereupon shut up in prison by the wakil and bastinadoed. This was at Shibil-el-Koum, where fourteen other men accused of being "associates of the military party" affirmed that while in prison the sheikh had stolen their money, horses, cattle, and other property. It was in some of the provincial prisons that these monstrous perversions of justice were so numerous, and the one mentioned was perhaps the worst, for there the thumb-screw and the bastinado were in active operation. The instances given by Mr. Ardern Beaman were not to be considered to represent the number of prisoners who declared themselves to be the victims of oppression. As soon as he attempted to write a man's name and grievance others would seize his hand and strive to kiss it in order to ensure their cases also being noted; while two or three were clinging to his feet, a fourth would catch his beard and implore his attention. The scene beggared description, and the very desperation of the prisoners hindered their own cause by rendering it impossible to stay in the prison; but that they were convinced of the authority of the British commissioners, and of their power to demand justice, appears to be shown by the fact that they openly accused the mudiriate officials to their face of having received bribes, applied the thumb-screw, beaten them, and detained them unjustly in prison. In other prisons some of the accused were kept in chains without having been brought up for examination; in all, numbers of persons were detained for weeks and months without being brought to trial; in many the prisoners who could not bribe were starving—only a small loaf for a day's food, and water to drink—the regular rations being

three small loaves weighing together less than three pounds. Little or no clothing, scarcely any bedding, and in some cases none of either, was provided. Except in three or four instances the various rooms or wards, crowded with miserable wretches, were indescribably filthy and dilapidated; the courtyards and passages draughty, cold, and damp. Disease was prevalent, wounds and sores from repeatedly inflicted punishments had to be endured without amelioration.

In several jails the prisoners accused of political offences were undistinguished from the criminals, and had suffered similar punishments without having been brought to trial. The evidence against them when the examination was made by the commission was so slight, or so open to the suspicion of being prompted either by fear, or bribery, or private animosity, that numbers were released, numbers let out on bail, and the preparations for bringing others to trial were pushed on as fast as it is possible to push on anything in Egypt. The work to be done was difficult, almost appalling, but it seems to be indisputable that the British officials, to whom it was confided, spared no effort to accomplish it thoroughly, and to secure for the prisoners an impartial investigation by the sub-commission of inquiry which sat at Cairo under a native president to hear cases referred to it from the mudiriates.

It was absolutely necessary to release a large number of persons (about 140 in all) upon bail, and 100 were set free altogether because the charges brought against them could not be substantiated at the time that they were brought to trial. At Alexandria, exclusive of twelve men executed and 180 sentenced by the original court-martial, there were 118 cases, comprising about 200 prisoners accused of pillage and massacre, in the hands of the commission. The ordinary judicial machinery was quite inadequate, and the action of the few special commissions was so dilatory that there were at the date mentioned 190 prisoners classed as political offenders in the provinces which had been visited, including Alexandria, and above 900 accused of riot and massacre, including about 100 soldiers, besides the numerous cases marked as "ordinary," but more or less connected with the recent events. There were

universal complaints by all these classes of prisoners of the long time that they had been kept in misery without either examination or trial. Without exception the governors were of Turkish or Circassian extraction, and a number of them were, not unnaturally, actuated by vindictive feelings, so that at a serious crisis the prisoners and a large part of the population were living under a reign of terror, attributable, not alone to the cruelties exercised upon those who were arrested on trustworthy evidence, but to the opportunity afforded to accusers for procuring the imprisonment of personal enemies, or for threatening to denounce their neighbours unless their silence should be purchased by heavy bribes. Governors, local notables, employés of all sorts, and some Europeans joined in this detestable method of spoliation, for it was certain that the accused, once in prison, must undergo a lingering confinement. Prosecutions could be dropped for a consideration; and there was a fine harvest for all these scoundrels down to the officers of the local courts, and even the jailers.

In the dead-lock that followed the confusion and anarchy in which the country had been plunged ordinary charges went long without examination; prisoners declared over and over again that old charges had been brought up against them, or a vindictive governor was ready to imprison upon some petty accusation anyone who was accused of having helped the rebels.

The native Christians, Syrians, Maltese, Europeans, and, above all, the Greeks, were very vindictive, and the fine commercial instinct of the latter enabled them at once to grasp the value of the British occupation and of the present reaction to *exploiter* the situation. "Inciting against Christians," "pillage and massacre," were easy charges to bring, and there is no doubt that the fear of being proscribed was made a marketable commodity.

At Tantah, where there were some 400 people in prison for massacre and pillage—239 for the former alone—the commission was deluged with petitions, and fresh arrests were continually made. The official number of murdered was 38: 8 or 10 persons or more were accused of the murder of one individual. A Greek actually brought back his list of 10, amended, a rich notable being

substituted for one of the others; and it was said, on good authority, that meanwhile the said notable had been invited to compound. At Mohallet Kebir, where 6 (or 7) people were killed, 120 at least of the 180 prisoners were accused of riot and massacre, and 32 persons were accused of one murder.

At Zifteh, where a church was plundered, 80 men were imprisoned on this charge, and there was corroboration of the assertion of two well-to-do men, presumably above a senseless riot, that they were confined on evidence extorted from a boy by the bastinado. The boy and another man confirmed this.

It is impossible to dwell upon the horrible condition of some of the prisons; the want, exposure, and torment suffered by prisoners who had not been brought to trial. Fifty days in irons, with the addition of 500 strokes of the kourbash, crushed thumbs, feet lamed and swollen from the bastinado, were among the worst cases.

These evils were not surprising in a country where prisoners accused of ordinary non-political offences were kept for weeks and months without trial or examination, even though they might declare that they could prove their innocence: where servants of a man of distinction had been imprisoned, and after being released by the general pardon of the khedive had been again arrested without being charged with any offence: where a sarrâf, who had embezzled government money, but whose sureties had paid the full amount, had been kept in prison because he had sued the Ma'mon of a district for £375 which he had lent him, and the ma'mon had forcibly entered his house in his absence and stolen his books and the acknowledgment for the money. This prisoner had given £145 in bribes to two of the clerks of the mudirieh in the endeavour to get back his £375. One man, who had been charged with stealing £3, 10s., had been twelve months in prison without trial; another, sentenced to one month, had been four years in prison; another, with his family of three women and children and twelve men from his village, had been seventy days without examination; another, charged with abusive language to a woman, fifty days without examination. Two were released from chains

after being kept in that condition for fifty and sixty days respectively. The less cruel punishments of distinguished or notable persons accused of political offences consisted in being starved on bread and water, refused permission to see or to communicate with their families, and the almost certainty that their property was being appropriated or destroyed. One singular case was that of an old sheikh, Ali Fakhri, who had taken to the Mudir of Mansoorah an egg said to have been laid bearing upon it the word "mansoor" (victorious), and had proposed that it should be presented to Arabi. The suggestion being complied with, another sheikh, Salli, now also in prison, had been summoned by the mudir (Khalil Pasha) to make corrections in the address, written by the mudir himself, to accompany the egg. The corrections having been made the mudir signed the address and sent that and the egg together to Arabi.

While numbers of men were starving in jail without trial, their families had been reduced to poverty and were begging outside. Mere boys and old men were cruelly beaten. It is not to be believed that the majority of the accused who declared that they were falsely imprisoned or were the innocent victims of spite were to be believed, whether they were charged with criminal or political offences; but the fact remained that they were barbarously used, and bore the revolting marks of the treatment they had received; that constant attempts were made to extort money from them; that hundreds of people went in fear, and were compelled to buy off the informers and false witnesses who threatened them; and that all had been kept in durance, many for long periods, without examination or trial. "It may safely be stated," wrote Mr. Ardern Beaman in concluding one of his reports, "that no report can convey the feeblest impression of the hopeless misery of the mass of the prisoners, who live for months like wild beasts, without change of clothing, half starved, ignorant of the fate of their families, and bewailing their own. They look forward to the day of their trial as synonymous with the day of their release, but the prospect of its advent is too uncertain to lend much hope to their wretchedness. From the moment of entering the prison,

even on the most trifling charge, they consider themselves lost. The one power than can release them is money, and they do not command it. It is impossible for them to guess at the time when a new official may begin to clear off the cases in his district, or when the slow march of administration may reach them. It may be weeks, it may be months, and it may be years: many of them have long since ceased to care which."

It will, of course, be seen that the events which had recently taken place in the country, the suppression of the rebellion by British interposition and the occupation by British troops, had not caused this condition of affairs. It already existed in all its revolting cruelty and injustice—and arose from the bad state of the government and the venality and irresponsibility of the officials. The visits of the British officials, commissioned to examine the prisons and hasten the trials, were expected with eager anticipation that abuses would be rectified and complaints listened to with a view to a demand for inquiry. But it is also easy to understand that the very considerable portion of the population who had been on the side of Arabi and believed that he was fighting for national freedom, began to show fresh symptoms of revolt. The first strong impression made upon them by the rapid suppression of the rebellion and the almost immediate defeat of an army that had seemed to melt away before the attack of the British troops, began to wear off. The conquering force was gradually diminishing, only a portion of it remaining to assist the khedive in keeping order. Arabi and his companions had for several weeks been prisoners—hundreds of those who were accused of abetting them were in durance and undergoing the torments of Egyptian jails, from which, according to ordinary experience, no man knew when they might be brought to trial. Where were the effects of the amnesty and of the declarations of English officials that justice would be done, and that no man would be put to death, or secretly sentenced, or left to rot in prison? Arabi was still in the country, and the presence of him and his former supporters at Cairo was in itself a danger. There were some among the ignorant people in distant places who believed that Arabi was still in power, or who

began to imagine, or perhaps were persuaded to believe, that the English were after all only temporizing, and would ultimately set him up in place of the khedive. Many of the Egyptians possess the strange credulity exhibited by most people who live in an atmosphere of lying, and the seeds of sedition grow a crop not easily uprooted or destroyed. One difficulty was that our government had distinctly declared that it would not take upon itself the government of Egypt or the administration of its courts of civil or military law. British officials were employed to make inquiries into alleged abuses and were to be present at the trials, but not with any official authority. They were, so to speak, expected "to see fair," but they had no part in the executive nor any judicial function. The responsibility of hastening the trials and of bringing the evil and injustice of the prevailing abuses before the native authorities, who began to bestir themselves under the vigilant eyes of our representatives, was one of the sharpest and most difficult of our experiences after the occupation of Cairo. There can be no doubt, however, that the relation we held towards the khedive and his government gave a very decided quality of authority to our advice and remonstrances, and we had the advantage of employing earnest, able, and indefatigable men, whose personal character and judicious mode of procedure compelled respect apart from the official position which they occupied. Lord Dufferin was truly as much master of the situation as though he had been commissioned sternly to demand instead of seriously advising, and our acting consuls and assistants as well as the military officers who, like Sir C. Wilson, Lieutenant-Col. Stewart, and Major Chermside, were appointed to special and onerous duties, acted with great circumspection. The result was that the local commissions and the courts by which the prisoners were tried proceeded in the main with fairness, and probably, on the whole, justice was never before so promptly and so evenly administered by any native court in Egypt.

But the danger was serious, especially while the leaders of the late mutiny remained without trial. The lower order of Egyptians were constantly using insulting remarks to Europeans, not only in the provincial towns and villages, but in Cairo, and especially to

the Greeks, whom they detested. It soon became so evident that the leaders of the recent mutiny must be brought to trial that though Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, who were their counsel, desired to extend the time during which they were to collect evidence for the defence, Lord Dufferin and Sir Edward Malet, who received careful reports from Sir C. Wilson as to the probable result of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the charges of participation in the firing of Alexandria and the massacres could not be sustained against Arabi, who vehemently denied that he was answerable for them; though Suleiman Sami, who had savagely instigated both, declared that he acted under his instructions. Some pressure was brought to bear upon the khedive to put an end to the trial and exile Arabi by decree, but this was precluded by the action taken by the British government.

It was for some time expected that Arabi would refuse to plead guilty even to the charge of rebellion. He had expressed confidence in the justice that would ensue from his having been permitted a public trial and the assistance of English counsel, and he had handed over to Mr. A. M. Broadley all his private papers, which had been hidden, and some of which his wife had kept concealed within her dress. These papers, which were supposed to implicate high Egyptian and Turkish officials, were given into the charge of the British vice-consul and deposited in the safe at the consulate, and were to be translated after having been initialed by Sir Charles Wilson.

After Lord Dufferin reached Cairo the trials were pushed on with greater despatch. It had transpired that Arabi, who was desirous of being tried before a properly constituted court under British observation, would be willing to plead guilty to the charge of rebellion, and more unexpectedly still it was made known, that he was willing, and even anxious, to get out of Egypt. It may be surmised that he foresaw that his life would not be safe should he be committed to prison after a sentence of capital punishment had been pronounced, even though it should be commuted to incarceration for a period preceding his being exiled, if that period extended beyond the British occupation. At anyrate, the British

government never meant that he should be put to death. To him and several of his companions it was intended that the khedive should be advised to extend his prerogative of mercy, and it was eventually not difficult to induce him to accept the suggestion that a sentence of exile to a region under the dominion or direct influence of the British government, and with a monthly allowance sufficient for comfortable maintenance, would be no bad exchange for a trial ending in a doubtful sentence and the risk of being assassinated, or privately executed, even if the punishment of death was supposed to be commuted.

On the 30th of November Lord Dufferin telegraphed to Lord Granville that an arrangement had been come to between the Egyptian government and Mr. A. M. Broadley on behalf of Arabi and his principal associates. They were to be charged simply with rebellion before the court-martial. To this charge they would plead guilty. In the event of the court pronouncing a capital sentence it was to be submitted to the khedive, who would commute it into perpetual exile. The prisoners would give their parole that they would proceed to any locality which might be indicated to them, and would there remain unless invited to remove. Should they return surreptitiously to Egypt the capital sentence might be enforced against them without a new trial. By a subsequent decree of the khedive their property would be confiscated, but the property of their wives would not be touched, and the Egyptian government undertook to provide each prisoner with an allowance sufficient for his maintenance. By another edict the military prisoners were to be degraded from their respective ranks. The maximum penalty to be inflicted on any of the other prisoners was not, except in one or two cases, to exceed two years' imprisonment or five years' exile. Those who were ready to plead guilty would thereby entitle themselves to a lighter sentence. It was understood that wherever possible, penalties less than the maximum would be imposed. Many of the prisoners were to be released with or without bail.

It is evident that there were very strong reasons for proposing such a compromise by which Arabi and his co-mutineers were let

down so easily, that many an unfortunate insolvent debtor in Europe would have accepted such a sentence as a boon to himself and to the family which was to go with him to ease and comfort in another and not altogether disagreeable country.

The complicated proceedings in which the representatives of England had to act with great caution were now becoming easier, although Riaz Pasha, the Egyptian minister of the interior, resigned office on the plea of ill health, but in reality because of his objection to the compromise made in the sentence of Arabi and his companions. Cherif Pasha, however, retained the premiership, and the ministry was reconstructed on what was regarded as a more liberal basis than that which had existed since the return from Alexandria.

On the 3d of December, 1882, the court-martial was held, at which the sentence was pronounced. Reouf Pasha, who presided, said to the prisoner: "Arabi Pasha, you are accused before this court, in accordance with the instructions of the commission of inquiry, of rebellion against His Highness the Khedive under articles 96 of the Ottoman Military Code, and 59 of the Ottoman Penal Code; are you guilty, or not guilty?" Mr. A. M. Broadley on behalf of his client replied: "Of my own free will, and in accordance with the advice given me by my advocate, I acknowledge myself guilty of the crime alleged against me." A paper signed by Arabi to the same effect was handed to the court and read out. The court then adjourned to deliberate, and in the afternoon pronounced the sentence, which was that of death, but it was to be submitted to the khedive. After the sentence had been pronounced, a khedival decree was read by the court commuting the capital sentence to perpetual exile. The confiscation of the prisoner's property and his degradation from military rank were to follow.

Arabi's companions, Mahmoud Sami, Ali Fehmi, Abdullah, Toulba, Yacoub Pasha Samy, and Mahmoud Pasha Fehmy, were brought up before the court on a like charge, acknowledged their guilt, and were sentenced to death, the sentence being commuted to perpetual exile; so that the seven chiefs of the rebellion were com-

comfortably disposed of, and it was the opinion of our government that Arabi should be sent to Ceylon at all events for the present. The arch rebel could have very little objection to take up a life of ease with a modest competency of £30 (which was afterwards increased to £40) a month in an island which is famous for its beauty and luxuriance. The Moslem tradition had made Ceylon the cradle of the human race, the place to which Adam had departed when he was exiled from Paradise, and Arabi neatly remarked that he considered himself to be "greatly honoured by being sent to the last resting-place of the common father of all men."

He may well have been satisfied at such a result of his rebellion, and people who had held the opinion that Egypt was, to say the least, divided in the belief of Arabi's patriotism and of his being the representative of the national feeling, were now able to point to the result of the influence of our government as a proof that the public belief in England was divided on the same subject, and that the compromise of punishment almost took the form of reward.

Arabi himself wrote to Sir Edward Malet a letter which, being translated, read:—"I feel bound to present to you my heartfelt thanks for the noble efforts you have made in order to ensure my treatment with fairness and justice, and for all that you have done to rescue me from the dangers which surrounded me. I hope, therefore, that you will accept the expression of my gratitude and of my highest respects, and of the friendly and sincere feelings I shall always entertain towards you." This was signed "Ahmed Arabi, *the Egyptian*."

Arabi's fellow-prisoners having been similarly tried and sentenced, and their sentences also commuted in the same way that Arabi's had been, it was afterwards decided to send them to the same destination, where they would be under the eye of British observation, though our government would not, of course, be responsible for their detention.

In this way seven of the principals concerned in the rebellion were comfortably disposed of, and all of them declared on oath, and engaged their personal word of honour to accept to go to the place

which the government should designate for them, and to stay there. It has been already mentioned that the sentence of confiscation did not touch the actual property of wives and children of the prisoners, and as their families accompanied them to Ceylon, the property remaining, with their allowances, must have enabled them to get on pretty well. The property confiscated was to go to the payment of indemnities claimed by those who had been injured by the rebellion, but the prisoners were very generously treated, and their English counsel still watched their interests narrowly. They were allowed to sell their horses and carriages to the value of about £750, in addition probably to personal property of a similar description, and they were permitted to take with them a proportion of their household furniture, bedding, &c. On its being represented by Messrs. Broadley and Napier that the persons sent to take an inventory invaded the privacy of the ladies of the families and proposed to take away the watches and personal effects of the prisoners, Cherif Pasha at once issued an order precluding the police from entering their houses and securing to the exiles their personal property. When inquiry was made as to the number of persons for whom accommodation would be required in the ship that was to take them to Ceylon, the demands were such as to rather stagger even the amiable Lord Dufferin. A list was sent in of 130 persons, including a large number of the sisters, the cousins, and the aunts of the prisoners,—female dependents, butlers, valets, cooks, eunuchs, and retainers. Lord Dufferin mildly observed in his despatch, that considering the position of those concerned, such requirements seemed to him unreasonable. The hire of the ship alone would cost the Egyptian government £5000, to which about £3000 would be added for incidental expenses. All the exiles and their followers had to be well found, the owners being bound by their contract to provide for them and their families on the same scale as for first-class passengers. The ship chartered, the *Marcotis* of 1392 tons, had accommodation for 20 first-class and about 30 second-class; it was provided with a stewardess and an English naval officer in the Egyptian service. Major Morice Rey, an officer of marines, was

to accompany the party to their destination. If all the female relatives and their belongings had been provided for also, a second ship would have been necessary, and it was blandly suggested that as this was out of the question, it would be desirable for the Egyptian government to restrict the number to the wives, sisters, or children of the prisoners, and servants enough to represent a servant for each man, a maid for each of the respective wives, and a nurse for each family of children. It was also gently hinted that these proposed arrangements did not preclude the unfortunate gentlemen from providing themselves or their families with additional servants, or from being joined by any number of affectionate relatives—who chose to meet them at Ceylon after having made the voyage in an ordinary passenger vessel.

Though Arabi, his truculent lieutenant Toulba, Fehmi, his former chief engineer and military adviser, and the other principal leaders were got rid of, neither we nor the Egyptian government had by any means heard the last of them. They joined in writing a letter of very hearty thanks to the commander, officers, and attendants of the ship which conveyed them agreeably to Ceylon, and for some time after their arrival and reception by the governor, they appeared to live in comfort, Arabi having applied to have his children sent to a proper school. His family was so large (fourteen in number) that his allowance was said to be insufficient, and the others made a similar complaint, though with less reason, upon which the Egyptian government consented that an additional £500 a year should be paid for their subsistence, of which Arabi eventually received £20 a month, and the remainder was divided among the rest. When the account was taken of the property belonging to these exiles, which had been confiscated by the government, it was found to amount only to about £3000, after all the claims of creditors had been satisfied; but it must be remembered, that the land and other property of the wives and families had not been interfered with, so that some of the exiles were not very badly off. The wife of Arabi, however, either had no property of her own, or she chose to keep it for herself. She had not accompanied the others to Ceylon, as she was in ill health,

and when Arabi applied that the expenses of her passage to Ceylon might be paid in accordance with the promised arrangement, the Egyptian government was quite willing to fulfil the agreement, but had to report that Madame Arabi, who lived with her mother in Cairo, showed no disposition to leave Egypt.

With the various complaints or requests of the exiles Mr. Wilfrid Blunt seemed still to be concerned, especially with the representations of Toulba, who was suffering from asthma, and found that the climate of Ceylon did not agree with him. There was medical testimony that he required a drier and more equable temperature, and he had the offer of being removed either to Cape Town or to Jaffna, a place further in the interior of Ceylon and having a more equal climate. Neither of these suited his notions, however, as he was anxious to be sent nearer to Egypt, and begged that he might go to Syria, Cyprus, or Beyrout.

Some surprise was caused by the exiles in Ceylon joining in a formal declaration that the promises they had made to remain in the place to which they might be sent were made, not to the Egyptian, but to the British government, to which they owed so much, and to which they intended to be loyal. They represented that they had consented to plead guilty, contrary to the actual truth, in consideration of the British government naming a place of exile, that that place should be under British control, and that thenceforward they would be answerable to the British government only. This view was afterwards supported by Mr. Mark Napier, one of the counsel who had been engaged on their behalf; but Lord Granville entirely denied that any such agreement was either understood or expressed.

In a similar manner there was a representation that our representatives, and therefore our government, had been instrumental in pushing on the trials for the express purpose of preventing accusations of participation in the alleged crimes being brought against various distinguished persons, including the khedive himself and Loufti Pasha, minister of war. This Lord Dufferin also entirely denied, referring to the expressed opinion of Sir C. Wilson, who, after examining the evidence, had distinctly

stated that the attempts to implicate the khedive in the atrocities at Alexandria, and the subsequent outrages, were quite groundless and unworthy of consideration. The counsel for Arabi and his companions had made some threatening intimations that the evidence they could produce would have the effect of bringing accusations against persons in high authority; but Lord Dufferin had immediately replied to the effect that the English government had nothing whatever to do with any such result, and that the trial and its consequences were the business of the Egyptian ministry. It seems to have been the case that though the official representatives were assiduous in endeavouring to prevent further delay, their object was to bring all the prisoners to trial on such evidence as would alone legally convict them, and so to put an end to the evils that were likely to ensue from retaining the chiefs of the mutiny at Cairo, and from crowding the prisons with political offenders whose examination might be indefinitely deferred. The alacrity with which the Egyptian court accepted the proposition that Arabi and his companions should plead guilty to the charge of rebellion, however, seemed to point to the fact that the high officials shrank from the production of Arabi's papers and from the criminating evidence that might have been forthcoming; but no such evidence, having any weight, had been produced at the examinations where English officials were present. The careful and complete report of the charges, trials, and sentences which were sent to our foreign office showed that our representatives had endeavoured to execute their difficult task thoroughly and impartially. Their object was to secure a fair trial for the prisoners, and they had nothing to do with the secret reasons which might have influenced the Egyptian government to adopt the recommendations given them that the offenders should be tried only on those charges which could be promptly substantiated.

After the deportation of Arabi and his companions the examinations went on more rapidly, and the sentences, many of which were mitigated by the advice of English officials, were on the whole far less severe than they would have been but for our intercession, and were mostly in just proportion to the degree of turpitude

which they were designed to punish. There were few persons put to death, although it had been distinctly stated that we would not interfere with the capital sentence being passed upon those who were proved to have taken part in the massacres and the burning of Alexandria. On these grounds it was beyond our province to interpose when some of the worst of the criminals were sentenced to execution. Among them was the chief culprit, Suleiman Sami, who had, without doubt, been the instigator of the destruction of the city and the murder of numbers of the inhabitants. In the former he had taken a personal part. He acted with the utmost ferocity, sometimes rushing about pistol in hand, and forcing the soldiers to set fire to the houses, and sometimes sitting in a high chair in the square urging them on to special acts of incendiarism, his rage being particularly directed against the family and possessions of the Sheikh Ibrahim Pasha, against whom he had a private quarrel. Suleiman admitted the part he took in the incendiarism, but declared that he had been ordered by Arabi to burn the town as a military measure, an assertion which was contradicted by Arabi and separately by each of his officers; while there was no direct evidence that Arabi had given such an order, and the buildings which were at first spared were precisely such as would have really been the first doomed to destruction under a military order. That Arabi marched his troops out of the city at a time when they should have remained to protect it, and that he cared nothing about what was likely to be done by such a man, did not prove that he had actually given orders for the destruction that followed. The impression made by the evidence was that Suleiman Sami, having been quartered in Alexandria, was acquainted with the town and its people, and took advantage of a time of great disorder to carry out a threat he had often made of burning the town, and to gratify a wish to be revenged on his personal enemies. His bearing at the trial was not in his favour. Others who had been convicted and sentenced to execution had maintained a firm bearing; but the ferocious ruffian, who had taken the most prominent part in the work of fire and slaughter, sunk into abject cowardice even while under examination. Endeavours were made in England to

induce our government to interpose on his behalf, but it was felt that to remonstrate against his sentence would be going beyond the extreme limit of our legitimate influence. His execution was ordered to take place on the 9th of June. He was hanged very near the spot on which he had ordered the destruction of the city—and his last muttered words are said to have been “Mazloun Arabi!” “victimized by Arabi!”

Having followed the current of events with such observations of the attendant or surrounding details as will show what were the difficulties which confronted us after the suppression of the rebellion and our partial occupation of the country; we may continue the narrative of the arduous task that had yet to be accomplished in the endeavour to restore order by introducing reforms in the government, which still relied upon our advice and support.

CHAPTER V.

Government Reform. Suez Canal Finance. Sickness of Troops. Condition of Cairo. Formation of Army and Police Forces. Alarming Rumours from the Soudan. The Mahdi. The Rebellion. Reports from Khartûm. Hicks Pasha. Destruction of Egyptian army. Sinkat and Tokar. Osman Digna. Defeat of Baker Pasha's Force. Preparations in England. Arrival of Forces at Suakim. General Graham's Expedition. Defeat of Rebels at El Teb and Tamai.

In the early months of 1883, while the trials of rebels were still going on, it became necessary that the Earl of Dufferin, as British plenipotentiary, should formulate his scheme for the reconstruction of government in Egypt. He and his coadjutors had devoted earnest attention to the subject, and had collected a vast amount of information of a practical character, founded on long observation and experience, which seemed calculated to assist them in their deliberations.

The first question that had to be asked was, Who are the Egyptians? and a writer on the subject had answered that it was sufficient for our inquiry into a proposed reconstruction of the government to reply, broadly speaking, that they comprise about 700,000 Copts, who are commonly regarded as the sole survivors of the Egyptian people; 400,000 Bedouins, made up of fifty tribes divided from each other by petty jealousies and long-existing feuds; about 4,000,000 fellaheen, the descendants of the hewers of wood and drawers of water to conquerors who date from thirty centuries; and about 30,000 men and women of Osmanli origin.

The Bedouins, of whom about 40,000 are capable of bearing arms, include: 1. The Eastern or Arabian tribes of the country bounded by the Red Sea and the Nile valley on the east and west, by the Mediterranean on the north, and on the south by the Keneh Kossair route, where the Nile approaches nearest to the Red Sea coast; while to these are to be added the people of the Tih plateau and the Sinaitic peninsula. 2. The Western (or Mongredin) tribes in the western border of the Nile valley and the oasis of the Libyan Desert. 3. The Southern (or Ethiopian)

tribes on the eastern edge of the Nile valley south of the Kenh Kosseir route, and a great part of Nubia. Lord Dufferin, in the scheme of reconstruction which he prepared, did not contemplate the withdrawal of Egypt from the government of the Soudan, although the struggle that was being maintained there was a constant source of trouble and expense. He only thought that it would be wise to abandon Darfûr and, perhaps, part of Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining jurisdiction in the provinces of Khartûm and Sennâr; while he considered that the first step towards tranquillity would be the construction of a railway from Suakim to Berber or, perhaps, preferably to Shendy on the Nile.

The starting-point of the scheme for reform and reconstruction was, that it would be futile to attempt to go back to any race distinctions in apportioning the authority of future rulers of Egypt. It ought not to be a difficult task to endow the Egyptian people with good government. The institution of international tribunals had already aroused first surprise and then admiration, and the desire to extend courts where, whatever may have been their shortcomings, justice was administered with greater purity than was ever previously known in the country. Nor did the fact that a great number of the persons in high authority were the Osmanli, affect the position of the governing class. The valley of the Nile had always been ruled by foreigners, its inhabitants domineered over by alien races; its annals indicate no epoch when the justice of the country was not corrupt, its administration other than oppressive, and the indigenous population emotional, obsequious, and submissive; but the rulers themselves are under some of the influences which make the people desirous of reform and the adoption of a regular and equal administration of just laws. "Osmanli does not politically mean Turks only, but includes Roumelians, Albanians, Circassians, Armenians, and other subjects of the sultan; and of these the rulers of Egypt largely consist, for they are practically the dominant races, small as their proportionate numbers are, in Egypt. But the characteristics which in the earlier history of Egypt appeared to be so hateful, have lost something of their malignant influence. Her actual

rulers are still supplied from a foreign stock, but the progenitor of the race was one of the most illustrious men of the present century, who proved his right to found a dynasty by emancipating those whom he ruled from the arbitrary thralldom of an imperious suzerain. His successors have carried the liberation of their adopted country still further, and the prince now sitting on the khedival throne represents, at all events, the principle of autonomous government, of hereditary succession, and commercial independence. . . . His disposition is eminently benevolent and sympathetic. Well versed in history, and alive to the progress of events, he is indisposed either to claim or exercise the arbitrary powers of an Oriental autocrat. Having conscientiously at heart the welfare of his people, he is willing to accord them such a measure of constitutional privileges as their backward condition entitles them to demand."

Though the "foreign element" still holds sway in Egypt, and enjoys a social and political ascendancy not in harmony with a democratic ideal, it no longer occupies the same odious position as the foreign oligarchies which formerly crushed the fellaheen. The fellaheen themselves, though they constitute five-sixths of the population, have scarcely any intelligent interest in politics, and care very little who governs them, so long as they are allowed to cultivate their plots of land, are not compelled to pay exorbitant taxes, are free from the dominion of local tyrants wielding the kourbash for the purpose of extortion, and are not dragged off by irregular conscription to serve in the army.¹ It would matter little to them who ruled at Cairo, if they were made happier and more prosperous by the laws arising from a settled and righteous constitution. The invidious distinctions, too, which follow the conquest of one race by another have been greatly obliterated.

"The individuals of Turkish extraction left in the country form a very small minority; they do not stand in the relation of landlords to the peasantry, a few hundred thousand feddāns

¹ This seems to have been proved from the fact that when the fellaheen, under a new *régime*, had a vote for the village constituency or the provincial councils, many of them offered to pay something rather than take the trouble to leave their work for the purpose of voting; but this reluctance may have had an element of suspicion or fear in it.

out of five millions approximately representing the extent of their possessions; and they are closely incorporated with those amongst whom they have been domiciled by the bonds of a religion, the very essence of whose doctrine is brotherhood, equality, and social unity. The Ottoman Egyptian appreciates thoroughly the advantages secured to him by the firmans, and, proud of the political privileges of his country, he is as violently 'Chauvinist' as any Arab. The policy of some of the late rulers of Egypt has also contributed to amalgamate the races, Abbas, Said, and Ismail having found it their interest to promote to posts of honour and authority personages of 'fellah' origin. At the present moment two important state departments are administered by Pharaonic Egyptians. Sultan Pasha, a distinguished personage of fellah descent, is president of the Chamber of Notables, and holds a position of great influence in the country. Most of the judges and all the religious dignitaries are pure Egyptian, as are also the majority of the large landed proprietors and a host of the public servants. If, on the other hand, the prestige of the notabilities of Turkish extraction is still more considerable than a political philosopher might desire, we must accept it as the unavoidable outcome of the irrevocable past, and as in some measure justified by the superior education, ability, and energy of a vigorous race. Nor would it be just or advisable to resort to forcible means to redress the inequality. A similar process of epuration would have to be applied to the descendants of other nationalities—Armenians, Greeks, Syrians, and Jews—which would result in excluding such men as Nubar, Riaz, and Tigrane, equally with Cherif Pasha and his colleagues, from all contact with public affairs, until at last it would become the turn of the Copts to demand the disqualification of their Arab invaders. It will be safer to regard every native-born Egyptian, no matter what the stock from which he springs, as entitled to whatever position his talents or aptitudes may enable him to attain, and to rely upon the influence of equal laws and the development of constitutional principles to invalidate caste pretensions and obliterate obnoxious distinctions of race. Nor need the fact of the sparse descendants

of Mehemet Ali and his companions having become rooted in Egypt be considered as any longer incompatible with the introduction of a popular government, though their presence and the moral ascendancy they exercise may render still more urgent the establishment of an omnipotent justice and a perfection of equality before the law."

These were the opinions expressed by the Earl of Dufferin in the reconstruction scheme which was designed to reform and reorganize without revolutionizing the government of Egypt. Such declarations removed the supposed obstacles to the restoration of order under a system which would have in it elements of permanence and of future prosperity to the country, and at the same time the plan proposed was in accordance with the emphatic assertion of our government that their design was to leave the administration of the khedive to stand alone, directly it became capable of supporting its own authority by the influence of more just and regular laws which would enlist the confidence of the people.

The other European powers had been watching with expectant eyes the course that we appeared likely to take, and at the very beginning of the year Lord Granville had relieved their anxiety by issuing a circular note which had previously been approved by the Turkish government, who had abstained from taking any step that would have made our undertaking in Egypt more difficult.

The circular note sent out by Earl Granville to our representatives abroad treated of various matters relating to our interposition in Egypt as they concerned other countries, and required the concurrence of the European powers, and then went on to questions of the internal administration of Egypt itself. The chief of those of the former class were those relating to the Suez Canal, of which it was said:—

"One result of recent occurrences has been to call special attention to the Suez Canal, firstly, on account of the danger with which it was threatened during the first brief success of the insurrection; secondly, in consequence of its occupation by the

British forces in the name of the khedive, and their use of it as a base of the operations carried on in his highness' behalf and in support of his authority; and, thirdly, because of the attitude assumed by the direction and officers of the Canal Company at a critical period of the campaign.

"As regards the first two of these points, Her Majesty's government believe that the free and unimpeded navigation of the canal at all times, and its freedom from obstruction or damage by acts of war, are matters of importance to all nations. It has been generally admitted that the measures taken by them for protecting the navigation, and the use of the canal on behalf of the territorial ruler for the purpose of restoring his authority, were in no way infringements of this general principle.

"But to put upon a clearer footing the position of the canal for the future, and to provide against possible dangers, they are of opinion that an agreement to the following effect might with advantage be come to between the great powers, to which other nations would subsequently be invited to accede:—

"1. That the canal should be free for the passage of all ships, in any circumstances.

"2. That in time of war a limitation of time as to ships of war of a belligerent remaining in the canal should be fixed, and no troops or munitions of war should be disembarked in the canal.

"3. That no hostilities should take place in the canal or its approaches, or elsewhere in the territorial waters of Egypt, even in the event of Turkey being one of the belligerents.

"4. That neither of the two immediately foregoing conditions shall apply to measures which may be necessary for the defence of Egypt.

"5. That any power whose vessels of war happen to do any damage to the canal should be bound to bear the cost of its immediate repair.

"6. That Egypt should take all measures within its power to enforce the conditions imposed on the transit of belligerent vessels through the canal in time of war.

"7. That no fortifications should be erected on the canal or in its vicinity.

"8. That nothing in the agreement shall be deemed to abridge or affect the territorial rights of the government of Egypt further than is therein expressly provided."

Another question in which the great powers were concerned was the financial arrangements in connection with the law of liquidation, and in relation to these our government recommended greater economy and simplicity in the management of the Daira estates and some other administrations by changes of detail which would not diminish the security of creditors. It was also proposed to provide an equitable plan for the equal taxation of foreigners and natives, and the last, but not the least, important proposition was that the international agreement for the establishment of mixed tribunals for deciding civil suits between natives and foreigners, instead of being permitted to expire at the end of the term agreed on, which would be in February, 1883, should be prolonged by the Egyptian ministry for a year, in order to give time for the discussion of amendments in the codes and procedure which had been interrupted by the events of 1882.

In subjects relating to the internal affairs of Egypt, the responsibility of advising, and assisting to reorganize, which lay upon our government, included the formation of a small Egyptian army commanded by British officers, lent for a time by request of the khedive, to fill the higher ranks, and of a separate force of gendarmerie and police. The latter, it was afterwards intimated to General Valentine Baker Pasha, who was commissioned to form it, was not to be a military but essentially a police force for the maintenance of order. Three thousand gendarmerie had already been reorganized and officered, and Sir Evelyn Wood was already well advanced in forming the new army, which it had then been decided should consist of 6000 men; the list of both forces falling much below the amount allotted for those services by the committee of liquidation.

The practical extinction of the dual control by the substitution of a single European financial adviser without authority to interfere

in the direct administration of the country was the next item referred to, and reasons were given for concurring in the proposal of the Egyptian government that the control should be abolished. After mentioning that the khedive had been strongly advised of the necessity of immediately introducing an improved system of administering justice to natives throughout the country, and alluding to the desire of our government to urge upon his highness to take such steps as might be judicious for the abolition of slavery, the circular said:—

“There remains the question of the development of political institutions in Egypt. It is one of great importance and complexity, and requires for its treatment careful study of the circumstances of the country and people. Her Majesty’s government are of opinion that the prudent introduction of some form of representative institutions may contribute greatly to the good government of the country and to the safety and regularity of the khedive’s rule. But they await further reports from their representatives in Egypt before coming to a conclusion as to the shape which would be best suited to the present occasion, while affording opportunities for future growth.”

The scheme of administrative and social reform was being elaborated by the Earl of Dufferin assisted by a number of gentlemen, among whom was Mr. Villiers Stuart, M.P., whose acquaintance with both Upper and Lower Egypt made his services of great value in a visit of inquiry and observation in the villages.

The scheme of reconstruction was founded, as we have noted, upon the conviction that English control was not to be authoritative, and was not to be permanent. That the Egyptians were not to have forced upon them institutions which they could not beneficially adopt until they had, so to speak, grown up to them, and could understand and appreciate them. Our object was to give to the country such institutions as would gradually develop and naturally lead to further reforms. Lord Dufferin in one part of his report points to the difficulties that present themselves in India, where we have direct and permanent authority,

when it is sought to make changes in the internal administration, and argues that much more allowance should be made for the working of newly introduced modes of procedure and striking reforms in the administration in Egypt. That, as it is impossible immediately to abolish all those practices and existing abuses which we desire for the sake of the country to put an end to, we must trust to the natural extension of the sentiments of liberty and justice which is promoted even by the imperfect or retarded operation of laws and principles which are good and just in themselves. As, for instance, Lord Dufferin had plainly declared, "The native courts were never more imbecile and corrupt than they are at present," it was a good plan to induce the khedive to issue a commission, presided over by Fakhry Pasha, minister of justice, and with Nubar Pasha, the founder of the mixed tribunals as a member, to examine how the proceedings of provincial governors and their lieutenants in criminal cases, and the strange notions of cadis and muftis in civil matters could be best remedied. The result was the proposal to establish eight new centres of justice, with a suitable number of native judges and one European judge in each,—a staff which was thought sufficient for administering the law around the district in which the court was the centre, as, at least, one court of appeal would have authority to review sentences, even in criminal cases, from the lower courts. We have seen in relation to this subject that the international tribunals of first instance and appeal were not to be touched by the measure, nor would they interfere with the new courts, which were only for trials between natives. Reverting to the difficulty of advising a too sudden and thorough change in matters which must be left to the gradual working of events, Lord Dufferin said:

"Had I been commissioned to place affairs in Egypt on the footing of an Indian subject state, the outlook would have been different. The masterful hand of a resident would have quickly bent everything to his will, and in the space of five years we should have greatly added to the material wealth and well-being of the country, by the extension of its cultivated area, and the consequent expansion of its revenue; by the partial, if not the

total, abolition of the *corvée* and slavery; the establishment of justice; and other beneficent reforms. But the Egyptians would have justly considered these advantages as dearly purchased at the expense of their domestic independence. Moreover, Her Majesty's government and the public opinion of England have pronounced against such an alternative."

In setting forth his plan he dealt successively with the necessity for seeking the material, moral, and political security of the country, the first maintained by the military and naval forces, the second guaranteed by its courts of justice, and the third defending its representative institutions. Isolated on three sides by the desert, the military forces of Egypt proper need not be numerous. The number was therefore fixed at 6000 men, the composition of the ranks being solely Egyptian, with the foreign janissary, but not the Turco-Egyptian element excluded. The khedive to be supreme commander-in-chief, the army to be divided into two brigades, in only one of which the first and second officer in command would be Englishmen, with three other English officers unattached to help them when required; the same principle of division of command and therefore the opportunity for promotion to Egyptian officers being observed in the artillery. The reorganized Egyptian army would consist of 6147 officers and men, including 1 regiment of cavalry, 4 batteries of artillery, 20 guns, 8 battalions of infantry, a camel corps, an engineer company, and coast artillery.

A body of provincial constabulary was also to be formed of a semi-military character, and capable of coping with any ordinary attempted incursions of Bedouin marauders, a considerable proportion of them being organized and equipped as mounted infantry; but within the valley of the Nile itself acting very much like ordinary policemen, and avoiding the display of military characteristics. The constabulary force was to be placed under the control of the minister of the interior, a school of instruction was to be provided, and two reserve battalions of 500 men each were to consist of volunteers, who would receive a rather higher rate of pay than the recruits obtained by conscription. The total number of men in this force was to be 5650.

In the large towns of the Delta order was to be maintained by an urban police force of 1600 constables with an element of Europeans among them, and under the same inspector-general and inspecting staff as the constabulary: the Cairo and Alexandria police being commanded by two European officers with two deputies, while thirty-five subaltern European officers were to be attached to the European sections of the corps, the rest of the force being purely native, a decision arrived at because of a disturbance having been caused by the numbers of Albanians who, hearing of the formation of the force at Alexandria, swarmed thither and demanded to be enrolled. They continued to be troublesome till their violent demonstrations were suppressed and they were all packed off again to their native villages. The total force for maintaining domestic order would be 7390 men, 3800 of whom were already enrolled and distributed, including 596 Europeans. The total expense of the army, police, and constabulary would be £E.519,741.

The system of representative institutions was to a great extent founded on the reform or reconstruction of existing elective principles. Speaking of the want even of the forms of constitutional freedom in the East, as despotism not only destroys the seeds of liberty but renders the soil on which it has trampled incapable of growing the plant—Lord Dufferin said:

“A long-enslaved nation instinctively craves for the strong hand of a master rather than for a lax constitutional régime. A mild ruler is more likely to provoke contempt and insubordination than to inspire gratitude. Nowhere is this truth more strikingly exhibited than in this country, and those whose only prescription for government in Egypt is the lash, diagnose correctly enough the symptoms of the disease, however wrong they may be in the choice of the remedy. The problem before us is not, however, so disheartening as it might seem. Though hitherto Eastern society has only been held together by the coercive forces of absolutism, it must be remembered that, on the one hand, the Mohammedan religion is essentially democratic; and, on the other, that the primitive idea of the elders of the land assembling in council round their chief has never altogether faded out of the traditions of the people.

Even the elective principle has been to some degree preserved amongst their village communities. If, therefore, we found ourselves upon what already exists, and endeavour to expand it to such proportions as may seem commensurate with the needs and aptitudes of the country, we may succeed in creating a vitalized and self-existent organism, instinct with evolutionary force. . . . Most people have fondly imagined that a chamber of notables implied constitutional freedom. . . . The component parts of the chamber of notables were large landed proprietors, rich townspeople, and village sheikhs, that is to say, the three classes most indifferent or opposed to the interests of the fellaheen. . . . Hitherto the village sheikhs have always been regarded as the spokesmen and delegates of the commune, but they are seldom really entitled to exercise such functions or assume such a character. In the first place, there are half a dozen sheikhs, or sometimes many more, in every village, each of them connected with varying sized sections of the community; and, in the next, they are either hereditary dignitaries or the direct or indirect nominees of the authorities, or have been chosen by the headmen of the adjoining districts. They may for the most part be looked upon as the most inveterate oppressors of those placed under their authority. It is they who best know what individuals in the village can be most profitably squeezed, and whose itching palms are greased by the wealthier peasant anxious to avoid the 'corvée' or greedy for a disproportionate share of the fertilizing stream. Although, therefore, it might be too revolutionary a step to interfere with the administrative position of these questionable authorities, the community should be at least given a free choice of the person with whom the suffrage of the hamlet is to be deposited."

Briefly stated the proposed Egyptian electoral institutions were:—

1. *The Village Constituency*.—Composed of representatives of each circumscription, chosen by manhood suffrage, who are the depositaries of the village vote.

2. *The Provincial Councils*.—(Varying in number from 4 to 8 members.)—Chosen by the spokesmen of the villages.

3. *The Legislative Council*.—Consisting of 26 members, of whom 12 are nominated by the khedive on the advice of his ministers, and 16 are elected by the provincial councils.

4. *The General Assembly*.—Of 80 members: 8 ministers; 26 members of the legislative council; 46 delegates elected by the spokesmen of the villages.

5. *Eight Ministers*.—Responsible to the khedive.

6. His highness the khedive.

In addition to these there was to be the establishment of a privy council of a purely administrative and not of a political character, but with a judicial side in relation to its functions in dealing with indigenous courts of justice. Justice was the chief requirement in Egypt. Justice administered on a pure, cheap, and simple system would prove more beneficial to the country than the largest constitutional privileges. The structure of society in the East is so simple that, provided the taxes are righteously assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy. For several weeks the commission was engaged in the arduous task of elaborating an entirely new system of indigenous justice, by the entire revision of the codes and the organization of new tribunals presided over at first by European judges, principally taken from the judiciaries of Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, except in special instances where a knowledge of the native language or other particular qualification would be requisite, and the election would turn upon such points. The minister of justice had secured the co-operation of an eminent English lawyer to act as procureur-general in organizing the new tribunals and making the necessary arrangements with the European judges. There was to be a court of first instance in every *mudirieh*: three judges to form a quorum, and one of the three to be a European. There would be an appeal court for Upper and one for Lower Egypt, where five judges would form a quorum—two being European and three native; and it had been advised by the commission that the salaries should be such as to remunerate men of high ability. A knowledge of Arabic was to be held indispensable. All public functionaries were to be amenable to the ordinary tribunals for any

act committed in violation of any law, decree, or regulation; but for trying cases where litigation might arise between the state in its corporate capacity as a government and its subjects, involving public interests of great importance, the privy council, already referred to, by having a proportion of its members independent of the government, and associating three of these with the two European members of the court of appeal, could secure a bench of judges of such exceptional ability as would entitle them to exercise so important a jurisdiction.

This then is a full outline of the scheme proposed so far as its political mechanism is concerned; but it also included provision for the material needs of the country by controlling and improving the works of the canals and irrigation, as the most necessary works had been neglected. The *corvée* or enforced labour was carried out in a manner which inflicted the greatest hardship on the peasantry; the poor suffered from the unequal distribution of water by corrupt officials; the crops of sugar and coffee were lighter every season, and the area of cultivated land was diminishing notwithstanding an expenditure of £187,434 per annum on the canals.

"Wishing to witness with my own eyes the forced-labour system," said Mr. Villiers Stuart, "I went to a place where a new canal was being excavated. A cut about 18 feet deep had been made through a conglomerate of sand and gravel. This cut was flanked on either side by a high embankment of excavated *débris*. The distance from the summits of these ridges to the floor of the canal was about 40 feet. Along the bottom, and on the slopes right and left, men swarmed like bees for the length of a mile. The overseer told me that the entire forced labour of the province, amounting to 40,000 men, was concentrated beneath my eyes, and that they worked from sunrise to sunset, with a brief intermission at midday for a meal, consisting of bread, supplied by their relations, soaked in Nile water. They had a similar meal before commencing their work and when they left off. They were engaged in filling a quantity of small baskets with the soil, which they dug out with their fingers. A limited number had short picks

a foot long, but the majority had no implements but their hands. Both their tools and the baskets are provided by themselves. The day was excessively hot—82 degrees in the shade, probably 95 degrees at the bottom of the trench. They wore felt skull-caps on their heads, exactly like those represented on the workmen in the bas-reliefs of the fourth dynasty. At night they slept on the bare ground in the calico rags they wore during the day. The nights were often very cold. Amongst them were many overseers armed with sticks, with which they often struck the men without any apparent reasons. Many had sore fingers and sore feet, for there were sharp flints among the *débris*. Ophthalmia was very prevalent."

When it is remembered that the men thus seen by Mr. Villiers Stuart were forcibly taken from their village plots, which they had been obliged to leave barren and uncultivated; that hundreds of them were probably conscious that they had been impressed, and their luckier neighbours left, through the spite, favouritism, or corruption of some official; and that the work upon which they were engaged was so distant from their homes as never to bring them any advantage, it will be understood what bitterness and ill-feeling must be generated by such a system.

The cost of the "corvée" to the country must have been prodigious, as, according to the best authorities, it implied the annual withdrawal from agricultural labour of from 100,000 to 130,000 men for a period which varied from 60 to 120 days.

The remaining portions of the scheme of reconstruction had relation to the proposals for the more economical and profitable working or the disposal of the "Daira Sanieh" and "Domain" territories, formerly, as was noted in an earlier page, in the exclusive possession of the ex-khedive and his family, and amounting to 1,000,000 feddāns of land, or an area equivalent to one-fifth of the whole cultivated land of Egypt, and ceded to the state, the Domains having in 1878 formed the guarantee for the Rothschild loan of £8,500,000.

Arrangements for a thorough and effective cadastral survey; the consideration of plans for relieving the widely spread mortgages

and debt encumbrances upon the land of the fellaheen—who had borrowed beyond their power of paying, with the imminent danger of considerable tracts of territory passing out of the hand of the peasant cultivators, whose mortgage debts had risen in six years from the total of £500,000 to something like £5,000,000,—occupied a considerable portion of the scheme. To save the fellaheen it was preferably proposed to make use of the “credit foncier,” which was already existing in the country, and if supported by the guarantee of the government could obtain the necessary fund at a low rate for the purchase of the debts, while to repay the loans the land would be charged with an annuity or “taxis” extending over a long period. Land revenue assessment, agricultural taxes, and other such questions were entered into, and provision made for simple but effectual reforms; and then came a careful review of the question of the necessity for educating the masses of the people, who at present derive little benefit from the elaborate system of instruction in the numerous schools and colleges in Egypt, the fellaheen children not being taught to speak the ordinary Arabic, but the Koranic Arabic, the fellah Arabic being quite a distinct language with a grammar of its own. The reduction of enforced labour by organization, and the use of hydraulic machinery, the reduction of the area of conscription, and the increased advantages of service by the establishment of the new army, also formed subjects with which the plan of reform was concerned. Other matters, however, such as slavery, the Soudan, and the Suez Canal, will be touched upon in another page. The scheme as set forth was wide in its scope, elaborate in detail, and so full and clear as to be indisputable evidence of the great ability, no less than the untiring energy and industry of those who had taken part in furnishing the particulars and examples by which the proposals made in its numerous sections were illustrated and supported.

The effect of the plan for liquidating the State Domain loan would be to complete that object in eight years and so to get rid of a troublesome administration, and to distribute among private cultivators those enormous accumulations of landed property in the

hands of one family, which took place during the rule of Ismail Pasha.

It was time that a thorough reform took place in the financial arrangements of the government, and our own government was inclined to render all possible assistance. On the 29th of December, 1882, Earl Granville wrote to the Earl of Dufferin that as the Egyptian government were doubtless preparing their budget for the ensuing year, it was desirable that they should know without delay the demand which her majesty's government would have to make for the maintenance of the British troops to be kept in Egypt pending the organization of a native defensive force.

Her majesty's government undertook to defray all expenditure incurred in the suppression of the rebellion, the date of the conclusion of which they had fixed with liberal intention at the 30th September. From that date, accordingly, they asked the Egyptian government to repay all extraordinary expenses which the retention for police purposes of the queen's troops in Egypt would entail on the exchequer of the United Kingdom. This force had been fixed for the present at 12,000 men, to be reduced from time to time and in the degree that was considered judicious, in view of the formation of a native force, whether military or police, ready and able to take its place.

Provision had been made in our normal army estimates of the year for the ordinary pay and charges of the army, and no demand was to be made upon Egyptian finances in respect of this expenditure; but additional expenditure incurred by the war office and admiralty for maintaining the troops in Egypt, and the cost of any reserves kept under the colours to replace men retained in that country, constituted the extraordinary charge which the Egyptian government were asked to repay. The war office and admiralty estimated this extraordinary charge in round figures at £4 per calendar month per man.

It may be mentioned here that when the estimates were brought forward in the House of Commons in the spring of 1883 the additional military expenditure consequent upon the opera-

tions in Egypt was about £3,400,000. Of that amount £1,142,000 related to the Indian contingent, and £500,000 was to be borne by this country, and the residue by India. The Egyptian government had agreed to pay at the rate of £4 per head per month for the military force left for the protection of the country; and from the first of October, 1882, to the 31st of March, 1883, that would amount to £279,000 (£209,000 for the army and £70,000 for the navy), which was shortly to be paid into the exchequer.

The Egyptian budget for 1883 was rather of a speculative character. The computed normal expenditure of the year amounted to £E.200,000 less than the receipts. But as there was no extraordinary budget the surplus of receipts over expenditure gave no effective surplus. Certain expenditures were all debited to the extraordinary budget; such as £E.100,000 for the Soudan, and £E.100,000 extra grant to public works having to be met from the ordinary budget.

The reserve fund for unforeseen expenses had been reduced to £E.90,000. Hitherto it had been £E.150,000, borne partly by the ordinary, partly by the extraordinary budget.

For the marine grant a large economy (£E.25,000) had been made, arrangements being in progress for selling off old ships and material. "War" showed a saving of £E.222,961; gendarmerie and police, an increase of £E.160,788; £E.17,000 were economized on the slavery suppression corps, whose duties were to be performed by the gendarmerie, the net saving shown on the army and gendarmerie being thus £E.79,173. But the real net saving was expected to be much in excess of this, certain items having been charged, for purposes of comparison, in the budget for 1882, to the interior, which should have been debited to the police.

A reduction of £E.15,000 would also be made on the cadastre (ministry of finance), which in future would stand at £E.55,000.

The cost of the army of occupation, and the interest on the new issues for indemnities, did not figure in the budget, because they had to be met by special means, which was also the

case with a probable deficit of the Domains, to be met during the year. If these items were separately arranged for, it was probable that at the close of 1883 there would be a saving on expenditure, and excess of receipts, of about £300,000 for the extraordinary budget of 1884.

There would also probably be a sum, the amount of which was quite uncertain, to be credited to the government during the year for the sale of war material.

"Quite uncertain!" As events turned out many calculations were upset; but apart from the unforeseen or the unprepared there were clear evidences, in the arrangements of this financial statement, that the proposed plan of reconstruction had already begun to work by anticipation.

The Egyptian budget, assuming its calculations to be correct, was regarded by our government as matter for congratulation, seeing that there was so slight a deficit in presence of the disorders and disorganization which had prevailed. It was recognized, however, that no contribution could be made during the current year to the extraordinary expenses of the British troops which had been lent to the Egyptian government. It was therefore agreed that as our financial year did not end till the 31st of March the six months' contribution (from the 1st of October) should be held over until March, and be paid before the end of that month. Our government had paid the Suez Canal Company for the dues and charges for British vessels of war, transports, &c., employed in the canal during the recent military operations, but an intimation was given to the directors of the company that these payments had been made as a recognition of the great assistance to the military operations afforded by the use of the canal, but without admitting that under the circumstances there was any legal obligation, as in any equitable claim that might be made on behalf of the company consideration must be given to the fact that the presence of the British forces on the canal alone prevented the suspension of the traffic and the consequent cessation of the earnings of the company, a view which was supported by the Egyptian government.

Some references have been made in earlier pages of this work to the employment of foreigners in Egypt and to the dissatisfaction which was said to have been caused by their appointment to the more important offices, and consequently by their appropriation of the largest salaries and rewards.¹

Without again dwelling on the fact that Egypt had for ages been governed by others than native Egyptians, and that recent Turco-Egyptian rulers had, so to speak, been so completely nationalized that they were identified with the progress and independence of the country, it is desirable at this point of the narrative briefly to consider what was the proportion of Europeans as compared with native officials and government employés, and what were their relative emoluments, at the time of the English intervention in the autumn of 1882, at the time, that is to say, that one of the complaints made by the so-called "leaders of the national party" was the preponderance of Europeans in the service of the state. This question has so often been raised in discussions on Egyptian affairs that it is necessary for us to have the facts before us in order to arrive at an intelligent understanding of the actual condition of affairs, especially as it became absolutely necessary for the Egyptian government to appoint European, and particularly English, officials to several important and responsible positions for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of reformed administration.

The returns from which we may glean a few particulars were contained in a second careful report and analysis prepared by Mr. Gerald Fitzgerald, director-general of public accounts, the result of which showed that in September, 1882, the foreigners employed in the Egyptian service formed but two per cent of the whole number of public servants, and that the aggregate of their salaries amounted to not more than $15\frac{5}{8}$ per cent of the amount paid in salaries by the Egyptian government.

This, of course, shows that foreigners occupied many of the positions which carried the highest salaries, but it is to be noted that the larger proportion of highly paid employés were not

¹ Vol i. pp. 81 and 82, &c.

English but French, and that under the term "English" there were classed Maltese, and all "English-protected" persons, so that of the 240 employés named as English there were 140 English-born subjects, 56 Maltese, and 44 English protégés. These protected persons were inhabitants of Egypt or Syria whose parents had sought the protection of the British government in order to avoid local laws or in some cases local taxation, and they were amenable only to the consular court. In presenting the report Sir Edward Malet was able to say that since November, 1879, when he had taken up his duties as her majesty's agent and consul-general, he had not obtained from the Egyptian government a single place for a British subject. Those who had come into the service after that date had done so through the acknowledged requirements of the service, and in consequence of the wishes of the different heads of departments. He had never heard a complaint from members of the successive governments that there were too many foreigners in the service, though he had often heard complaints that many of those employed did not do the amount of work to be expected of them. The conclusion that he had come to was that a weeding process applied to the service would be an advantage, but it should extend equally to the foreigner and the Egyptian.

Several among the English-born employés had been specially asked for by the government of Egypt for the purpose of introducing reforms in the administrations, others because European mechanical skill was required in the land survey, railways, telegraphs, and public works, and a knowledge of European languages in the departments of public instruction and justice, and for carrying on in the finance, customs, and post-office the ordinary business of government.

It should be noted also that it was owing to the presence and exertions of European officials that numerous and salutary reforms had been accomplished in the public departments, especially in the customs, the railways, and the octroi, where not only was the current work done with greater efficiency and simplicity, but the receipts had largely increased as compared with those of the

time when these departments were administered by natives. By the publication of accurate estimates and financial statements European officials had also succeeded in making known the real position and progress of the country, and this had tended to raise the national credit and to bring Egypt into fairer comparison with well-governed countries in Europe.

Of 1067 Europeans in the service of the Egyptian government in September, 1882, only 504 had been engaged before 1877 and 563 had been engaged after that date, the increased proportion being caused by the largely extended relations of Egypt with Europe, the development of external commerce and public works, the increased duties and improved methods of work necessitating the employment of a larger number of Europeans in the ministries of finance and public works, railways, telegraphs, ports, customs, and post-office. Of the 563 persons representing the increased number of European employés, the mixed tribunals and the land survey accounted for 208, leaving 355 for the remaining government departments.

In the previous return on the same subject it had been stated that the total number of 1263 Europeans employed in the Egyptian service included: French 328, at a total annual salary of £E.117,650; English 272, salary £E.95,686; Italians 345, salary £E.71,902; Austrians 96, salary £E.27,771; Greeks 114, salary £E.17,544; Germans 40, salary £E.14,673; other nations 68, salary £E.28,265. By the later return of 1882, however, it was shown that the number of European employés had diminished to 240 English, 244 French, 35 Germans, 80 Austrians, 300 Italians, 5 Russians, 9 Americans, 12 Belgians, 9 Spaniards, 104 Greeks, 9 Dutch, 1 Dane, 12 Swiss, 1 Swede, 3 Norwegians, and 3 Roumanians, or a total of 1067; the number of native employés being 52,974. It must again be remembered also, that the "English" element included Maltese and English-protected persons.

The number of departments of the government among which the European employés were distributed comprises the khedive's household, the service of his highness' yachts, council of ministers, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of finance, employés in the

offices of the under-secretary of state, director-general of accounts, director of legal affairs, and director of revenues, office of the controllers-general, land survey, octroi department, administration of lighthouses, the mint, miscellaneous services, palaces of Ghizeh and Gezireh, ministry of war, marine department, public instruction, ministry of the interior, civil administration of the provinces, police, administration for the suppression of slavery, board of health, ministry of justice, mixed tribunals, public works, railways, telegraphs, port of Alexandria, customs and coast-guard, post-office, packet service, and salt department.

Natives only were employed in the financial service of the provinces, in the fire brigade, in the native tribunals, the government storehouses, and as messengers, porters, &c., in the ministry of finance, where the whole number of employes was small, and other departments. The aggregate salaries of Europeans, it is needless to say, bore a very large proportion as compared with those of natives, the numbers being 52,974 natives, with total salaries of £E.1,648,503; and 1067 Europeans, with £E.305,096. But the latter occupied positions of trust and responsibility, to which they were appointed for the purpose of effectually carrying out the direction of the departments. The number of Europeans employed in the purely administrative services was 893, with a total of annual salaries amounting to £E.234,964.

The English nationality predominated in the railways, post khedival steamers, customs, and lighthouses. The French and Italians were about equally represented in the cadastre and finance departments, both being of greater weight than the English, while the French alone was greatest in the department of public works, and the Italian in that of the post-office. The French also predominated in the services existing in virtue of international arrangements, viz.: the Control, Caisse de la Dette, Domains, Daira Sanieh, and the tribunals. The numbers and aggregate salaries of these being, French 124, £E.49,787; English 39, £E.25,225, the larger salaries falling to the English. Italian 102, £E.21,354; Austrian 36, £E.11,875; Greek 35, £E.6951; German 10, £E.5715; and other nations 24, £E.17,618.

Another important point for consideration was, that employés in Egypt were divided into two classes, those who were paid by the Egyptian tax-payer, and those who were paid by revenue derived wholly, or in part, from Europeans. The state employés would come under the first of these divisions, but there were notable exceptions even there. The customs, the port, the telegraph, the railways, the post-office, the octrois derived their revenues in very large measure from Europeans, the native tax-payer contributing a quota, which, in some cases, was little more than that of the European. The international tribunals employed a very large number of Europeans, and were mainly supported by fees paid by European litigants. The above administrations employed in all 465 Europeans, or more than a third of the whole number employed in Egypt.

In the second division come the numerous employés of the Daira and the Domains. These were paid from lands which were formerly the private property of the khedive or his family. Their salaries came out of the pockets of the bondholders, on whose behalf the Daira and Domain lands were administered. More than half the European employés in Egypt fell in these two classes. Thus European employés were very largely paid either by European capital, or from funds hypothecated to Europeans.

The following showed precisely the state of European salaries in Egypt. The statement includes all employés, whether of the state or the creditors:—

				Per Annum.	
				£	£
				From	to
707	60	180
383	180	360
130	360	720
53	720	1500
15	1500	2000
13	2000	3000
2	3000	4000

The average salary being in round figures, 283*l.* per annum. Of the 13 receiving more than £2000 4 were the members of the "Caisse de la Dette Publique;" 4 were the members of the Daira

Sanieh and Domains Commissions; 2 were the members of the Railway Commission; 3 only were Egyptian employés, unconnected with the service of the debt. The 2 who received £4000 per annum were the controllers.

To the reader who may feel inclined to "skip" these figures because like most of such statements they appear only dry and uninviting, it may be hinted that the employment of foreigners in the principal offices in Egypt had been one of the "burning" questions for a long time previous to the series of events which led to our intervention and the subsequent occupation of the country. No accurate survey of the condition of affairs in relation to this complaint can be made without some knowledge of the facts which are here taken from the very elaborate report sent to our government; and though by the abolition of the control, the reconstruction of the government, and reform of the administration, considerable changes were made, those changes necessarily involved some additions to the number of European employés in the various departments of the government. The Earl of Dufferin, writing to the Earl of Granville, anticipated any objection that might arise on that score by saying:—

"In the first place, every new appointment has been made, not merely with the consent, but at the solicitation, of the Egyptian ministers. In no case have I attempted to force upon them a European administrator when they themselves did not think his services required. The fact is, that the objections raised to the number of posts occupied by foreigners in Egypt belong to a totally different order of ideas from those connected with the nomination to high and responsible office of distinguished individuals, with whose qualifications no native talent can pretend to compete. What vexes the Egyptian is to see well-paid offices filled by persons who discharge duties for which they know themselves to be equally competent, or dual offices created not out of regard to the nature of the work to be done, but to suit the political convenience of European nations. The Egyptians are perfectly intelligent enough to understand what an insignificant relation the salaries of a dozen first-rate experts bear to the

benefits their ability and talents enable them to confer upon the country. It is when we descend into the inferior ranks and return to the protected administrations that the multiplication of European clerks and commissioners begins to breed bad blood and discontent."

Early in May, 1883, Lord Dufferin was about to quit Egypt; the work which he had undertaken was accomplished, and the new organization was slowly, but it was hoped surely, working to beneficent ends.

Sultan Pasha, an Egyptian "*pur sang*" and one of the most influential representatives of Egyptian interests and aspirations, as distinguished from those of the Circassian and official world, had become assured of the good intentions of the English proposals, and went to Lord Dufferin for the purpose, as he said, of expressing the undying gratitude of the Egyptian people to England for all the benefits she had designed for their country. The proposals surpassed anything that he had expected, and he had not words to express his satisfaction. He confessed that he had been under a complete misapprehension as to our intentions, but now that he had had an opportunity of reading the Arabic version of the scheme as communicated to Lord Granville he and his were more than content: a universal feeling of gratitude towards England would possess the country from one end to the other.

The benefits which the new régime would confer on the country would mainly rest on the provision for the gradual but decisive liberation of the fellaheen, by means of a representative system and laws which would deliver them from tyranny and corruption and the arbitrary caprices of the local pashas directly they perceived that they had a voice in the administration of their own affairs and that they could breathe freely, at the same time that they would sustain a more intelligible situation in relation to foreign capitalists, and the whole agricultural system would be placed on a better footing.

"Various circumstances," said Lord Dufferin in concluding his report, "have combined to render the actual condition of the Egyptian fellah extremely precarious. His relations with his

European creditors are becoming dangerously strained. The agriculture of the country is rapidly deteriorating, the soil having become exhausted by overcropping and other causes. The labour of the 'corvée' is no longer equal to the cleansing of the canals. As a consequence the desert is encroaching on the cultivated land, and, unless some remedy be quickly found, the finances of the country will be compromised. With such an accumulation of difficulties native statesmanship, even though supplemented by the new-born institutions, will hardly be able to cope, unless assisted for a time by our sympathy and guidance. Under these circumstances I would venture to submit that we can hardly consider the work of reorganization complete, or the responsibilities imposed upon us by circumstances adequately discharged, until we have seen Egypt shake herself free from the initial embarrassments which I have enumerated. This point of departure once attained, we can bid her God-speed with a clear conscience, and may fairly claim the approbation of Europe for having completed a labour which every one desired to see accomplished, though no one was willing to undertake it but ourselves. Even then the stability of our handiwork will not be assured unless it is clearly understood by all concerned that no subversive influence will intervene between England and the Egypt she has re-created."

The accomplishment of these expectations had begun even before Lord Dufferin's departure for Constantinople. In writing a farewell letter to Cherif Pasha, who firmly upheld the new organization, Lord Dufferin, who had sent to him the able general report on Egyptian reorganization, was able to say that though they were but standing on the threshold of the new era, and the expectation of what was in preparation only accentuated more forcibly the unsatisfactory nature of the system which for the moment they must submit to tolerate,—already they were to be congratulated on the progress which had been made. The moral agitation excited by recent events had disappeared. The material tranquillity of the country was absolute from one end to the other. The progress made in the reconstruction of the army had excited the surprise and admiration of all who had witnessed its evolutions.

The defects which for some time prevailed in the organization of the police had been remedied, and that force began to command the confidence of the public, while the provincial constabulary had completely cleared the country of the marauders who infested some of the rural districts. The harvest of Upper Egypt was good, as were also the cereal crops in the Delta; the land revenue and the taxes were being satisfactorily paid; and the population at large was busily intent on the prosecution of the national industries. The indemnity commission had been for some time at work, and, so far, the claimants had no reason to be dissatisfied with its awards.¹ With a humane consideration which was beyond all praise, his excellency had made preparation for the immediate payment of all the smaller claims, and already their owners had begun to rebuild the shops in Alexandria. The application of the "kourbash" had been declared illegal by the minister of the interior, and the summary dismissal of two high officials for authorizing its use had proved that the government was determined to enforce its abolition.

The worst abuses attendant upon the conscription had been removed, and reforms in the application of the corvée were under consideration. It is true that the misuse of arbitrary power, corruption in official circles, and a thousand injustices, still prevailed. What else could be expected in a land as yet without law or any semblance of constitutional freedom? But the elaboration of the civil and criminal codes and their procedures was completed; they were being translated; and in a few weeks would be issued, thus securing, once and for ever, to every Egyptian, however poor, definite and indestructible rights of person and property, which he would be able to vindicate before trustworthy tribunals, emancipated from the control of executive authority. As soon as it was seen

¹ By the 8th of May 9000 applications had been received, representing claims to the extent of 230,500,000*f*. Austria-Hungary was on the list for 550 applications, amounting together to 12,000,000*f*. The number of claims recognized as valid by the commission, down to May 15th, was 2261, representing a total value of 23,500,000*f*. In these figures Austria-Hungary was included for 272 applications, amounting together to 2,200,000*f*. The total sum for indemnity which would devolve upon Egypt would not exceed 100,000,000*f*., and it was considered that no heavy sacrifice would be necessary for its payment. The Egyptian government had already begun to pay small accounts not exceeding £E.200 each.

that the taking of a bribe, the illegal striking of a fellow-citizen, the abuse of the *corvée* or the conscription, would lead the author of the wrong, no matter how highly placed, straight to the felon's cell, corruption and tyranny would gradually become as rare in Egypt as in any other country. Long before the end of the year the representative institutions with which his highness the khedive had so generously endowed his people would have been called into activity. It seemed to be generally admitted that they were well calculated to promote the cause of good government, but doubts had been expressed as to the possibility of finding men to work them. Upon this point Lord Dufferin had no misgivings. Their function was to acquaint the government with the wants and wishes of the people; and as no one knows where the shoe pinches so accurately as he who wears it, there need be no misapprehension that the popular representatives would fail to articulate the needs of the nation. Nor was it probable that constructive statesmanship would be wanting. Within the circle of his own Egyptian acquaintance he could point to many a personage of unblemished integrity and of proved ability who would be anxious to assist in the regeneration of their country. In any event, it was plain that fortune had afforded Egypt an unexpected opportunity of working out her own salvation, and she would only have her own children to blame if she failed in the endeavour. Though the problems before her were arduous, they were not disheartening. With one of the most difficult of them, namely, the liquidation of the Domains, Cherif Pasha had already dealt. The next which was to engage his attention, was that of the indebtedness of the fellahen. Such indications of uneasiness and dissatisfaction as still prevailed in Egypt, however differently expressed, might all be traced to this root of bitterness. The mere fact of the government seriously endeavouring to discover some mode whereby the fellahen might be relieved from the instant pressure of their present embarrassments, without detriment to the legal interests of their creditors, would at once relax the strain of the actual situation. For the solution of the other problems, time, patience, and administrative ability would suffice.

In July, 1883, Lord Dufferin was in London and a guest at a banquet of the Grocers' Company, where, in acknowledging the toast of her majesty's representatives abroad, he said:

"For thousands of years the Egyptian people have been the victims of tyranny and malversation. Corruption and oppression in every form was so ingrained in the administration of the country as to have become, in the eyes of the unhappy peasantry, incorporated with the order of nature. Law and justice have never existed in Egypt. The conscription and the most capricious system of taxation that has been known to mankind ground the fellah to the dust. But ere the smoke of battle had cleared off the field of Tel-el-Kebir a new Egypt had come into existence—an Egypt soon, I trust, to be the home of equal laws, righteous legislation, domestic freedom, and constitutional government—above all, an Egypt which is destined to prove to the world that all that is best, most wholesome, and most useful to mankind in the wisdom of the West can be associated and combined, harmonized and amalgamated, with Eastern habits of thought and feeling, and with the precepts and customs of an Oriental religion. If the East is ever to be resuscitated it is in Egypt that the vital spark is most likely to spring into flame. Months and years may elapse before satisfactory results occur and unchallenged accomplishments can ripen into full and perfect consummation; but believe me, under the auspices of able men the good work is fairly in progress, and can never again be checked or interrupted. I have no hesitation in saying, that ere a year is past, England will have the satisfaction of knowing that it has been acknowledged on every hand that she has been the happy instrument of increasing a hundredfold the prosperity and the happiness of an ancient, innocent, industrious, and sober population, the good government and tranquillity of whose country is absolutely necessary to the commercial interests of Great Britain and the people of Europe."

Much allowance is to be made for the "effusion" of a speech made at such a time, and it cannot be denied that the prospects in Egypt were in accordance with Lord Dufferin's declarations, and seemed to warrant his unhesitating assertion that the Egyptian

campaign would triumphantly stand the test of being justified by the peace it was undertaken to ensure, and the excess of the benefits over the risks, sacrifices, and losses which it caused.

At the time that these declarations were being made, however, a very serious outbreak of cholera had taken place at Damietta, and the rapid and terrible spread of the disease, and the necessity for taking measures to meet the calamity, retarded the immediate progress of the work of reconstruction. The disease first appeared towards the end of June, and it was thought that the immediate seclusion or isolation of the district of Damietta would be necessary.

Sir Samuel Baker said that Damietta was a disgusting example of Oriental neglect and filth accumulation. A long narrow street ran parallel with the river at the back of the dilapidated houses, which for a distance of a mile rose from the level of the stream. This street was without drainage, and was a miserable channel of communication, deep with poisonous mud after a heavy shower, and full of dust holes emitting germs of pestilence during hot and sultry weather. If cholera could be manufactured, there could not be a more elaborate factory.

The first necessary step being isolation upon the appearance of an epidemic, Lake Menzaleh, upon the east, would effectually protect the approach from that quarter. The railway terminus being upon the west bank of the river, while the town of Damietta was upon the east, that could be easily guarded. The embankments of the Nile which confined the stream, and which formed the highways upon either side, could be barred by sentries in half an hour. A bridge of boats should be at once constructed across the river to prevent all shipping from passing to and fro between Damietta and Mansourah.

But it was too late to take such measures, even if there had been much chance of being able to move so quickly in Egypt. The disorder had already spread. On the 25th of June cholera was at Mansourah and Port Said, and so rapidly did the infection extend that in three months the disease was fatal in 30,000 cases.

There is no need to recount the horrors that attended the

widely spread disease. It had doubtless originated at Damietta, where at the great fair about 15,000 people had assembled and had for several days been living on foul water and putrid food. The stench of the place tainted the air and was noticeable at several miles distance. Doubtless the conditions of the country were also such as to develop infection, for pestilence frequently follows war as famine often follows pestilence. There were no doctors, medicines, or disinfectants at Damietta, and there was no authority prompt enough or powerful enough to place a rigid cordon round the town before 10,000 people, who had attended the fair, dispersed to the various towns and villages of the interior. The death-rate at Damietta rose to 200 a-day, and the disease rapidly began to appear at other places where the sanitary conditions were little better.

No precautions had been taken, no sanitary organization existed, and all was delay, uncertainty, and confusion. In Egypt nothing is ever ready on an emergency, and it can scarcely be said that we always set the people there a good example in this respect. After the suppression of the military rebellion and the final engagement at Tel-el-Kebir, the condition of the hospitals to which our sick or wounded soldiers were consigned was abominable, and though it was understood that surgical appliances, medical comforts, and the furniture, beds, and bedding suitable for military hospital use had been ordered and sent, there was considerable delay before the bare, ruinous, and filthy buildings appropriated for the purpose of hospitals for the troops were either properly cleansed or even decently provided with the ordinary and necessary appointments of the commonest hospital ward. This was quickly remedied after the attention of Lord Wolseley and the superior officers had been emphatically called to the condition of the patients, and they had themselves visited the hospitals, but it lasted long enough to provoke in England strong remonstrances against the "departments" which had failed either to profit by or to remember the disastrous delays and confusion of the commissariat and supply during the earlier periods of the Crimean war.

With the cholera outbreak there was no one having sufficient



DARB-EL-AHMAR, CAIRO.



power to use the initial means of checking the spread of the disease; nor did the means themselves exist at the places first attacked. At Mansourah the filthy condition of the hospital to which the sufferers were sent prevented all but a few patients from recovering. On the 15th of July, 1883, one or two fatal cases were reported at Ghizeh and Boulak, the suburbs of Cairo. There were then grounds for serious apprehension that the capital itself would suffer from the epidemic, for beautiful and picturesque as "Grand Cairo" may be, and numerous as the modern improvements are, it is, like all other towns in Egypt, and in Europe also for that matter, defiled by noisome slums and foul buildings, while the science of drainage, cleansing, and ventilation has received little practical attention. We have already seen what was the condition of the prisons there and elsewhere, the hospitals were but little better. The narrow streets of Cairo and their picturesque irregularity are, of course, part of the Oriental character of the place, but there are pestilential festering nooks and corners there as elsewhere, and they are not easy to get at even if anybody thought of cleaning them up, or drenching them with dilute carbolic acid or Condy's fluid. The whole Oriental part of the city is divided into quarters consisting mainly of dwelling-houses, but named either from some public building, from somebody to whom the property may once have belonged, or from the social peculiarity in the callings followed by the greater part of the inhabitants, so that there is the "Hart-es-Suggaeen"—the Quarter of the Water-carriers; the "Hart-el-Kobt"—the Copt Quarter; the "Hart-el-Yahood"—or Jews' Quarter; the "Hart-el-Frang"—or Frank Quarter, and so on; the Esbekeeyeh being now considered a separate quarter with its more modern additions of the Abdeen and the Ismaileeyeh. For administrative purposes Cairo is, or was then, divided into ten quarters or Toomns:—Esbekeeyeh, Bab-esh-Shareeyeh, Abdeen, Darb-el-Gammameez, Darb-el-Ahmar, Gemeleeyeh, Keyssoon, Khaleefeh, Boulak, and Old Cairo. Some of these quarters have good and picturesque streets and fine mosques, one of the best being the mosque of Merdānee in the Darb-el-Ahmar, leading from the Bab Zuweleh to the citadel; but the

mosque itself, five centuries and a half old, was lately falling into ruin. This condition of ruin and comparative neglect, however picturesque and imposing it may be in an ancient building, is by no means an element to be desired in byways and narrow tortuous streets and dirty lanes, where the houses on the opposite sides touch each other at the upper stories: and in Cairo, as in less important towns, the habits of the lower classes of Egyptians are such as to defy any merely temporary efforts to effect sanitary reforms.

When the cholera broke out in the suburbs it quickly spread to the city itself, where the death-rate rose to 500 a-day, and though the extreme measure of isolating and setting fire to one of the most infected districts was adopted, the result was of little apparent advantage, since nothing was done to prevent hundreds of the evicted tenants from swarming in crowds through the streets of the city; and in the general want of any organization cholera patients were taken to the hospitals in vehicles which afterwards were seen plying for hire, mourners rode home from funerals seated on the coffins or shells which had conveyed the bodies of their deceased relatives to the grave, and the clothes of those who died in hospital were sent to surviving friends by the hospital authorities. The British troops were sent out of the city to more healthy quarters, and not only at Cairo, but at other places where the men were quartered, precautions were taken similar to those which had been found successful in India to preserve them from the ravages of the epidemic. They were frequently moved from one station to another, a hospital camp was established, and medical and sanitary knowledge were employed to overcome the danger to which our soldiers were exposed in Alexandria and other towns, as well as outside the walls of Cairo.

As soon as arrangements could be made in England, Surgeon-general W. Guyer Hunter started for Egypt with a staff of twelve surgeons, for the purpose of rendering assistance, but for some time they could not prevail on the Egyptian hospital authorities to adopt common precautions against the spread of the disease. Against the obstinate fatalism, and the indifference and indecision of

the Egyptians, they would have been powerless had they not, by their active self-denial and determined devotion to duty, succeeded in arousing the admiration of the people themselves. For a short time they were thwarted in every attempt to establish ordinary sanitary regulations, and it was not till they had threatened to resign their appointments and return to England that they were permitted to take active measures. Of the British soldiers outside Cairo, in various districts and in camp on the heights, 140 died, and the mortality among the natives was appalling, the ravages of the disease being far greater there and at Damietta than at Alexandria, where better precautions had been observed, and the city itself did not present so many conditions for the spread or the virulence of the disease.

During the whole period of the calamity the unflinching devotion of the English officers of the Egyptian army in their care of the men under their command aroused the warm admiration and grateful surprise of the natives, and the untiring activity, skill, and courage of the surgeon-general and his staff were regarded with equal satisfaction and astonishment. The efforts of all these officers were, however, heartily supported by the khedive, who himself set an excellent example by personally visiting some of the worst and foulest wards of the hospitals at Mansourah, Cairo, and other places, where he encouraged, admonished, and stimulated the authorities intelligently to perform their duties. The unselfish interest and sympathy which he showed was quite a new experience for the people, who everywhere met him with enthusiastic expressions of loyalty, and proved by their manifestations of gratitude that, for a time at least, he was thoroughly and deservedly popular. By the beginning of August the disease began to abate. It had already greatly diminished in other parts of the country where it had first appeared, and the cases in Cairo assumed a less virulent type and diminished in number. In September there was a full Nile, and the authority of the extraordinary council which had been appointed during the emergency was sufficient to enforce regulations to prevent corpses and the putrid carcasses of animals being thrown into the canals, which were then filling with

water. By the middle of the month the epidemic had almost entirely disappeared, and local restrictions and quarantine were soon afterwards removed.

For some time previously the news from the Soudan had excited attention, and, now that the health of the capital was restored and the recall of the British troops which had been interrupted was continued, the khedive and the Egyptian government urgently requested that a sufficient body of our men should be permitted to remain, to aid in maintaining public order, while the new constitution was being developed and the protection afforded by British arms, and the presence of British officers might be needed in order to carry out the proposed reformation.

After a time the surgeon-general¹ and the medical staff were able to return, leaving Egypt free from the further ravages of the epidemic, but the retirement of the troops went on more slowly than had been intended, and eventually was still further delayed. The great changes which were being effected in the administration, including even a scheme for improved education in the Egyptian colleges and schools where several necessary reforms were to be promptly inaugurated, made it necessary to retain some proof that the moral support of Europe was not withdrawn from the khedive's government, while the rebellious temper which had been aroused by the revolt and maintained by the adherents of Arabi, who still professed to believe in his patriotic professions, might make the presence of a British force necessary for the maintenance of order, until the organization of the Egyptian gendarmerie and police had been completed.

As early as October, 1882, General Valentine Baker Pasha, an English officer who had been in the Turkish service, arrived at Cairo in order to tender his military aid to the khedive should the British government permit English officers to offer such temporary service without quitting that of her majesty. The reorganization

¹ Sir W. Guyer Hunter, K.C.M.G., who now (1886) represents Central Hackney in parliament, entered the Indian Medical Service in 1850, and served through the Burmese War and the Indian Mutiny. In 1876 he was appointed Principal of the Grant Medical College, and in 1879 Vice-chancellor of the University of Bombay. He retired in 1880, but was despatched to Egypt on a special mission when the cholera broke out there in 1883.

of the Egyptian army was then under consideration, and General Baker proposed a scheme which, after some modifications by the council of ministers, was approved by the khedive. The proposed force was to consist of 11,500 men, of whom 5400 were to consist of 6 battalions of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, 3 batteries of field artillery of 100 each, 1 battalion of 500 heavy artillery, 2 battalions of mounted infantry, and a company of 100 engineers. All these to be under the command of English officers, while Egyptian officers would command 6 battalions of infantry, 3 batteries of field artillery, 1 battalion of heavy artillery, 2 battalions of gendarmerie amounting to 2000 men, and 300 men for hospital and transport duty,—in all 6100 men. This scheme was subjected to some alterations, for though it included the number of men sufficient to allow drafts to be made to supplement the Soudan garrison and to occupy the Mediterranean forts, it did not appear to make a sufficient distinction between those services and that of Egypt proper. Lord Dufferin thought that though a military force was necessary for Egypt, it should not exceed by a single man the actual requirements of the country. Though an efficient gendarmerie might be able in ordinary times to prevent the Bedouins causing trouble along the desert border and the banks of the canal, it was essential that those unruly Arab communities should know that there was a military force sufficient to suppress any attempt they might make to disturb the country or to break through the frontier guards and plunder Cairo. There were also other dangers to be provided against. Egypt had at all times been liable to small local insurrections, usually of a so-called religious character, set on foot by half-mad impostors representing themselves to be divinely inspired leaders, and as such movements spread with extraordinary rapidity among the credulous population, the means of suppressing them should not be wanting. This was one of the reasons given for maintaining an Egyptian army in Egypt, and without reference to any such pseudo-religious insurrection in the Soudan itself, although, even at that time, rumours from the neighbourhood of Khartûm seemed to indicate troubles in that district. It was, however, thought most desirable that the affairs of Egypt and the

Soudan should be kept distinct, and that the armed forces belonging to each should be regarded separately. Only a small army would be required for Egypt, the Delta being a triangular area of only a few thousand square miles, traversed in every direction by railways and branches of the Nile, and the rest of Egypt consisting of a narrow strip of alluvial soil from six to fifteen miles broad, divided through its entire length by a navigable river, and consequently accessible to troops in every part and on the shortest notice. It was thought, therefore, and General Baker concurred in the proposition, that a force of 6000 men would be sufficient, mainly consisting of infantry, with a regiment of cavalry, a camel corps, artillery, rocket companies, engineers, and transport, including 100 garrison artillery and 100 palace guard; and it was proposed not to include Turkish or Albanian mercenaries, but to enlist native Egyptians, while General Baker's plan of dividing the command between English and Egyptian officers was regarded as highly desirable. It became evident, however, that a British general officer should be appointed to assist the khedive's government in organizing the army and to take command as chief of the staff, the khedive himself having desired to be ranked as commander-in-chief. As we have already seen, Major-general Sir Evelyn Wood, K.C.B., V.C., was selected for that duty, and left England for Cairo on the 15th of December, 1882.

We have already noticed the Bedouins—the factions of tribes which crossed into Egypt in remote times from Arabia and the Sinaitic peninsula, some of whom Lord Dufferin tells us still preserve a tradition of the district whence their ancestors came. The most powerful tribe is the Maazeh, whose ascendancy extends from the Keneh-Kosseir route to Suez. The Tarrazin dwell around Suez and its coasts, the Amran or Hamran between Suez and Cairo, the Allawin on the Isthmus, and the Ayaideh near Heliopolis, a few miles to the north-east of Cairo. Above Cairo are the Beni Wasel opposite Beni Souef, the Metahrat opposite Siout, and the Hawarah near Thebes. The Western Bedouins of the Libyan Desert though of Arab origin have come more immediately from Tripoli or Tunis, and are regarded by the

Eastern Bedouins as inferiors both in birth and breeding. The Southern or Nubian Bedouins, between the Nile valley and the Red Sea from the Keneh-Kosseir route to the table-lands of Abyssinia are known as the Beza tribes, and are believed to be descendants of the Blemmyer expelled from the Upper Nile valley in the fourth century. Though physiologically of a high type, they are not Arabs, and speak a language said to be a dialect of Abyssinia. The Ababdeh, occupying the district between the Keneh-Kosseir route and the second cataract, are the most civilized and docile, and have adopted the Arabic language. Further south are the Bishari and the Hadendon, who are fiercer and much less civilized.

The astute old Mohammed Ali employed the Bedouins as irregular cavalry, but as they were always a disturbing element he with equal sagacity transformed a considerable number of them into agriculturists, thinking that they might form a defence against the less amenable tribes who continued to be marauders. The result was that numbers of them settled on the irrigated land in districts near the desert. They despise the fellaheen, but they have to some extent mingled with them by intermarriage, and the government has a considerable hold over them through their sheikhs, many of whom have become owners of estates. An instance of this was found when one of the chiefs of the tribe near the scene of the murder of Professor Palmer was ordered by the government to assist in capturing the criminals, and found it to be to his interest to obey the command with considerable promptitude. The tribes are still independent enough to claim exemption from the "corvée" and from conscription, and in the rebellion a band of 2000 of them under a single leader crossed over from the Fayoum to the camp of Arabi: while the confusion which reigned at Alexandria after the bombardment was worse confounded by the irruption of several hundred Bedouins into the blazing streets. But these predatory or half-settled tribes were badly armed, and though they had picked up a few Remington rifles, had no ammunition. A good many of the chief men were not very likely to run the risk of having their property con-

fiscated, and it was believed that the gendarmerie pickets would be sufficient to deter even the most disorderly bands from serious outbreaks or organized raids.

The administration of the gendarmerie was, as we have seen, placed under the minister of the interior, but its organization was intrusted to General Baker Pasha, who was made inspector-general, with a deputy inspector-general to take his place in the event of sickness or absence. His headquarters staff was to consist of one European orderly officer and four Egyptian staff officers, and he was to have the supervision of the urban police of Alexandria, Cairo, Ismailia, Port Said, and Suez, so that his duties and responsibilities were arduous, and unremitting activity was required to form such a force out of the materials with which he had to deal. The commandant of the urban police, who was also amenable to the inspector-general of gendarmerie, was Count della Sala, an Italian officer who had previously had command of the anti-slavery police, and who had done good service in organizing the constabulary force at Alexandria, and suppressing the tumults made there by the Albanians who had demanded to be enrolled in the force.

These, then, were the provisions made for enrolling semi-military and constabulary bodies who would discharge duties that would render the maintenance of a large army unnecessary, and who would maintain order in the large towns where unruly foreign elements frequently created disturbances. It was not intended, however, to interfere with the ancient rural police system—probably as old as the time of the Pharaohs—by which each village sheikh is responsible for the maintenance of order in his hamlet: appoints the watchmen: and is made answerable to the higher authorities in case of any disturbance of the peace of the village.

By the 1st of January, 1883, a force of 1800 mounted and 1400 foot gendarmerie had been fully organized and equipped, and were being distributed throughout the provinces and the Delta. The force was composed almost entirely of noncommissioned officers taken from the reserve of the regular army, the

commissioned officers having been selected from those who had not been specially implicated in the recent troubles. In their military capacity the gendarmerie partook of the character of mounted infantry; a portion of them were to be organized into camel corps and rocket companies, an arrangement which was not difficult, as all the people in Egypt are accustomed to manage camels, and the rockets, as well as the camels, were likely to be useful in any conflict with the Arab tribes.

When all the arrangements were made for the protection of Egypt proper, however, there still remained the question of the military forces to be provided for the Soudan and Darfûr. Lord Dufferin was of opinion that the sooner Egypt relinquished the profitless incumbrance of Darfûr the better it would be for her, and there were a good many people who believed that it would be just as desirable that she should get rid of the Soudan also. The Egyptian government, however, were not likely to take this view. They desired that their jurisdiction should extend along the whole valley of the Nile, and were convinced that if it could be opened up by a railway the entire district would become a rich and profitable possession. A country with a length from Assouan to the equator of about 1650 miles, and a width from Massowa to the western limit of the Darfûr province of from 1200 to 1400 miles, is an immense territory to hold, and under present conditions it seems impossible to hold it securely; but the great plain has a population far less than it would support, and, though it is not fertilized and its surface is so high above the river that three tiers of chaloufs or water-wheels are needed to irrigate it, it would grow cotton and sugar in profusion if the means existed for importing the necessary machinery and exporting the produce; while other sources of natural wealth are abundant. But the chief difficulty was that it was abandoned to the slave-hunters, and that the so-called religious war, fomented by the Mahdi and his followers, was supported by the slave-dealers, who were always ready to take advantage of any such fanatic outbreak to restore their traffic and defy the authority of the Egyptian government. To include this vast tract of country under one name is in itself misleading. It is

inhabited by two totally distinct races. In the northern half of the territory—that is to say, north of the 11th parallel of north latitude—the inhabitants are almost wholly pure Arabs, most of them nomad tribes, professing a more or less adulterated form of Mohammedanism. South of the 11th parallel the country is peopled by negro tribes, who, though officially described as Mohammedans, are really Pagans. But besides these two main divisions of race, there are localities the inhabitants of which cannot be classed under either. The negroes, it may be said roughly, are all sedentary and cultivators; the Arabs are almost all nomads, and do little or no tillage. Up to a little more than sixty years ago, when the Egyptians seem first to have directed their attention steadily to the Soudan, the district was divided into a number of kingdoms and chieftaincies, and the petty monarchs seem to have lived in a state of chronic war.

Lieutenant-Colonel D. H. Stewart, in one of the able reports which he made of his investigations in the Soudan, said:—

“The Arabs and Dongolawis, negroes and others, settled within the Arab zone are all Mohammedans of the Maliki school. This religion, however, owing to the prevailing ignorance of the people, partakes mostly of an emotional and superstitious nature. Hence the enormous influences of the Fakis, or spiritual leaders, who are credited with a supernatural power, and are almost more venerated than the Prophet.” “The negro tribes,” he adds, “notwithstanding their being officially described as Mohammedans, are all Pagans, or have no system of religious belief.”

This will explain how it was that a pretended prophet raising a “religious war” so readily formed a host of followers, and the nature of the country prevented an immediate and decisive blow being struck. The physical difficulties were too many for the Egyptian forces to make rapid movements against the flying forces of the rebels, so that in 1883 the Soudan was unsubdued, and a source of boundless trouble after all that had been undergone to suppress slavery and bring the country under regular authority. “Of the country west of the White Nile,” reported Colonel Stewart, “between the parallels of Khartûm and that of Kaka (or Caka),

about eleven degrees latitude, the general appearance is that of a vast steppe, covered with low thorny trees (mimosa, gum-trees, &c.), and prickly grass. Occasionally low groups of bare hills are met with. The villages and the patches of cultivated ground are few and far between. Water is scarce, and stored in wells and trunks of baobab trees."

This was the very district in which the defeat of Hicks Pasha and his Egyptian army took place, an event to which with the occurrences preceding it we must now turn.

We have already referred to the reports sent by Colonel Stewart from Khartûm. In these he made known to the British consul at Cairo the position of affairs in the Soudan, and the anxiety of Abd-el-Kader, the governor-general, for large reinforcements of troops in order to prevent the rebels from taking El Obeid, the capital of Kordofan, in order that they might advance on Khartûm itself. This was in the latter part of 1882, while Lord Dufferin and the British representatives in Egypt were earnestly engaged in the trials of the associates of Arabi and the reconstruction of the government of the khedive, and though the organization of the small regular Egyptian army under Sir Evelyn Wood was being effected, the men had all been enlisted under a promise of exemption from service in the Soudan.

The insurrection had then been going on for above a year and a quarter, and had no doubt been joined by a number of the disaffected officers and soldiers who had taken part with Arabi. The success of the Mahdi in raising the tribes and extending his influence over great tracts of country, proved the inability of the Egyptian government either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. Within a year and a half about 9000 men had fallen in various engagements with the followers of the Mahdi, of whom it was computed that 40,000 had perished, and yet the fierce and fanatic tribesmen, and the retainers of the truculent slave-owning chiefs, swarmed to the standard of the false Prophet, and the slaughter seemed to be no nearer to an end. There is no doubt that Abd-el-Kader, the governor-general,

was active and not wanting in courage, and, though he had but poor material out of which to form an army, he was able for some time to inflict severe defeats upon the enemy. Colonel Stewart did not attribute the rise of the rebellion so much to the want of troops as to the want of military knowledge on the part of the Egyptian officers. The primary causes of the success of the pretensions of the Mahdi were, in fact: (1) the venality of the officials, and the oppressive and unjust method of collecting the taxes; and (2) the suppression of the slave-trade, most of the supporters of the Mahdi, especially the Baggar tribe, owing their wealth to the traffic in slaves which the Egyptian government was endeavouring to suppress.

It will be remembered that on the departure of General Gordon, Raouf Pasha had been made governor-general of the Soudan, and in July, 1881, his attention was drawn to the declarations of one Mohammed Achmet or Ahmed, then living at Marobieh, near the island of Abba, and claiming to be the Mahdi, the deliverer, whose coming had been foretold by the Prophet, as that of him who would restore the power and establish the faith of Islam. There have been at different periods several ambitious fanatics or pretended religious leaders who have claimed to be the Mahdi, and for a time they have raised riots and gained followers, but none of them attained such rapid and widely extended influence as this man, who had very artfully prepared the part he had to play. He claimed the degree of relationship to the Prophet which was said would belong to the true Mahdi, and, singularly enough, certain warts or moles upon his cheek, and a difference in the colour of his eyes, were tokens said to have been named as marks of the genuine leader and prophet. Of course among a deeply superstitious people, encouraged by a number of influential chiefs interested in creating an insurrection, such tokens are easily accepted; but there was nothing particularly remarkable about the professed Mahdi except that he possessed tact and cunning in dealing with the tribes. He had not even personal courage to recommend him, for he seldom led his troops or exposed himself to danger, and though his proclamations were couched in language of a semi-religious

kind, and declaring that he was the chosen leader in a holy war, he was in other respects, as well as in this, an unscrupulous liar, representing that he had achieved great things, and sending false intelligence to distant tribes in order to encourage them to continue the revolt after he had suffered defeats.

Colonel Stewart gave a succinct account of him in which he said Mahomet Achmet, the Mahdi, is a Dongolawi, or native of the province of Dongola. His grandfather was called Fahil, and lived on the island of Naft Arti (Arti—Dongolawi for "Island"). This island lies east of and opposite to Ordi, the native name for the capital of Dongola. His father was Abdullahi, by trade a carpenter. In 1852 this man left and went to Shindi, a town on the Nile south of Berber. At that time his family consisted of three sons and one daughter, called respectively Mahomed, Hamid, Mahomet Achmet (the Mahdi), and Nur-el-Sham (Light of Syria). At Shindi another son was born called Abdullah. As a boy, Mahomet Achmet was apprenticed to Sherif-ed-deen, his uncle, a boatman, residing at Shakabeh, an island opposite Sennâr. Having one day received a beating from his uncle, he ran away to Khartûm, and joined the free school or "Medressu" of a faki (learned man, head of a sect of dervishes) who resided at Hoghali, a village east of and close to Khartûm. This school is attached to the tomb of Sheikh Hoghali, the patron saint of Khartûm, and who is greatly revered by the inhabitants of that town and district. The sheikh of this tomb or shrine, although he keeps a free school and feeds the poor, derives a very handsome revenue from the gifts of the pious. He claims to be a descendant of the original Hoghali, and through him of Mahomet. Here he remained for some time studying religion, the tenets of his sheikh, &c., but did not make much progress in the more worldly accomplishments of reading and writing. After a time he left and went to Berber, where he joined another free school kept by a sheikh Ghubush, at a village of that name nearly opposite to Mekherref (Berber). The school is also attached to a shrine greatly venerated by the natives. Here Mahomet Achmet remained six months completing his religious education. Thence he went to

Aradup (Tamarind Tree) village, south of Kana. Here in 1870 he became a disciple of another faki—Sheikh Nur-el-Daim (Continuous Light). Nur-el-Daim subsequently ordained him a sheikh or faki,¹ and he then left to take up his home in the island of Abba, near Kana, on the White Nile. Here he began by making a subterranean excavation (*khaliva*—retreat) into which he made a practice of retiring to repeat for hours one of the names of the Deity, and this accompanied by fasting, incense-burning, and prayers. His fame and sanctity by degrees spread far and wide, and Mahomet Achmet became wealthy, collected disciples, and married several wives, all of whom he was careful to select from among the daughters of the most influential Baggara sheikhs (*Baggara*—tribes owning cattle and horses) and other notables. To keep within the legalized number (four), he was in the habit of divorcing the surplus and taking them on again according to his fancy. About the end of May, 1881, he began to write to his brother fakis (religious chiefs), and to teach that he was the Mahdi foretold by Mahomet, and that he had a divine mission to reform Islam, to establish a universal equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of goods (“beyt-ul-mal”); also that all who did not believe in him should be destroyed, be they Christian, Mohammedan, or Pagan. Among others, he wrote to Mahomet Saleh, a very learned and influential faki of Dongola, directing him to collect his dervishes (followers) and friends and to join him at Abba. This sheikh, instead of complying with his request, informed the government, declaring the man must be mad. In person the Mahdi is tall, slim, with a black beard and light brown complexion. Like most Dongolawis, he reads and writes with difficulty. He is local head of the Gheelan or Kadrigé order of dervishes, a school originated by Abdul Kader-el-Ghulami, whose tomb is, I believe, at Bagdad. Judging from his conduct of affairs and policy, I should say he had considerable natural ability. The manner in which he has managed to merge the usually discordant tribes together denotes great tact.

¹ The Fokarah (Fakirs) are taught by their instructors how to write amulets or charms, which are doubtless a profitable source of income, and establish an influence over the superstitious Nubians. These amulets may be love charms, or protections against spears or bullets.

He had probably been preparing the movement for some time back.

An Austrian missionary, Father Dichtl, who was at Khartûm, gave an account of the Mahdi containing some further particulars; he says:—

“Mohamed Ahmed, who was born at Dongolah, is about forty years of age, tall, and of coppery red complexion. For a long time he worked with his two brothers in the neighbourhood of Khartûm at building boats for the Nile, but got tired of his trade and aspired to become a fakir, which is about the same thing as a priest. He applied to the sheikh of the island of Tuti, situated close to Khartûm, a little to the north of the junction of the White and Blue Niles. After a few years' study with the sheikh, he succeeded in taking the order of fakir. He then sought to become a sheikh, and was again successful. Thenceforth he had but one object in view, namely—to assume the character of a prophet. He retired to the island of Abba, near Kana on the White River, about twenty-one hours by steamer from Khartûm, and, taking up his abode in a dry cistern, he led the life of a sheikh in the strictest sense of the word. He remained there for six years, only leaving his retreat on Fridays to go to the mosque. His reputation for piety spread in course of time throughout the country, and when, subsequently, he came to be regarded as a saint, he expounded his mission to a numerous assembly of Moslems at Kana. He told them that the archangel Gabriel had twice commanded him to unsheath the sword of faith, in order to reform the bad Moslem and to found a Mussulman empire, which would be followed by universal peace. He held his mission from the Prophet, and would achieve what Mohammed had been unable to do. He therefore urged them to follow him; he was the Mahdi, and would lead them to the kingdom founded by Allah for true believers. Abd-el-Kader, the ex-governor-general of the Soudan, a man of high probity and ability, endeavoured by theological argument to convince the people that Mohamed Ahmed was an impostor, but to little purpose. Not only the lower classes but also the government officials and many officers secretly believed in the Mahdi's mission.

Raouf Pasha, at the time he was governor-general, sent an emissary to the false prophet."

Father Dichtl happened to be present when that emissary on his return rendered the following account of his interview with the Mahdi: "On arriving at Abba I found Mohamed Ahmed surrounded by 500 or 600 followers, all of them naked, with iron chain belts round their waists and broad drawn swords. The Mahdi occupied a raised seat in their midst, and in his right hand he held the Prophet's staff. When I asked him what his object was he described his pretended mission. I answered that the government and myself were as good Mussulmans as he. But this he denied, on the grounds that we allowed the Christians to have churches of their own, that we afforded them protection, and that the government levied taxes. I advised him to abandon his plans and to surrender, adding that he could not resist a government which disposed of soldiers, Remington rifles, guns, and steamers. To this he rejoined, 'If the soldiers fire upon me and my followers their bullets will not hurt us, and if you advance against us with steamers they will sink with everything on board.'"

It seems pretty evident that, at all events, a large number of the Arabs who joined the rebellion followed their chiefs, who desired to take advantage of any attempt that would serve to break the power of the Egyptian government in the Soudan.

According to M. Rassam of Abyssinian fame—and no mean authority—the Mahdi expected by the Moslems must be, "firstly, according to the Sunnite belief, a genuine Arab of the Koraish tribe, and of the family of Mohammed, and not of the so-called 'Arabs' of the Soudan, or half-caste Africans; secondly, his advent must be preceded by signs and wonders, such as the sun rising in the west, the coming of Antichrist, the descent of Christ from heaven, the appearance of Gog and Magog, the returning of the Arabs to idol worship; and last, but not least, the demolition of the temple of Mecca by the Ethiopians—that is to say, the Abyssinians."

The Sheeis, the other great sect of the Moslems, believe the

Mahdi to be living and concealed in some secret place till the time of his manifestation, and both sects expect him to do wonders and act as a superhuman being. "There has," he adds, "been no lack, from time to time, of false prophets among the Mahomedans, whether Arabs, Persians, or Turks; but their fanaticism only lasted as long as they could find lawless and discontented people to follow them."

The emissary who visited the Mahdi on behalf of Raouf Pasha was the notorious Abu Saoud, whose former doings have been noted on a previous page, and when the governor-general afterwards sent out a small expedition of 300 men, who embarked on a steamer with one cannon to invade the Mahdi's village, Abu Saoud was one of the three commanders of the force who quarrelled together on the journey and so mismanaged that another of their number, Ali Effendi, shot the wrong man in mistake for the Mahdi and was cut down by the Arabs along with 130 of his soldiers, the rest of the expedition running away, and the gunner on board the steamer being so overcome at sight of the Mahdi on horseback close to the bank that he lost all courage, and after some delay in finding his ammunition only succeeded in firing his cannon into the air. Thus the expedition ended in increasing the reputation of the Mahdi, who left his island village and settled at Gebel Gedir, where he was allowed to remain for some months undisturbed, to extend his influence, and make plans, not only for defeating the Egyptian government in the Soudan with the aid of the slave-dealers, but for advancing on Egypt itself. For there were already symptoms of an extension of the revolt among the tribes in the Eastern Soudan and Suakim with the garrisons at Sinkat and Tokar, the former 35 miles or two and a half days' journey from Suakim on the route to Berber, the latter south of Suakim and not far from Trinkatat on the Red Sea coast.

It will be seen that the insurrection threatened the main points of Egyptian occupation both in the Eastern and the Western Soudan. Khartûm was threatened by the danger which approached Obeid or El Obeiyad, the capital of Kordofan. Obeid, which stands in a vast plain, is composed of six different villages, repre-

sented by a straggling series of groups of mud-huts, each group forming a separate quarter and inhabited by a distinct class of people. These dwellings are mere huts of straw and mud, a few only being constructed of clay; and the Government House, one of the mosques, three barracks, and a hospital built of some dried bricks. But Obeid is a great trading centre for gum, ostrich-feathers, &c.; 100,000 cwts. of gum being sent annually from the market there, which is a lively place enough during the day. A Roman Catholic mission, a branch of that at Khartûm, has been established at Obeid. Though the wells are deep, some of them more than a hundred feet, water is sometimes very scarce, and for this reason it is expected that the government will be removed to Bara, an exceedingly pleasant place, with water supplied from wells twenty or thirty feet deep, luxuriant gardens, and plenty of vegetables and fruit of all kinds.

Khartûm, which, as we have before noted, lies at the confluence of the Blue and the White Niles at a height of 1450 feet above the sea, is chiefly upon the left bank of the Blue Nile and separated from it only by gardens, but it is also near enough to the White River for the inundations frequently to reach the earthen wall that surrounds the town. As approached from the White Nile it is a rather dreary mass of dirty gray houses, with a single minaret overlooking them, and in front a bare sandy plain without trees or shrubs. The one long narrow street by which to enter Khartûm runs from west to east, and the market is at the end of it. It is a filthy thoroughfare of windowless mud-houses—or, at all events, there are no windows, or any apertures but the doors, visible from the street itself. The other parts of the town are not streets at all, but mere congeries of huts and houses of all sizes and shapes, which seem to be stuck up at random, with labyrinthine approaches, but at irregular intervals one comes upon open spaces large enough for good-sized gardens or even for cornfields. The place is, of course, unhealthy. It contains hollow spaces where water collects and is allowed to stand. The larger number of the houses are wretched hovels of sun-dried clay, cemented with cow-dung and slime. Only in the main street are to be seen superior buildings,

the governor's house and offices, and several spacious dwellings belonging to Turks, Copts, and Arabs. There is a brick-built mosque in the market-place, and also a bazaar, coffee-houses, and shops for the sale of brandy and other commodities. The other buildings are a Coptic church, a Roman Catholic chapel and school, an infirmary, barracks, and a jail. The pleasantest features of Khartûm are the gardens on the bank of the Blue Nile, where fruit and vegetables grow in considerable variety, and the date-palms present a stately and handsome appearance, though they here are at their southern limit and consequently the fruit does not fully ripen. There is plenty of land capable of cultivation, but it is left barren from the old cause—over-taxation—the water-wheels are taxed, produce is taxed, and consequently the Arabs cultivate only enough for their immediate needs.

Suakim is better known to travellers, for it is within ordinary observation, is the principal port on the Red Sea for merchandise from the Nile provinces, and is the starting-point for the main caravan routes into the interior, namely to Berber across the desert on camels by two or three different routes, to Kassala across the desert and along the telegraph line, and to Tokar by the coast, thence up the Baraka river to Zoga, near which is a junction with the Keren and Kassala road.

Suakim consists of a town built on an island, and a suburb on the mainland which has grown to be larger and more important than the town. It contains a number of mosques and public buildings, of which the principal are the governor's house, the custom-house, and the bazaar. The inner harbour is formed by a channel 500 yards wide penetrating between the mainland and the two islands on one of which the town is built. It is sheltered from all winds, but is too shallow for vessels of the largest size; but the lagoon or bay in which the islands are situated is joined to the sea by a neck of water three-quarters of a mile long and just wide enough to admit of two ships passing, while in the bay outside the islands it is said, in a report by Captain Gascoigne in 1882, that the water is deep enough for ocean-going steamers. The entrance to the harbour is difficult, and as there are, or were, no lights it can

only be approached by daylight because of the coral reefs lying off the coast for twenty miles both north and south, these reefs being unmarked by buoys and lying only a few feet beneath the surface. The harbour once reached, however, is very secure, but there is not anchorage for more than four or five steamers at a time.

The town, which is built of coral, is rather picturesque-looking, though of a glaring white, and it boasts of one or two minarets. It is built on an island which is united to the mainland by a causeway which Col. Gordon had made when he was Governor-general of the Soudan. Its population is about eight thousand. In 1881 the Egyptian government separated the Red Sea ports Suakim and Massowah, together with the country between them and Kassala, Sanheit, the town of Kassala itself, Gedariff, the Hamran country, Galabat, and neighbouring provinces, from the rest of the Soudan. Ali-ed-Deen Pasha, who had been for a long time Governor of different parts of this territory, was made supreme governor, superseding Ali Reza Pasha, formerly governor of the Red Sea ports, who was deposed. A number of the shops in Suakim are kept by Greeks, who seem to make a living almost everywhere in Egypt as small traders, merchants, and money-lenders, but the town can scarcely be called a flourishing place. The surroundings are dreary. The largest building in Suakim is a storehouse and caravanserai, built on the mainland, erected for merchants to deposit their goods in while waiting for transport. It cost 80,000 dollars, and was, of course, built by slave labour. The builder and proprietor was formerly a government employé at 150 piastres (about thirty-one shillings) a month wages. No vegetables are grown, and the country is desert, the nearest village being Tokar, which is two days' journey, and there the cultivation is principally confined to a little dhurra (millet) which springs up after the rains.

The great caravan route from Suakim is that which, crossing the desert, strikes the Nile at Berber, a distance of 240 miles. Its trade, however, is not increasing, owing to the present low price of gum, its chief export to Europe, and to the restrictions on the slave-trade. Formerly slaves could be purchased with cotton cloth imported from Manchester, and were made to carry



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF SUAKIM.

ivory, ostrich-feathers, &c., to the coast; now this "branch of industry" is done away with, although more merchandise finds its way to Europe by Suakim than by the other great outlet, that *via* Berber and Korosko on the Nile.

The desert journey from Korosko to Abou Hamed is a most severe one; the distance is 250 miles of the worst desert imaginable, with nothing for the camels to eat, and only one well the whole way. The heat, too, during the greater part of the year is terrific, and the consequent mortality among the camels that make the transit very great. It is across this desert that the route of the regular slave caravans lies.

Besides the Berber and Korosko route, and that from Berber to Suakim, there is a third road much used by Soudanese travellers. This road follows the banks of the Nile to Wady Halfah; it is chiefly made use of by caravans coming from Darfûr and Kordofan, provinces to the west of the White Nile that produce great quantities of gum. The Nile is struck at a small village called Debbe, about latitude eighteen degrees north, whence goods are conveyed by boats as far as Dongola, where the cataracts render further navigation impossible; and then camels carry them to Wady Halfah at the second cataract. The journey is then resumed in boats to the first cataract, where a railway five miles in length carries the goods below the cataract to other boats waiting for Cairo or Alexandria.

Of course the camel service is the principal as it is the cheapest means of transport in the Soudan. The camel-drivers, who mostly belong to the Hadendowa tribe, live on the mainland. Most of them wear long hair standing up straight on the crown of the head, and of a fine but woolly texture, while that at the back of the head generally reaches to the shoulders, and is sometimes worn in plaits: when properly dressed the whole is covered with fat, and a wooden skewer, by way of comb, stuck into it. There are distinctive ways of dressing the hair in various tribes, but the distinctions are not very wide, and the general mode, and especially the free use of unguents, has already been referred to in a previous page. These Hadendowa Arabs were among the fiercest and

most hardy of the rebel hordes when the insurrection reached the Eastern Soudan.

When the author of *The Wild Tribes of the Soudan* was at Suakim in 1881 he saw huddled together in the courtyard of the "palace" or divan some forty Bedouins from the neighbourhood of Jeddah, mostly men, with a few women and children. They were government prisoners with chains on their legs, and were kept there in almost hopeless captivity. These people were some of a number of Bedouins who had crossed to Suakim for the purpose of settling in the adjoining country as camel-breeders, having obtained permission from the government. Of course they had no sooner occupied the place allotted to them than serious quarrels arose between them and the Arabs of the district, and Colonel Gordon, who was then Governor-general of the Soudan, found it expedient to give them 9000 dollars compensation and send them back to their own country. On Colonel Gordon's retirement it was only to be expected that a number of these people would break their implied agreement and go back again to the neighbourhood of Suakim to recommence camel-breeding—perhaps with the hope that they would again be compensated in case they were interfered with by the local occupants; but they no longer had the just and humane governor to deal with. Ali Reza Pasha was then governor of Suakim and the district, and he took this promising opportunity of putting the screw on to the Bedouins, who, having no more than 2000 dollars to pay, were put in irons and kept prisoners at their own expense, that is to say, no shelter was provided for them, and they had to find their own food or to subsist on the charity of people who saw and pitied their forlorn condition. Many of them died. Some of them, guarded by soldiers, were allowed to live with their diminishing herd of camels, which could only find food a few miles out of Suakim. The wretched Arabs were distressed enough, but it remained for the government agent, Achmed Effendi, to complete what the pasha had seemingly effected. The wretched prisoners had been shorn of their dollars, but there was still a possibility of obtaining more by adroit promises, and the agent gave them to understand that

a present of forty dollars to himself would help them to liberty. How the money was obtained it is difficult to say, but it eventually was forthcoming, and the condition of the prisoners was unaltered, or rather became worse, for they were suffering from disease as well as severe privations, when Ali-ed-Deen Pasha began to govern in place of Ali Reza, and had scarcely been an hour in Suakim before he set them free, at the same time giving permission to any of them who chose to settle in the country on the north of the town.

Having thus briefly glanced at the principal places to which the first operations of the conflict in the Soudan were directed, we may return to the narrative. Some descriptions of the various parts of the country have already occupied our attention in earlier pages, and these with a reference to the maps will enable us to understand the relative positions of the places which were most prominently identified with the series of hostilities which ensued.

It must be remembered that we are now considering the events which took place before British intervention in Egypt—the events following the demonstrations made by the false prophet in August, 1881, and we need only review them rapidly.

The Mudir of Kordofan, who was ordered to arm several companies of regular troops and march with them to the White Nile, to crush the revolt, did nothing. The Mahdi having left his own village and retired to the Tekelé Mountains with hundreds of followers, made his headquarters at Gebel Gedir (north-west of Fadosha), and the mudir, instead of following him, waited at Kawa for a month or so till the Nile had risen, and then returned to Kordofan.

The more active and resolute Mudir of Fashoda, Rashid Bey, a Kurd, however, assembled 400 regular troops, and with these and 1000 Shillúk negroes commanded by their own melik marched to Gebel Gedir to fight the Mahdi on his own authority. He was accompanied by Karl Berghoff, the slave inspector, who was stationed at Fashoda. The want of organization and military knowledge was fatal to this expedition. After fourteen days' march Rashid Bey arrived at Gebel Gedir on the 8th of Decem-

ber, 1881, and attacked the insurgents at once. There was a brief hot battle, in which nearly all the troops as well as the Shillûks were speared by the Baggara. Rashid, Berghoff, the Shillûk melik, and all the officers, were killed, and Remington guns, ammunition, and provisions fell into the hands of the enemy.

The catastrophe itself was less serious than the impression which it caused. After every such victory vast numbers of natives flocked to the standard of the Mahdi, who had, it was believed, proved himself to be invincible. There was a rising in Darfûr which occupied Slatin Bey the governor; and tribes in Sennâr, on the Blue and the White Niles, the Kabobish in the north of Kordofan, and the Bishari at Berber, were all in a ferment, and ready to join in a general rebellion. Raouf Pasha was at his wits' end, but before he had time to make either plans or excuses he was recalled, and Abd-el-Kader was appointed to the uncovetable post of Governor-general of the Soudan, with strict orders that he was to reside in Khartûm. Until he could reach Khartûm he chose as his deputy the Bavarian Giegler Pasha, who had, in fact, been vice-governor since General Gordon's departure, and who, having received a frank report of the state of affairs, began to organize another and stronger expedition.

In April, 1882, therefore, a body of 3000 men was ordered to concentrate operations against the Madhi at Kaka. The irregulars of this force were recruited from the Choterieh and Dongolawies and the warlike Shaiqies, who had remained loyal to the government, their commander was Mahomet Bey Suliman, and the commander of the whole force was our old acquaintance Yussuf Pasha, the Dongolawie slave-dealer, who had been lieutenant to Gessi when he suppressed the rebellion of Zebehr's son and caused the leaders of it to be shot. This army was well provisioned and accoutred. The troops left Kordofan for Gebel Gedir in the middle of March, and Yussuf started up the river with steamers conveying the forces from Khartûm. Over 1000 baggage camels from Kordofan were provided to accompany the force, and Giegler had impressed all his officers with the necessity for caution, for by this time the Mahdi, either from instruction or experience,

had acquired some military knowledge, and his followers, as the Egyptians had found to their cost, were not to be underrated. The more fanatic of them were quite reckless of their lives, and fought with a determined courage and desperate ferocity which few even of the regular troops could withstand, even though their weapons were only swords and spears, for the firearms which they acquired were of little use to them because of the want of ammunition. In fact, the dervishes and fakirs regarded the use of firearms as heretical. Scarcely had Yussuf Pasha left Khartûm, however, than 500 of his Dongolawies deserted to the Mahdi with arms, ammunition, and the wages which, contrary to Egyptian practice, had been paid to them beforehand.

No sooner had these troops concentrated at Kaka, and thus reduced the garrisons in other parts of the country, than Giegler received a despatch from the Mudir of Sennâr that that town was threatened by above 1000 of the Baggara commanded by Sheikh Amr-el-Makashef, a relative of the Mahdi, and brother of Achmed-el-Makashef, one of the false prophet's most influential supporters, who was with him at Gebel Gedir. The news caused a panic at Khartûm, for the spread of the insurrection to the most prosperous district of the Soudan provinces—the place that was the store-house, the granary of Khartûm itself—had not been anticipated. The Mudir of Sennâr, however, thought he was strong enough to drive off the assailants, but he was mistaken. His troops made a sally, but were driven back by the Baggara, who followed them into the town and began to massacre not only the soldiers and the officers, but foreign merchants and natives, and to plunder and destroy the houses. But at the government buildings and the barracks they were brought to a stand, for the troops had occupied the roofs, from which they kept up a heavy fire upon them. The Arabs destroyed the telegraph offices and cut the wire, so that no more messages could be sent to Khartûm except by letter, and the reports were gloomy enough, while there were rumours that the Arabs were approaching Mesalamia.

Giegler Pasha took active measures to raise a force to go to the relief of Sennâr. Six companies of regular troops were sent

from Galabat to Abu Kharaz. In Khartûm a corps of Bashi-Bazouks was formed under the Sanjak Yussuf-el-Melek, and a company of irregulars from Kawa with 270 Shaiqies under Sanjak Salah Aga went direct to Sennâr. On the 15th of April Giegler himself went thither with 200 soldiers of the Khartûm garrison, who were conveyed in two steamers.

But Karkodj, sixty miles above Sennâr, had capitulated, and the inhabitants were allowed to leave only on payment of heavy fines to the Mahdi, who, wherever he went, had the sharpest possible eyes for finding where the money was kept. Many of the Greek and Jewish merchants disguised themselves as dervishes in order to avoid being killed by the savage fanatics, and walked through the town in procession, crying "La Illah illa Allah, wa Mohamed Achmed Mahdi Allah"—There is no God but God alone, and Mohamed Achmed is his Mahdi. The whole country of Kordofan was in terror and disorder. Robbers infested the roads, the telegraph line between Khartûm and El Obeid was broken; the wire to Fodjah being destroyed no messages could pass thence to Darfûr, and by that time (June, 1882) all intercourse with Darfûr had ceased, the post having several times been robbed before that date. In Obeid the panic was so prolonged that no business was done, the houses were barricaded, and the shops were closed.

A village, a little distance north of Abu Kharaz, was occupied by the chief who had threatened Mesalamia, a shereef named Mohammed Taha, who declared that he was the vizier of the Mahdi, who had presented him with a sword as a token of authority. When Giegler arrived at this village, which was near the river, he sent to the shereef to appear before him and answer for his rebellion. But the answer was, "If the pasha is a Christian he is an unbeliever, and therefore an enemy; if he is a Turk he is a heretic, and certainly an enemy." The soldiers who had been sent with the messenger were killed. Giegler then sent the Sanjak Yussuf with a hundred soldiers and fifty Shaiqies to bring the shereef by force to the steamers, but they were attacked with such ferocity that the square in which they had formed was broken, the soldiers were slain in a desperate hand-to-hand fight, in which

the women and girls of the village were said to have joined, biting and tearing like panthers, and Yussuf Aga was stoned to death. Giegler was obliged to go on to Abu Kharaz to wait for the troops expected there, but it was necessary that the shereef should be vanquished before Sennâr could be relieved. Again an attack was made upon the village, but his followers once more defeated several hundred of the mounted Shaiqies and killed their officers. The result of defeats like these was that the irregular troops began to fancy that the Mahdi was invincible, as he pretended to be, and they became demoralized and threw down their arms, while numbers of the Arabs went over to the enemy. The arrival of the regulars from Galabat under the command of the Mudir of Sennâr considerably strengthened Giegler's position, but, according to an account afterwards published, the Shukuri prince, Sheikh Auad-el-Kerim, with 2500 warriors of his tribe, arrived upon the scene, and offered his aid with many expressions of loyalty. He, his six sons, and the chiefs of his tribe wore some such armour as that discovered by Colonel Gordon—coats of mail, armlets, greaves, and steel helmets, and were all mounted on thorough-bred horses, the fleet and enduring steeds of the Arabian desert. They presented a spectacle which might have reminded one of an illustration to Sir Walter Scott's *Talisman*, especially when the prince approached and kissed the pasha, assuring him of their loyalty. The prince and Giegler Pasha were not strangers, for the former had received some benefits from the vice-governor, and had been treated with great consideration at the time that Gordon held the governorship.

At sunrise the next day the whole of the forces were drawn up, and the white-haired prince and the pasha addressed the men. The Shukuries were ready enough for fighting; the Shaiqies for revenge and plunder. The village of the shereef, who claimed to be the Mahdi's vizier, lay not far from a wood which separated it from the river, on the opposite bank of which was a seriba occupied by Sanjak Osman Aga with the recruits from the neighbourhood of Mesalamia for the purpose of watching the adjacent ford of the river. The regulars from Galabat took up a

position before the village with their front to the river, and behind them came Auad-el-Kerim with his Saracenic cavalry and his Shukuri, who stimulated the courage of the Egyptians by threatening them that if they turned their backs to the foe they would be speared.

The shereef presently appeared advancing towards the assailants on horseback amidst a vast crowd, consisting of hundreds of dervishes, whose screams, howls, prayers, and frantic gestures were doubtless intended to strike terror into the Egyptians; but the soldiers fired and a ring of dead fell around the shereef. Three times the bullets flew, and each time the gaps made in the ring where the corpses lay piled on each other, were filled by the dervishes, while the shereef remained untouched in the centre of the ring. This was too much for the Egyptians, who cried, "He has a bullet charm—none can kill him!" and would have turned and fled but for the Shukuri spears behind them. As the fanatic fury of the shereef's followers increased, the crowd surrounding him grew greater. Old and young, men, women, and children, pressing forward were shot down till he was surrounded by a wall of dead. He turned his horse to endeavour to get free from the bodies of the slain, and it stumbled and was falling, causing him to stoop forward, when a bullet entered the top of his head. A dreadful panic ensued, and well it might, for the fierce Shaiqies, wild for slaughter and vengeance, rushed upon the wretched fugitives and the carnage soon became horrible. Even those who sought refuge in the tomb of a saint were shot down through the doors and small windows; the straw huts, where the dead and wounded lay together, were fired, and those who fled to the river were shot down by Osman Aga's men. Giegler did all he could to prevent the slaying of women and children, but the fierce tribesmen were beyond control, and he could only contrive to save the wife and son of the shereef by himself conveying them to the steamer. The body of the shereef, the Mahdi's "vizier," was brought to the pasha on a camel, a company of mailed horsemen curvetting and galloping round it uttering wild cries and excited to a kind of frenzy. The head, already half severed from the body, was taken

through the villages of the Blue Nile and set up in the market-place at Khartûm.

Giegler Pasha then went on with a portion of his force to relieve Sennâr, but Salah Aga had already done that work. The governor, the officials, and merchants, with their wives and families, were in the buildings of the mudirich and in the barracks, from the roof of which the soldiers by continued firing were keeping the rebels from approaching near enough to enter. For a week they continued in this state of siege, and the news that Sennâr was taken had brought several thousands more of the rebels, who encamped in or around the town where the fakirs and dervishes were using every means to stimulate the fanatics to fury. Salah Aga with his small body of Shaiqies arrived quietly before the town, and the Arabs, who could not tell what had brought him there, as they supposed that the telegraph was destroyed, sent to ask him whether he was on their side. He contrived to deceive them as to his intentions, while he marched his men in close file straight through the crowds till he was close to the river bank, and being thus protected from attack in the rear gave a rapid order to his followers to form in square, and instantly opening the ammunition boxes, shouted to them to fire. The rebels were confounded, but they did not retreat. For several hours they endeavoured to break and destroy the square, but the fire of the Shaiqies was close and deadly and their assailants were mown down by hundreds; at last, when the devoted band were beginning to fear the failure of their ammunition, the Arabs fled and Sennâr was saved, to the great rejoicing of the beleaguered people, who welcomed Salah Aga with effusive gratitude, crowding round him to kiss his garments and shout his praises. Shortly afterwards the Shukuris and the troops from Galabat combined to drive the rebels out of the province of Sennâr, and this was effected after a victory over Achmed-el-Makashef, who had held the village of Teko with about 10,000 Arabs; but there were still unquiet elements in the province.

It was early in May, 1882, that Abd-el-Kader, the new governor-general, arrived in Khartûm. The country was in a state of revolution, and news of sudden attacks on various villages were

constantly arriving. Amr-el-Makashef, who had recovered from his wounds, had just been sent by the Mahdi to join his brother Achmed-el-Makashef, who was collecting the scattered rebels in the south of Sennâr, but on his way he was attacked and killed by Salah Aga, his followers retreating across the White Nile; they afterwards received such reinforcements as to become formidable, but the death of their leader was a gain to the government as he had had great influence over the Baggara.

There is no need to enter into descriptions of the succeeding skirmishes and battles which occupied the constant activity of the governor-general, who met with varying success or defeat. It began to be more and more obvious that the cause of the Mahdi was strengthened by every victory that he obtained, and when he was defeated he contrived to explain it by pretending that he had misinterpreted the divine directions. He was an adept at lying proclamations, and he and his emissaries managed to send false intelligence even to Khartûm for the purpose of misleading the government. The rebellion was constantly being extended by resentment against official tyranny, the mode of collecting taxes, and the brutality of the Bashi-Bazouks, while wild fanaticism and tribe hatreds were added to hatred of the government to increase the hordes, who swarmed hither and thither and held the country in constant alarm and almost hopeless disorder, their numbers enabling them to attack, harass, and overcome small bodies of troops moving from place to place and to fill up the wells between the different stations.

Near the end of May Yussuf Pasha, governor of Fashoda, was placed in command of a great disorganized force of several thousand men and swarms of camp-followers, and was ordered to march against the Mahdi, who was in the mountains at Gedir; but the rains had set in and the march was slow, so that it was only on the 7th of June that the army came front to front with the rebels in a densely wooded part of the country, where they commenced to make a stockade or seriba, but the Arabs came down upon them, and though they formed into a hollow square, the fierce rush of the rebels sufficed to break through, and the whole force

was destroyed: a disaster the news of which was received with consternation at Khartûm, and gave an immense impetus to the insurrection.

The Mahdi now declared that he intended to take possession of Kordofan, and sent a portion of his army to the White Nile to the ford of Abu Zeir, to threaten Sennâr.

At this time the massacre and riots in Alexandria had but just taken place, and therefore the whole country, both Egypt and the Soudan, was in a state of revolt, but at the end of the month attacks on Om Shamga in Darfûr, and on Bara, by the rebels, were repulsed with heavy loss, though another defeat had been inflicted on 1000 Egyptians near Shakka.

Several minor engagements on the lines of communication between Kordofan and Duaim resulted in the success of the Mahdi, who, at the beginning of August, was with the bulk of his forces at Gebel Gedir, while a second army was wasting Kordofan, and a third stretched along the White Nile from Duaim to Geziret Abba on the north-west, and from Kaka to Marabieh on the east bank. On the 19th of August the rebels were again defeated at Bara and the garrison at El Obeid had been revictualled, and on the 23d an attack made on Duaim was so completely repulsed that 4500 of the insurgents were killed, while Makashef, who was advancing on Khartûm with the first army sent by the Mahdi, was also defeated with heavy loss.

The Mahdi now took the field in person, and advanced on El Obeid, where he arrived with about 60,000 men—for thousands of Baggara, Hassanis, and other tribes of Kordofan had joined him on the way—and at daybreak he commenced to storm the well-fortified town, where 6000 men were concentrated, and the walls of which were defended by twelve cannons. The attack was so violent that in spite of the continuous fire of the besieged, and the enormous losses of the rebels, the latter almost succeeded in taking the town on the first day; they pressed forward in hand-to-hand fight with the receding soldiers. At the critical moment, however, Iskender Bey, the commander of the town, ordered grape-shot to be fired into the fighting crowd, which, unfortunately, resulted in

the death of 300 soldiers, but Obeid was saved. On two following days, the 11th and 14th September, it was again stormed by the Mahdi, but in vain; he lost 15,000 men, the remainder were demoralized, and many who had joined him in the preceding days forsook him.

But his persuasions and the pretended confession that he had misread the prophetic message and should have waited a short time before attacking, enabled him to reassure his credulous followers, while others who had committed themselves to his cause were not unwilling to keep the flame of insurrection burning, as any restoration of the power of the government would, they knew, be accompanied by strong and regular measures against the slave-hunters.

On the 24th of September, twelve days after the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, a relief column sent from Duaim under Ali Bey Satfi was directed on Bara, but was defeated in a second engagement with the enemy, and lost 1130 men, the survivors making good their retreat to Bara.

On the 9th and 10th of October, after some skirmishes in which the Egyptian troops were defeated, the rebels attacked Bara with great determination, but were again driven off with considerable loss. It appeared that the Mahdi could do nothing against regularly fortified places, so he blockaded both Bara and El Obeid. Nothing of importance took place in November except the defeat of a sheikh who led an expedition against Duaim and was taken prisoner and hanged at Khartûm; but early in the month the fortification of Khartûm had commenced.

At the end of the year El Obeid had a garrison of 3000 men and Bara 2000, and both were reported to be well provisioned. Troops of Arabi's regiments were being sent for service in the Soudan, but fresh disturbances were taking place in Sennâr, Mesalamia, and Qetena. About the middle of December, Lieutenant-colonel Stewart arrived in Khartûm to report on the condition of the Soudan to the English government through our officials at Cairo. He remained at Khartûm till the early part of March, 1883, when he left for Massowa. By that time, however, the

aspect of affairs had somewhat changed, and though an English officer was in command at Khartûm, they had not changed for the better as regarded the ultimate condition of the country and the suppression of the rebellion.

On the 17th of January Obeid, which had again been hemmed in by the Madhi, was obliged by famine to surrender. It is said that dogs, donkeys, and everything that could be consumed had been eaten, the price of the last fowl was 500 dollars, and a bushel of corn cost 100 dollars; the soldiers had even eaten their leathern straps and belts; the scurvy had broken out, and at last their commander, Iskender Bey, surrendered, and with his followers joined the ranks of the false prophet, and afterwards became one of his most active supporters—even sending a letter in conjunction with another skeikh to the people of Khartûm, where the gunboats kept the insurgents at a distance, inciting them for politic and religious reasons to join the rebellion.

At the beginning of 1883 Abd-el-Kader went himself to the province of Sennâr with a force of about 2400 regulars, 600 Bashi-Bazouks, and some irregular cavalry, commanded by the sons of the prince of the Shukuri—those warriors, as well as other native contingents, having been granted remission of taxes and certain rewards for their services. On the 24th of February they came upon about 10,000 or 12,000 rebels near Dai, under the command of the Mekshefeh, who had written to Abd-el-Kader entreating him to join the forces of the Mahdi if he valued his life and his happiness thereafter. After a severe engagement, in which about 2000 of the rebels with several of their leaders were killed, this force was completely dispersed, many being cut down in attempting to ford the river. So close was the fighting that Abd-el-Kader had his watch-chain broken by a bullet. This for a time quieted the district; but Kordofan was under the power of the Mahdi, and in the spring great efforts were made for retaking it, and considerable bodies of troops were sent from Lower Egypt to Khartûm for the purpose of effectually suppressing the rebellion. No movement could be attempted until after the close of the wet season in September, and as it was desirable to test the quality and disposition

of the new Egyptian force, many of whom had been Arabi's soldiers, a camp was formed at Um-Durman, a place on the west side of the Nile opposite Khartûm.

The Egyptian government had determined to place the new forces under the command of an English officer, and the khedive decided to intrust it to General Hicks (Pasha). Before this officer had arrived at Khartûm, however, Abd-el-Kader, who was apparently doing his best, was recalled by an order from the Egyptian government brought to him by Hassein Pasha, who succeeded him in the command of the Sennâr army, while Allah-ed-din Pasha, the Mohofa of Massowa, was to be installed, and on the 26th of March *was* installed as governor-general in Khartûm.

Colonel William Hicks, who entered the Bombay army in 1849, had served in Bengal in 1857-59, and as staff-officer in the Punjab movable column he was in the Rohilcund campaign with Major-general Penny, and was in the principal actions; afterwards he had served in the campaign for the subjugation of Oude, and again with Lord Clyde's force, and played a distinguished part in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. He had served as brigade major, 2d brigade, 1st division, during the Abyssinian campaign in 1867-68, and was present at the capture of Magdala. Honourable mention in despatches and medals marked his career. Colonel Hicks obtained his lieutenancy in November 1856, became captain in December 1861, major in August 1868, lieutenant-colonel in December 1875, and honorary colonel in July 1880. He was appointed to the Reserve in October 1880, and went to Egypt in 1882, where he became chief of the staff of the Egyptian commander. The khedive conferred on him the rank of pasha, and afterwards made him commander-in-chief of the army of the Soudan; but the British government was careful to inform both him, their officials at Cairo, and the Egyptian government that they held themselves irresponsible for the appointment, and neither recommended it nor objected to it. They repeated that they desired to refrain from any participation in the measures which the Egyptian government might take in the Soudan. There can be no doubt, however, that Hicks Pasha was an officer



HICKS PASHA.

(MAJOR GENERAL HICKS.)

COMMANDER OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1882.

of experience, courage, and undoubted ability, a man of firmness, and even, when occasion required it, of severity, and accustomed to deal with Orientals. The one great drawback was that he was not well acquainted with the nature of the country in which he had to control operations, and from all that can be inferred he had some of the usual difficulties in dealing with Egyptian officials, who were ready to differ from him or to place obstacles in his way, and yet would themselves take no decided action and would accept no responsibility.

On the 7th of February, 1883, General Hicks Pasha and his staff of officers left Cairo for Suakim. Those officers were: Colonel Farquhar, chief of the staff, and previously captain in the Grenadier Guards; Lieutenant-colonel the Hon. John Colborne, formerly of the 60th King's Royal Rifles, and with the 77th Regiment in the Crimea, for which he received the medal with clasp, and the Turkish medal; Lieutenant-colonel Henry Watts Russell Coetlogon, late major of the 70th Foot; Major Martin, previously captain of Baker's Horse in South Africa, and now to command the cavalry; Major Warner, Captain Massey, Captain W. Page Phillips, Surgeon-major Rosenberg, and Mr. Edwin Baldwin Evans, intelligence department, who had acted as interpreter during the state trials in Cairo, and was to fulfil a similar office in the present expedition. Mr. Evans had served with the Indian contingent, and was at Tel-el-Kebir. During a long residence in the Hedjaz he had acquired a thorough knowledge of Arabic, and he had the additional qualification of being a cheerful, indefatigable campaigner, and an excellent comrade. The commissions were, of course, from the Egyptian government, these officers, as well as General Hicks, having entered the service of the khedive. Captain Forrestier Walker, who had been lieutenant of the Buff or East Kent Regiment, was in command of the artillery, and he remained behind to follow with the guns.

The general and his officers started in a hurry, and not without some apprehensions on the part of their friends, the general leaving his wife, two daughters, and a son at Cairo; but he and his staff were all officers who had seen hard service,

and knew what toil and danger meant; and though the expedition which they had undertaken was arduous and full of peril, they were not a gloomy party as they went on by rail to Suez, and thence by steamer to Suakim, whence having sent on their company of Bashi-Bazouks, they started on the camel route through the desert to Berber with a caravan of 145 camels, each officer having his "hygeen" to ride and two baggage camels, while the rest of the animals were laden with stores and water.

After twelve miles' march across a very gently rising plain strewn with huge black boulders, they reached Bir Handuk, their first halting-place, where the wells are situated at the foot of a low rocky spur jutting out from the main range of mountains which bounds the horizon. The next day they ascended the mountain route amidst the fragrance of camphor, mint, and thyme from the plants that grow there, and crossed the Wady Otan amidst an amphitheatre of rugged mountains, the ground thickly strewn with black hornblende rocks. After leaving this they ascended more rapidly, and entered a narrow valley or defile, into which debouched numerous ravines, the dry beds of torrents bearing witness to the violence and volume of the periodical floods on these mountains, which extend nearly 200 miles into the interior, and rise at the highest point to 6000 feet; their vegetation on the seaward side of the watershed, where alone plants grow amidst the glowing waste of bleak stone, being weird, uncouth euphorbiæ, dragon-trees, and the caraib with jagged prickly branches. Among the scrub at the water stations game was met with, turkey-bustards, sand-grouse, pigeons, and gazelles; but eagles, vultures, and kites were predominant, for the carcasses of the dead camels which perish on the route supply them, and the jackals and hyenas, with food. The detachment of troops that followed with Captain Walker and the Nordenfeldts had a kid carried off at the second water station out of Suakim, probably by a leopard. Leaving the mountains, the expedition crossed the great arid plains of sand and stone, where in the long intervals between the wells not a living thing was to be seen. Silence and oppressive desolation reigned supreme, and every step

westward seemed to be towards a desert still more forbidding. After crossing the second pass, no herbage of any kind was to be found. There was nothing but bare grim rocks, without even a tuft of moss or lichen;—greenstone, serpentine, and vast masses of porphyry, but with none of the glowing colour visible, as the surface is as black as ink.

Leaving Sinkat on the left, and little thinking of the events that were soon to be enacted there, they crossed the Wady Otan and encamped at the wells of Djibisil; another stopping place being Oched, a small oasis between the Wady Otan and Haratree; the latter place, which they reached on the fourth day, is approached through a labyrinth of ravines. It is the highest point between Suakim and Berber, and there are two wells there, El Bir Tamai and El Bir Tuahwah. The road from this point to Ariab is nothing but a mountain pass, alternating with basin-like valleys surrounded by bold jagged mountains, split with deep gorges and ravines and full of dark shadows. The camels toiled through a succession of basins and along stony paths. From clefts and crannies tufts of dried desert herbage seemed to struggle for life, and the thorny mimosa, through which the camels strove to drag their riders, held out its barbs to tear clothes and skin. Rocks of all shapes and sizes seemed to start out in the hot glaring atmosphere—like fortresses or giant idols, or huddled together in conical shapes appeared in the distant vapour like villages. From Haratree across a hollow plain or basin of alternate herbage and stone towards the well Salaluat, where they halted, the travellers proceeded above twenty miles to Bir Hayaba, where the next water is to be obtained (the first in the Wady Kokreb), at a group of three wells: Bir Hayaba; Bir el Matre, about six furlongs ahead; and Bir Abd-el-Hab, a mile and a half farther still. The first two, like many so-called wells in the Soudan, are mere holes in the sand, from which the water is scooped out as it is wanted, or rather in much less quantity than is wanted: but Bir-el-Hab is a real well, revetted with stone, and having a good supply of water. Thence across Wady Kokreb, two miles to Wady Yumga, and the third mountain range is reached. On the south is Rowel, a much-

frequented oasis, but this they did not visit, but pushed on to Ariab, the line of demarcation between the territory of the Hadendowa and the Bishareen Arabs. Ariab is the prettiest oasis between Suakim and Berber, with two deep wells sunk in the solid rock, and giving a good supply of water, and luxuriant acacia-trees giving shelter from the sun. The party had descended more than a thousand feet since leaving Wady Haratree, and the most serious part of their journey was before them, as they were seven days from Suakim. It was two days' march to O'Bak, seventy miles off, where a limited supply of brackish water is taken from small shafts sunk in the sand. Thence to Bir Mohabé is a two days' journey across another waterless track. After leaving Ariab they rested by day and marched by night in the grand silent impressive solitude of the desert, beneath the starlight of the southern sky. At O'Bak commences a plain of shifting sand which for about six miles is blown up into dunes of a hundred feet high, and mostly looking like a long line of intrenchments, over and amidst which they had to pass, seeing the waterless and treeless plain beyond—where the mirage mocks the traveller with enchanting scenery. Twenty-four miles beyond this region of quicksand they encamped in a gloomy waterless waste full of black boulders, that looked as though they were the débris of some vast volcanic conflagration. They passed a huge solitary block of granite called "Eremit," and further on saw Aboo Odfa, the rock shaped like an obelisk, its base worn with wind-driven sand till it more resembled a rotten pear. The road across the boulder-strewn plain consisted of tracks running side by side. The pack-camels were again sent on as before, with the 300 Bashi-Bazouks whom they had overtaken at Ariab, and 100 Egyptians were retained as an escort. Twenty-five miles off lay Bir Mohabé, the last halting-place before Berber, which with the broad waters of the Nile was but seven miles' ride, so that they abandoned their camels and mounted their horses with deep sighs of relief that this part of the journey was accomplished.¹

There is no need to describe the journey to Khartûm. Hicks.

¹ Col. the Hon. J. Colborne, *With Hicks Pasha in the Soudan*.

Pasha and his officers began at once to drill the troops there, and especially in ball practice and the manner of firing. In three weeks Captain Forrestier Walker arrived with the Nordenfeldts and the men who had been left with him at Cairo to be drilled into handling them. They had failed to learn their lesson, however, and Captain Walker, who knew no Arabic, found it difficult to drill them, but General Hicks kept him at it for three days without intermission. He was soon afterwards invalided from sunstroke and was obliged to leave for England, but he returned to the Soudan at a later date, and was killed while gallantly fighting his guns at El-Teb.

The troops at Khartûm were of various races, and the Bashi-Bazouks, who accompanied the expedition from Cairo, were probably the most gorgeously attired, the most arrogant, and, except the Egyptian levies, the least courageous. White turbans, embroidered Albanian or Roumelian jackets, Anatolian rainbow-hued scarfs, belts of stamped leather full of cartridges, silver-mounted pistols, and conspicuous knives, silk caftans, richly embroidered gaiters worn above sandals, distinguished the sort of gentlemen who fought under the green standard, and with the motley crowd already at Khartûm they made a bright and picturesque variety; but these Bashi-Bazouks were such thieves and lawless ruffians and braggarts that they were soon marched over to the other bank of the Nile, and encamped there. The mailed warriors, relics of the Saracens, were then at Khartûm, and were afterwards mounted and engaged in the first battle which Hicks fought at Marabia. One of these, Sheikh Mohammed Sebekh, of a loyal tribe of Baggara, resembled an ancient crusader, was over six feet high, rode seventeen stone, and wore a hauberk of mail fastened round the body by the baltan, a two-handed double-edged sword hanging between the leg and the saddle. His horse's head was encased in steel, and its body covered with a quilt. He said the armour had been in his family three hundred and ten years.

Intelligence which reached General Hicks of the movements of the enemy determined him to attack them before the rainy season set in, and on the 31st of March Lieutenant-colonel Colborne,

Major Martin, and Captain Massey had orders to take 180 Egyptian troops in a steamer to Kawa, 150 miles up the White Nile, towing a flat boat with the horses on board. A merkeb or large open 25-ton boat with a latteen-sail carried Egyptian officers, and eight others were crammed with troops for the same destination.

The vanguard of Hicks' Sennâr army arrived at the place, which was the last point held by Egyptian troops on that side the Bahr Gazelle, and between it and them both banks of the Nile were in the hands of the fierce fanatic Baggara. Major Martin was taken ill, and was sent back. General Hicks took up the rest of the troops on the 6th of April. News had arrived from Duaim that 20,000 rebels had assembled there from Darfûr and Sennâr, and that the enemy had a battery of artillery and rifles.

The Egyptian army, leaving 1000 men to garrison a fort left at Kawa though the village was in ruins, marched under the command of Suleiman Pasha to attack the enemy, and on the 23d another force with four Nordenfeldt guns and accompanied by three staff officers advanced; the whole expedition was under Hicks' command, but he went on by river to secure the ford between Kordofan and Sennâr, and to land and intrench himself some miles above it. He took with him 200 Bashi-Bazouks and two guns. On the 25th he rejoined the camp, which had reached about eighteen miles south of the fort at Kawa, on hearing that the rebels were approaching. The enemy appeared more than once afterwards, but it was not till the 29th that they suddenly approached in full force, thousands of their spearmen emerging from a wood. The forces of General Hicks had formed a vast square, and at once opened a tremendous fusillade; but the chiefs of the Arabs led their men on regardless of the withering volleys. They sought to penetrate the square, but the guns added to the firing of the rifles prevented them from approaching, and with the fall of their chiefs the advancing hordes gave way and retreated. About 500 were killed, including their commander and several leaders, and large numbers were wounded. It was hoped that this victory would tend to a general pacification of the country; but no more could be

done except to clear the country of skirmishers till the later months of the year, and therefore Hicks Pasha continued his exertions to complete a force for the reconquest of Kordofan. By the end of August he had collected an army of 7000 infantry, 120 cuirassiers, 300 Bashi-Bazouk cavalry, and about 30 guns, rockets, and howitzers. He then prepared for an expedition in force, and though he was evidently harassed by having to apply to Cairo for the pay of his soldiers, which was much overdue, and by other circumstances, he determined to commence the campaign. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne had left for Cairo invalided by sunstroke, but other officers remained, and the work went on, but with great difficulty so far as obtaining proper equipments and the proper accessories for conveying a large force for a long distance in a desert country was concerned. The task of collecting provisions and the necessary number of camels seemed to be insuperable, but the personal exertions of Allah-ed-Deen, the governor-general, helped to overcome them, and after some delay because of the endeavour to secure the co-operation of Adam, the so-called King of Takale, a district south-east of El Obeid, who would only promise aid if the expedition passed his way, but agreed not to let the Mahdi go through his territory, the force of about 10,000 men, 500 horses, and 5500 camels was ready to start on the 9th of September. First went two Habirs on camels followed by the armour-clad cavalry, then the general staff, preceding one battalion, and behind them the artillery, flanked by eight battalions of infantry on each side, and followed by another battalion of infantry and one of cavalry. Then came the great body of transport camels and the Bashi-Bazouks, and a body of irregular cavalry brought up the rear. In this order they left the camp, and it was expected that they would be joined by about 1000 men at Duaim.

There are three routes to Obeid: the ordinary caravan route to Bara, one passing to the north of a village on the left of the White Nile opposite to Khartûm, and the southern route along the river to Duaim and then through the desert. The latter was the way chosen, and the commander took a route as near to the western side of the White branch of that river as the inundations would

allow. The spirits of the men were pronounced excellent, and their officers expressed themselves highly satisfied with their *morale*. No one doubted the result of the expedition, or that the days of the Mahdi's power were already numbered.

On the 20th of September the force reached Duaim, 110 miles south of Khartûm, and situated on the west bank of the Nile. The march had been hindered by the flooded state of the country, but the men had done their ten miles a day under an unusually fierce tropical sun. El Obeid is distant from Duaim by the direct way less than 150 miles, but other considerations led to the selection of a southern route, which increased the distance to fully 240 miles, involving at the same rate of progress a march of more than three weeks.

It was a tremendous undertaking, and that it should have been attempted was afterwards accounted for by the supposition that orders from the Egyptian government may have precipitated it. At all events there was much to contend with, and Hicks Pasha had constant hindrances and annoyances to bear. In July he had tendered his resignation, but had been induced to remain by the promise that Suleiman Pasha, the sub-commander, should be removed from office.

Whether the long route to Kordofan was taken because assistance was expected from the tribes under the so-called King Adam cannot be decided.

Major Evans, who was on the staff of Hicks Pasha, writing to a friend from Zerezza, twenty-seven miles from Duaim, on the 30th of September, said: "We left Khartûm on Sept. 9, proceeding along the west bank of the White Nile, and with the exception of four days' rest at Duaim, have been marching ever since. The heat is terrible. About thirty men have died of exhaustion, and camels are falling down by the score. Yesterday we were twelve hours in the saddle, and for sixteen days we have averaged eight hours daily. We have halted at this wretched village of twenty huts to give rest to the men and animals. The water is horrible. The enemy is reported to be in great force thirty miles from this, so we will meet in four days. The road behind us is closed, and

after this note nothing can be sent to Khartûm till we crush the principal rebel."

Major Baron Von Seckendorf, formerly of the German army, who for two years had been in the Egyptian service, and a relation of Count Von Seckendorf, master of the household to the crown finances, writing from the camp of Duaim on the 25th, said: "Thank goodness, on Sept. 9 we at last started from Khartûm, and after a twelve days' march arrived yesterday at Duaim, a fortified place on the Nile, which will form the basis of our operations in Kordofan. Our march hither has given us a foretaste of what we have to expect, although, as we have still plenty of water, our experience was but on a small scale. I can, at any rate, assure you that it is not a pleasure-trip we have before us. The false prophet will give us plenty to do. He disposes of 15,000 serviceable breech-loading rifles and fourteen guns. He further holds two well-fortified towns—Bara and Obeid. The latter is the chief city of Kordofan. Above all, the fellow has a numerous and well-mounted cavalry, and each of his followers is rendered a hero by fanaticism, a thing that cannot be said of our own troops. I have seen the Egyptians in three different battles. If you want to find a hero amongst them you will have to look a long time. There is a terrible scarcity of water, all the wells on the road having been destroyed; while on leaving here we no longer follow the Nile, and there is no other river. We cannot take water with us for more than twenty-four hours. That is already a large quantity, as we are 11,000 men and 6000 camels, besides horses, mules, &c. Our march to Duaim was a most trying one. Every day, from half-past five in the morning till twelve or one o'clock, we were on the move. It was pleasant till nine o'clock, and bearable till ten; but after that the heat was overpowering. Our road lay through the desert, where there is nothing to be seen but thorn-bushes and sand. One day only we crossed an oasis, with green trees and grass. It was a beautiful bit of landscape, with clusters of small mountains. You cannot think how refreshing this was, not only to the eye, but to the whole system. You may believe me when I tell you I shall be glad to have done with this kind of life."

Poor fellow—he was soon to have done with it for ever. The whole force disappeared in that devouring desert, and perished by treachery at the hands of the savage foe. Of all that band of English officers who had accompanied Hicks to Khartûm there remained only Lieutenant-colonel Colborne and Major Martin, who had both been invalided, and Lieutenant-colonel Coetlogon (Pasha), who had been left in command at Khartûm.

At the last halting-place whence a message could be sent, what seemed to be a fatal decision was come to by the advice of the governor-general. Hicks in that last despatch wrote on October 3rd:—

“On leaving Duaim, on the White Nile, to march by the Khor-el-Nil to Melbeis and Obeid, I decided that my line of communications should be secured by posts of 200 men each, left in strongly fortified positions at the following places:—Shat, 16 miles distant; Zeraiga, 16 miles distant; Sarakhna, 32 miles distant; Naurabi, 16 miles distant; Agaila, 24 miles distant; Johan, 32 miles distant; Abli, 28 miles distant; Beliab, 22 miles distant; Um Sheikh, 12 miles distant; Rahad, 14 miles distant; Khashil (? Kasghul), 14 miles distant; Melbeis, 25 miles distant. At all these places I was informed water would be found. Large quantities of biscuits were to arrive at Duaim, and as we were unable to leave a single camel at the base, 1000 were ordered to be purchased and forwarded to Duaim. His excellency Ali-ed-Din Pasha had already at Khartûm 300, and gave orders for the remaining 700 to be purchased and forwarded to Duaim without delay. The biscuits would then, with ammunition and other stores, be pushed on to the front from post to post.


Depôts would be formed at each post, and in case of a reverse a line of retreat secured, the troops falling back upon these depôts, where we should be certain of finding supplies of food, ammunition, and water.

We marched to Shat, and formed the first post and depôt there; but before reaching Zeraiga I was informed by the Governor-general of the Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duaim, that the soldiers left at the



HICKS PASHA AND HIS ARMY ON THE MARCH AGAINST THE MAHDI

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posts would not guard the convoys; in fact, that they would be afraid to do so; that to ensure supplies being forwarded an army would be required with each convoy. The Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we have passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to forward the supplies; that it would be dangerous; and I would find that they would not run the risk.

The governor-general requested me to abandon the idea of having this line of posts; to give up my line of communications and line of retreat, and to advance with the army *en l'air* with fifty days' supply of food only, the Arabs closing in on our rear.

I am naturally very averse to this; but if, as his excellency assures me, it is a fact that the posts will not be supplied from the base at Duaim, and supplies will not be forwarded through them, I should, in garrisoning these posts, be only weakening my fighting force without gaining any advantage. I have therefore called a council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinion."

The majority of the council decided against the commander-in-chief. The posts were abandoned, and with the enemy left to close round them in the rear, the army marched into the desert after leaving the Nile, the whole force forming a square, with the baggage, horses, camels, and mules in the centre. It was impossible to carry a large supply of water, the wells were far apart, and would probably be filled or dug up, and not more than ten miles a day could be accomplished. Thus the army went out of sight and hearing, and though terrible rumours, and later something which looked like trustworthy evidence of a terrible disaster reached Cairo from Khartûm and other places, it was hoped that the worst accounts were exaggerated. Still the news that the whole force had been misled by a pretended guide into a defile where it had been totally annihilated by the Mahdi's savage followers, gained ground.

In the autumn of 1883 the Arabs on the Red Sea coast, in

the vicinity of Suakim, assumed a threatening aspect, and in August they broke into rebellion, and cut off communication between Suakim and the interior. There can be no doubt that at this time, or soon afterwards, the desperate position of the force of Hicks Pasha was known among the coast tribes, although no rumours of it had reached Cairo by the valley of the Nile. The greater portion of the tribes of the sea-coast, from the Abyssinian frontier to Suakim, declared for the Mahdi, and the Egyptian garrisons in Sinkat, a level sandy valley, five miles by three in extent, and 2500 feet above the sea-level, and of Tokar, some twelve miles from the coast, were, like the rest of the Egyptian garrisons of the Soudan, virtually besieged and surrounded by the rebels under Osman Digma, a principal lieutenant of the Mahdi, and a great slave-owner.

The Egyptian officer commanding the garrison at Suakim, Mahmoud Pasha, determined to effect the relief of Tokar. Placing 500 men on board a ship, he went down to Trinkatat, forty-five miles south of Suakim, the anchorage for Tokar, and landed there. He was accompanied by Captain Moncrieff, the English consul at Suakim. The force had marched but a few miles when the Arabs were seen in great force. The Egyptian troops were formed in a square; but the Arabs rushed straight down upon them, and at once burst through their ranks. A wild panic seized them, and throwing away their arms they fled at once. Eleven officers and 142 men were killed in the rout, and Captain Moncrieff, being surrounded by the Arabs, fell fighting to the last. The field-gun which accompanied them was taken, and 300 muskets fell into the hands of the Arabs. Mahmoud Pasha returned with the remnants of his force to Suakim, and despatched an urgent request for reinforcements, saying that it was necessary that black troops should be sent, as the event of the fight showed that Egyptian troops would not face the Arabs, even when, as in this case, the assailants were greatly inferior in numbers.

The news did not reach Cairo until ten days after the engagement, which took place on the 6th of November; but as soon

as it was known the urgency of the position was recognized. A council of the ministers assembled at the Ismailia Palace. It was determined to send down 150 Bashi-Bazouk troops to Suakim, and to order up six companies of black troops from Massowa. Immediately after the defeat of the Egyptian force the Arabs assumed a very threatening attitude around Suakim, and so great was the alarm that most of the European traders there left at once. The panic was, however, stayed by the arrival in the port of the British gun-boat *Ranger*, Rear-admiral Sir William Hewett having been ordered to take a small naval force for the protection of Suakim.

On the very day after the sitting of the council, confirmation was received of the annihilation of the army of Hicks Pasha. Native rumours of the event had for some days been in circulation, but no credence was attached to them; but on the 21st a Copt, disguised as a dervish, brought the news into Khartûm, whence it was at once telegraphed to Cairo.

Perhaps the most detailed narrative, professing to give an account of the event, was procured by Lieutenant-colonel Colborne, from a slave boy who was in the service of Sir Redvers Buller, and gave some evidence that he had actually been in the engagement, where all the officers were killed, and Mr. O'Donovan, the war correspondent of the *Daily News*, and Mr. Frank Vize-telly, an artist, had also perished. Lieutenant-colonel Colborne had taken great trouble to obtain trustworthy intelligence, and he declared that he had reason to believe the story told by the lad, who certainly could not have invented it.

"I was slave of Mohamed Bey, an officer in General Hicks' army. The army marched from Omderman and Khartûm along the banks of the Blue Nile. We experienced no opposition whatever on the road to Duaim, though we occasionally took spies, and saw parties of the Baggaras watching us at a distance. At night we heard their tom-toms all around, and saw their watch-fires, but we were never attacked. We had an enormous number of camels with us and plenty of provisions. There were

the same regiments that marched under you from Kawa Fort. I was with them, too, when Hicks Pasha joined you with the Nordenfeldt which he brought from the steamer. I remember you and the other English officers when we were attacked in square near Abas Island, when we beat the Baggaras away from us. You, Hicks Pasha, and the other English officers were on horseback outside the square when the Arabs first showed. Then you came in. You were all scattered about, looking out for the Arabs. [This was in answer to questions put to test the accuracy of the boy's information. This was correct, as, having no cavalry, all Hicks Pasha's English officers had to patrol outside the square, in which formation Hicks' army always marched.] Besides the old army you were with, there were a great many more who had come from Cairo, and two black battalions which before had been left behind at Khartûm and Kawa. We also had 500 cavalry on our march to Duaim. It was a grand army. All were confident of success, and felt certain of reaching El Obeid and defeating Mahomed Achmet. We had plenty of music, too; the bands played in the evening. We stayed at Duaim for some time waiting for stores; then two English officers came up in a steamer from Berber with them. This had delayed us for a long time, and it was unfortunate, most unfortunate, for the rainy season had already finished, and wells and pools soon dry up as in Kordofan. . . . Captain Massey and Major Werner were the two officers who brought up the remaining stores from Berber. At length we marched out of Duaim as far as Shat. We halted one whole day here—our first march inland. The world was to be shut out from us—a last opportunity was given to officers to write to their friends, and from here my master said Hicks Pasha wrote for the last time till Obeid should be reached, or perhaps till we returned to the Nile. My master told the officers around him that it had been decided that no communication should be kept up with the Nile.

It was early dawn when we marched from Shat. We plunged into the desert, having turned our backs on the Nile that the greater part of our soldiers were to see no more. They had

commenced their last march—the march from which there was to be no returning. No more would they greet the rising sun. With backs turned to the east, every step they traced on the sand led to the sunset—the sunset of their lives. We now occasionally saw the enemy in the distance—in scattered groups in front, on our flanks, and we perceived, too, they were gathering in our rear; but when the cavalry were sent out against them they vanished like mists in the morning sun; but they were dogging our footsteps like wild beasts do their prey—slowly, but surely. We used to shell them and fire the Krupps at them.

From Shat we went to the wells of Ragshah. . . . We always kept two squares a day's march apart. When Hicks Pasha's square, consisting of 5000 men, left that place Ali-ed-deen Pasha's force, consisting of 6500, occupied the position. We now marched to El Juama; from this to El Agana.

The enemy always prowled round us at a distance. When the cavalry pursued them they retired. A "door" was always left in the square for the horsemen to gallop back into the square in case of the enemy attacking in force. From El Agana the next march was to Dara-el-Gemmel (House of the Camel), and then to Arakhich. After a halt here for a day we marched to Helet el Mama (Lodge of the Mama); thence to Naghier, and from Naghier to Helet-el-Dobat. At every one of these places we found water. Every day the enemy increased in numbers, and we used to wonder they did not attack us. We had now got into a thick brushwood country, though all along there were mimosa bushes.

At length we reached Lake Rahad. This is a large swamp with pools of water; there is always water here. It is on elevated ground, and rocks and hills around. We had hoped the Takala tribes would join us here—that is the reason we had come this way—but they were afraid of the Arabs.

I don't think Lake Rahad is more than two and a half days' journey from El Obeid. Hicks Pasha built a fort here, and placed in it four Krupp guns and nineteen smaller ones. We got here plenty of beans and melons, and as much water as we wanted. We rested here three days. This was our last rest. The enemy

were gradually hemming us in even here, and Hicks Pasha determined to push on at once to El Obeid. The order was given to advance, and all tents were struck at daybreak. We had not marched an hour when the enemy for the first time commenced to fire at us, but from a long distance. No one was hit, or scarcely any one; but some camels were wounded. We halted for the night and intrenched ourselves with earthworks, putting a seriba outside again. The fires of the enemy at nightfall played all around. We remained here two days. We found some water, but had to search for it.

We left at sunrise, and marched to Shekan, where we again halted for two days. The reason we did this was because we were now encircled by our enemies, and the camels began to fall from the fire, and soldiers to be wounded and killed. We marched from Shekan till the sun was in the middle of the sky. We halted, as Arabs were all around firing from the bush. On the third day, on our way to Birkee [Birket, Turkish, pronounced *birkee*, means a pool], the cavalry went out of the square and encountered the enemy's horsemen, putting them to flight. Our cavalry then returned, bringing with them several captured horses. This was when the sun was young. Our square continued to move on. Shortly afterwards, the sun being yet young, we heard a sound, "w-o-o-o-h" [here the boy tried to give the idea of the galloping of horses], and then presently all around we saw Arabs innumerable—the whole world surrounded us (verbatim), and bayareh (flags) were waving, and spears gleaming in the sunshine above the bush. Our square was halted, and we opened fire, killing a great many, but we too lost many. There were too many bushes for the Krupps to do execution, but the machine-guns were at work day and night. Next morning when we marched I saw Arabs lying in six heaps, slain by these guns. Before we got to Shaheen we had nine Englishmen with us besides Hicks Pasha. At first the Egyptians lay down to hide, but General Hicks ordered his English officers to go round and make them stand up. Some of the English were killed when doing this, and Hicks took out his pocket-book and wrote down their names and the time of day

that they were killed, and the manner. At noon Hicks Pasha called an assembly of them to see who were alive. We waited for Ali-ed-deen, who now joined us. The next morning we all marched off together. We came to many large trees. An immense number of the enemy could be seen by field-glasses. The men declared they would rather march on their way fighting and reach the water than stand still in square. So Hicks, yielding to these remonstrances, continued to march on in square. It was not yet *dhuka* (noon), and we were not far from Elquis. We could see it. We should have been there by noon, and there there was abundance of water. [I believe this is the same as is written in our maps "Melbeis."] The rear face of our square was formed by the two black battalions, one raised in Sennâr and the other from the mudirieh of Sankeet. The guide led us out of the way to a place called Kieb-el-Khaber (I mean before this), instead of taking us straight to Elquis. It was near noon, just about this time—*zyessa*—a rush, terrible and sudden, sweeping down like the torrent from the mountain, was made. The Arabs burst upon our front face in overwhelming numbers. It was swept away like chaff before the wind. Seeing this, the other sides of the square turned inwards, and commenced a death-dealing fusillade both on the Arabs pressing into the square and on each other crossways. A terrible slaughter commenced. Hicks Pasha and the very few English officers left with him, seeing all hope of restoring order gone, spurred their horses, and sprang out of the confused mass of wounded, dead, and dying. These officers fired away their revolvers, clearing a space for themselves, till all their ammunition was expended. They killed many. They had got clear outside. They then took to their swords, and fought till they fell. Hicks Pasha now alone remained. He was a terror to the Arabs. They said he never struck a man with his sword without killing him. They named him Abou Deraa Dougal, the heavy armed (or thick or brawny). He kept them all at bay, but he was struck on the wrist with a sword, and he dropped his own. He then fell. I was covered with blood, and I got under a dead body and pretended to be dead while

the struggling and yelling, uproar, fighting, and slaughtering was going on, as it did for three hours. They felt me and found I was alive; they pricked me with a spear. I was made prisoner. Now what I tell you further is from hearsay. The rear face alone remained in good order when all else was confusion, composed as it was of black troops. These marched away, forming a square of their own, and the Arabs could not break it, so they went to plunder and slaughter the rest. The blacks marched on till sunset, and there was a lull for them. [He represented that they were afterwards overtaken and killed.]

Mahomet Achmet remained far distant at the time of the battle. He had said to the ameers and dervishes: "Forward! Attack the enemy. Meanwhile I will remain here, and pray to Allah for your success." He came after all was over, and was shown the body of Hicks Pasha. I heard that Mahomet Achmet put all the spoil into a great hole. He ordered it all to be given to him."

• The news from Suakim had the effect of postponing the evacuation of Egypt by the British forces, and to secure the safety of Lower Egypt, it was determined to send down a portion of the gendarmerie force to Suakim, and orders were given for Colonel Sartorius, the chief of the force at Suez, to leave at once with 2500 men. He was to be accompanied by Majors Harrington and Giles; Baker Pasha was to go down and take the command a few days later.

The gendarmerie received with great disgust the order to proceed to Suakim, and the Turkish officers belonging to the force at once threw up their appointments. They had been enlisted for civil service in Egypt only, and had worked very hard in restoring order and in performing the heavy duties entailed by the outbreak of cholera, when they had to keep a cordon round infected districts. Now they were ordered to go beyond the limits for which they were enlisted and to perform purely military duties, while the regular army of Egypt under Sir Evelyn Wood were to remain quietly in Lower Egypt, taking upon themselves the civil duties of the gendarmerie.

The only reason that can be assigned for ordering the gendarmes to Suakim is that the Egyptian government thought it might be necessary to send their regular army up the valley of the Nile to check the northward advance of the Mahdi. Whatever the cause was, the result was most unfortunate. The men and officers, considering justly that they were being ill treated, went down without any heart in the business, and a spirit of insubordination frequently showed itself. Thus the efforts of the English officers to discipline them were thwarted, and the way was prepared for the catastrophe which followed.

For the time the influence of Baker Pasha allayed the spirit of mutiny, the Egyptian officers consented to go to Suakim, and a majority of the men followed their example; some, however, persisted in their determination to abide by the letter of their contract, and left the ranks, and in consequence of the terms of their agreement no measures could be taken against them.

On the 28th of November the first contingent of the gendarmerie started, 200 horse and 300 foot, the former under Major Giles, who had now received the brevet rank of colonel, the infantry under Colonel Holroyd. A good many of the infantry, however, did not turn up at the rendezvous at the station, and others deserted when the train stopped at the various stations on its way to Suez—a bad beginning for a force about to be employed on dangerous service.

On the 3d of December 600 more men left Cairo. In the meantime the Arabs were showing increased confidence outside Suakim and came down from the hills every night and opened fire on the town. On the 2d 600 black troops went out from Suakim to attack them, but the Arabs fell back on their approach.

These black troops were the flower of the Egyptian army, and confident in their fighting power they had become impatient at their inaction. It was therefore in accordance with their wishes that the governor authorized the movement against the enemy. With the blacks a half battalion of Bashi-Bazouks also went out. When they had marched some distance small bodies of the enemy were seen in the plain. The force drove them before them towards

the foot of the hills, when suddenly an immense number of Arabs sprang from the bushes and dashed against them.

The onset fell first upon the Bashi-Bazouks, who, after firing one or two wild volleys, broke and fled in the greatest disorder. The Arabs then rushed upon the black battalion; these for a time stood their ground well, but they were unable long to resist the impetuous charges of the rebels; the square was broken, and a hand-to-hand fight took place. The black soldiers fought to the last, and for the most part died as they stood.

The battalion was almost exterminated, only a few men making their escape back to Suakim. Many of the Bashi-Bazouks were killed in their flight, but the greater portion regained the town—the Arabs being too intent upon attacking their braver foes to pay much attention to these flying cowards. This was a most serious blow to the hopes that had been entertained that Baker Pasha would speedily be enabled to effect the relief of the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar. The black troops had been relied upon as the nucleus of his fighting force, and their destruction by the Arabs not only weakened him materially, but had a crushing moral effect upon the Egyptian troops.

After the manner in which these had on two occasions given way at once before the Arab onslaughts it seemed a well-nigh hopeless undertaking to lead them out against the victorious hordes of the enemy. Colonel Sartorius on his arrival at Suakim at once set to to fortify the town, which was situated in an easily defensible position—an island connected with the mainland only by a causeway, and the plain by which the enemy must approach to the attack was commanded by the guns of the *Woodlark*, *Coquette*, *Euryalus*, and *Ranger*, which ships had now arrived in the harbour.

Admiral Hewett was on board the *Euryalus*, and his presence and aid were of great utility in supporting Colonel Sartorius against the Egyptian officers of the fort, who were constantly throwing obstacles in the way of the English commander.

Baker Pasha left Cairo for Suakim on the 18th of December. The position of the garrison at Sinkat was now becoming critical.

They were commanded by Tewfik Bey, a most gallant and determined officer, and had hitherto repulsed all the efforts of the Arabs to take the place; but their provisions and ammunition were running short, and they were, moreover, hampered by the presence of a large number of women and children—upwards of a thousand.

Mahmoud Ali, a friendly chief, endeavoured to pass some provisions into Sinkat, but he failed in doing so. The Bishareen Arabs had now joined the enemy, and Osman Digma, the Mahdi's lieutenant, was now ascertained to have over twenty thousand men under his command; of these some twelve hundred were armed with Remington rifles, the rest were a mere horde carrying sword and spear, but their fanaticism and contempt of death rendered them very formidable opponents, especially to such timid and untrustworthy troops as those under Baker Pasha's command, who were so ignorant of drill that they had difficulty in performing the most simple manœuvres even on the parade-ground.

On the 16th a scare took place at Suakim, news being brought in by the natives that an attack would be made that night upon the town. The ships of war pitched shells during the night on to the plain beside the town, and this probably deterred the Arabs from their expected attacks. On the 18th Colonel Sartorius, who had now received the brevet rank of general, and Colonel Giles with a party of 200 Turks and Bashi-Bazouks, made a successful foray against the enemy, and captured and drove in 200 camels.

On the 23d of December Baker Pasha arrived at Suakim, and a review took place on Christmas-day of all the troops in the station. The force consisted of 1300 infantry of the gendarmerie, 400 Egyptian infantry of the line, 400 Turks and Bashi-Bazouks, 47 European police, 200 mounted gendarmes, 100 Turkish cavalry, 90 mounted Bashi-Bazouks, and 200 Egyptian artillery.

Colonel Giles, who commanded the cavalry, executed a reconnaissance thirteen miles into the interior to the spot where the black regiment was annihilated. While the parties were examining the bodies the enemy were seen approaching in force. They

came on with loud shouts, keeping up a scattered fire, and when nearing the cavalry they disappeared in the nullahs or deep ravines which intersected the country, thus threatening the line of retreat.

As Colonel Giles had been ordered not to risk his command in an action he retired and fell back to Suakim. He reported that the country at the foot of the hills was extremely unfavourable for the action of regular troops, being greatly broken and intersected with nullahs, which would afford an enemy abundant opportunities for approaching unseen close to an advancing force and then rushing upon them.

The whole country from the shores of the Red Sea was indeed unfavourable for the action of regulars. The sandy plain which extends to the foot of the mountains is covered with scrub, with here and there clumps of thorny mimosa bushes, rendering it extremely difficult for troops to advance in regular formation, while enabling any number of the active and scantily clothed Arabs to creep up close at hand without their presence being suspected.

On the 2d of January a messenger from Sinkat, who had made his way through the enemy's lines, arrived with a message from Tewfik saying that his provisions were now all but exhausted, and that he could not hold out beyond the 10th, on which day, unless relief arrived, he should march out and try to fight his way down to the coast.

On the same day one of the three principal Sheikhs of Islam arrived at Suakim, sent by the khedive to try and reconcile the rebels.

Messengers were sent up to Tewfik, urging him to hold out, if possible, till the end of the month. Some of them succeeded in getting through, and in bringing a reply from him, saying that he would endeavour to do so. Although, until negotiations with the Abyssinians were concluded, it was impossible to withdraw the garrisons from Massowa and its neighbourhood, General Baker succeeded in recruiting some 800 or 900 blacks in that neighbourhood.

The number of the rebels was now estimated at 27,000. In spite of the smallness and unreliable nature of his force, Baker

Pasha would have attempted the rescue of the garrison of Sinkat; but he was absolutely without transport, beyond a few hundred camels, and was therefore unable to move in that direction.

The announcement of the British government of the proposed evacuation of the Soudan applied to Khartûm, Darfûr, and Kordofan, but on the receipt of the news that the Soudan was to be abandoned, the Cadi of Suakim secretly assembled the leading Arab inhabitants, and informed them that the English were going to give the Soudan up to the Mahdi, and that he should therefore at once go over and make friends with Osman Digma, and strongly advised them to do the same.

The same night he passed through our lines and joined the enemy. This defection naturally produced a very bad effect both in the town and among the wavering tribes. On the 18th of January General Baker went down to Trinkatat and, having examined the coast, found a suitable place for the disembarkation of troops.

From the ship a portion of the encampment of the enemy besieging Tokar was visible five miles distant from the shore. Three thousand of the enemy were encamped there, the remainder of the besieging force being in the vicinity of the town itself, fifteen miles inland. The ground appeared fairly level, and the general decided that he would first attempt the relief of Tokar.

The place was not so hard pressed as was Sinkat, and could hold out for some time longer; but he thought that were the operations successfully performed and a heavy blow inflicted upon the Arabs in the plains, it would dishearten the enemy and give his troops confidence in themselves before being called upon to advance into the hills upon the far more difficult and dangerous operation of the relief of Sinkat. He hoped, too, to draw Osman and the greater part of his force down towards Tokar, when the Sinkat garrison might possibly manage to make their way down to the coast.

In order to detain Osman Digma and a large portion of his force near Suakim, Baker Pasha on the 22d marched out with a body of cavalry 400 strong, and advanced towards the enemy's

camp at Tamai, fourteen miles distant, at the foot of the hills. On the way the cavalry came upon some eighty cattle, herded by a few of the Arabs, who at once took to flight; the cattle were captured. The force had proceeded but a short distance further when the bush in front was seen to be swarming with the enemy; these at once advanced yelling and shouting, and firing their rifles.

As the force of the enemy was considerably over a thousand, and there was no saying how many more might be advancing under shelter of the bushes, the general gave the order for the cavalry to retire. This they did, keeping up a fire with their carbines upon the enemy. Their retreat was conducted in extended order, the Egyptian cavalry forming a skirmishing line in the rear. The enemy pressed on very vigorously, and the squadron of Turks were sent out to support the Egyptians.

For upwards of an hour the fight went on, the cavalry falling back steadily, and opposing a firm resistance to the Arabs. But their ammunition began to run short, and a sudden panic seized the Turks, who fled in a body, hotly pursued by the Arabs.

Colonel Gildea in vain endeavoured to arrest the flight, and in order to set them the example charged back among the Arabs and killed three of them with his own hand. The Egyptian squadron lost heart upon the flight of the Bashi-Bazouks, and also fled. Several fell from their horses, and four were overtaken and killed by the enemy, who pursued them for four miles. The result was not altogether discouraging. The cavalry had for a long time resisted the attack of a greatly superior enemy, and it was only on the failure of their ammunition that they had been seized with panic. The native spies reported that the enemy's loss in the skirmish was upwards of a hundred, and that their failure to annihilate a force so inferior to themselves in number had caused them much disappointment, as it was the first time that they had failed in obtaining a decisive victory. On the 24th General Baker again moved out with 2200 men, and threw up some slight intrenchments in the plain. They passed the night there, and were not attacked by the enemy. On the evening of the 26th 800 more newly raised

black troops came down from Suez, and the same night General Baker embarked with 1000 men for Trinkatat; the rest of the force was to follow the next day.

The troops were transported rapidly down to Trinkatat, and soon the desert beach was busy with the crowd of men, horses, and camels, an intrenchment being thrown up to defend the camp from an attack of the enemy. Of this there was, however, but little probability, for between the line of beach and the sand-hills beyond was a salt-water lagoon some two miles wide and a foot deep. General Baker's force consisted of some 1200 gendarmerie, 300 Massowa blacks, 800 of the newly raised blacks, 300 Bashi-Bazouk Turks, 400 cavalry, 4 guns, and 2 Gatlings. The cavalry crossed the lagoon and scouted a short distance out. The enemy were not found anywhere near the water, but could be seen in numbers in the distance.

On the 2d of February a portion of the infantry crossed the lagoon and intrenched themselves on the other side. News arrived from Tokar that the sight of our ships in the distance had encouraged the besieged, who had made a successful sortie and had driven the enemy back. They sent word to say that they would make a sortie with 250 men to aid our advance.

On the 3d the rest of the force crossed the lagoon and prepared to advance upon Tokar on the following morning. The troops were in good spirits. The general had informed them that if they succeeded in relieving Tokar they might in a fortnight be on their way back to Cairo. Confident in their force and in their officers, the Egyptians chatted merrily round their fires, and even the British officers—who, knowing the utterly untrustworthy nature of their troops, had hitherto regarded the expedition as a well-nigh desperate one—began to hope that the men would really fight when it came to the point.

They had, at least, elements in their favour against which the Arabs of the sea-coast had not hitherto contended. There were guns and cavalry; the latter would give timely warning of the approach of the enemy, the former would check their charges and drive them out from the thick bushes in which they might be

lurking. It was probable that the fight would take place at a spot about half-way between Trinkatat and Tokar. Here were the wells of El-Teb, around which the principal portion of the enemy's force was known to be encamped.

It was at this spot that the column with which Captain Moncrieff had gone out was attacked and almost annihilated, and doubtless the Arabs would endeavour to repeat their victory on the same ground. A few shots were fired into the camp during the night. In the morning before dawn the bugle sounded and the camp became a scene of bustle and activity. Soon after daybreak the force were all under arms, and at half-past seven the advance began. The Egyptian cavalry were extended in front in skirmishing order, and the general and his staff rode a short distance behind. Colonel Giles with his Turkish cavalry followed; then came the artillery, four guns and two Gatlings; and close behind them the infantry, marching in massive columns, so arranged as to throw themselves into a great square if necessary.

It was intended that in case of attack the Turkish infantry and the black battalions should form in separate squares on the right and left flank of the main body, which they would cover with their fire from attack; while the Egyptian gendarmerie would form the main square, inclosing the baggage animals of the column. In front of the Egyptian cavalry the general sent out half a dozen European scouts, whom he had enrolled at Cairo. All were old cavalry soldiers: English, French, Italian, and Austrian.

The force had not been marching more than half an hour when the two Englishmen who were out in front galloped back to report that the enemy were to be seen in front, and their report was soon confirmed upon the best evidence, for dark figures could be seen moving rapidly among the bushes on the crests of the sand-hills in front. A sharp shower now fell and for a few minutes obscured all view of the surrounding country.

Dropping shots were now heard, and the Egyptian skirmishers had commenced the action. At half-past eight the column halted and one of the Krupp guns was brought up to the side of the

general, and thence opened fire upon a body of men mounted on camels some 3000 yards away. After two or three shells had been fired the Arabs fell back and the force again advanced. At nine o'clock it was raining heavily, but the force had now approached near enough to see something of the enemy's position.

In front was some rising ground covered with low scrub, and above this waved some flags. On the left front clumps of spear-heads of from fifty to a hundred each could be seen among the bushes. A few rounds of shell were fired at the point where the flags were waving. As the force slowly advanced the firing between the front line of skirmishers and the enemy's parties became hotter and more continuous; the cavalry out on the flanks of the column, instead of keeping half a mile away as ordered, closed in to half that distance. A party of Arabs on wiry little horses dashed in between the cavalry on the right flank and the infantry and rode right along the line apparently in sheer bravado. Colonel Giles chased them for a short distance with his Turkish cavalry, but then halted and let them go on, and fell back to the position assigned to him. The general and his staff were still close behind the front line of cavalry skirmishers, who were making their way forward steadily and well, but already the great column of infantry were showing signs of disorganization. Instead of marching in regular order and in silence, as they had been taught to do, all were talking and marching in confused order. Instead of the one large central square and the two flanking ones in which they had been ordered to move, they were marching in one confused mass.

Unfortunately General Baker and his staff, being in front, were in ignorance of the disorder which was already spreading. General Sartorius, too, was with Baker, and there was no English officer present with the infantry. Had the English officers been present at this time with the square, halted it, and formed it into fighting order, the result of the day might have been different. Suddenly the fire of the cavalry skirmishers on the left flank ceased, and almost instantly the troopers came galloping back at full speed. In their rear could be seen a long line of Arabs,

spear in hand, coming on yelling as they ran. The column now attempted to close up into a regular square.

The black regiments, and the Turkish infantry, who were on the left face of the square, took up their position with some regularity; but on the right, and in front, were the Alexandrian and Cairo regiments of Egyptian gendarmerie. These fell at once into disorder, and the efforts of their officers were insufficient to induce them to keep steady, the Alexandrian regiment in front being especially unsteady, while the crowded mass of baggage animals in the centre, frightened by the din and shouting around them, the yells of the approaching Arabs, and the fire which the outer line of the square now began to open, were with difficulty restrained, and their struggles added to the confusion.

The Arabs were 700 yards away when first seen, and had the troops been steady and fallen quietly into their positions, their fire should have swept away the Arabs; for they were considerably superior in force to their assailants. Those coming, or on the left, did not number more than 1000, while on the right they were coming up in little parties of threes and fours.

When they were within about 400 yards the square had, to some extent, got into order, and a tremendous fire was opened, not only in the direction in which the Arabs were approaching, but from all four sides of the square, killing many of Colonel Giles's cavalry, who so far had stood fairly, but who now began to waver, in spite of the efforts of their colonel; but the fire of the Egyptians took but little effect upon the Arabs. The storm of lead passing high over their heads, they continued their course unchecked, and as they approached both the Egyptian regiments gave way, and the men rushed back among the animals in the centre.

In a minute the Arabs were among them, the square broke up altogether, and became a dense crowd of men, camels, and horsemen. The firing ceased almost altogether, the few Europeans in the square, the Massowa blacks and the Turks strove to defend themselves, but the Egyptians offered not the slightest resistance to the Arab spearmen. Many threw away their arms,

and casting themselves down on the sand allowed themselves to be speared like sheep. The three Englishmen in the square, Dr. Leslie, Morice Bey, and Captain Walker were with the guns in the front face. Of these Captain Walker was in command; but his men, themselves unsteady at the approach of the Arabs, and hampered by the cowardly Alexandrians, did not fire a single shot with the guns or Gatlings.

When the Arabs burst in, the three Englishmen defended themselves with their revolvers to the last. Round them the fighting was thickest, the European police, Turks, Egyptians, and Arabs all struggling in a confused mass; at last all resistance ceased, the Englishmen had fallen, and the work of slaughter continued with scarce an effort on the part of the victims to avoid their fate; then numbers of the Egyptians succeeded in extricating themselves from the mass of animals, and throwing away arms, accoutrements, and uniforms, fled for their lives hotly pursued by the exulting Arabs.

General Baker and his staff, as soon as they saw the enemy approaching, had ridden back from the front, but by the time they reached the square the enemy had already broken its ranks. Several of the English officers were killed, as they rode up, by the wild fire of the Egyptian infantry. The general rode along the square and tried in vain to rally the men, but their panic was so complete that no one heeded his shouts; for a minute or two the general, and the little group of officers, sat on their horses at the edge of the surging mass of men and animals, then seeing that nothing could be done, and that the Egyptians were no more capable of being rallied than would be a flock of sheep with a pack of wolves among them, they turned to ride off, having to cut their way through the swarming Arabs.

The general and his staff now joined the Turkish cavalry, whom Colonel Giles had succeeded in keeping in hand, and trotted off the ground, endeavouring as well as they could to cover the rear of the flying fugitives, and so the retreat went on for five miles to the edge of the lagoon, the fleet-footed Arabs continually overtaking the wretched Egyptians, who, when they found themselves cut off,

would kneel down and with bowed head accept unresistingly the thrust of spear or slash of sword; except a few of the blacks, the Turks, and the Europeans, not one of the 2000 men who were massacred lifted their hands in self-defence. On the approach of the first fugitives the garrison left in charge of the intrenchments commanding the ford across the lagoon had decamped; but here the general managed to rally some of the troopers, and on these opening fire with their carbines upon the Arabs the latter desisted from the pursuit, and the fugitives who arrived crossed the water to the beach at Trinkatat followed by the cavalry.

The scene of confusion on the beach was tremendous, and had the Arabs continued their pursuit across the lagoon the greater part of the fugitives would have been massacred, as the boats on the shore were not sufficient to take them away. The panic-stricken Egyptians rushed into the water and struggled and fought for a place in the boats. When General Baker and the English officers arrived they rode down into the water, and with their revolvers forced the crowds from the boats, and restored something like order.

During the afternoon and all night long Generals Baker and Sartorius, Colonel Hey, Colonel Burnaby, Major Harvey, and Colonel Giles remained on the beach, shipping off the men, horses, and stores; and thus 600 horses besides ammunition and numerous stores, which at one time seemed destined to fall into the enemy's hands, were saved.

Only about 700 of the Egyptians escaped, while from 1600 to 1800 were massacred. The loss of the Arabs was very small in comparison. A good many fell before the revolvers and swords of the European officers, while the Turkish battalion and the battalions of the mounted police made a stout fight before they were overpowered.

Many very gallant actions were done by the European officers, who were all engaged in hand-to-hand fights with the enemy's spearmen. Major Harvey saved his European servant when exhausted in the fight, by placing him on his horse and running himself on foot beside it. Of the English officers Maurice

Bey, Dr. Leslie, and Captains Forrestier Walker, Carrol, Smith, and Watkins were killed, with some ten foreign officers of the force.

The enemy showed the most profound contempt for the troops, and clearly regarded themselves as invincible. One Arab would attack a score of Egyptian infantry, and a mounted Arab rode single-handed at a troop of our cavalry. He slashed the Egyptian commander, who was too frightened even to attempt to defend himself, across the back and severely wounded him, and was then shot by an English officer.

Of the blacks from Suez who marched from Trinkatat 678 strong, 410 were killed; of the 560 men of the Alexandria brigade, 15 officers and 380 men were killed; of the Cairo battalion, 500 strong, 16 officers and 280 men were killed.

Of Zebehr's recently raised blacks, 17 officers and 414 men fell, out of 678; of 421 Sinkat blacks, 10 officers and 268 men; of 450 Massowa blacks, 13 officers and 234 men.

Of 40 European police, 2 officers and 35 men; of 429 Turkish infantry, 16 officers and 352 men; of 128 artillerymen, 8 officers and 101 men; of the headquarter staff, 12 officers and 30 men were killed; and 3 officers and 124 men of the baggage guard and drivers. The Turkish cavalry lost only 6 men; the Egyptian cavalry, 24 men. Total killed, 96 officers and 2250 men.

It was only the fear of the guns of the fleet which arrested the Arabs on the edge of the lagoon, and prevented the massacre being even more complete than it was.

General Baker returned at once with the survivors of his force to Suakim, where 1500 men had remained in garrison, and set to work to organize the whole into three battalions—one of Turks, one of blacks, and one of Egyptians.

Utterly useless as the troops had shown themselves in the field, it was hoped that they might defend the intrenchments, especially as they would have the aid of the marines from the fleet, and of the guns of the men-of-war. The task, however, was found to be well-nigh impossible. The Egyptian officers refused to do anything. The men on landing dispersed about the town,

and altogether disregarded the bugle-calls for the assembly, or the orders of the English officers for them to return to their camp.

Several of the Egyptian officers of the highest rank absolutely refused to take the men into the trenches, under the plea that they could not depend upon them. A hundred and fifty men of the fleet were landed and manned the intrenchments, but for the next three days the town was thronged with a mutinous and disorganized rabble of soldiers; and, had Osman Digma attacked, it was probable that the great portion of these would have joined the populace of the town in a rising against the foreigners.

The effects of the three defeats which the Egyptians had suffered at the hands of the rebels, had been to place in the possession of the latter 4000 Remington rifles, 5 Krupp guns, 2 Gatlings, 2 rocket tubes, and an abundance of all kinds of ammunition.

It was an immense relief to the British officers at Suakim when on the 10th news was received that the disorganized troops were to be sent back to Egypt at once. So far they felt that they were sitting on a mine, for at any moment an open mutiny might have broken out, the Europeans in the town might have been massacred before any assistance could be rendered from the ships, and the troops marched off with their arms to join the Mahdi. A parade was held at once of the remnant of the army; the battalion of mixed blacks and Egyptians, who had been the last arrival from Cairo, refused to obey orders, General Baker at once surrounded them by the Soudan battalion, which was the best of those remaining, and threatened to open fire unless the mutineers at once laid down their arms. This they did, and were then marched straight down to the port, and sent on board the troopship *Orontes* to be taken up to Suez.

The whole of the other troops were to follow immediately, with the exception of 400 of the most reliable blacks. On the following day a most important step was taken, a step which, had the British government seen fit to accomplish earlier, would have

entirely changed the position of affairs. The following proclamation was issued:—

“In accordance with a telegram received from Nubar Pasha, president of the council, it is notified that Admiral Hewett is appointed military and civil governor of Suakim by the Egyptian government, by the permission of the English government. Consequently he hereby declares the town to be in a state of siege and under martial law. The inhabitants need not have any further fear, as the British government have promised to protect the town, which is now perfectly safe.”

It was declared that had this proclamation been issued earlier there would have been no difficulty whatever in obtaining the adhesion of a great many of the tribes of the neighbourhood, and that even if the garrisons of Sinkat and Tokar could not have been brought off, the tribesmen could without difficulty have thrown large quantities of provisions into those towns; but hitherto they had seen the Egyptian officials still all-powerful in Suakim; they had seen them thwarting the English general at every turn, and knew that they were in active communication with Osman Digma. Consequently they placed no reliance whatever upon the promises of protection and reward if they would assist against Osman, especially as we had officially proclaimed our intention of evacuating the Soudan.

In the town of Suakim itself the appointment effected an instant change in the situation. A strong body of marines were landed, order was restored. The appearance of the place changed as if by magic; the hubbub and confusion in the native bazaars at once subsided. The trading portion of the population, who had, since the return of the army, been living in the greatest trepidation, dreading by day an insurrection and sack of the town by the mutinous troops, and by night an attack by the Arabs, now showed themselves outside their houses with demonstrations of extreme satisfaction.

The disorderly soldiers were at once confined to their camps, and Suakim regained its ordinary appearance. On the following morning the whole force was paraded for the inspection of the

admiral. There were 3000 men upon the ground, and no stranger who had seen them would have imagined that three days before they were a mutinous rabble. The Egyptians are very quick in learning their drill, clean and tidy in appearance, quiet, attentive, and painstaking on parade. They have, indeed, many of the qualities required for making excellent soldiers, but these qualities are rendered useless by the fact that they will not fight.

The blacks especially made a good appearance. General Baker had removed all the worthless Egyptian officers and had replaced them by men promoted from the ranks. The English officers coming down from Suez were to be placed in command, and there is no doubt that these black troops, well drilled and disciplined, and officered by Englishmen, would make excellent soldiers—superior, indeed, to those of the West Indian regiments, which have often rendered good service, but which are recruited from a class of negroes inferior in fighting qualities to the warlike blacks of the Soudan.

One of the first actions of Admiral Hewett was to issue a notice that he should hold a court on shore every morning to inquire into any complaint or grievances brought before his notice, and that he would allow no acts of looting or violence whatever on the part of the troops. The next day came the long-dreaded news of the fall of Sinkat and the massacre of its brave garrison, and the streets of Suakim presented a heart-rending appearance, crowds of weeping women wandered in the streets, throwing dust upon their heads, and filling the air with their wailings for the loss of husbands and relations in the garrison of Sinkat.

For three months that heroic little garrison had repulsed every attack; for weeks they had been living on half rations, for the last fortnight had been existing on roots and leaves, hoping against hope that the long-expected aid from England would arrive. At last human nature could hold out no longer, the news of the defeat of Baker Pasha destroyed their last hope of rescue, and they determined to march out and try and cut their way down to Suakim. Their gallant commander, Tewfik Bey, pointed out to them that by fighting stoutly they might possibly

save themselves, while by remaining all must in a few days die of hunger, while flight was impossible.

Having animated his men with his own heroic spirit, he burned all the stores, spiked the guns, and blew up the magazine. Then the men, having filled their pouches with as much ammunition as they could carry, the 600 issued out in the form of a square, inclosed in which were over 1000 women and children. They had proceeded but a short distance when Osman's hordes rushed down to the attack. Enfeebled by hunger and privation Tewfik's soldiers yet fought gallantly, but in vain, the square was broken by the rush of the Arabs, and Tewfik and everyone of his men slaughtered—the only males who escaped with their lives were six soldiers, who, being too ill to march, had been left behind at Sinkat. These the Arabs, mad with carnage, spared on entering the place.

The women and children, including the wives of Tewfik and his officers, were divided as slaves among their captors.

Admiral Hewett at once sent off a letter to the commandant at Tokar telling him that if he could hold out a little longer an English column would march to his relief. Tokar lay in the heart of a fertile country, and there was still a sufficient amount of grain in store to last the troops for some time longer; they had been, however, for some time suffering from bad water, as the Arabs held possession of the wells outside the town, and those upon which the garrison had to depend were brackish and unwholesome.

On the 14th the *Carysfort* arrived at Suakim with a strong body of marines; 212 men were landed at once, and marched into the town, their appearance producing a great effect upon the populace, who had never before seen English soldiers; 120 blue-jackets were also landed. Henceforth the town was safe from any attack which Osman Digma might make against it.

On the 16th a large body of the enemy came down at night and fired into our camp for some hours. In the morning numerous bodies of men could be seen from the mast-heads of the men-of-war moving about the plain. Mahmoud Ali, the chief of one of the

tribes who called themselves friendly, but who might more properly be termed neutral, for they were standing aloof to see which was the winning side, reported that Osman was waiting for the arrival of the guns taken from Baker Pasha and for the fall of Tokar, when he had promised to lead his men to the capture of Suakim, and to drive the English into the sea.

In view of the number of men seen moving on the plain every precaution was taken, the sentries were doubled, and when in the evening native spies came in with the news that the enemy intended to attack at night, a boat-load of sailors with a Gatling gun was sent ashore to hold the causeway should the enemy carry the two outlying forts held by the marines, or manage, which was more probable, to pass between them. The intrenchments connected with the forts were held by the Egyptian troops, and it was considered probable that these would bolt at once if the enemy attacked.

In the course of the day one of the spies returned from Tokar with an answer from the commandant, who was a man of very different calibre from Tewfik Bey. He wrote in the most desponding tone, saying that his provisions were all used up—a statement known to be false. He stated that large numbers of the enemy were massed round the town, and that they were continually firing upon it with the Krupp guns captured from Baker, killing some of the garrison every day.

He asked that two vessels of war should at once be sent to Trinkatat to make a demonstration and keep up the spirits of his men till the troops arrived. The spy reported that the enemy had several times summoned the garrison to surrender, promising in that case their lives should be spared, and pointing out the futility of resistance, and the fate which had befallen the garrison of Sinkat, who ventured to resist the power of Osman.

The night passed off without the expected attack. The next day the *Jumna* arrived with 300 men of the 10th Hussars and 400 men of the Irish Fusiliers. The hussars had not brought their horses with them, but they at once took over the horses of the Egyptian cavalry. The ships now began to arrive fast. The

Bokhara landed the 3d battalion of Rifles at Suakim; the other ships as they arrived were sent down to Trinkatat, where the *Carysfort* and *Sphinx* had already gone in answer to the request of the commandant of Tokar.

The troops were not intended to land at present, but were sent on to Trinkatat because there was no accommodation for them in the harbour of Suakim.

On the 21st the transport *Neva*, with the 19th Hussars, ran ashore on a reef 19 miles from Suakim, and other steamers were sent to take the troops off. By dint of the greatest exertions all the animals on board, with the exception of some fifty mules, were saved, but the vessel herself became a complete wreck. The next morning the news was received that Tokar had surrendered to the enemy; it was brought by five soldiers who had made their way along the coast. They said that the civil governor of the town had entered into negotiations with the enemy, and had agreed to surrender, on a promise that the lives of the garrison should be spared.

This news was confirmed in the afternoon by the return of two spies, who had been sent to Tokar by Mr. Brewster, the assistant governor of Suakim. Their account tallied exactly with that of the soldiers. The garrison were so worried and annoyed by the constant fire of the five Krupp guns taken from Baker Pasha, which were worked by some black artillerymen captured at the same time, that they lost heart altogether, and allowed the inhabitants, who had long been in favour of surrender, to take the matter into their hands; accordingly a hundred and fifty of them, with the civil governor at their head, went out to the rebels, and made terms with them on the basis that all lives should be spared if the town surrendered.

This governor was known to have been a great adherent of Arabi's, and he had all along been the leader of the party for submission to the Mahdi. The spies and soldiers both agreed that Tokar was in no danger whatever of assault, as there were not more than a thousand of the enemy round the town, the rest of the besiegers, together with large bodies of men who had arrived from

Osman, having taken up their position at the wells of El-Teb, the scene of the defeat of the columns of Moncrieff and Baker, and where they were awaiting the advance of the force from Trinkatat.

The garrison at the time they surrendered possessed forty or fifty rounds of ammunition per man in their pouches, and there were forty thousand rounds in reserve. As the governor was well aware that the English troops would advance in a few days to his relief, the surrender of Tokar was an act of gross treachery. It was important, inasmuch as for a moment it arrested our action, as General Graham was obliged to telegraph the news to England and wait for orders, and the task of marching to Tokar would be rendered all the more difficult by the certainty that in addition to Osman's Arabs we should have to fight the well-armed garrison of Tokar, who would be in their ranks.


While waiting orders from home, General Graham and Admiral Hewett went down to Trinkatat, where the greater part of the force intending to operate was now gathered, and the troops had already been landed on the beach. The Black Watch, the Gordon Highlanders, the Irish Fusiliers, the mounted infantry, and half the 19th Hussars were already on shore. Across the lagoon large numbers of the enemy could be seen. The marines were to have formed part of the advancing body, but as soon as the troops had left Suakim the soldiers of the black regiment mutinied and refused to obey orders, and dispersed into the bazaar, openly saying that they intended to join the rebels.

The marines were consequently detained at Suakim for the defence of that place; and only a detachment of blue-jackets with six Gatling guns were sent down from the gun-boat there to form part of the expedition.

On the 24th the 19th Hussars and mounted infantry crossed the lagoon and made a reconnaissance, the enemy retiring as they advanced. On the following day the Gordon Highlanders and Irish Fusiliers moved across the lagoon and took possession of the intrenchments erected by General Baker on the further side. They were accompanied by a squadron of the 19th Hussars, the mounted infantry, and two cavalry guns. The enemy, who had


BATTLE OF EL TEB.

29TH. FEB. 1884.



BATTLE OF TAMAI.

13TH. MARCH 1884.





in the early morning been seen in large numbers about the intrenchments, retired as our troops advanced; but when we occupied the intrenchments they took up a position in large numbers on rising ground some 3000 yards away on the plain, where they could be seen through the field-glasses brandishing their spears, and going through exultant dances, deeming, no doubt, that they were about to enjoy a repetition of their two previous victories.

Our cavalry moved out towards them, but they held their ground and opened fire at a long range. As some 500 of them could be seen on the brow, and it was probable that a much larger force might be behind it, it was not deemed prudent for the cavalry to advance. Now, and throughout the campaign, the want of a battery of horse-artillery was greatly felt. Lord Wolseley had forbidden horse-artillery to be taken, and the want of this arm greatly crippled the force, and exposed them to dangers which would have been avoided had they possessed an efficient artillery. The camel-guns were unprovided with shrapnel, and their small calibre rendered them but of slight efficiency. After watching each other for a considerable time, the cavalry retired and recrossed the lagoon, while the infantry remained for the night in the fort.

The naval brigade landed on the morning of the 27th. They were a splendid body of seamen, picked from the crews of the gun-boats, and were 115 strong, with 10 officers. Parties of the enemy could be seen moving about the plain, but they did not attempt to advance, or even to keep up a distant fire. It was clear that they were acting under a regular plan, and intended to wait for us at some point along the road, and not to waste their strength by attempting an attack upon the intrenchments. On the 28th they showed more boldness in maintaining a heavy fire from a distance upon our mounted infantry. Our artillery fired a few shots in return.

Seeing the uselessness of the camel-guns, Admiral Hewett supplied eight 7-pounders from the fleet to take their place, together with a supply of shrapnel. In the afternoon, to the great

satisfaction of everyone, the 65th Regiment (York and Lancaster) arrived in the *Serapis*, whose engines had gone wrong, and it had been feared that she would not arrive in time. No one had any doubt of the ability of the British force assembled to defeat the rebels, however strong they might be. At the same time the addition of five or six hundred men was not to be despised, for the Arabs had already shown themselves really formidable antagonists. The 65th were landed at once.

The force of General Graham now consisted of the cavalry brigade—the 10th Hussars, 328 men; the 19th Hussars, 410; the mounted infantry, 126; artillery, 126; six 7-pounders, ten brass mounted guns, four Krupps. The naval brigade, with two 9-pounders, three Gatlings, and three Gardners, under Commander Rolfe of the *Euryalus* and Flag-lieutenant Graham. 1st brigade: the Rifles, 610; Gordon Highlanders, 751; the Royal Irish Rifles, 334. 2d brigade: Black Watch, 761; Royal Marine Infantry and Artillery, 361; Engineers, 100. To these were now to be added the York and Lancaster with some 500 men, making our force up to about 4500 men and 206 officers.

There were 600 camels for the transport, and 350 mules and 100 camels for the ambulance service, while the camel-battery was composed of eighty camels and about 100 men. The 65th crossed the lagoon as soon as they were landed, and were received with hearty cheers by the troops in the intrenchments there. In the afternoon Major Harvey accompanied by Lieutenant-colonel Burnaby, rode two miles out, and planted a white flag with a letter attached to the flag-staff, enjoining the rebels to retire and to allow us to pass without opposition. The Arabs kept up a distant fire on the officers while placing the flag.

A short time after their return the flag was taken down, and there was no doubt that the letter reached its destination. The troops bivouacked for the night in the order in which they were to march. 150 men had been left at Trinkatat under Colonel Ogilvie. 300 were to remain in the intrenchment, when the force marched, to defend the transport and stores there against any attacks the enemy might make during the absence of the column.

The troops were to advance in the form of a hollow square, of which the Gordon Highlanders were to form the front face, advancing in company columns at deploying distances. The Irish Fusiliers formed the right face, with the Rifles inside them; the 65th were on the left face, with the Marines inside; the Black Watch were to march in line in the rear. The square was about 250 yards broad by 150 deep.

In the centre, between the Marines and Rifles, were the transport animals, with reserve guns and rifles, ammunition, hospital necessities, and stretchers. The six machine-guns with the sailors were to be stationed at the left of the Gordon Highlanders, and the camel-battery with the eight 7-pounder guns was to remain in the centre of the square in reserve.

The main body of the cavalry was to march well in rear of the square, and to abstain from action in order to pursue the enemy. Two squadrons of cavalry were to move in extended order as scouts a mile in front, and on both flanks, their orders were that they were not to engage the enemy, but if attacked were to open right and left, and to sweep round to the flanks to the rear of the square, so as not to intervene between the infantry fire and the enemy. The infantry were directed to fire only in volleys, on word of command, and were not to open fire until within 300 yards of the enemy.

The bivouac fires were kept up all night, lighting up the whole intrenchments, and presenting a wild and picturesque scene; lines of sleeping men wrapt in their cloaks lay in their places in the ranks ready to fall in at the first call of the bugle. Groups of men sat around the fires smoking and talking over the probable events of the next day's fighting, while somewhat in the rear stood the mules and camels of the transports.

A few shots were fired by the enemy during the night, and two rockets were let off by them; but these signs of the whereabouts of the distant foe in no way disturbed the camp. Towards morning the rain, for a time, fell heavily, completely soaking the troops as they lay, and all were glad when the bugle sounded the *veille*. The fires were piled high again, and the men

tried as best they could to dry themselves. Breakfast was eaten, and while the men were so engaged, the cavalry recrossed the lagoon to the beach in order that the horses might be watered at the tanks there the last thing in the morning before marching: they then rejoined the infantry.

At eight o'clock the troops were all in their allotted places, and moved out from their camp. When once beyond the intrenchments, and on ground free from the litter and stores of the camp, a halt was called, and a brief inspection made to see that all was in order, and each corps in the place assigned to it; then the advance began in earnest. Immediately the force moved forward the enemy could be seen falling back, just as they had done when Baker Pasha's force marched out from the same halting-place a month before.

With a good glass the enemy's position could be seen on a slight ridge of ground far away in the neighbourhood of the wells: there they could be seen swarming along a front a mile in length. Many flags floated lightly in the air, which was but just sufficient to lift them. Here and there guns could be seen in position. As the column advanced the enemy disappeared from their rising ground, and it was uncertain whether they had retired behind it, and were waiting there in anticipation of an assault, or whether they were moving round to make an attack in flank.

The position of the enemy was a strong one. A breastwork had been thrown up, the guns were well placed, and had the force advanced directly to the attack it would have been exposed to a sweeping fire of musketry and artillery, and to a charge by the whole body of the enemy.

In the enemy's lines all was quiet, the line of flags alone marking their position. Presently the gun-boat *Sphinx*, in the harbour, opened fire with one of her long 6-inch guns, but her shot fell far short and she was signalled to cease firing. Admiral Hewett himself accompanied the column in the character of a spectator.

It was now ten o'clock and the square was nearing the enemy's line; the pipers of the Black Watch struck up a cheerful air and

the column advanced more briskly. The enemy could be seen now, though partially concealed by the bushes in which they were crowded, still they made no movement.

The cavalry scouts moved away from the front, and at eleven o'clock the square was moving past the position at a distance of less than 400 yards. The moment was an intensely exciting one, as the troops expected momentarily to see the Arabs rise to their feet and dash down upon them in a dark mass. Suddenly the silence was broken by a hot fire of musketry which spurted out from bush and earthwork, while the Krupp guns, manned by the artillerymen of the Tokar garrison, also opened fire.

Several men in the square at once dropped out of their places wounded, but the greater number of the bullets flew harmlessly overhead. No reply was made to the fire, but the column inclined its course rather more to the right, thus taking it somewhat further from the face of the enemy's position, but still passing on to a point which would place them in its rear.

As they moved along they were pelted with a shower of bullets, while the shrapnel-shells from the Krupp burst overhead with great accuracy, showing that the Egyptian artillerymen were accustomed to their work. General Baker, who had accompanied the expedition as head of the intelligence department, was wounded in the cheek, and the ball, embedded in the jaw, could not be removed until the end of the day's fighting; nevertheless, having had his face bandaged, the general remounted his horse and continued to carry on his duties to the end of the day. At a quarter to twelve our guns had obtained a mastery over the guns of the enemy, and their artillery fire ceased. The men, who had been for some time lying impatient under the heavy fire, sprang to their feet with a cheer as the order was given for the force to advance. The pipes struck up, and the square moved on until well in rear of the enemy's position; then having attained the point aimed at the force moved directly towards the enemy.

Owing to the change of direction of the march, the flank of the square was now its front; and it was the Black Watch, the 65th, and the Naval Brigade who would be first exposed to the

charge of the enemy. The musketry fire from the bushes ceased as the square approached them; then with uplifted spears and swords the enemy burst out in parties of from ten to thirty, who leaped to their feet and dashed at the square.

For a moment the English fire was withheld. It seemed incredible that these handfuls of men could be intending to hurl themselves on the solid line of British bayonets, but as fresh parties sprang up from every bush, and with wild yells rushed down upon them, a flash of fire broke from the face of the great square, and a loud continued roar told that the breech-loading rifles were at last at work.

It appeared impossible that men should stand for a moment against the terrible hail of bullets; but the Arabs came on with a desperate courage, which seemed to defy danger and death. The Gardners and Gatlings at the corners of the square added their deeper rattle to the roar of the musketry. The Arabs fell beneath the leaden shower as if struck by lightning, as they approached a charmed circle, but they fell every man with his face to the foe. Not one of those wild warriors reached the square; not one of them turned to fly. They fell, mowed down like corn before the scythe of the reaper, in groups as they had approached. Then the square moved forward, but the instant the column reached the bushes the enemy were upon them again.

So fierce and sudden was the attack that they nearly succeeded in breaking in among the sailors, and for a minute there was a hand-to-hand fight, and the troops, bayonet in hand, crossed steel with the Arab spearmen, several single-handed combats taking place, but no efforts of individual courage or desperation availed to check the progress of the British troops. The ground over which they were now passing was broken and difficult; cut up with bushes, rifle-pits, and rough intrenchments, rendering it impossible to preserve the exact formation of the line, and every bush, every rifle-pit contained its party of Arabs, who, lying close until the troops were almost upon them, then leaped to their feet and hurled themselves upon the bayonets.

The hardest fighting was at their main intrenchment. There



THE NAVAL BRIGADE AT LILIBETH.



they made a desperate stand, and the Black Watch and sailors had to fight hard to win their way. Colonel Burnaby was wounded, and Captain Wilson of the *Hecla* rushing forward to the assistance of a soldier who was hard pressed by two or three of the Arab spearmen, received a severe slash across the face from an Arab sword; but he defended himself with his sword hilt until some of his men rushed to his assistance. The square now formed up again; two Krupp guns had been taken in the intrenchments, and these were turned against the second position of the enemy.

Their central post was around a brick building, formerly erected for the purpose of irrigation, but long since abandoned, a great steam boiler lying in front of it. All around this the Arabs had dug their rifle-pits, and in these they lay close as rabbits in a warren. Here the defence was obstinate; the Arabs fired through loopholes in the walls until the doors were burst open, and the defenders bayoneted. Many of our men were wounded by Arabs who lay feigning to be dead in the rifle-pits, leaping to their feet when the line of troops had passed them, and then rushing among the troops, cutting and slashing until bayoneted or shot down.

There were many examples of determined courage, some of which received special notice from the commander. Among the first of these was the action of Major R. W. Dalgety of the 65th Regiment (now Lieutenant-colonel Dalgety of the 1st Battalion York and Lancashire Regiment). This officer had called for volunteers to storm a mud house which appeared to be a post of some importance, and on eight men following him, he contrived to force the door of the house and was the first to enter. His life was saved by Sergeant Franklyn, who dragged him to the ground to save him from a spear thrust at his head, and at the same moment pushed back the weapon, which pierced through his own hand. For this gallant act the sergeant received a medal from the queen.

A great struggle took place as the Gordon Highlanders carried the village, while the Black Watch captured the last redoubt in the position which the enemy had at first held. This concluded

the fighting. Entering at the rear of the enemy's lines of defence, point after point had been carried until the troops issued out in a long line, now through the intrenchments, along the face of which they had marched in the morning.

During the early part of the battle the cavalry had been kept well in rear of the infantry, but when the square was seen to be forcing its way into the enemy's lines, and the Arabs were seen to be withdrawing from their position, General Stewart, who was in command of the cavalry division, swung round far to the right of the infantry, and led his men against a large body of Arabs visible in the plain beyond the ridge.

They had halted after pursuing the flying foe for some little distance, when the news reached them that Colonel Webster, who with a hundred men had formed the third line, had been attacked by a great number of the enemy on the right; the order "left about" was sounded immediately.

The enemy soon showed in great force, some mounted, some on foot. As the cavalry neared them the footmen threw themselves among the tufted hillocks and little mounds of which the whole plain was made up. As the cavalry swept over them, the horses leaping the little hillocks and swerving at the sight of the dark figures lying among them, the Arabs sprang to their feet in the intervals of the horsemen, and discharged their spears, or as they lay thrust them into the horses, and then as the animals fell sprang upon the riders, and cut them down before they could gain their feet.

At the same time some thirty Arab horsemen rode boldly at the squadron. There was a short, sharp hand-to-hand fight, and but three of the enemy made their way through the line, and these, turning the instant they had passed through, pursued the charging squadron before whose swords the rest of their comrades had just fallen. Colonel Barrow was pierced by a spear which passed through his arm and entered his body, but having lost their commander the squadron still charged on although the opposition they encountered was becoming momentarily hotter and hotter.

General Stewart, who was riding somewhat in advance of the

left flank of the second line, seeing a large body of Arabs rushing down on the right flank of the first squadron, galloped forward with his staff to arrest the further advance, followed closely by the 10th Hussars, but before they could reach the first line they had to cut their way through the foes.

Of the general's four orderlies, one was killed and two were wounded. Here Major Slade of the 10th Hussars fell; his horse was hamstrung by an Arab footman, and before the major could gain his feet he was pierced with seven spear wounds. Lieutenant Probyn of the 9th Bengal Cavalry, attached to the 10th Hussars, was killed, as was Lieutenant Freeman of the 19th Hussars; and twenty men were killed and as many wounded of the 10th and 19th.

The enemy were now in full retreat, and although Colonel Webster, who with his squadron had made several brilliant charges at the enemy, now joined the rest of the cavalry, it was not deemed prudent to press the pursuit further, as many thousands of the defenders of the intrenchments were now moving across the plain.

Our loss had been very small, with the exception of that suffered by the cavalry; the total being 30 killed and 142 wounded. Quartermaster Wilkins of the 3d battalion of the Rifles was the only officer killed, in addition to those already named. Lieutenant Royds, R.N., was dangerously wounded, and died two days later; and Captain Littledale, of the York and Lancaster Regiment, was severely wounded; many other officers receiving slight wounds.

The loss of the Arabs exceeded 2000. The enemy's force exceeded 10,000, but by far the greater portion of these retired when they saw that their position was turned, and all their disposition for attack completely frustrated.

The troops slept that night at the wells, and at nine next morning moved out towards Tokar, leaving half the Gordon Highlanders at El-Teb with orders to find and bury the Europeans.

Over 2000 bodies of the Arabs were found at El-Teb and buried by our troops, and numbers of their wounded must have died in the retreat. Some thirty wounded were found on the

field of battle. The bodies of all the English officers who fell with Baker Pasha's force were found and identified by the burying parties.

All through the day parties of the Egyptian garrison of Tokar continued to come into the camp from the surrounding villages.

The force which advanced to Tokar met with no resistance whatever; several parties of the enemy were seen, but these withdrew hastily as we advanced. In Tokar seventy of the Egyptian garrison were found in a half-starved condition, they having absolutely refused to join the Arabs against us. By them and by the population of the town the troops were received with the greatest joy.

The cavalry rode to Debbah, where the camp of the force besieging Tokar had been situated, and where a number of the enemy were still lingering. Before going out the cavalry armed themselves with Arab spears picked up on the battle-field, the uselessness of their swords against an enemy lying upon the ground having been fully proved. The Arabs evacuated the camp of Debbah before their arrival. Here the greater portion of the booty taken from General Baker's army was found, and an immense quantity of rifles regularly stacked. Large quantities of ammunition were also captured, together with a Gatling and a mountain gun, these with the pieces taken in the intrenchments making up the whole of the artillery captured from Baker Pasha and from Moncrieff's force.

No long stay was made by the troops at Tokar, and the column returned to the sea-shore, bringing with them such of the inhabitants as wished to leave the place. The work of the expedition was not yet done. Osman Digma had not himself been present at the fight of El-Teb, having contented himself with sending 1000 men to reinforce the body engaged in the siege of Tokar, and it was certain that he would explain away the result of that fight by alleging that in some way the tribesmen engaged there had acted in disobedience to his instructions.

One of the prisoners taken by Osman at the destruction of the garrison at Sinkat came in two or three days later to Suakim,

having made his escape from Osman's camp. He bore signs of ill usage, having many marks of blows on his body, and his wrists being chafed with ropes. He said that at the time he made his escape the news of the battle of El-Teb was known there, but that the Arab impression was that seven thousand of the English had been killed, and that it was only the approach of night which compelled the Arabs to withdraw, and so save the invaders from total annihilation.

Until the arrival of some three hundred of the garrison of Tokar, and four hundred women and children from that town, the people of Suakim were altogether incredulous as to our victory at El-Teb; but the arrival of these people from Tokar convinced them that the British troops had really defeated the hitherto invincible followers of Osman.

Among those brought down were the prefect and commandant of Tokar. It was a matter of surprise that these men were not tried by court-martial, and shot for their treachery; for the soldiers of the garrison completely confirmed the reports brought in by the spies, saying that they had plenty of ammunition and food, and that, so far from being forced to surrender because so many men were killed and wounded by the enemy's fire, only one man was killed and one wounded, and that they could have held out for a long time had not the commandant and prefect told them that it was better to fight with Moslems against Christians than with Christians against Moslems.

On arriving at Suakim Admiral Hewett and General Graham issued a joint proclamation to the tribes; they asked all the sheikhs to come in and meet them at Suakim. "You have already," said the proclamation, "been warned that the English force have come here not only to relieve the garrison of Tokar, but to redress the wrongs under which you have so long suffered; nevertheless, you have gone on trusting that notorious scoundrel Osman Digma, well known to you all as a bad man, his former life in Suakim having proved that to be the case. He has led you away with the foolish idea that the Madhi has come on earth. The great God who rules the universe does not send such scoundrels as Osman

Digma as his messengers. Your people are brave, and England always respects such men. Arise, then, and chase Osman Digma from your country. We promise you that protection and pardon shall be granted to all who come in at once. Otherwise the fate of those who fell at El-Teb will surely overtake you."

This proclamation was preceded by letters from the Sheikh Morghani telling the tribesmen that because they thought the old religion was not good enough for them they had made a new religion, and God had therefore sent to destroy them and the new religion together. He entreated them to come in and consult with him in order that further bloodshed might be avoided.

It was then determined to open communications with King John of Abyssinia, and eventually in April, Admiral Hewett went on a mission to that arrogant and intractable ruler, and succeeded, after a good deal of difficulty, in negotiating a treaty, by the terms of which the king bound himself, in return for the cession of the Boghos country and the free transit of goods through Massowa, to remain on friendly terms with the Egyptians, and to undertake the relief of the garrisons of Kassala, Gelahat, Gedari, and Gireh. The former portion of the contract was carried out, and Abyssinia gave no trouble for the remainder of the year, but nothing was done for the relief of the beleaguered garrisons.

But this treaty was not made till after we had completed the work immediately in hand, General Graham having learned in the month of March that a strong force of Arabs remained assembled at Tamai, a place about sixteen miles to the south-west of Suakim. At the latter port the work of disembarkation went on vigorously, so that in a short time the whole force was on shore. All the news which was brought in by spies tended to show that Osman would fight another battle. The most fanatical of the tribes were still with him, and their belief in his invincibility was unshaken. On the 9th of March twenty-one of the hostile sheikhs sent in a reply to the proclamation defiantly refusing our offers of peace, and as these represented tribes capable of putting 10,000 men into the field, it was evident that another desperate battle would have to be fought.

On the 10th the Black Watch marched out six miles and formed an encampment surrounded by a stockade or defence of bushes, &c., known by the natives as a *seriba*. On the evening of the 11th the rest of the force, with the exception of the cavalry, moved out to the *seriba*.

Many halts were made, and the force took four hours in getting over the seven miles of ground between the *seriba* and the spot where it was determined to encamp, within two miles of the enemy's position. The cavalry had a slight skirmish with the enemy before the point was reached, but the Arabs fell back without serious fighting. The spot chosen for the encampment was a space of open ground sufficiently large to allow the entire force to encamp in the form of a square, with some fifty yards of open space between them and the bushes, which covered the country thickly around. The position was an exciting one. It was known that some 10,000 daring and fanatical savages were lying within two miles, and that at any time during the night these might burst out from the bushes.

Fortunately there was a brilliant full moon, and though the enemy might have crept up unseen in the shelter of bushes, they would have been perceived the instant they emerged into the open space. The day's work, although the distance traversed had not been long, had been a trying one, the heat had been great, and the dust suffocating. The men of the Naval Brigade had had very heavy work in dragging the guns through the deep sand and across the rough ground, but it was felt that there would be little sleep in the camp that night, in such close and dangerous vicinity to an enemy whose valour had been already so thoroughly proved.

The early part of the night passed off quietly, and so bright was the moonlight that messages were flashed by the heliographic mirror to the force eight miles away. Soon after it fell dark Commander Rolfe, R.N., made a most daring reconnaissance of the enemy. Starting by himself he made his way to the bushes in the direction of their camp. For aught he knew the enemy might be lurking in great numbers in the scrub preparing for

an attack upon our camp; but he made his way fearlessly forward until he reached a point within 200 or 300 yards of their camp. He could see them sitting in great numbers round their fires or stretched on the ground, and he brought back the news to camp that for the present, at least, they were not meditating any attack upon our camp.

After the receipt of this report the troops were ordered to lie down and get what sleep they could. At one o'clock a musketry fire suddenly opened on the camp, and continued until daylight, the enemy swarming all round. The troops lay, rifle in hand, in readiness to leap to their feet to repel an assault should the Arabs come on, but not a shot was fired in return to the Arabs' fusillade.

As usual, the enemy fired high, and the leaden hail swept thickly overhead. Several of the camels, mules, and horses, which were huddled together in the centre of the square, were hit, but of the troops only one man was killed, and an officer and two men wounded. There was a general feeling of relief when the day began to dawn, and the long anxious hours of watching and expectation came to an end.

The Arabs, however, showed no signs of any intention of retiring, so a 9-pounder and Gatling gun were brought into play, and the Arabs soon fell back to their camp. The men then took their breakfast, and while they were so doing the cavalry arrived from the seriba where they had passed the night.

At eight o'clock the mounted infantry pushed on in front with some thirty Abyssinian scouts under Mr. Wild. They had not, however, gone far when they became warmly engaged, and Captain Humphreys, who was in command, sent back word that the broad ravine which was a few hundred yards in front, but was altogether hidden from the force by the thick bush, was strongly occupied. At half-past eight the infantry began to move forward, the two brigades being formed, as before, in squares.

The brigade under General Davis consisted of the 42d, 65th, and marines, General Buller's brigade consisting of the 89th, 75th, and 60th Rifles. General Graham with his staff were in the first brigade square, which first moved out, the second advancing in

echelon about 400 yards to the right rear of the first. The camels and baggage animals were left behind in the seriba.

General Davis's brigade had moved but a short distance when a heavy fire was opened by the enemy, and the mounted infantry and Abyssinians fell back. As soon as these had retreated sufficiently to clear the front of the square the machine-guns, which were placed at its corners, opened fire. These guns soon subdued the enemy's fire, and the square again advanced. As it did so the enemy's fire again broke out. General Graham then gave the order, "The 42d will charge."

The Highlanders responded by a cheer, and went forward at the double until they reached the edge of the ravine, but only a portion of the 65th went forward with them, the remainder not hearing the word of command. The result was that a huge gap was formed in the right front corner of the square, and great confusion took place. The enemy were seen coming on at the top of their speed. The three machine-guns under Lieutenant Graham, R.N., pushed forward into the gap.

The right companies of the 65th tried to form up to meet the enemy, but the confusion was too great and the enemy too close to permit the operation being completed in time. A heavy fire was opened on the advancing Arabs, and they fell in hundreds, but the survivors charged on undaunted with spears poised ready for action. The 65th fell back, and thus exposed the rear of the 42d, and the sergeants of that regiment were attacked in rear by the Arabs, and were the first victims. Major Dalgety, who at El-Teb had continued to lead his men after he had been injured by the fragments of an exploding shell, was again conspicuous in this engagement; and, as General Graham reported, displayed the utmost gallantry in rallying his men until he was severely wounded. He was in the front urging his men on when he became engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand fight. He had lost his helmet, and trying to guard his head received upon his left arm a serious thrust, at the same moment shooting his assailant.

The sailors manning the guns on the right stuck to their

pieces as long as possible, Lieutenant Montreson being first speared in the shoulder as he, with Midshipman Briscoe, was turning the handle of the Gatling, and was then shot by our own men as he endeavoured to reach the mass of soldiery, who were now falling back in full retreat.

With exulting shouts the Arabs poured down upon the retreating mass, and had not help been at hand a catastrophe similar to that which befell Baker's force would have taken place; but now the cavalry upon the left dismounted and poured volley after volley into the flank of the advancing Arabs. But a still more efficient support was at hand. General Buller's square had been attacked with equal fury by the Arabs, but these, being well handled and facing outwards in readiness to repel the enemy, poured in such a tremendous fire that not one of the Arabs ever reached the square, which advanced steadily, and their fire and that of the guns accompanying them speedily cleared off the Arabs from the right of Davis's retreating brigade, the men in which, as soon as the pressure upon them ceased, formed up again in line with Buller's brigade. Both brigades were now formed in line, and steadily advanced towards the ravine, retaking the abandoned guns, which the enemy in vain endeavoured to carry off.

When the troops reached the edge of the ravine the battle of Tamai was virtually over. Crowds of the enemy were flying along it or ascending its opposite side, and the fire of the infantry and guns swept them down by scores as they did so. But though the fighting was over the enemy all day maintained a distant fire, and it was dangerous for the troops to move about singly or in small parties, for the Arabs lying hidden in the bushes would leap up and fling themselves desperately upon any who approached them. The ground was strewn thickly with Arab bodies; they were of all ages, from boys of ten or twelve to gray-haired patriarchs. The slaughter of the Arabs was terrible, over four thousand having fallen before the fire of our men.

Passing across the ravine the force moved on against the three villages in the rear where Osman Digma's camp lay. The enemy made a short stand here, but were soon driven out. The huts

were found to be full of grain and property of all kinds—Korans, bags of money, bundles of clothing, and various plunder. Nothing had been removed by the rebels, who had not for a moment believed that our troops would be able to resist their attack. Osman Digma himself had taken no part in the fight, which he had viewed from a distant hill. When he saw that his followers were defeated he fled at once.

Our loss amounted to about 120 killed, of whom sixty-five belonged to the 42d, including ten sergeants.

The little naval brigade suffered heavily. Lieutenant Almack of the *Briton*, Lieutenant Montresor of the *Euryalus*, Lieutenant Houston Stewart, and ten seamen were killed, and several were severely wounded. Captain Ford of the York and Lancaster (65th), and Major Aitken of the 42d were killed. Captain Brophy, Lieutenant-colonel Green, and Lieutenant Macloud of the Black Watch, and Major Macdonald of the 2d Highland Light Infantry, Major Dalgety, 65th, Surgeon Cross, Royal Navy, Surgeon Prendergast, and Mr. St. Leger Herbert were wounded.

The next day the cavalry went out to a village two miles further, where they found great quantities of Krupp cannon and ammunition and other loot, some of which had been taken from Baker's column. The villages were burnt and the whole of the contents destroyed. Our force then began to retire to the coast.

It would have been hopeless to attempt to follow Osman Digma among the mountains, and it was hoped that after the tremendous defeat which had been inflicted upon him, his prestige and power would be altogether destroyed, and that he would never thenceforth be in a condition to cause us further trouble.


The greater part of our troops were then embarked and returned to Egypt, only a small force being left in garrison in Suakim to act in concert with the naval commander in the Red Sea; and with the exception of occasional skirmishes and outpost engagements, Suakim remained undisturbed during the remainder of the year.

Subsequent events show that the anticipations as to the effects which would be produced by the battle of Tamai were erroneous,

and from one point of view it appears to have been unfortunate that a force of some strength was not left at Suakim to complete the work; for, after we had retired, Osman Digma gradually recovered his influence, and before another year the whole work had to be recommenced, and the vast expense and the enormous effusion of blood in this campaign appeared to have been wasted.

It was shown, indeed, how terrible is the effect of breech-loading weapons at short distances, but it was also shown how far reckless bravery can make up for inferior arms, and that savages endowed with such valour as that possessed by the Arabs of the Soudan are, even when armed only with sword and spear, truly formidable opponents even for the best-armed and most disciplined troops.

END OF VOL. II.



BINDING SECT.

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